

**Towards New Approaches to Scientific Inquiry:  
Interdisciplinarity in the 21st Century**

**Working Papers  
New Central Europe 2 Fellowship Program**

edited by

Izabella Agardi and Ferenc Miszlivetz

**2015**

**Kőszeg**



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### **I. Complex Networks -- Convergences Between the Natural and the Social Sciences 6**

**Jody Jensen:** The Role of the Social Sciences in the Age of Uncertainty 6

**Róbert Manchin and János Abonyi:** The Attractiveness and Development of Economic Regions - Evaluation Based on Company Network Analysis 24

**Dezső Boda:** The Natural and The Human Sciences: A Few Parallels 39

**László Csernai:** Physical Basis of Limits to Growth 56

**Szabolcs Varga:** Potentials for Renewable Energy in the Kőszeg Region 71

### **II. Central Europe in a Global Context 93**

**Bába Iván:** The Fall of Communism, *Changing Regimes in Central Europe in 1989-1990* 93

**Pók, Attila:** Memory and Legacy of Communism in Post-Soviet Eastern and Central Europe 115

**Christopher Walsch:** Visegrad Four at Twenty-five: Which way Forward? 134

**Michal Vasecka:** Nationalized Citizenship in Central European Countries 151

**István Kollai:** Openness Towards Central Europe. The Public Diplomacy Activities of OSCE in Central and Eastern Europe 166

**Stefano Bianchini:** State Dismemberments and Their Implications for Europe 186

**Bence Kocsev:** Interpreting Populism, Democracy and Euroscepticism: A Rorschach Test for Social Scientists 231

### **III. Transnational Economies and Management 255**

**Stuart Holland and Teresa Carla Oliveira:** Progress and Regress in Change Management in Health Services 255

**Anikó Magasházi:** Locational Advantages within Production Networks of Transnational Corporations and the Role of Industrial Clusters 280

**Andrew Black:** Examining Meso Corporations: Who are they? What do they do? Where are they Located? How have They Performed? Recent Status and Trends in the World of the Top Meso Corporations **312**

#### **IV. Cultural Heritage Management and Sustainable Development 337**

**Mónika Mátay:** Ego Traces in the Archives: Searching for the Individual in Historical Documents **337**

**Melinda Harlov:** Ideology realized? The notion of culture industry and cultural industries in the texts of statutory meetings of UNESCO World Heritage organization in 1980s **355**

**Ildikó Ernszt:** „Take it Slow” – The Case of Slow Tourism **366**

#### **V. New Approaches to Linguistic Analyses 400**

**Judit Navracsics and Gyula Sárosi:** Phonological and Semantic Awareness of Bilinguals and Second Language Learners – Potential Implications for Second Language Instruction **400**

**Marjolijn Verspoor:** A Dynamic Usage-based Approach to Language Learning and Teaching; from Theory to Practice **425**

#### **VI. Supporting Critical Thinking in Science and Education 446**

**Gyöngyi Fábri:** The Conceptual Framework of Critical Thinking in Education: A Proposal **446**

**James Malachy Skelly:** Information Technologies, Reading and the Future of Higher Education **461**

**Nick Chandler:** The Search for the Holy Grail of Efficiency in Higher Education: a Preliminary Pilot Study Comparing the Organisational Culture of Two Higher Education Institutions in Hungary and Slovenia **478**

**Anita Trnavčević:** Global Academic Identity: A Path to Strengthen Internalization? **503**



## **I. Complex Networks -- Convergences Between the Natural and the Social Sciences**

### **The Role of the Social Sciences in an Age of Uncertainty**

Jody Jensen

Every original idea is imaginative, because only imagination can trigger creativity. This is why imagination is just as essential in science and technology as in the arts and humanities. The difference between these two pairs of fields is that in science and technology imagination is disciplined rather than free.

Mario Bunge 2012: 1

#### ***The Problem with Science***

In his book, *Science Set Free: Ten Paths to New Discovery*, Rupert Sheldrake (2012) discusses the ‘scientific worldview’ that has become dominant, influential and successful in modern sciences today. He agrees that our lives have been profoundly influenced by the advancement of scientific endeavor in medical research and technology. This has transformed the way we view ourselves, our societies and our place in the cosmos. But, he says, “in the second decade of the twenty-first century, when science and technology seem to be at the peak of their power, when their influence has spread all over the world and when their triumph seems indisputable, unexpected problems are disrupting the sciences from within” (Sheldrake 2012: 6). Sheldrake says that most scientists accept that these problems will eventually be solved by continuing the same kind of research and practise from which the problems and tensions emerged, and this he believes reflects a deeper and more serious problem regarding scientific inquiry (Sheldrake 2012: 6). Sheldrake argues that science is being held back by old assumptions that have become dogmas, the biggest of which is that science already knows all the answers, and only the details need to be worked out. The contemporary scientific creed is based on the 10 core beliefs or dogmas below:

- 1) Everything is essentially mechanical.
- 2) All matter is unconscious.
- 3) The total amount of energy and matter is always the same.

- 4) The laws of nature are fixed.
- 5) Nature is purposeless.
- 6) All biological inheritance is material.
- 7) Minds are inside heads and are nothing but the activity of brains.
- 8) Memory is stored in material traces of the brain.
- 9) Unexplained phenomena such as telepathy are illusory.
- 10) Mechanistic medicine is the only one that really works.

Sheldrake's arguments are presented with many clear examples that show how these beliefs compose the philosophy or ideology of materialism, where everything is essentially material or physical, even the human mind. His purpose is to "set science free," from its own dogmas to increase its relevance and credibility to tackle really existing problems.

In Samuel Arbesman's, *The Half-Life of Facts: Why Everything We Know has an Expiration Date*, an anecdote is related that many medical schools tell their students that half of what they have been taught will be wrong within five years – the teachers just don't know which half. What we know about the world is constantly changing, yet our approach to knowledge and the communication of that knowledge has remained the same. The extreme technical and specialized nature of contemporary scientific discourse alienates all but the initiated, creating an increasing gulf between the sciences and the societies in which they work. This is quite surprising considering the explosion and proliferation of the information society, and the possibilities this provides for better communication and dialogue.

Arbesman comes from the field of 'scientometrics', which is the study of measuring and analysing science, technology and innovation, or the science of science. He explains that knowledge in most fields systematically and predictably evolves. In some fields, change occurs over a few years, in others over centuries. But most of what we know are called 'mesofacts' that often change over a single human lifetime. This is important because if we are more aware of how our knowledge changes over time, we are better equipped to deal with contemporary challenges, like improvement in the allocation of resources by companies or governments, for example.

Science is absorbed with its role to explain the nature of everything, and then tries to convert others to believe in the particular methods, explanations and models. For example, since the 1960s, physicists and mathematicians have developed a framework called 'string theory' to try and reconcile general relativity with quantum mechanics. Over the years, "it has evolved into the default mainstream theory, even as it has failed to deliver on much of its early promise" (Powell 2015). The same article discusses the implications for Einstein's theory of relativity, and the basic assumption (going back to Aristotle) that space is continuous and infinitely divisible, so that any distance could

be divided into even smaller distances. This is being questioned by Craig Hogan, a theoretical astrophysicist at the University of Chicago and the director of the Center for Particle Astrophysics at Fermilab who argues that there might be an unbreakable smallest unit of distance: a quantum of space.

What emerges from the dust-up could be nothing less than a third revolution in modern physics, with staggering implications. It could tell us where the laws of nature came from, and whether the cosmos is built on uncertainty or whether it is fundamentally deterministic, with every event linked definitively to a cause (Powell 2015).

There have been many great feuds in science that have been popularized in accounts like Hellman's *Great Feuds in Science*; *Great Feuds in Technology*; *Great Feuds in Mathematics* (1998, 2004, 2006 respectively), of Levy's (2010) *Scientific Feuds: from Galileo to the Human Genome Project*. In many of these cases the assumption that science has successfully delivered accurate knowledge based on authoritative sources does not bear close scrutiny.

Scientists with radically new ideas have difficulty getting an audience among their more orthodox brethren. Sometimes they are ignored or rejected because of personal animosities or simple inertia. In other cases, the rejection seems to violate the canons of open-minded scientific inquiry. Through the whole spectrum of the sciences, one can document an astonishing disregard for facts which contradict fashionable theories, stereotyping of acceptable approaches to problems and theories, and the waving of academic credentials and ritual invocation of the specialist's mystique to discourage criticism from 'outsiders' (Judge 2012).

Science is engrossed with the importance of 'validation', which is most often carried out in the framework of statistical analysis, that often excludes other factors that may appear to be at least as significant if not more than others. This reflects 'downstream thinking', that is, a blind focus on imminent causes rather than on the root causes of phenomena, as is the case with many social issues and challenges, including the present migration crisis and terrorism.

Besides the obsession with validation, some other systemic knowledge processes that are neglected by science are outlined here by Judge (2012) as an expansion of Sheldrake: selective appreciation of the creative imagination; unexamined preoccupation with professional reputation and recognition (self-referencing, references in peer-reviewed journals); deprecation of alternatives and anomalies that challenge conventional models; methodological dependence on questionable engagement with society; uncritical belief of science in the appropriateness of its own process;

institutionalized incoherence and disagreement; lack of recognition of the constraints and opportunities of an information society; self-referential inadequacy of ‘metascience’.

In Sheldrake’s (2012) final chapter, "The Illusions of Objectivity," he questions the ‘objectivity’ of science, by asking the question "whose objectivity?" Science praises innovation and creativity only within the currently accepted paradigm that is approved by accepted scientific authorities. For example, the imaginative reframing of paradigms is most often disparaged by the old order, until the new paradigm comes into full being which, most often, occurs after the proponents of the old order have died.

The current practise of science inhibits creative and imaginative thinking in most fields, thereby reinforcing the general tendency to capitulate to present authorities. While the tendency of science is to deprecate or condemn alternative worldviews, there is little capacity of science to reflect on these processes and to discover more holistic ways of relating to perspectives that challenge the current order. This incapacity or reluctance is reinforced also in other sectors of society, in governance structures (see below), and the practise of democracy. In other words, there is an uncritical belief of science in the appropriateness of its own process (Judge 2012). This is complicated by the fact that government and industry supported scientific research is many times complicit with the prevailing power structures, on whom it depends for research funding.

Loren Eiseley (1964), wrote that all human undertakings are driven by the imagination, be they artistic, scientific, or humanistic. The danger lies in the strict enforcement of the separation of academic disciplines, and the cult of ‘professionalism’ based on the self-acknowledgement of approved authorities, that is depleting the creative and imaginative power of the sciences. He passionately laments the loss of the capacity to wonder in a divided, money-driven world of big science. He rearticulates, in fact, Einstein’s thought:

“The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all true art and science. He to whom the emotion is a stranger, who can not longer ópause to wonder and stand wrapped in awe, is as good as dead – his eyes are closed.”

### ***Paradigm Shift***

Our whole world society appears to be following a distinct pattern that occurs very rarely in history, one that has led in the past to total reinventions of the world within very short periods of time. *In short, we are in the midst of a classic paradigm shift and are fast approaching the tipping point of the whole process.*

Michael Shacker 2013: 31

The present crises are connected by a mechanistic world view that has dominated for the past 300 years and that has endangered the environment and quality of life, societies and individuals. In a mechanistic world view, we all become parts of the machine and mere objects, reified, commodified. The fatal flaw of a mechanistic world view is eloquently elaborated by Michael Shacker (2013) in his work, *Global Awakening, New Science and the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Enlightenment*. Referring to William Barret's (1979), *Illusion of Technique*, he explains that the smooth operation of the machine becomes everything in the mind of the technician; and since there is no meaning that can be derived from a machine, life becomes meaningless.

Our whole mechanistic society now reflects this meaningless and purposeless world view. ... *The illusion of technique* helps us understand this fatal flaw of mechanistic dogma and how it fails to confront reality. In short, the lure of the machine outweighs the mounds of scientific data showing the fragile interconnections of Earth and its biosphere. Social, environmental and health concerns are swept under the rug and ignored. The mechanistic paradigm is thus dysfunctional at its core – so we find ourselves in the mechanistic dilemma (Shacker 2013: 29-30).

He continues by addressing the necessity of “more-than-ordinary” thinking and action to transcend the mechanistic dilemma to extract the planet and humanity from its current precarious situation.

The crisis is further exacerbated by the collusion between big business and increasingly self-defensive, nationalistic governments who, in order to maintain their power positions and monopolistic control of market forces, will not willingly relinquish their power positions. This is clearly seen in the increasing incidents of state violence by state sanctioned police forces against populations that have arisen to protest against economic and social inequalities resulting from the financial crisis and increasing economic consolidation of the 1%, as well as aspirations for a more democratic politics of participation.

What is common in the many ways the states and their authorities, and economic players react is their strong insistence on historic divided-ness and cultural differences as well as the complete lack or rejection of the holistic approach in dealing with grave social, political, economic, and ecological problems. Threatened in their existence and legitimacy, old institutions, interest groups and other powerful global, regional and national stakeholders are keen to entrench themselves and fight one another to secure their interests and survival. The new wave of disintegration and self-isolation is a result of the failure of global and regional ‘caretaker’ or ‘guardian’ institutions such as the UN, the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF or the European Union. Instead of contributing globally and regionally to more democracy, equality, peace and human security, these institutions themselves

contribute to the survival of the old paradigm of inequality and division, human vulnerability and insecurity. A new paradigmatic approach should ensure the acceptance and understanding of the inevitability of a holistic view of humankind, together with its self-created institutions, markets, nationstates and means of violence. The vision and practice of a **wisdom based society** that turns knowledge into organic and holistic practices has to gradually replace the old paradigm of a knowledge-based society that was established on the premise and special historical understanding of fragmentation and division. Awareness of increasing interdependence and interconnection in various spheres of our common existence is a slow process that needs to speed up to reflect a new planetary and species consciousness.

### *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: Medieval, Mechanistic and Organic World Views*

A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die....

Max Planck 1949: 33-34

Every world view needs to answer the fundamental questions of who we are, how we got where we are, and where we are going that is delivered in a new story or narrative frame. The current crisis of world view requires a paradigm shift which will move humanity into a new world system and mind-set. Paradigm shifts or ‘flips’ have occurred before. Thomas Kuhn (1962) formulated the structure of scientific revolution as follows:

- ▶ Emergence of an anomaly that contradicts the old world view. Nature violates the expectations of normal sciences and answers have to be found outside the paradigm.
- ▶ The emergence of a new paradigm or way of thought. A revolutionary period upsets the stability of the normal science period.
- ▶ Crisis ensues and there is reconsideration of the old paradigm by new thinker(s) to explain anomalies and a new narrative emerges.
- ▶ Bitter struggle develops; there is resistance to the new from old scientists; paradigm wars are fought by the new world view with facts and by the old world view with ideology.
- ▶ The new paradigm wins the struggle, and a new normal science period begins with the new underlying analogy/model, new scientific methods, and a changed set of rules.

Since humanity has experienced this before, Michael Schacker has presented the evolution of historical paradigms in the following way:

Table 1: Comparison of Medieval and Mechanistic World Views (Shacker 2013: 36)

Medieval World View	Mechanistic World View
God is responsible for all events on earth.	God or nature merely sets universe in motion, natural law determines the rest; clockwork universe of Newton.
God's creation only 6000 years old.	Universe very old, Earth millions to billions years old, formed by natural forces.
Two sets of laws: one for Earth, one for heaven.	One set of natural laws governs Earth and the universe.
Geocentric universe: Earth does not move.	Helocentric solar system: Earth orbits the sun.
King and nobility have divine right to rule.	The right to govern derives from the people; kings are tyrants.
Medieval laws and value system designed to protect the lands and power of kings, the aristocracy and the church.	Laws and values designed to provide liberty and equality to all men, to protect the pursuit of happiness, and to derive power from the people in a democracy.

Table 2: Comparison of Mechanistic and Organic World Views (Shacker 2013: 41).

Mechanistic World View	Organic World View
Limited mechanistic models underlie traditional science and medicine and cannot explain living systems adequately; ecological, health and economic breakdowns.	Encompassing organic/biological models underlie new-paradigm sciences from physics to agriculture, medicine, technology, economics, and psychology.
Clockwork universe, no purpose assigned to humanity or universe; we live in a vast static cosmos.	Complexity-centered universe and evolution means we are always evolving to the next level.
Anthropocentric universe; planet Earth treated as a non-living thing to be exploited.	Complexity-centered universe: planet Earth shown to be a living system.
Newtonian physics limited to macroworld, non-living things only.	New physics studies sub-atomic realm; law of organics and other theories explain living systems.
Time and space quantified.	Life, evolution, consciousness quantified and given meaning.
Studies objects and things as separate parts.	Studies the relationship between objects and things
Old paradigm culture based on oil, ultranationalism and militarism; huge military budget, small foreign aid; top 1% owns 45% of wealth.	Counterculture based on transition from oil, world peace and sustainable development; increase foreign aid to \$50 billion to stop terrorism; new economics to eliminate poverty.
Laws and values designed to protect the rights of men, especially corporations and men with property.	Laws and values designed to protect the rights of all, from women to blacks, gays and all minorities, especially the poor and middle class.
Belief that war has always been a part of human nature.	War has been invented and can be transcended in a future world of peace.

I have adjusted Kuhn's scientific revolution and incorporated Shacker's paradigm shift into our contemporary period in the following:

I. The Emergence of Anomalies, 1970s to the present

- ▶ Increase in the number of economic crises and market volatility
- ▶ Increase in the number of manmade disasters
- ▶ Population increases, as well as industrial material exploitation, put increased strain on the natural environment
- ▶ Increased concentration of corporate global power (see the definitive study by Vitali, Glattfelder, Battiston 2011).
- ▶ Increased economic inequality within and between nations and regions

II. The Backlash Phase, 1980-1995

- ▶ **Conservative backlash**, fundamentalist revivals (but they begin to slowly break down because of internal divisions and corruption)
- ▶ Rise of the New Right (Reagan and Thatcher – government is evil, free market is infallible)
- ▶ Scandals pile up: bailouts (already in 1984, a Savings and Loan bailout for more than \$400 billion), arms deals, resisting end to apartheid, Lebanon invasion, rise of Saddam Hussein, AIDS and women's rights ignored.
- ▶ Increasing environmental catastrophes: Chernobyl, Bhopal, Exxon Valdez, Fukushima – the mechanistic dilemma deepens. Recognition that the mechanistic world view can never solve the problems of its own making.

III. The Intensive Phase (1991-2011)

- ▶ Regressive presidencies
- ▶ Corporate World Domination (oil wars, GMOs)
- ▶ Activist Millennial or Phoenix Generation (Dennis 2015)
- ▶ Integrative medicine
- ▶ Global Education – the Future University ('Multiversity')
- ▶ Regenerative regional planning (e.g., Kőszeg KRAFT project, see, Miszlivetz, et.al 2014)

IV. The Transformational Phase (2012-2050)

- Regenerative Revolution: New economics, technological/social innovation will replace the macroeconomics machine models of today. It is based on organic development and the interdependence of life processes. (see, e.g., [www.GlobalRegen.net](http://www.GlobalRegen.net), [www.kraftprojekt.hu](http://www.kraftprojekt.hu)).

### *A Tale of Two Cultures*

A great poet is always timely. A great philosopher is an urgent need. There's no rush for Isaac Newton. We were quite happy with Aristotle's cosmos. Personally, I preferred it. Fifty-five crystal spheres geared to God's crankshaft is my idea of a satisfying universe. I can't think of anything more trivial than the speed of light. Quarks, quasars – big bangs, black holes – who gives a shit? How did you people con us out of all that status? All that money? And why are you so pleased with yourselves? ... If knowledge isn't self-knowledge it isn't doing much, mate. Is the universe expanding? Is it contracting? ... Leave me out. I can expand my universe without you.

From Tom Stoppard's play *Arcadia* (1993), quoted in Jacobs (2014)

The division of scientific disciplines is recognized as both old and new. Some authors (Dirks 1996) trace the origins back to the ancient Greeks, and already in the 16th century scholars and philosophers complained about the fragmentation of knowledge (e.g., in the works of Sir Francis Bacon we clearly encounter the disruption of relations between science and social philosophy). At the base of this divergence was the rapid growth and expansion of the sciences.

For many years, Immanuel Wallerstein wrote about the two cultures of scholarship. But before we expand on Wallerstein's analysis, a brief discussion on the background of the debate is necessary. Wallerstein based his reasoning on both the lecture and publications of C.P. Snow (1959), on the topic of the two cultures, that is science and philosophy (*The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*). This debate was actually introduced even earlier in the 1880s by Mathew Arnold in another Rede Lecture in 1882, entitled "Literature and Science," a clear precursor to Snow's later lecture, and in letters responding to Thomas Henry Huxley's advocacy of scientific endeavor over the study of humanities. Arnold's response takes a practical look at the education of young people, arguing "that while the study of the sciences could fill the mind with facts, the humanities could move the human spirit" (Jacobs 2014). Arnold emphasized the need for culture to be protected in order to guide human conduct in the face of moral challenges presented by modern science. This could not be more relevant today considering the challenges facing societies relating to, for example, genetic engineering, increasing weapons of mass destruction, and the underlying assumption that every problem we face has a technological solution.

What Snow later developed in his Rede Lecture in 1959 emphasized that because of the expansion of intellectual specialization in the 19th century, the sciences and humanities had become mutually incomprehensible to one another. The gulf between these two cultures of thought was deliberate and a clear product of 19th century thinking. Science was assigned the task of looking for 'truth'; while philosophy, and what became known more generally as the humanities (history, and later economics, sociology, and political science), was positioned to search for the 'good'. The progress of the last 200 years has tried to reunite the search for 'truth' and the search for the 'good' under the label of social science as established in the 19th century. In the 19th century, the disciplinary boundaries took shape at universities. After WW II, massive expansion and development of universities consisted of the formation of more and more disciplines and departments. One problem of the rapid growth of science was that there was too much information spread across the disciplines for any one person to handle. This has only been exacerbated in the 20th and 21st centuries with technological developments and the 24/7 provision of information to many researchers and academics.

Wallerstein observes, that rather than reunifying these two cultures, social science has itself been torn apart by the dissonance between the two distinct approaches to inquiry, or cultures of knowledge. But Wallerstein (1999) recognizes two remarkable intellectual developments of the last decades that perhaps provide evidence of a process of overcoming the split of the two cultures that points towards a more holistic approach to scientific analysis. The first is called 'complexity studies' in the natural sciences, and the other is called 'cultural studies' in the humanities. Complexity studies rejects the Newtonian science that assumed that there were simple underlying formulae that explained everything. Complexity studies, Wallerstein argues, reveals rather that formulae can at best reflect only partial reality, that may explicate the past, but never the future. This is a transformation that Ilya Prigogine (1996) called moving from a 'geometrical universe' to a 'narrative universe'. The universe is filled with structures that constantly evolve, and then reach points of inequilibrium that cannot be sustained, when bifurcation takes place and new paths are found and new structures and systems established. Although we do not know what, for example, a new world system or structure will look like, as individuals and collectives we can have more impact at these times, because we are not under the constraints of the old or emerging new world system. Therefore, the age we live in is more open to human intervention and creativity (Wallerstein 2000: 251-252).

Cultural studies do not just study culture as such anymore, but rather how, when, why and in what forms culture is produced, and how cultural products are received by others, and for what reasons. Therefore, cultural studies has moved away from the traditional humanities into the realm of the social sciences and the explanation of reality as a constructed reality.

With the move of natural science towards social sciences via complexity studies, and the move of humanities towards the social sciences via cultural studies, we are in the process of overcoming the two cultures of knowledge by recognizing that reality is constructed. This gradual process of overcoming the artificial distinction between hard and separate disciplines, and moving towards the unification of scientific and human endeavor, provides the basis not only for holistic scientific enquiry, but for the basis of new, regenerative educational models, and ‘multi-versities’ as oppose to ‘uni-versities’. Pinker (2014) declares that instead of science being the enemy of humanities, that they both share a common enemy which is an educational system that avoids addressing the complex and varied global challenges of our age. Real and exacting critical training in any field is essential in order to prepare young people today for the unexpected uncertainties and surprises they will face.

In academic scholarship (research as well as education), particularly in the social sciences, there is an increasing tendency to try to bridge the fragmentary nature of knowledge to create truly transdisciplinary methodologies. New methodology is needed that is not tied to compartmentalized disciplinary categories that reflect and reproduce a mechanistic world view. Knowledge produced through the cross-fertilization of tools, information and methodologies requires a new type of university that can aid in the production of a complex understanding of contemporary global challenges. A ‘multiversity’ needs to be different in fundamental ways from today’s obsolete, out-of-touch, and petrified institutions. New institutions should be ‘learning’ and not just teaching institutions where the co-creation of knowledge is translated into programs that promote self-reflection and self-correction, in systems, policies and societies. This way new knowledge hubs can steadily reconfigure their own capacities to include new partners and methods to assess and address changing realities. The social and natural sciences, as well as technical innovations, should also be socially responsible. In the first place, the question needs to be asked: does the research serve the interests of societies and if so, in what ways will it be useful identifying and providing relevant alternatives for solutions to problems.

### ***Integrative Cognitive Tools: Wholeness and the Implicate Order Revisited***

...science itself is demanding a new, non-fragmentary world view, in the sense that the present approach of analysis of the world into independently existent parts does not work very well in modern physics. It is shown that both in relativity theory and quantum theory, notions implying the undivided wholeness of the universe would provide a much more orderly way of considering the general nature of reality.

David Bohm 1980: xiii

...Science is in transition to a new form of rationality based on complexity, one that moves beyond the rationality of determinism and therefore of a future that has already been decided. And the fact that the future is not given is a source of basic hope.

Immanuel Wallerstein 1999: 166-167

The main challenges are to overcome dogma, complacency and the neglect to reflect on scientific processes, 'objectivity' and underlying structures; at the same time enabling the synergistic exploration of trans-disciplinary research in order to imagine new worlds and new futures through a collective process of co-creation. This can take the form of the 'wisdom of crowds' approach by Surokiecki (2004), Csermely (2015), among others. A brief summary of my own research is based on the inadequacy of current analytical models to assess and analyze the new methods and pervasiveness of social organization at the global level. Through the application of complexity theory and the study of the 'emergence' of new cultural forms, new narratives, and new networks under the surface of societies, a better framework is approached to account for the diversity and spread of new networks of social connectivity and activism. When initiatives emerge to the surface they can presage fundamental social and structural changes. I have found that the emergence of new 'order' in complex systems is prompted by small, singular events that result in small disorders that intensify and cause instability where the novelty emerges. If the new issues, methods, identities, structures and forms of protest are widely imitated, then what began as a singular innovation can spread within the protest system and transform it. This critical phase reflects the idea that, dependent on initial conditions, small causes can have large effects. The qualities of self-organization, networking, and synergy as emergent qualities can then be employed to construct a dynamic concept of contemporary protests.

Another application to our interconnected and interdependent planet emerges from 'entanglement theory' which describes how particles of energy or matter can become correlated to predictably interact with each other regardless of how far apart they are.

Quantum entanglement allows qubits [quantum bits] that are separated by incredible distances to interact with each other immediately, in a communication that is not limited to the speed of light. No matter how great the distance between the correlated particles, they will remain entangled as long as they are isolated (Whatis.com 2006).

Einstein called quantum entanglement a "spooky action at a distance", but it is a really existing phenomenon that has been demonstrated in experiments, although the mechanism behind it cannot be fully explained by any existing theory. One proposal suggests that all particles on earth were once compacted tightly together and, as a consequence, maintain a connectedness. This includes the

particles that make up each one of us. Recent events certainly reinforce the one-ness of humanity and the crises we face together, and the need to meliorate current conflicts between each other, and between us and the planet. This kind of perspective could lead to a new understanding our place in the universe, informing the way we conduct our behaviour.

In my research, I am also interested in ‘entropy’ and the application of Social Entropy Theory (SET) and the Second Law of Thermodynamics to networks, societies and civilizations. Social entropy measures the natural decay within a social system. It can comprise the disintegration of social structures and social relations. Legal institutions, as well as political and educational/scientific institutions expend much energy maintaining structures to decrease systemic entropy to try and maintain the system. But the Second Law of Thermodynamics states that entropy production is irreversible and tends to increase over time in any naturally occurring process. ‘Anomie’ is the maximum state of social entropy, which can lead to the general breakdown of social networks, the fragmentation of social identities and the regulatory function of social values in societies over time. Cooperation is replaced with conflict and chaos.

This kind of analysis of social phenomenon through the use of theory from the natural and physical sciences is gaining momentum. The world’s problems are too complex, and interdependent to be defined within traditional disciplines. The challenge and responsibility of science today is to bring together people with different backgrounds and experience since no one has all the information required to deal with the gravity of issues we are facing.

The kinds of networks of which we are part of today appear to have deeply innovative qualities of density, temporality, spontaneity, and de-territorialization, crossing time as well as space. Recently, the Japanese government has decided to phase out the social sciences and humanities, claiming that they are no longer relevant to today’s world and today’s problems (Sawa 2015). This action may be a bit extreme, but it does emphasize the challenge for the social sciences and humanities to become more relevant when addressing global issues. If we are condemned to live in extraordinary times, where all known ‘truths’ are being disputed, and where the certainties that have operated until now have evaporated, where does this leave the social sciences?

The social sciences, inter-connected with the natural sciences, are more important now than ever, and can become more relevant at times like these. In a complex world, the social sciences act as the conscience and critique of societies and institutions. As social scientists, we engage in critical analysis that moves beyond the accumulation of data, to reflect, inform, and provide future alternatives and ways out of crisis. In contrast to journalists, politicians, and pundits, who are satisfied with soundbites, responsible social scientists accept the complexity of the age and refuse, for example, to see contemporary conflicts in the framework of a ‘clash of civilizations’, which inspired disastrous

foreign policies for which both global peripheries and traditional centers are now paying a high price in terms of migration and terrorism. Relevant social sciences must challenge simplistic and black-and-white thinking that reduces the hopes of hundreds of millions of people into simple contrasts between good and evil. Critical social scientists insist on the complexity of the world, and that there is nothing inevitable about neo-liberal capitalism, and that the withdrawal of the state from society and from its responsibilities is not a necessity, but a political choice. The perceived breakdown of basic civility, the return of nationalism and extremism in Europe, has more complex causes than the challenges of new migrations and immigrants. This may be out of step with the requirements of one type of contemporary reality, for example, reflected in the media, that performs an unrelenting ‘social acceleration’ where there is no time for detail, subtlety, balance and complex thinking, but it is crucial.

Another example can be taken from the financial crisis. When it came, and in its aftermath, it became clear that existing economic and financial models were seriously limited, oversimplistic and overconfident and actually helped to create the crisis in the first place. This is reflected in a combination of opinions not only from people who are skeptical of the neo-liberal, unregulated, post-Bretton Woods global capitalist system, but from people who actually worked at the heart of finance. All expressed concern that we do not understand the complexity or interdependence of the economic systems that drive our modern societies. We are, in fact, surrounded by systems made up of many interconnected and interacting parts like swarms of birds or fish, ecosystems, even brains, and this includes financial markets. Complexity theory tells us that what looks like complex behavior from the outside is actually the result of a few simple rules of interaction. So in order to begin to understand a system you need to look at the interactions.

Complex systems have a unique characteristic that is called ‘emergence’ which means that a system as a whole cannot be understood or predicted by examining the components of the system, because the system as a whole starts to reveal a particular behavior. **Therefore, the whole is literally more than the sum of individual parts.** Networks also represent complex systems and the nodes in a network are its components and the links are the interactions.

Applying this analysis to economic networks (but also to social and political networks) is new and reveals a surprising gap in the literature and analysis. In a definitive study Vitali, Glattfelder, Battiston (2011) present, for example, the extent of trans-national company (TNC) control of global wealth and finances. The TNC network they analyzed was structured with a periphery and a center. The center contained about 75% of all players, and in the center there was a tiny but dominant core of highly interconnected companies. Although they only make up 36% of total TNCs, they control 95% of the total operating revenue of all TNCs.

After computing network control with 600,000 nodes of interconnections, they found that the top 737 shareholders (making up 0.123%) have the potential to collectively control 80% of all TNC value. What are the implications of this high connection in the core of global finance? First of all, the high degree of control is extreme; and second, the high degree of interconnectivity of the top players in the core poses a significant systemic risk to the global economy, because any disruption in the core will quickly spread through the entire system. The study concludes that the network is probably the result of self-organization which is an emergent property and that the network depends on the rules of interaction in the system.

The realization that crisis is the new normal state of affairs requires radical and innovative rethinking, and not just palliatives. For example, we need to see the market as an aspect of human existence that cannot be divorced from the rest of life, yet the possibility that we should stop and rethink the market simply does not arise. Karl Polányi (2001) in *The Great Transformation*, presented a set of interrelated and intertwined phenomena. With extraordinary prescience, he warned that crisis would come. He rejected the idea that the market is ‘self-regulating’ and can correct itself. There is no ‘invisible hand’ such as the market fundamentalists maintain, so there is nothing inevitable or ‘natural’ about the way markets work: **they are always shaped by political decisions and powerful private interests.** These observations and propositions were for the most part rather neglected during the past decades and by the explicit or tacit consensus of both social scientists and political analysts. In most cases analysts deal with each crisis as separate, isolated phenomena. This negligence and restricted perception (based upon the paradigm of the sovereign nation state and doctrine of independent academic disciplines) is greatly responsible for the present global turmoil which is at its heart a civilizational crisis. One of the major negative results is the lack of responsibility-taking for global or transnational disasters by the dominant players and stakeholders – from national and regional political leaders and institutions via institutions of knowledge creation and distribution including eminent social scientists.

This institutionalised irresponsibility and indifference surrounded by a tacit consensus about divided-ness as an unchangeable given is to a significant degree responsible for undermining and emptying out democracies as well as for endangering the future of human existence on the planet. The recent return of the nation state and accompanying nationalistic cliches and prejudices within Europe and all around its borders resulted in the rise of rightwing and religious extremism, populism and an increasing rejection of multiculturalism. Xenophobia, racism and anti-semitism has been growing not only in the peripheries but also in the core countries of established democracies of affluent societies. This will only increase with the influx of refugees and migrants and the threat of

new terrorist attacks, like in Paris, unless the inter-, cross-, multi-disciplinary ‘wisdom of the crowd’ can be leveraged to envision better possible futures.

The critical approach that is needed also leads to questions about the university itself, and about the research industry in which we are all embedded. The economic crisis became a pretext for profound transformations in how knowledge is produced and what kind of knowledge matters that we need to be aware of. We live in a complex, inter-dependent world where, on the one hand, governments say they need to downsize, open markets, and foster personal responsibility, while, at the same time they bail out banks and regulate our lives in increasingly invasive forms of controls over employment, personal conduct and appearance, and through surveillance. This also determines the nature of the research that is conducted. A creative, innovative and responsible approach to the social sciences and research entails a much greater engagement and deeper involvement in being a producer of ideas, a critic of society, and a member of intellectual networks where new ideas and new visions emerge for possible futures.

The social sciences needs to embrace uncertainty because “... uncertainty is wondrous, and [if] certainty were to be real, would be moral death. If we were certain of the future, there would be no moral compulsion to do anything ... If everything is uncertain, then the future is open to creativity, not merely human creativity, but the creativity of all nature” (Wallerstein 1999: 4).

## **Bibliography**

Arbesman, Samuel (2012). *The Half Life of Facts: Why Everything We Know has an Expiration Date*. New York: Penguin.

Besnier, Niko (2010). “World Crisis and the Social Sciences”. Lecture Delivered on the Occasion of the Opening of the Graduate School Academic Year. 3 September.

Barret, William (1979). *Illusion of Technique: A Search for Meaning in a Technological Civilization*. New York: Anchor Books.

Bohm, David (1980). *Wholeness and the Implicate Order*. New York and London: Routledge.

Bunge, Mario (2012). “Parallel Universes? Digital Physics?” *Evaluating Philosophies, Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science*, 295: 151-157.

Cohen, E., & Lloyd, S. (2014). “Disciplinary Evolution and the Rise of the Transdiscipline”. *Informing Science: the International Journal of an Emerging Transdiscipline* 17: 189-215. <http://www.inform.nu/Articles/Vol17/ISJv17p189-215Cohen0702.pdf>

Csermely, Péter (2015). “Fast and Slow Thinking – of Networks.” Cornell University Library. <http://networkdecisions.linkgroup.hu/docs/fast-and-slow-arxiv2.pdf>

Dennis, Kingsley. *The Phoenix Generation*. London: Watkins Publishing.

Dirks, A. L. (1996). “Organization of Knowledge: The Emergence of Academic Specialty in America”. <http://webhost.bridgew.edu/adirks/ald/papers/orgknow.htm>.

Einstein, Albert, Infeld, Leopold (1938). *The Evolution of Physics: The Growth of Ideas From Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Eiseley, Loren (1964). “The Illusion of the Two Cultures.” *The American Scholar*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Summer): 387-399.

Hellman, Hal (1998). *Great Feuds in Science: Ten of the Liveliest Disputes Ever*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Hellman, Hal (2004). *Great Feuds in Technology: Ten of the Liveliest Disputes Ever*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Hellman, Hal (2006). *Great Feuds in Mathematics: Ten of the Liveliest Disputes Ever*. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Jacobs, Alan (2014). “The Two Cultures, Then and Now.” *Books and Culture: A Christian Review* (March/April). <http://www.booksandculture.com/articles/2014/marapr/two-cultures-then-and-now.html>.

Judge, Anthony (2012). “Knowledge Processes Neglected by Science: Insights from the Crisis of Science and Belief.” (4 November). <https://www.laetusinpraesens.org/musings/muversex.php>

Kuhn, Thomas (1962). *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ledford, Heidi (2015). “How to Solve the World’s Biggest Problems,” *Nature* 525 (September): 308–311. <http://www.nature.com/news/how-to-solve-the-world-s-biggest-problems-1.18367>

Levy, Joel (2010). *Scientific Feuds: from Galileo to the Human Genome Project*. Chatswood, Australia: New Holland Publishers.

Miszlivetz, Ferenc, ed. (2014). *Creative Cities and Sustainability*. Szombathely: Savaria University Press.

Oinas-Kukkonen, Harri (2008). “Network Analysis and Crowds of People as Sources of New Organisational Knowledge. In: A. Koohang et al., eds. *Knowledge Management: Theoretical Foundation*. Santa Rosa, CA: Informing Science Press: 173-189.

Pinker, Steven (2013). “Science is not Your Enemy: An Impassioned Plea to Neglected Novelists, Embattled Professors, and Tenure-less Historians.” *The New Republic* (7 August). <https://newrepublic.com/article/114127/science-not-enemy-humanities>.

Planck, Max (1949). *Scientific Autobiography*. New York: Philosophical Library.

Polányi, Karl (2001). *The Great Transformation*. 2nd ed. Boston: Beacon Press.

Powel, Cory S. (2015). “Relativity versus Quantum Mechanics: The Battle for the Universe.” *The Guardian* (4 November). <http://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/nov/04/relativity-quantum-mechanics-universe-physicists>.

Prigogine, Ilya (1996). *The End of Certainty*. New York: Free Press.

Sawa, Takamitsu (2015). “Humanities under Attack.” *The Japan Times* (23 August). <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2015/08/23/commentary/japan-commentary/humanities-attack/#.VkyDXvkveUk>

Sheldrake, Rupert (2012). *Science Set Free: Ten Paths to New Discovery*. New York: Random House.

Snow, C.P. (1998). *The Two Cultures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Snow, C.P. (1959). *The Two Cultures and Scientific Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stoppard, Tom (1993). *Arcadia*. London: Samuel French.

Surokiecki, James (2004). *The Wisdom of Crowds*. New York: Anchor Books.

Vitali, Stefania, Glattfelder, James B., Battiston, Stefano (2011). “The Network of Global Corporate Control”. <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.5728.pdf>

Wallerstein, Immanuel (1999). *The End of the World as We Know it. Social Science for the 21st Century*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2000. “Globalization or the Age of Transition? – A Long Term View of the Trajectory of the World System.” *International Sociology*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 251-267.

Whatsit.com (2006). “Entanglement.” <http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/entanglement>

# **The Attractiveness and Development of Economic Regions Evaluation Based on Company Network Analysis**

János Abonyi and Robert Manchin

## ***Abstract***

How the structure of company networks can characterize the attractiveness and development of economic regions? How ownership relationships are distributed in the geographical space? Is physical proximity significant factor in investment decisions? What is the impact of the capital city? To explore these issues, we analyzed the complete network of the Hungarian companies. Company-company connections define ties among geographic locations. According to the levels of the settlement hierarchy, we carried out a town, region, and county level study. We proposed several measures to evaluate the attractiveness and the development of towns and geographical regions based on the calculation of the internal and external linking probabilities. We found that in forming a connection distance dependence is more significant than in online social networks. The analysis of the local clustering coefficients showed hierarchical and modular structure that is shaped along the settlement hierarchy, in which Budapest is the absolute center and the centers of counties are also functioning as hubs. The proposed measures can be effectively applied to compare different cities and regions and monitoring and planning development strategies.

## ***Introduction***

Mining complex multivariate socioeconomic data can generate information that can be used to formulate and monitoring of European regional policy [1]. Such data driven analysis is also useful in managerial decisions at early stages of foreign market selection [2]. The definition and selection of informative socioeconomic variables are the key aspects of these applications [4]. The Creative City - Sustainable Region model (KRAFT model) is an innovative regional development concept [4]. The KRAFT Index integrates individual (company, city, university etc.) and community interests and provides a complex in-depth understanding of long and medium term development objectives.

The drawback of these indicator based approaches is that the structure of the economy is neglected. We would like to add an additional viewpoint to the analysis of regional economic development by studying how the network of companies relates to the structure of regions and the settlement hierarchy. Our interdisciplinary research project applies network science to build new models of company network analysis. We study the complete network of the Hungarian companies to explore how the owners of these companies are geographically distributed, what are the typical network structures, what are the typical directions of the connections, and how the extracted information is correlated to the settlement hierarchy. Although network phenomena are now studied

in many disciplines, including sociology [5], economics [6], and political sciences [7], our work is innovative since till now graph mining is not applied correlate company network properties and socio-economic indicators of cities and regions.

The methodology is based on a novel multidimensional data model defined by multi-layered heterogeneous networks. The applicability of the methodology is demonstrated through by the analysis of the network of Hungarian companies defined based on the Dun & Bradstreet database (2010-2013) that contains information about the owners, official addresses and NACE (European activity and product classifications).

According to the levels of the settlement hierarchy we carried out a three-level study. Based on the calculation of the internal and external linking probabilities we proposed several measures to evaluate the attractiveness and the development of towns and geographical regions. We found that at forming a connection distance dependence is more significant than was found in online social networks. The analysis of the local clustering coefficients shows that the company network is a hierarchical and modular, so it is shaped along the settlement hierarchy, in which Budapest is the absolute center and the centers of counties are also functioning as hubs. The proposed measures can be effectively applied to compare different cities and regions and monitor their development strategy.

From the analysis of how the companies are connected we explored how cities and regions are connected, and how the probabilities of new connections are affected by geographic distance and the attractiveness of the region. We believe this knowledge and proposed network based analysis methodology can successfully support strategic regional development and further development of the KRAFT model.

### ***Company network-based connections of towns and regions***

We defined the network of the Hungarian companies based on the Dun and Bradstreet database (2013) by linking companies having at least one joint owner or manager. The resulted undirected network is represented by a symmetric adjacency matrix  $A^{cc}$  of existence variables:

$$A_{ij} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if there is a connection between node } i \text{ and node } j \\ 0, & \text{if node } i \text{ and node } j \text{ are not connected to each other} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

The database also includes the locations of the companies (site address). Whenever two companies in different towns are linked to each other, then there is a connection between those cities. (For simplicity, we are going to use the expression „town” for all the cities and villages.) Consequently,

company-company connections define ties among geographic locations. We carry out a three-level study, according to the levels of the settlement hierarchy (see

There are 367,975 company-company ties in total, out which 119,486 remain within town borders. Among these 78,388 are internal ties in Budapest. It is interesting to note that 120,960 companies are linked to Budapest, which shows half of the 248,507 external connections are related to the capital.

Table 1). The aggregation to a town, region levels enable the introduction of weights that represent the number of links between the towns, regions, or counties.

The town-town adjacency matrix is defined by multiplying the  $A^{cc}$  company-company adjacency matrix with the  $H^{cz}$  and  $H^{zt}$  matrices representing the company - zip code and the zip code - town arrangements:

$$A^{tt} = H^{ztT} \times H^{czT} \times A^{cc} \times H^{cz} \times H^{zt} \quad (2)$$

In Hungary there are 2667 towns, so the resulted symmetrical weighted  $A^{tt}$  matrix has 2667 rows and 2667 columns, where its  $A_{ij}^{tt}$  elements represent how many companies ties the  $i$ -th and  $j$ -th towns. The links between the 175 regions can be calculated in a similar manner:

$$A^{rr} = H^{ztT} \times H^{czT} \times A^{cc} \times H^{cz} \times H^{zt} \quad (3)$$


where the  $H^{zt}$  matrix represents the zip code-region arrangement. As it can be seen, the  $H^{cz}$ ,  $H^{zt}$  and  $H^{zt}$  matrices map the connections into a given geographic hierarchy level.

We analyzed  $N= 112,124$  companies having three or more employees. We also dropped out companies in which location was set outside Hungary. Among these  $L=367,975$  company-company-connections were properly identified.

The map of the regional connection of the companies can be generated using the obtained  $A^{rr}$  connectivity matrix and the latitudes and longitudes of the regional centers (see Figure 1.). It can be seen that network shows hierarchical and modular structure as the Hungarian economy is concentrated the capitals of the counties that are also clustered around Budapest, the capital of the country. The majority of the companies are in these locations; consequently the network follows the

structure of online social networks [5]<sup>1</sup>, that is also shaped along the settlement hierarchy, in which Budapest is the absolute center of the network and the centers of counties are also function as hubs.

To quantitatively evaluate how companies are geographically connected and how much Budapest-centered the Hungarian economy is, in the next session we analyse the basic statistics, the scale-free property and the hierarchical modularity of the network.



*Figure 1. Regional connections of Hungarian companies (only links defined by at least 30 companies are visualized).*

### ***Internal and external links of economic regions***

The key concept of our approach is to handle economic regions as community networks [8], where communities represent the towns or regions where the companies are located. The external degree  $k_i^{ext}$  is the number of links that connect  $i$  community to the rest of the network, while the  $k_i^{int}$  integral degree is the number of links between companies in the same area.

---

<sup>1</sup> Lengyel, Balázs, Attila Varga, Bence Ságvári, Ákos Jakobi, and János Kertész. "Geographies of an online social network: weak distance decay effect and strong spatial modularity." PLOS ONE (2014).

Using the proposed matrix representation, it is easy to calculate the number of internal and external links. A key property of each node (company, town, or region) is its degree,  $k_i = \sum_{j=1}^N A_{ij}$  representing the number of links of the  $i$ -th node. The diagonal of the  $A''$  and  $A'''$  matrices represent the internal interactions.

The  $k_i^{\text{int}} = A_{ii}$  internal degree of the node (town or region) is significant, since the density of economic region can be analyzed based on the relative frequency of the internal links. The number of external ties,  $k_i^{\text{ext}} = k_i - k_i^{\text{int}}$  is also informative, we will evaluate the attractiveness of economic regions based on this value.

There are 367,975 company-company ties in total, out which 119,486 remain within town borders. Among these 78,388 are internal ties in Budapest. It is interesting to note that 120,960 companies are linked to Budapest, which shows half of the 248,507 external connections are related to the capital.

*Table 1. Statistics of the networks*

	Company-level	Town-level	Region-level	County-level
Number of nodes, $N$	112,125	2667	175	20
Number of internal ties	-	119,486	126,044	156,363
Number of external ties	-	248,507	241,939	211,612

Having  $H^z$  zip code - town and  $H^{cz}$  company-zip code matrices, the  $A^{ct}$  company-town matrix can be defined as

$$A^{ct} = H^{cz} \times H^z \quad (4)$$

Using this matrix, the  $n_i^t$  number of companies in the  $i$  th town can be calculated as:

$$n_i^t = \sum_j A_{ji}^{ct} \quad (5)$$

Using the number of companies and the number internal nodes the density of the economic region can be calculated, that represents the probability that two companies are linked in the given region:

$$P_i^{\text{int},t} = \frac{2k_i^{\text{int}}}{n_i^t(n_i^t - 1)} \quad (6)$$

We believe this probability is an excellent tool to measure and compare the internal complexity of economic regions.

The probability of an external tie can be calculated similarly

$$P_i^{ext,t} = \frac{k_i^{ext}}{n_i^t(N - n_i^t)} \quad (7)$$

where  $N - n_i^t$  represents the number of companies that are outside of the region.

To evaluate the attractiveness of the region, we defined the ratio of the external and internal probabilities:

$$o_i^t = \frac{P_i^{ext,t}}{P_i^{int,t}} = \frac{k_i^{ext}(n_i^t - 1)}{2k_i^{int}(N - n_i^t)} \quad (8)$$

The  $P_i^{int,t}$  probability can be used to measure the complexity (development), the  $o_i^t$  the attractiveness (openness) of a town or a region. As Figure 2. and Figure 3. show, Budapest is and Pest region are the most attractive while Tatabánya has the most densely connected economic network.





Figure 2. Density vs. attractiveness of regions



connections shows much faster decay. The exponent of distance decay in our data is  $-0.96$ , which means that the geographical distance has a much stronger effect on the investment ties than on online social networks.

It should be noted that the effect of the capital city is so strong, that the probability of connection with companies seated in Budapest is almost distance independent, the distance decay exponent of these companies is only  $-0.24$ .



*Figure 4. The probability of links as function of distance. Probability  $P_d$  is plotted as a function of distance on a log scale. The decay exponent is  $-0.96$*




Figure 5. The probability of links as function of distance. Probability  $P_d$  is plotted as a function of distance on a log scale. The decay exponent is -0,96

### ***Hierarchical Modularity and Scale-free Properties of Networks***

The clustering coefficient is a measure of an "all-my-friends-know-each-other" property. More precisely, the clustering coefficient of a node is the ratio of existing links connecting a node's neighbors to each other to the maximum possible number of such links. The clustering coefficient for the entire network is the average of the clustering coefficients of all the nodes. A high clustering coefficient for a network is indication of a small world property.

The local clustering coefficient gives a clustering measure for each node in a network. To determine how close they are to form a cluster the neighbors of the nodes into account. Let  $N_i$  mean the set of neighbors of a node  $i$   $k_i = |N_i|$ , and  $L_i$  the number of links between  $i$ 's neighbors. The  $C_i$  local clustering coefficient can be calculated by

$$C_i = \frac{2 \times L_i}{k_i(k_i - 1)} \tag{9}$$

Note that in the numerator stands the number of connections between the neighbors of a node  $i$  while the denominator refers to the number of possible connections between them.

Hierarchical modularity is measured based on the relationship between a node's clustering coefficient and its degree. It means that nodes with a high degree have a smaller clustering coefficient.

$$C(k) \approx k^{-1} \tag{10}$$

Hierarchical modularity can also prove the scale-free property about a network because if Eq. 10 holds, then much fewer number of high-degree nodes defines clusters, while the huge number of groups of small degree nodes can be merged.




Figure 6. Hierarchical modularity analysis for the network shows  $C(k) \approx k^{-1}$  type distribution

It can be seen on Figure 6. the company based network tend to be hierarchical modular because it follows the  $k^{-1}$  function. So clustering of the network is defined by the high-degree hubs, that are the companies with huge connection numbers.

The resulting networks of towns and regions show scale-free property as the degree distributions follow the power-law. (for towns:  $\gamma = 1.8216$ ,  $k_{sat} = 10$  and  $k_{cut} = 4766$ , for regions:  $\gamma = 1.7283$   $k_{cut} = 6638$ ) (see Figure 7).




Figure 7. Cumulative degree distributions of the networks of the towns and the regions.

### ***Compactness – The Effect of the Number of Inhabitants***

As we mentioned before, internal connections are necessary to evaluate economic density. In this session, we propose an additional measure for this purpose and study the size-effect of the region in the function of the number of inhabitants.

A network with high modularity value means good partitioning because in that case objects in the same group have dense connections [8]. The modularity can be determined for each community of a network. A network with  $N$  node,  $L$  links and  $n_c$  communities, Eq. 11 is used to determine  $M_c$  community modularity value by comparing the structure of the network to its randomized version. Each  $C_c$  community with  $N_c$  nodes is connected with by  $L_c$  links,  $c = 1, \dots, n_c$ .

$$M_c = \frac{1}{2L} \sum_{(i,j) \in C_c} (A_{ij} - p_{ij}) \quad (11)$$

The  $p_{ij}$  random network can be determined by randomization of the original network by calculating this probability based on the number of the  $k_i$  node's degrees.

$$p_{ij} = \frac{k_i k_j}{2L} \quad (12)$$

The  $M_c$  modularity value of a  $c$  cluster can be either positive, negative or zero. In the case of zero, the community has as many links as a random subgraph. If it is a positive value, then the  $C_c$  subgraph tend to be a community, while a negative  $M_c$  means it is not.

With the use of this definition the calculation of the  $M_c$  mosimplifiedan be much simplieied:

$$M_c = \frac{L_c}{L} - \left( \frac{k_c}{2L} \right)^2 \quad (13)$$

where  $L_c$  is the total number of links and  $k_c$  is the total number of nodes in the  $C_c$  community.

The modulatrity of the whole network is calculated by adding the modularities of the communities (subgraphs):

$$M_c = \sum_{c=1}^{n_c} \left[ \frac{L_c}{L} - \left( \frac{k_c}{2L} \right)^2 \right] \quad (14)$$

With the use of this measure we can evaluate the development of the cities. The 10 mostly modular towns are shown in Table 1.

Table 1: The most modular towns.

Town	Population	$M_c$	Town	Population	$M_c$
Budapest	1670918	0,1001	Nyíregyháza	118742	0,0052
Tatabánya	68190	0,0333	Győr	125240	0,0051
Szeged	164424	0,0082	Székesfehérvár	98309	0,0045
Debrecen	202348	0,0082	Pécs	149521	0,0043
Miskolc	159595	0,0053	Kecskemét	110964	0,0038

The modularities of the regions can be also determined by analyzing the network defined by the  $A''$  matrix. The most modular regions are represented in Table 2. It is interesting how regions outpaced each other when they grouped from towns. For example, the "Kecskeméti" region is more modular than the "Nyiregyházi" although the town "Nyiregyháza" has much more modularity value than the town "Kecskemét". According to this analysis, the cities near "Kecskemét" are more dominant than the ones near "Nyiregyháza".

Table 2: The most modular regions.

Connections between these values and the number of inhabitants can be seen in Figure 8. which represents data by a Log-Log scale. It can be identified that smaller towns are more coherent while connections inside large towns, like those of Budapest are sparse.

Region	Population	$M_c$	Region	Population	$M_c$
Budapest	1670918	0,1001	Győri	179238	0,0064
Tatabányai	86416	0,0340	Kecskeméti	173204	0,0060
Szegedi	204476	0,0095	Nyíregyházi	144850	0,0058
Debreceni	207028	0,0082	Székesfehérvári	134280	0,0052
Miskolci	256715	0,0069	Pécsi	181120	0,0051




Figure 8. Density and modularity analysis of Hungarian towns




Figure 9. Density and modularity analysis of Hungarian regions

The modularity of the town-level network is 0.2647, while the region level network has 0.277, and the county level network has 0.327. As in the case of towns, regions with bigger population also have greater  $M_c$  modularity value.

## **Conclusions**

In this paper, we analyzed the structure of company networks and proposed a methodology that can be used to characterize the attractiveness and development of economic regions. Company-company connections define ties among geographic locations. According to the levels of the settlement hierarchy, we carried out a three-level study. Based on the analysis of the complete Hungarian company network we determined how ownership relationships are distributed in the geographical space. We realized that the network is hierarchical and modular, and the modules are based on geographical areas that coincide with administrative regions, in which Budapest is the absolute center, and the centers of counties are also functioning as hubs. We found besides the extremely strong attraction of Budapest; the geographical distance has significant deflating power on the frequency of connections. Based on the calculation of the internal and external linking probabilities we proposed several measures to evaluate the attractiveness and the development of towns and geographical regions. The proposed measures can be effectively applied to compare different cities and regions and monitor their development strategy.

## **Bibliography**

Cavusgil, S. Tamer, Tunga Kiyak, and Sengun Yenyurt. "Complementary approaches to preliminary foreign market opportunity assessment: Country clustering and country ranking." *Industrial Marketing Management* 33.7 (2004): 607-617.

Csomós, György. "The Ranking of Cities as Centres of the Hungarian Economy, 1992-2012." (September 25, 2015). *Regional Statistics*, 2015, Vol 5, No 1: 66-85.

Del Campo, Cristina, Carlos MF Monteiro, and Joao Oliveira Soares. "The European regional policy and the socio-economic diversity of European regions: A multivariate analysis." *European Journal of Operational Research* 187.2 (2008): 600-612.

Jackson, Matthew O. *Social and Economic Networks*. Vol. 3. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.

Lengyel, Balázs, Attila Varga, Bence Ságvári, Ákos Jakobi, and János Kertész. "Geographies of an online social network: weak distance decay effect and strong spatial modularity." *PLOS ONE*, 2014.

Miszlivetz, Ferenc and Márkus, Eszter. "The KRAFT Index." *Working papers in social and european studies*, 2014.

Stark, David and Vedres, Balázs. "Social Times of Network Spaces: Network Sequences and Foreign Investment in Hungary." *American Journal of Sociology* 111.5 (2006): 1367-1411.

Girvan, M., Newman, M. E. J. (2002). "Community structure in social and biological networks." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*. 99(12): 7821-7826.

# **The Natural and The Human Sciences: A Few Parallels**

Dezső Boda

## ***Abstract***

Scientists dealing with Natural and Social Sciences not only have different research methodologies, but they also seem to have different approaches to basic questions such as “What is the purpose of my study?”, “What is the outcome of my study?”, “How do I publish my results?”. We are different from many aspects, there is no point denying that. We should embrace this difference, instead, because it makes us richer. This does not mean, however, that we cannot try to understand each other and to learn from each other. At the same time, of course, it turns out that we are not so different after all; it is much easier to bring us into a common denominator than we would assume at the first sight. In the following paper I try to show a few examples of how our (Natural Scientists’) mind works. Because I do not want to speak in the name of all Natural Scientists, I will speak only in the name of one person, myself, even if that is admittedly not a representative sample. I will present a few examples where methodologies of Natural Sciences (Physics, Chemistry, and Biology) find parallels in the world of Social Sciences, at least, in my mind. The following chapters are excerpts from a larger work that is forming under the influence of conversations with scholars from very different areas in Kőszeg.

## ***Micro- and macrowords***

In my proposal, I posed the question whether we can study complex systems with reduced models. Both expressions need explanation. Before I try to explain, I have to describe briefly what I do for a living as a scientist.

We examine physical and chemical systems, namely, materials. The word “system” is a well-defined central concept of physical chemistry, which is absolutely necessary to be defined if we want to know what we examine. Practically, the system is defined by its boundaries, the particles inside the boundaries, and the boundary conditions that determine how the system communicates with its environment. A system without a boundary is not a system, just as a country without a border is not a country.

The systems we study are many-particle systems. They are composed of molecules, atoms, or ions. These systems usually do something; that is why they are interesting for us. Liquids can flow, gases can expand, surfaces can adsorb molecules, ion channels can let ions through the cell membrane. We have experimental data for these systems, but they are just numbers without soul. We do not know from measurements how these systems work on the microscopic level.

The difference between the macroscopic and microscopic levels is many orders of magnitude in space and time scales. Microscopic motions are fast, while our measurements are slow. The molecules are small, while our measuring instruments are large. That is why we do not have direct experimental information about the microscopic level. Humans and their tools are too big and slow. We can measure only the macroscopic quantities. For the microscopic level, therefore, we must make models. The job of statistical mechanics is to gain macroscopic information (this is what we measure) for a system from microscopic information (these are the models). By modeling we mean that we specify the interactions that act between the particles.

Molecular simulations form a special class of statistical mechanical methods [1]. Computer simulations work as a special “microscope” with which we can look at these systems closely and get some ideas about their mechanisms. We do not see real particles in this “microscope”, however. We just see their representations in a computer or on a computer screen. We represent the particles with models.

When I used the word “complex” in the title of my proposal, I did not suspect that I opened a can of worms. The expression “complex system” is taken by mathematicians very seriously. There are solid definitions out there put down with rigorous methodology that I respect very much. Therefore, I will try to avoid using the term “complex systems” if possible even if it is used on many areas of science with slightly different meanings. What I mean by complex system in the case of my field is that these systems are huge containing an astronomical number of particles (the usual unit of chemists for quantity of matter is 1 mol that is  $6 \times 10^{23}$  particles).

Eventually, I had to realize that the systems I study are very simple. Their behavior on the microscopic level determines their behavior on the macroscopic level. Still, these systems are quite “complicated”. Statistical mechanics is a complicated science. The complicity lies in the very large number of particles. Even if the laws governing the motion of particles (the equations of motion of Newton) or the statistical rules that define in what probability do you find the system in a given state (Boltzmann distribution) are simple and well-established, the task to actually perform the calculations is overwhelming. Before the advent of computers, statistical mechanics could do everything in theory, but nothing in practice. If you look at papers from the time of Kirkwood (first half of the twentieth century), you will find a big pile of equations but no results. They knew very well what should be done, they were just unable to do it.

Computers changed everything. Today it is a routine to perform such calculations using program packages downloadable from the internet. The models included in these program packages, however, are reduced models themselves. What does it mean? If you want to describe the interaction between two molecules, you have to use quantum mechanics if you want to be precise. Even then, solving Schrödinger's equation involves a bunch of approximations. This is too time-consuming, so the usual procedure is to approximate the interaction potential with a classical expression. For example, the repulsion of two molecules when they get too close to each other can generally be described by a potential  $u(r) \sim 1/r^{12}$ , where  $r$  is the distance of the two molecules. Even this expression is a broad approximation; the real potential is rather exponential.

Anyway, the simulation packages contain force fields, where every atom of the system is treated individually with such potentials. Even though everybody knows that these force fields are broad approximations, many people (especially young people misled by an irresponsible supervisor) accept the results spit out by the simulations as “reality”. It is a broadly used metaphor (even I used it above) that simulations are powerful microscopes that make it possible to look at the system on the molecular level, to check what is going on down there on that time and length scale. This is misleading. What we “see” is not a magnified reality, but a representation of reality. So there are a lot of problems with these models when we model every single atom explicitly. We call these models all-atom models.

Reduced models do not model every single atom. These models say that certain parts of the system are so unimportant that it does not make sense to waste computer time for them. These unimportant parts are averaged together into a response function or something like that. For example, if you take a cell membrane and the two electrolytes on the two sides of the membrane (the cytoplasm and the blood), you do not have to take every atom of the membrane into account; it can be enough just to model the membrane with two charged hard walls. Or, if you are curious what happens with ions when they go through an ion channel, it might suffice to model water as a dielectric continuum [2]. Examples can follow without an end.


The main reason to use reduced models, however, is not just to save computer time. The main reason is that we can focus our attention with these models. We can concentrate to the “important” stuff. What is important and what is unimportant, of course, is not an easy question. That is the fun part of this kind of research.

This modeling philosophy is well described with Occam's razor (Lex Parsimoniae). This principle “admonishes us to choose from a set of otherwise equivalent models of a given phenomenon the simplest one. In any given model, Occam’s razor helps us to ‘shave off’ those concepts, variables, or constructs that are not really needed to explain the phenomenon. By doing that, developing the model will become much easier, and there is less chance of introducing inconsistencies, ambiguities, and redundancies.” ) [3].

If we use models with too many details, the computational task can be overwhelming, noise can cover the observable trend, and the too many model parameters can make the system too complex after all. Reduced models, however, where we take into account only those details that dominate the observed phenomenon can be advantageous in many cases.




An example was given in our research paper [4] produced during my fellowship in Kőszeg. In this paper, we are inspired by a solid experimental fact measured by Miedema et al. [5]. They produced a mutated ion channel in which they changed the positions of amino acids to create a distribution where the negative amino acids are on one side of the pore, while positive amino acids are on the other side (see Fig. 1). This charge distribution resembles a PN junction in semiconductor diodes that is known to rectify. Rectification means that the device conducts current at voltage  $U$ , while it conducts much less current at the opposite voltage  $-U$ .



Miedema et al. [5] Assuming that if the PN junction works in the case of a semiconductor diode, it should work in the case of an ionic diode too. They indeed found that the ion channel rectifies, so there should be something about this PN junction.

So we constructed an all-atom model, for the system, where every single atom of the ion channel, the membrane in which it is embedded, the water molecules of the solution in which the whole system is swimming and the ions that migrate through the channel are taken into account explicitly in the simulation (see Fig. 1). It means atoms of hundreds of thousands and simulation time of weeks (we had 5 million atom simulations that took months). To our complete surprise, the model did not rectify, although we tried our best to model it as accurately in details as possible.



Then, we decided that we construct a model that is profoundly reduced. We took only the important particles as real ones in the simulation: the ions and the important amino acid structural atoms that form the PN junction (see Fig. 2). Now, it was not a surprise at all that this model did rectify. Summarized, we are in the position when a reduced model works better than a detailed model. Why the detailed model fails is not the subject of this work; we have ideas that are found in our research paper [5].

What do all this have to do with Social Sciences? First, distinguishing micro and macro world is known in Sociology. These are called micro- and macrotheory. Citing the definitions of Babbie [6], macrotheory is “aimed at understanding the “big picture” of institutions, whole societies, and the interactions among societies.” Microtheory is “aimed at understanding social life at the intimate level of individuals and their interactions.” Drawing parallel with our many-particle systems is inevitable.

Society is also a many-particle system, but formed by human beings instead of molecules. This makes our job easier and harder at the same time. Human beings are not small and fast like molecules, so we can easily observe them on the “microscopic” level (the level of the individuals). Large-scale social events, the averages of the zillions of human movements are also easily observable using statistical procedures based on the Big Data pool. The basic question whether we can follow the procedure of statistical mechanics somehow and (1) create low-level model for the inter-human relations and behavior, (2) simulate the behavior of large number of humans to get averages, (3) compare to observed phenomena, and (4) modify the model if needed.

After a while I realized that this either very hard in the case of social sciences, or plainly impossible. Even the question whether it is possible at all is a question we might want to pursue first, before we proceed further.

Society is a complex system from many reasons. Micro and macro levels interact with each other constantly in an intricate manner. Even defining the system as we did in Physics is problematic. The parts of the system constantly modify the boundary conditions, while the environment constantly modifies the players of the system on the micro level. If that is not enough, it is hard to separate the investigator from the investigated system that is a basic requirement in Physics and researchers pay painful attention to achieve that separation.

The interaction between two oxygen molecules is the same yesterday, today, and tomorrow. It does not depend on weather, the exchange rate of dollar, or the winner of the elections. Creating good models in Physics, although challenging, is really quite simple. What I call "modelling", social scientists call "theorizing". At the Blue Sky Conference I heard this sentence: "Social scientists are not really good in theorizing" [7], but I also heard that "Without theory, the data are mute." [8]. There are even more challenges in theorizing in Social Science and scientists are well aware of that.

The most promising scientific method that we can try to call for help is network theory [9-11], in my opinion. Network theory is a constantly developing methodology with which we can analyze complex systems by modeling them as networks. General properties of a network can help us drawing certain conclusions for

the specific system under study, because that general property is a mathematically well-defined characteristic. Network theory can help us figuring out the intricate network of interactions between the actors of society.

### ***Order and Chaos***

Entropy is commonly considered a measure of order. Large entropy means more disorder, while small entropy means more order (a little bit simplifying things). The second law of thermodynamics states that spontaneous processes in Nature target equilibrium; they proceed to reach equilibrium eventually. During the process, the entropy increases, and, in equilibrium it is maximal. The law implies that order does not form so easily. If you leave a system alone and do not put in energy (in the form of work), the system gets more and more disordered. Anybody who forgot tidying up his/her desk for a while knows what I mean. There are many examples in Physics. Gases fill the available space. Liquids evaporate. Solids erode. Interactions between particles are needed to keep the liquid together or to arrange the atoms into crystals. These interactions lower the energy, make systems more ordered and decrease entropy in the meantime.

There are two important systems, where order is created spontaneously, at least, at first sight. The first is biological evolution, in which more and more complex creatures come along [12]. At the end, there is a species that sometimes seems very simple, but it created the other system that increases with the size of mankind and getting more and more complex. That system is the cultural evolution that is composed of all the ideas and thoughts produced by Humanity since prehistorical times up until now [13-18].

These systems are so important that I would not sit here typing these words without them. At least, that makes them important enough for me. These evolutionary systems are also in the center of heated debates regarding how they work, how they come about, and so on. Have we been created by God, or did we emerge in the blind process of evolution? Or did God create evolution, perhaps? Whatever is the answer, evolution is an efficient and logical model that provides a reasonable explanation for the mechanisms of how things come after each other in time during the development of Life and Culture. This mechanism will be expanded in another chapter; for now, let us remain at the issues of Order and Chaos.

If you have a system composed of two subsystems that are not in equilibrium, processes will occur until the system reaches equilibrium and entropy reaches its maximum. Dividing the system into a more ordered and a less ordered part is ordering itself. Bringing the two systems in contact, a process will start in which one system will gain, while the other system will lose entropy. The entropy of the whole system, however, will increase. The second law favors systems where everything is disordered to the same degree. The process that is going on to drive the system toward equilibrium is usually a transport process. Something will be transported from one place to the other until things even out.

There is a handful of useful quantities that tell us whether a system is in equilibrium or not. (1) If the system is in thermal equilibrium, *temperature* is the same everywhere. If not, heat (thermal energy) will flow

from the warmer place towards the colder place. Warmer place is more disordered, of course, so it has more entropy. (2) *Pressure* defines mechanical equilibrium. If pressure is larger at some place than somewhere else, mechanical work will be exerted on matter, and matter will move. If we talk about air, for example, the process of moving air is called wind blowing. (3) If you put a drop of ink in a glass of water, you will find that the ink particles diffuse all over the glass of water until they fill the glass homogeneously. In equilibrium, particles are not transported any more, and diffusion stops. The physical quantity that defines this kind of equilibrium is called chemical potential. Matter diffuses from the places of larger chemical potentials towards places of lower chemical potentials. This is an interesting quantity that deserves an equation:

$$\mu = \ln(c) + \mu^{\text{ex}}$$

where  $\mu$  is the chemical potential,  $c$  is the local concentration, and  $\mu^{\text{ex}}$  is the excess chemical potential. A kind of particle can have large chemical potential from two reasons. First, it has large chemical potential if it has large concentration, namely, it is present in a large quantity locally. Second, it can have large chemical potential, if it has large potential energy locally (actually, free energy, but let us skip this detail for now). A particle can have a large energy somewhere from many reasons. It usually originates from interactions with other particles or interaction with some external field (electric, magnetic, or gravitational).

So, particles diffuse somewhere where they have smaller quantity (low  $c$ ) like in the ink-free part of the glass of water, but they also diffuse somewhere if they have lower potential energy (low  $\mu^{\text{ex}}$ ) there. Systems are directed towards low potential energy. You have lower (more negative) potential energy at the bottom of the canyon than at the rim. Particles also feel good close to each other where they attract each other stronger. Stronger attraction means deeper potential energy. So particles diffuse where there is space for them or where they feel good. By the way, the difference of chemical potential is called the driving force of transport. In equilibrium, the chemical potential evens out and the migration of particles stops.

In the case of Societies, it is usually people who migrate. We are just witnessing a wave. If the story is true, Hungarians arrived to the Carpathian Basin with another wave. The natural question arises whether the above ideas for particle transport can be adopted for the case of migration of people. Seemingly, there is a concentration difference between the aging Europe and the overpopulated Africa. Still, it would be too quick a conclusion to say that this is a diffusion whose main driving force is the concentration difference. Overpopulation (and other factors) causes a chaotic state in Africa and other places that, in turn, causes people to feel insecure. They do not really feel good over there, so the real driving force is rather the “energetic” component that tells these people that they will have a better life in Europe.

Overpopulation, in itself, is a problem for people only if it causes a disordered environment for living: lack of food, lack of jobs, lack of law, increase of crime, and so on. If the society is ordered, overpopulation is not a problem, just look at the cities. From some mysterious reason (to me), people have migrated from the

countryside towards cities in last couple of thousands of years. Cities are large and ordered with many connections between the people living it. It is a typical complex system.

Complexity, however, has its price. Cities provide an ordered living environment for a large number of people, but, at the same time, they are more vulnerable. Just imagine what happens if the dumpster truck does not come for your garbage for a while. Entropy would increase like hell in the city. No wonder that Earth is full with deserted cities of fallen Empires [19]. When large-scale order fails, people aggregate into smaller units to find order locally. This fact is nicely explained by network theory as we saw at the lecture of Péter Csermely some time ago [20].

Order is grossly undervalued in the latest years because it is falsely identified with dictatorships. The result is a chaotic continent with inhabitants who lost their life instinct. They do not fight back when being attacked. They do not defend their values. They do not even have values. This creates a low chemical potential place for healthy, fertile people (who have nothing to lose) coming from a self-confident culture that has the elementary component of aggressive expansion (more about it in the last chapter).

There is a driving force for migration for sure, but what are the main components of the driving force is a complicated question. Different people come from different reasons, but it should be possible to identify the relevant components of the driving force.

Without energy, there would be just Chaos. Without that, we would not have stars that produce the heavier elements for us. Without the energy of the Sun, it would not be possible to have a friendly environment on Earth that can nurture the complex molecules that are the building blocks of life. Without the wonderful mechanism of evolution these building blocks would not organize themselves into more and more ordered structures. Life is the triumph of Order over Chaos. Let us take care of Order, we would be dead without it.

People also need order. They need morality, regulation, disciplines, and laws in order to live in peace without cutting each other's necks. It is easy to destroy order. Even the second law of thermodynamics is our ally in that. Creating a stable ordered culture, on the other hand, can be a slow process. Creating something from scratch is always a challenge, but, in some cases, it might be easier than improving the old system. Old structures might seem rigid, but they are the results of evolutionary processes nonetheless. They came about for a reason. Conservative people like the old structures, because they provide a feeling of comfort. Change, however, is often inevitable. How changes occur is the topic of the next chapter.

### ***Phase Transitions***

To talk about phase transitions, we should talk about the concept of phase first. The phase is a kind of state of matter that is although very different from another phase, can be in equilibrium with that another phase. A better way of putting it: they can coexist next to each other. Therefore, a phase transition can also be called phase coexistence. The first term is a dynamic one about what is happening during the process when a system

is changing its state, while the other is a static one that describes what is the situation when two phases coexist together in peace.

The trivial examples for phases are gases, liquids, and solids. They are obviously very different things. Still, they are composed of the same stuff. Ice, liquid water, and vapor all consist of water molecules. They are different, because they have different physical properties. They have different densities, for example. Solid is dense, while gas is rare. Or, vice versa, the volume of solid is small, while the volume of gas is large. Still, there are a handful of physical properties that are the same in the two phases. Guess what, these properties are the temperature, the pressure, and the chemical potential. The explanation is simple and is just a consequence of the second law of thermodynamics. The two phases are in equilibrium, so there is no any transport process going on between them. They are in thermal equilibrium if they have the same temperatures, so heat is not exchanged. The ice cubes in the glass of water remain ice cubes if the water is zero degrees, they do not melt further.

If the chemical potential is the same in the two phases, particles are not transported from one phase to the other. It is a dynamical equilibrium: the same amount of water molecules is evaporated into the vapor phase that is condensed into the liquid phase per unit time at the boundary surface between vapor and liquid.

Why is it so interesting from the point of view of social sciences? That is because processes when a society or an economy changes its state into something qualitatively different from the previous one in a relatively abrupt manner are known all over history: revolutions, crises, revolts, fallen empires, whole civilizations swept away by a chain of events, sometimes surprisingly [19]. These transitions are usually quite painful and sometimes they come as a complete surprise for the less insightful people of the given society.

Where surprise comes from we can understand if we consider the concept of the metastable phase. Two phases that coexist in equilibrium nicely are stable, but imagine that we start a process that changes the status quo. We can start, for example, to draw heat out of ice-cold water slowly. Being slow is important. If it is slow enough, we do not really realize that equilibrium is gone and that the water is in a metastable state now. It is called overcooled water. The same thing exists on the other side: ice can be overheated.

Now, if we drop something into the overcooled water, it freezes as quick as lightning. The same can happen with overheated ice. If you look at it from the point of view of a water molecule, it will not understand the whole thing. It was buzzing around chaotically in a disordered liquid freely in one moment, then, abruptly it finds itself at a well-established site in the crystal structure of ice without too much degrees of freedom to move. Well, it can vibrate, but the World have changed. What a shock!

Phase transitions can be understood better if we look at the interesting quantities: temperature, pressure, and chemical potential. If we look at the equation of the chemical potential, for example, we see that it has two terms. One is the  $\ln(c)$  term, while the other is the energetic (excess) term. For example, the  $\ln(c)$  term is large positive in a liquid compared to a gas, because the density of a liquid is larger than the density of a gas. The potential energy of a molecule in a liquid, on the other hand, is smaller (more negative) than in a

gas, because molecules are closer to each other in the liquid so they attract each other stronger. The result is that the sum of the two terms is the same in liquid and gas, so that they can be in coexistence in spite of the fact that they are pretty different. A liquid is ordered with large energy, while a gas is disordered with small energy. The sum is the same, but what a difference does it make if order and chaos balance each other in a different manner.

If we want to understand how phase transitions work in societies, we might want to look for factors (forces, interactions, certain quantifiable properties) whose balance defines the equilibrium of the system. There is a good chance that this balance is about the right amount of Chaos (you can call it Freedom, if you want) and Order (you can call it Law, Discipline, Ethic, Responsibility if you want).

Whether Europe (and Western Civilization in general) is in the middle of a phase transition is a question that should be taken seriously [21,22]. As far as my opinion is concerned, I have no doubt about it. The real question in my mind is that what is on the other side waiting for us. An even more serious question is whether we can influence now what comes at the end of the process. Societies are not like Physical systems such as ice cubes or water steams. We can influence things, but, at the same time, we are part of the system. Can a part of the system change the destiny of the system?

If we can change the memes (more about these in the next chapter) in our minds, we might be able to respond to the changing boundary conditions. If the root of the problem, however, is the way we think and act, we are part of the problem and we cannot separate ourselves from the boundary conditions. In that case, it is not enough to change only a few memes. Then, we must change the whole meme-complex, namely, we must change our culture.

### ***Genetic and memetic evolution***

In the first chapter, I imposed the question whether there are low-level laws or mechanisms that govern the evolution of large and complex systems in time. Evolution in this sentence just means “change in time”. Since Darwin [12], the word gained a much richer meaning. As in the chapter about Order and Chaos I implied, it can be considered a mechanism with which Order can be created somewhat spontaneously. All right, the process needs the energy coming from the Sun ceaselessly, but it looks like a process that has been going on since it has been started (how it has been started is not the topic of this paper) without too much intervention. It can handle catastrophic changes in boundary conditions such as asteroid impacts like the one destroyed the dinosaurs.

So, evolution is a nice functional model that provides conclusions, explanations, and implications that are in harmony with observations (the fossils dig up by paleontologists and the layers revealed by geologists). During evolution, things become more complex, so it works against the second law. The battle of Order and

Chaos, the battle of the creative and destructive forces of the Universe is everywhere around us. Evolution is on the Light Side of the Force.

Everybody thinks he/she understands evolution. If it were true, scholars like Dawkins and Sagan would not exert a tremendous amount of work to explain it to people. Dawkins said: „It is almost as if the human brain were specifically designed to misunderstand Darwinism, and to find it hard to believe.” It was Dawkins who helped to create an even lower-level version of the evolutionary theory in his book titled “The Selfish Gene” [13]. In this book, he pointed out that evolution requires a replicator.

Replicators are those things that stick around in the evolutionary process. They copy themselves. The criteria of evolution are that the copying should take place with a high degree of fidelity, but not perfectly. Certain degree of infidelity in copying (called mutations) is necessary for adaptation to the changing environment. The replicator, Dawkins suggested, is not the species or individual organisms, but the genes. Good genes that make you smarter, stronger, more agile, better in sex help you in survival and in reproduction, so these genes will be passed to future generations. As a matter of fact, the ultimate definition of the “good gene” is just that it is good in copying, namely, it is good in replicating itself. Genes do not care about your well-being. All they care about is their own multiplication. They are selfish in this sense. The title of Dawkins' book means just that, but, unfortunately, it is quite understandable. What is understandable people will misunderstand. Add that to the laws of Murphy if it is not there already. The term implies to some people without imagination (or with too much imagination) that genes can think, can feel, that is why they can be selfish.

In reality, they are pretty blind and their sole “purpose” is to get copied. Animals, plants, germs, and humans are just carriers of the genes, actors of evolution, but evolution does not revolve around us. There is no such a thing as purpose of evolution (see another picturesque book title: The Blind Watchmaker [23]). The central word of evolutionary theory (fitness) also changes its meaning in the context of the new low-level theory. It is not us, who are fit, but the genes. The fit genes are good at replicating. It is just a side-product that they make us smarter, stronger, more agile, or better in sex. So, the term “survival of the fittest” should be replaced by “abundance of the fittest”. This model, therefore, looks at the process of evolution from the point of view of a more low-level player, the gene. It is more logical, because organisms die, species extinct, but good genes stay with us. If there is a conflict whose interest is more important, good replicators always win. As Richard Brodie [17] explained it, imagine the „Protect the kids even at the expense of your life” gene. It is not good for the individual, but it is good for the species, and the gene, first of all. It also explains why this gene is present next to the “Save yourself” gene. According to the organism-oriented approach of evolution, the “Save yourself” gene is quite powerful. The selfish-gene theory gives a concise and logical explanation for the abundance of the „Protect the kids even at the expense of your life” gene.

Genetic evolution has built certain genetic drives into us that are commonly described by the four F's: Fighting, Fleeing, Feeding, F\*\*king (or, more politically correctly: Finding a mate). They are with us since prehistoric times. They are programmed by DNA. They form our basic instincts, our basic desires to survive,

eat, breath, sleep, and mate. There was a point during evolution when a powerful weapon was developed to make animals better in these: the brain. Later, it was developed further somehow (evolutionary psychologists [23,24] and other scholars still argue how) and consciousness was created and this the point when memetic evolution was kicked started.

Since that point, we have been witnessing another evolutionary process, in which the Culture of Mankind changed and got more and more complex during History. This process is described by historians and cultural anthropologists by describing events, facts, and processes and by pointing out connections between them on the “macroscopic” level. The question, however, naturally arises: if we have a seemingly evolutionary process that creates a system that is becoming more and more complex, is not there a low-level model similarly to the selfish-gene idea? The answer was given by Dawkins in the same book [13], where he raised the idea of the replicator of the cultural evolution. He named the replicator meme. The word was created on the basis of the Ancient Greek word *mimeme* meaning “imitated thing”. It also resembles the word gene, of course.

Memetics was not taken too seriously at the beginning. With the blooming of information processing through the internet, mobile phones, and media, it has been gaining popularity gradually. The problem now is that it is too popular, and they use the name in a restrictive way for short videos, quotes, tunes, and such things on the internet, while the concept is much more difficult (and complex) than that.

The meme, using the functional definition of Brodie [17], “is a unit of information in a mind whose existence influences events such that more copies of itself get created in other minds.” The medium where memetic evolution takes place, therefore, is not the internet or books, but the conscious mind. These media just help propagate the information, but eventually, human minds create, replicate, and mutate it. All these events are present during information processing if you think about it. If you like a meme, you will tell somebody, so you propagate it. That way, the meme is replicated. In the process, you try to replicate it as accurately as possible, but we all know that it is impossible. Information is always distorted, namely, the meme is mutated. Therefore, everything is at hand to start an evolution and to analyze the process on the basis of the meme as the replicator similarly to biological evolution.

Memetics is a large and exciting model and there are many books out there that I can suggest [13-18]. My personal favorite is the book of Richard Brodie, “*The Virus of the Mind*” [17]; I use that work to outline Memetics in this chapter. The theory is in an embryotic form. Even the definition of the meme is given differently by different authors [14,15,17]. Here, I restrict myself to a crucial concept of memetic theory: memetic programming. To discuss that, let us return to genetic programming a little bit. Genetic programming is done on the level of DNA. It programs our primary buttons, the four F's. Survival was helped by the development of communication (spreading news about incoming danger, location of food, mating capabilities, etc.). Later, development of language was a big step further that really ignited memetic evolution.

The first order drives have been associated with some very powerful memes (the first order buttons), and, of course, there are associated feelings. They are important because we usually listen to our Heart. The following table summarizes these:

Drive	Memes	Feeling
Fight	Crisis	Anger
Flee	Danger	Fear
Feed	Food	Hunger
Mate	Sex	Lust

These genetic buttons are very powerful. A bundle of memes, many memes together, when we are trying to spread them together, are called meme-complexes. If a meme is associated with one of the first-order buttons it also becomes efficient. Just think of advertisements and wonder why they are selling detergent with pretty women (Sex button) or babies (the same button). Or why the evening news is full of catastrophes, accidents, and wars (Crisis button). People would not watch these programs without these. Or why the migration crisis will elevate or destroy governments at the elections (Danger button). People react sensitively to events that endanger their safety or the safety of their children.

So, when memes are associated with first-order buttons, they attract more attention (a key concept) and can be spread (another key concept) easier. They are the good memes from the point of view of their ability of being copied. There secondary buttons are deeply rooted strategy memes. They are also efficient memes because they build on the first-order buttons. A few of these memes are “belonging to some group”, “distinguishing yourself”, “caring for others”, “seeking for approval”, and “obeying authority”. The really efficient meme-complexes that form the skeleton of our culture are built on these first- and second-order buttons. They are *tradition* (let us perpetuate that worked so far), *evangelism* (the meme explicitly involves its own spreading), *faith* (you stay in your belief system despite of reasoning, so you spread the meme of faith), *scepticism* (opposite of faith, if you are skeptic, you tend to remain skeptic so spreading this meme), *familiarity* (you spread what is familiar more easily, because you notice it more easily), and *making sense* (you accept those memes that are easy to understand more easily).

Although good memes are good for themselves, they are however, not necessarily good memes for us, Humans. The best example is the kind of meme complexes that are so good at their job that they have a distinct name. They are the *mind viruses*. Viruses penetrate your reproduction system and make it producing as many copies of them as possible. Mind viruses work similarly to biological and computer viruses because they penetrate your mind easily and issue instructions to modify our behavior in order to spread them and to reach uninfected minds.

Remember, memes enter our minds without our permission. There are powerful methods that help those who develop designer viruses spread the virus [26]. Who are these? Political and marketing campaigns jump in mind at once, but the frightening thing that you do not even realize that you are getting programmed. The programming methods that you should be aware of if you want to realize that you are brainwashed are the following. *Conditioning* is simply repetition. That is what happening in school. Let us admit it, school-system is the society's huge conditioning system. It is the same mechanism with which you teach the rat to run a maze. They are rewarding and punishing you. Do you have a dog? The other method is based on *cognitive dissonance*. If some new-coming memes conflict with some existing memes, the mind struggles to resolve the conflict. In such a case you reprogram yourself to resolve the conflict. You bail out or in. Either way, you develop some reasoning (create memes) that support you in your choice. This method is especially effective with smart people, because you will believe that it was actually your idea. *Trojan Horses* are simple, effective, and relatively easy to realize. The first- or second order button is always there (even if they are trying to hide it) next to the meme they want to sell you.

The job of an individual in this mess is not to get rid of mind viruses. They are always there. Your mind is open and hungry for memes. The job of an educated person is to be selective. Choose your memes yourself. Design your own meme-complexes. Realize when you are brainwashed. Remember, brainwashing is not bad. It is natural. When you are trying to convince your friend about your “truth” in the matter of the migrant crisis in the pub, you are doing that. You manipulate and being manipulated. Who is the winner if somebody succeeds in the manipulation? Just keep in mind that the first-order winner is the meme that is being replicated in the process.

What are the principles on the basis of which we are supposed to be selective? In any case, the first step is to get conscious. You must consciously choose between the mind viruses bombarding your brain ceaselessly. How can you do that? Here is a few ideas. (1) Be informed! Get the Big Data and try to process it. It is hard. The important information is generally hidden from you. You must find it. (2) Be really selective. Forget the liberal propaganda about the equality of ideas. You must decide what is good for you. It is your responsibility. If you do not take the responsibility, you will find yourself programmed just because you did not care. (3) Shut the really dangerous portion of the brainwashing stream out. It is simpler than you think. Turn off the tube! (4) Find other people who think like you. There is more of them than you think. It is just that the connection between them and you is not created yet (see Cultural Creatives). (5) Understand Memetics! It will help you realize what programs are running in your mind already and help you reprogram yourself in the direction you want.

What is that direction is your decision. Nobody can tell you, because in that moment you get programmed. Here is a hint. Survival is a pretty powerful drive. I would say, if your meme-complexes, or your culture in general, put you in a position where you get in danger, your alarm should start ringing. The meme-complex you have is not necessarily a surviving meme-complex. If the essential meme complexes of your culture are not survival meme-complexes, they will perish and your culture with them. And you will perish

with your culture. In such a situation, you must change your culture by getting rid of the suicide meme-complexes. I give you an example. Let us hypothetically suppose that there are two meme-complexes denoted by “L” and “I”. Their attributes are in this table.

“L” meme-complex	“I” meme-complex
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• I do not want kids, they are noisy and just pain in the ass.</li> <li>• Religion is not important.</li> <li>• Everybody believes in whatever he/she wants.</li> <li>• Family/country/community are old-fashioned concepts. It is the individual that matters.</li> <li>• My goal is to have as much fun in my life as possible. The most important thing to reach this goal is money.</li> <li>• I love piece and flowers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• My opinion is well grounded and I will tell it to as many people as I can.</li> <li>• It is important to have as many children as possible. They are the future.</li> <li>• My culture and way of living is important. We have to preserve it for our children.</li> <li>• My religion is the right one. I will spread it in every possible way.</li> <li>• I love my family/country/community. I am willing to defend them and die for them if needed.</li> <li>• I will fight for my goals.</li> </ul>

The question is that in the time of turbulence and phase transitions, which meme-complex is the survival one? It does not matter whether you like the “I” meme-complex, it is not about “liking”. You will have to apply some elements of that system in yours in order to be competitive.



At the end, allow me a few remarks about the responsibilities of “Intellectuals”. After a period when advertisement agencies, half-educated journalists, rock stars, narrow-sighted scientists, burnt-out teachers, and traitorous opinion-leaders formed our thinking, we should stand on our feet and take the responsibility to form an opinion about the Word that helps the survival of our Culture and our children. We must act consciously.

Two quotes at the end:

“Those who have the privilege to know have the duty to act.”

(Albert Einstein)

“And History will smile to think that this is the species for which Socrates and Jesus Christ died.” (Julien Benda)



### ***Bibliography***

M. P. Allen and D. J. Tildesley. *Computer Simulation of Liquids*, Oxford Science Publications, 1987.

- D. Boda. Monte Carlo simulation of electrolyte solutions in biology: in and out of equilibrium. *Ann. Rep. Comp. Chem.*, Editor R. A. Wheeler, volume **10**, pages 127–163. Elsevier, 2014.  
<http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/occamraz.html> for “Occam’s razor” at the Principia Cybernetica Web
- Zoltán Ható, Dezső Boda, Dirk Gillet, Jadran Vrabec, Gábor Rutkai, Tamás Kristóf. Simulation study of a rectifying bipolar ion channel: detailed model versus reduced model". *Condens. Matt. Phys.* submitted, 2015.  
<http://nce2.uni-pannon.hu/scholarship/mod/resource/view.php?id=220>
- H. Miedema, M. Vrouenraets, J. Wierenga, W. Meijberg, G. Robillard, B. Eisenberg, *Nano Lett.*, 7(9): 2886, 2007.
- Earl R. Babbie. *The Practice of Social Research*, 13th Ed. Wadsworth Publishing, 2012.
- Stephen Whitefield. In Defence of Social and Political Science in Times of Crisis, Second Blue Sky Conference, 29-31 October, 2015, Budapest
- György Csepeli. Comment to Stephen Whitefield. In Defence of Social and Political Science in Times of Crisis, Second Blue Sky Conference, 29-31 October, 2015, Budapest
- Albert-Laszlo Barabasi. *Linked: How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means for Business, Science, and Everyday Life*, Plume, 2003.
- Csermely Péter. *A rejtett hálózatok ereje (Tudomány-Egyetem)*, Vince, 2005.
- Csermely Péter. *Bloghálózatos életfilozófiám*, Typotex, 2012.
- Charles Darwin. *The Origin of Species: By Means of Natural Selection, Or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life*. John Murray, 1890.
- Richard Dawkins. *The Selfish Gene*. Oxford paperbacks. Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Susan Blackmore. *The Meme Machine*. OUP Oxford, 2000.
- Daniel C. Dennett. *Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meaning of Life*. Simon & Schuster, 2014.
- Ely Asher. *Disinfect Your Mind: Defend Yourself with Memetics Against Mass Media, Politicians*, Galiel.Net, 2004.
- Richard Brodie. *Virus of the Mind: The New Science of the Meme*. Hay House, Incorporated, 2009.
- Robert Aunger. *The Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We Think*. Simon & Schuster, 2013.
- Jared Diamond. *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed*, Pinguins, 2005.
- Péter Csermely. Network analysis as a bridge and mindset giving a synergy between social and natural sciences, ISES seminar, Kőszeg, Dec. 1, 2015.
- O. Spengler, H. Werner, and C.F. Atkinson. *The Decline of the West*. Oxford paperbacks. Oxford University Press, 1991.
- José Ortega y Gasset. *The Revolt of the Masses*. Norton paperback. W.W. Norton, 1993.
- Richard Dawkins. *The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design*, W. W. Norton & Company, 1996.

David M. Buss. *Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind*. Allyn and Bacon, 1999.

Geoffrey Miller. *The Mating Mind: How Sexual Choice Shaped the Evolution of Human Nature: How Sexual Choice Shaped Human Nature*, Vintage, 2001.

Anthony Pratkanis, Elliot Aronson. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*, Holt Paperbacks, 2001.

Malcolm Gladwell. *Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking*. Little, Brown, 2007

## **Physical Basis of Limits to Growth**

L.P. Csernai, I. Papp, S.F. Spinnangr, and Y.L. Xie

### ***Abstract***

This work is based on the talk given by L.P. Csernai at the Blue Sky International Conference in the Buda Castle on Oct. 30, 2015, Budapest, Hungary. The human development on the Earth is analysed based on basic physical principles and the available resources. The areal and material resources are obviously finite, but the very fundamental energy resources are sufficient in solid and sustainable continuing development. These energy resources can compensate many of the constraints arising from the finite material resources. The direction is going in the direction of increasing complexity on the surface of the Earth, due to the increasing green mass and the developing biological and material complex structures. This sustainable development is enabled by the astrophysical conditions and constraints and these conditions provide a good possibility for continuous further development in a sustainable way. This development is characterized by the increasing neg-entropy on the surface of the Earth.

## ***Introduction***

The Limits to Growth is a 1972 book, commissioned by the Club of Rome, about the exponential economic and population growth with finite resource supplies [9]. The book used a computer model to simulate the consequences of interactions between the Earth's resources and human systems.

The original version presented a model based on exponential growth of world population, industrialization. These conditions led to a collapse and reversal of the growth around 2030.

By now we see that these model predictions were unrealistic, and the 2030 as the limit of the growth of human society is unreasonable. See Prof. Norbert Kroo's talk at this meeting.

The population increase of the Earth is not linear or exponential. Clearly there are periods with more rapid increase and saturation of the population. These are actually not so much connected the availability of certain resources but the development of technology. The first rapid increase of growth was caused by the development of agriculture a few thousand years ago, then the next is the development of industry that started a couple of hundred years ago. This showed that the availability of energy is just as important for development as the availability of food.

## ***The Availability of Energy***

The problem of the Heat Death of the Universe that can arise from the non-decreasing entropy of a closed, near equilibrium system was brought up already by Kelvin in 1852. However, according to our present knowledge, the Universe is not in equilibrium, it is expanding and the expansion changes due to the gravitation.

The heat death idea was also brought up for the Earth, but the Earth is also an open system, it exchanges energy with the surrounding: Enormous radiated energy is received from the Sun,  $dQ_{Sun}$ , and it radiates in infrared into the universe,  $dQ_{Earth}$ .

The incoming and outgoing radiations are nearly equal; this is evidenced by the existence of all three phases of the water (steam, water, ice) on the Earth. As we will see later the imbalance is small, it is about  $dQ_{Sun} - dQ_{Earth} = +0.6\text{W/m}^2$ , while the maximum of the Solar irradiation exceeds  $1000\text{W/m}^2$ . Consequently we can use the approximation

$$dQ_{Sun} \approx dQ_{Earth} . \quad (1)$$

At the same time the Sun's radiation and the Earth's radiation is different, these are thermal radiations, but can be characterized by very different temperatures:

$$T_{Sun} \approx 6000K , T_{Earth} \approx 300K . \quad (2)$$

We perceive these radiations by their color. Our light-bulbs are usually radiating a color corresponding to 3000 K, and a 4000 K light-bulb is already looking blueish.

Having estimated the heat fluxes and the temperatures of the incoming and outgoing radiation we can also determine the incoming and outgoing *entropy* currents using the definition:

$$dS = \frac{dQ}{T} . \quad (3)$$

Here we assume locally equilibrated systems, which can be characterized by "intensive" thermodynamic parameters as temperature,  $T$ , pressure,  $p$ , etc. In a closed system spontaneous changes must lead to an increase of the entropy,  $dS = dQ/T_{\underline{T}} > 0$ . This thermodynamic entropy is sometimes also called Gibbs entropy. The entropy is an additive ("extensive") quantity, thus we can calculate the change of the Earth's entropy, assuming that both the source, the Sun, and the Earth is in close to local equilibrium, and the energy transfer can be characterized by the temperature of the source:

$$dS_{Earth} = \frac{dQ}{T_{Sun}} - \frac{dQ}{T_{Earth}} < 0 . \quad (4)$$

That is the entropy of the Earth is decreasing. What is this entropy and what does it mean that the entropy of the Earth is decreasing. We have seen that the entropy increase was perceived as the Heat Death, so all materials burn and will form structure less dust and smoke. The decreasing entropy (also called as neg-entropy) should be the opposite, but how can we quantify this?

The decrease of entropy may happen if the matter is organized into more complex molecules, living cells, organisms coded with a DNA, and even with the structure of the human brain. These complex living systems are not in equilibrium, these are in change and in development; so their entropy, should not be characterized by a temperature.

Another competing factor is the rather turbulent strong currents in the atmosphere and at the surface of the sea caused by the large temperature differences. The viscosity of air and water damps these currents, while generating entropy increase [3].

These considerations indicate that to discuss the development on the Earth should be based on quality and not quantity, and therefore the role of entropy is fundamental in discussing the limits of growth.

### ***Gibbs Entropy, Shannon Entropy and the Entropy of Life***

It was observed by Boltzmann that the entropy density of a gas out of equilibrium can be characterized in the space,  $x$ , and momentum,  $p$ , space, by the entropy density

$$s(x) = - \int d^3p f(x, p) [\ln f(x, p) - 1], \quad (5)$$

where  $f(x, p)$  is the  $(x, p)$ -phase space density distribution of the constituent particles of the gas, i.e. the probability that a particle is in a given phase space "volume" element.

(Here we used the convention that the Boltzmann constant is,  $k_B = 1$ ,  $c = 1$ , and  $\hbar c = 1$ .) We have to integrate this distribution to all possible phase space volume elements. If we want to receive exactly the same value for the entropy as in thermodynamics, then we have to quantize the volume of the phase space volume elements, based on the uncertainty principle (i.e. that the position and momentum of a particle cannot be determined exactly at the same time). The last term, "-1" is there to secure that the exact low temperature limit of this entropy is the same as in the thermodynamic exact definition. It can be shown that the entropy defined this way returns exactly the same entropy as defined in thermodynamics [1]. Boltzmann has shown that this non-equilibrium entropy increases in closed systems until one does not reach the thermal equilibrium, this is described by the "Boltzmann H-theorem". This development actually leads to an increasing 'disorder' in our system.

The information entropy, also called 'Shannon Entropy', was introduced in the mid 1900s [2]. If we assume  $n(x)$  particles of the same type in a volume element, the entropy expression, eq. (5), takes the form

$$s(x) = -n(x) \sum_i p_i \ln p_i, \quad (6)$$

where  $p_i$  is the probability of having a single particle in a given phase-space volume element,  $i$ , and we have to sum up the contributions of all particles. We can also consider several different objects,

with many different states,  $i$ , for each of them and then the total entropy of this system can be described as

$$S = - \sum_i p_i \ln p_i, \quad (7)$$

where the summation runs over all objects and all of their states.

This way we can for example estimate the human brain's entropy. In ref. [4], the entropy of humans (as well as some animals) were estimated. The total entropy of the Earth considering all complex systems and life-forms is difficult to calculate precisely, but we can compare the entropy of the different species at their maximum level of complexity, as well as the rate of increase of their entropy during their lifetime. This can be done based on their metabolism and body weight. It is shown that Maximal neg-entropy and the rate of entropy increase provides a good estimate for the life-span of the different species.

The same way one can estimate the increase of neg-entropy of the Earth by considering the increase of population, the increase of the populations of the different species and the increase of the green mass. This is somewhat compensated by the weakly increasing temperature and thus increasing entropy of the atmosphere and the surface layer of the Earth. But the growth of complexity has to dominate the entropy increase from the warming, due to the overall decrease of the entropy of the Earth.

Nevertheless the decreasing Entropy of the Earth alone is not sufficient to explain the existence and development of life on the Earth.

The neighboring planets have similar entropy imbalance and we still did not see the development of life there. The Earth has a special advantage: the existence of Water in 3 phases, Steam, Water and Ice. This acts as a thermostat, and the latent heat of ice and water vapor establishes a relatively constant temperature environment. This enables the buildup of complex molecules, cells, and life.

In the Sahara, or on the Moon, or Mars, the temperature changes daily by near to 100 °K, so the conditions for a stable gradual and sustainable development are not present.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> Still the question arises what happens with the decreasing entropy on other planets where this is not generating complex structures and life forms. On these planets the lack of water and the thin atmosphere leads to much larger surface temperature differences. This additional structure and the arising strong winds in the thin atmosphere, with turbulent currents lead to significant entropy production balancing the smaller entropy input from the Sun. The radiation outwards is much less uniform compared to the Earth, and a significant part of the Solar irradiation can be directly reflected back. With the rotation of the planet the absorbed heat still radiated out to the Universe at a much lower temperature. This non-uniform radiation, is proportional to  $T^4_{\text{Surface}}$ , thus it is much higher from the hotter, sunny side than from the dark side of the planet. This way it is acting in the direction of equilibrating the surface temperature, and radiating away the neg-entropy of arising from the surface temperature difference. I.e. the radiation out from such a planet is not thermal, and in eq. (4) incoming and outgoing entropy difference is smaller or negligible because of the reflection and the stronger atmospheric turbulent entropy production.

Let us see how stable is this "Water thermostat" of the Earth.

#### A. Ice as the Earth's Thermostat

Nowadays, the Earth is getting occupied by human beings more and more. Due to the hot focus of Global Warming, humans are concerned about the speed of melting the ice. Here we simply estimate the ice melting speed from physical fundamentals, based on some knowledge and observations as follow:

(1) The Earth's ice volume was estimated to be about:  $29,960,000 \text{ km}^3$  [5], i.e.:

$$3 \times 10^7 \text{ km}^3 = 3 \times 10^{16} \text{ m}^3 = 3 \times 10^{16} \times 0.9 \times 10^3 \text{ kg} = 2.7 \times 10^{19} \text{ kg} .$$

(2) The Earth surface is:  $5.1 \times 10^8 \text{ km}^2$  [8], i.e.  $5.1 \times 10^{14} \text{ m}^2$ . The area of glaciers on Earth is  $1.6 \times 10^7 \text{ km}^2$  [5].

(3) From NASA's observations, there exists on the surface of the Earth a small energy imbalance,  $dQ_{Sun} - dQ_{Earth}$ , which is measured to be  $0.60 \pm 0.17 \text{ W/m}^2$  [7].

If the energy imbalance is distributed evenly on the surface of the Earth, then the energy imbalance of the ice surface on the Earth, roughly equals to:  $3 \times 10^{20} \text{ J/year}$ . Then using the latent heat of ice,  $3.35 \times 10^5 \text{ J/kg}$ , the melted ice each year is about  $3 \times 10^{20} / 3.35 \times 10^5 \text{ kg} = 9 \times 10^{14} \text{ kg}$ , and it will take  $3 \times 10^5$  years to **melt all the ice** on the Earth.

Interestingly if we consider all of the ice as fresh water, when the **ice melts in the salty seas** it will increase the level of the seas due to the density difference between salty and fresh water. Salty water is more dense therefore fresh water cannot displace the amount of salty water equal to its own mass. We can calculate the average rise of sea levels per year. If  $9 \times 10^{14} \text{ kg}$  of ice melts each year, calculating with  $1.03 \text{ g/ml}$  of salty water density, it will displace roughly  $8.7 \times 10^{14} \text{ kg}$  of sea water. The volume of this water is roughly  $8.5 \times 10^2 \text{ km}^3$ . By distributing this amount on a surface of  $3.6 \times 10^8 \text{ km}^2$  we will obtain a sea level increase of **2.3-2.4 mm per year**.

We also have to take into account that the energy imbalance is heating up the oceans as well. Considering the salinity of a small portion of the ocean, which could absorb the




FIG. 1.

Measurements of sea level per year according to satellites of NASA. It shows a 3.24 mm increase of sea level per year [6].

heat, the heat capacity of that portion would be roughly  $4100 \text{ J kg}^{-1} \text{ K}^{-1}$  [10] and the energy received on the surface of the ocean ( $3.6 \times 10^{14} \text{ m}^2$ ) is  $6.8 \times 10^{21} \text{ J/year}$ . With this heat capacity when all the energy is absorbed by that portion,  $1.6 \times 10^{18} \text{ kg}$  ( $1.58 \times 10^6 \text{ km}^3$ ) of sea water would be heated up by 1 K, and if we calculate with a linear thermal expansion coefficient of  $2.1 \times 10^{-4} \text{ K}^{-1}$  the volume of that portion would increase with  $330 \text{ km}^3$ . Distributing this volume on the surface of the sea would approximately result in **0.9 mm increase of sea level per year**.

Adding up the two effects gives nearly exactly the values measured by NASA [6].

The estimate of radiated energy imbalance and the observed sea level change are thus consistent. As a matter of fact in the last few thousand years the sea level change was similar, around 1-2 mm per year or 1-2 m per 1000 years. If this sea level change is going to be increased or not is unclear at this moment. IPCC's 2001 projections estimate the range of sea level increase from this value, i.e. **9 cm to 88 cm** for the next 100 years.

In IPCC's worst case scenario this would mean that the ice on the Earth would melt in  $3 \times 10^4$  years, but by then the Earth's energy supply certainly will not be based on fossil fuels, and until then the ice serves us well for cooling the Earth.

In the industrial age the amount of energy available for humanity is increasing but again not linearly or exponentially, rather with rapid increases and stagnation periods. These are connected to the takeover of different energy sources, as wood, coal, oil, natural-gas, and nuclear energy. All but the last mentioned one are actually converted from the energy of the Sun, with shorter or longer storage or latency periods. In addition come the more or less direct (renewable) conversions of solar energy

via Water, Wind, Photo-Voltaic, energy sources. These forms of energy resources may be limited, particularly the fossile ones, coal, oil and natural gas. These could be available for a limited time of the order of  $10^2$  years. The other renewable energy forms have higher economic costs and an intermittent nature, which would require additional expenses as well as additional technological tools for storage.

The Nuclear energy is under development. This is not a conversion of the solar energy for our use, rather the use of those nuclear reactions which occur typically in the stars: fission and fusion. This last form of energy is available at a much larger scale and could last several orders of magnitude longer than the other energy forms dominant up to now. Thus the energy supply of the Earth is sufficient to Sustainable Development even with still increasing population.

A further hindrance of Growth is the environmental side effects, due to pollution, waste heat and change of the atmosphere, and atmospheric processes due to the emission of climate gases, particles and aerosols. The pollution and waste are actually generating entropy increase, so if our aim is to achieve a sustainable Development measured in quality we have to maximize the development of more complex forms of matter with the least waste production. These side effects are today dominant for the fossile energy production, so these effects will essentially disappear together with the fossile energy.

Still these environmental and atmospheric side effects are at this moment of time important, particularly in rapidly developing part of the World like China.

### ***The Energy Mix of China and its Consequences***

About 70 % of the energy production in China is made from coal. This is the most polluting form of energy sources. The question arises what are the present environmental effects of energy conversion in China. The question arises does China becomes warmer or colder? Maybe colder due to the smog from energy production?




FIG. 2. China' energy production mix in 2011. Source [16].


The present temperature change in China was estimated to be  $+0.15\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$  in 10 years (1951-2004) [11]. This value is a conservative estimate, i.e. it is a maximum value, and the practical value at different places and times may be lower. The well known Chinese scientist, Chu Ko-Chen, has studied China's historical climate fluctuations, and his conclusion was that the typical climatic temperature change in China was  $0.5 - 1\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$  in every 50-100 years [12], but sometimes as much as  $0.1\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$  per 10 years. The recently measured value of  $0.15\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$  per 10 years, [11] is somewhat greater than  $0.1\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}$  per 10 years, but from Fig. 3 in Ref. [12] this changing speed of  $0.15\text{ }^{\circ}\text{C}/10$  years can also be found in China's earlier history. During the last 30 years, the temperature did have an obvious increase, but it is not unusual, especially considering the urbanization and effect of urban heat islands [13]. The temperature during the last 15 years increased in a mild way [13, 14], and even in some regions such as in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, there is a trend of temperature decrease in recent years [14]. This is attributed to the excessive dust and aerosol emission in these regions. However, according Refs. [12, 14], one should also notice that the temperature in China has climbed to the highest level in the last 5000 years. This temperature growth started roughly from 1900.

As a conclusion, China has entered into a hot period since 1950 [15], and this increasing of temperature would be maintained for about another 50 years (because the cyclic period of the temperature in China is about 100 years [15]).

### *China's Energy Resource Structure*

Thirty years ago the energy production was almost exclusively based on burning coal and a smaller amount of oil. The energy production increases by more than a factor of 6 in this time and still coal and oil are the dominant sources of energy, but the hydroelectric energy came up to the 3rd place (especially due to constructing the World's largest Hydroelectric power plant of 22.5 GW (equivalent to 22 large Nuclear Power Plants). Just about 25 km downstream on the Yangtze River there is another dam at Yichang City with 2.7 GW power production. Still the total hydroelectric power of China is below 10 %.

FIG. 3. The development of China's energy production in the last 30 years. Source [17].



At this time (2014) China has about 20 GWe energy production by Nuclear Power plant and another 26 GW is under construction. By 2020 China plans to reach a fraction of 6 % Nuclear Power in its energy mix.

## *Limited Resources*

Certainly the surface of the Earth is finite, especially the dry-land, and the population density is increasing. So, the exponential or rapid increase of the population is not sustainable on the long term. Food production is still increasing adequately, but one should consider the land area of one of the most precious resources.

Again we can take China as example. In the 1960s China had famine, with a population of about 0.7 billion. The one child per family was introduced and strictly enforced. The agriculture is made technologically more intensive with fertilizers, gene modified crops and improved agricultural technologies. Production of fertilizers is highly energy consuming, but this was made possible by increased energy production. In addition the economic conditions were also modernized, different social productions and different incentives were introduced. This altogether led to a food production which by 2000 exceeded the demand. This happened without the increase of the agricultural territory but with a significantly higher energy consumption of agriculture. Thus seemingly rigid limits can be relaxed by technological and social advances!

The sustainable population growth is also an important question. Developing countries have large reproduction rate and increasing population, while the most developed countries have usually stagnating or slightly decreasing population.

The Chinese one child policy turned out to be unsustainable, as the working Chinese population became too small to cover the needs of the ageing elderly population. This led to changing the one child policy to a two child policy at the end of 2015. This shows that the issue of sustainability should be regularly reviewed and modified according to the needs. Usually decreasing or lacking resources can be replaced or reproduced, but one should consider the costs and consequences carefully.

This also applies to the questions of energy production, where the proper energy mix, the rate of the change of the mix, and the level of subsidizing or enforcing the change, are of utmost importance. Usually one cannot find or apply a general solution to these problems because these parameters depend on geographical, historical and economic conditions. The balancing the sustainable development among different countries, is a non-trivial questions and may lead to political differences and disagreements (sometimes even wars).

Under these conditions the sustainable development is a highly complex problem, where

natural science and human or social science issues are equally important. Thus a communication among these different scientific research activities should be much more intensive than earlier.

However, not only the sustainability of the development but the direction of development is changing.

### ***The Direction of Development***

As we discussed the Astrophysical conditions of the Earth and the Solar System, secure relatively balanced energy transfer to and from the Earth, stable physical conditions, with physical parameters that enable the sustainable Development of more complex organic molecules, life-forms, and human constructions on all scales. Even developments in the social structures of humanity could be considered as entropy increasing and decreasing changes, although these are difficult to assess quantitatively.

The constrained size of the Earth will not allow unlimited increase of the population, and the amount of material resources will not increase either. These conditions will remain the same for very many years (until population towards other planets will become technically and economically possible and desirable).

The development, already today, goes in the direction of increased complexity of the human life. Eg. cars do not grow but consume less fuel. Even Formula-1 race cars use hybrid technology today. We have much more effective and diverse medicaments, and medical methods. Thus, the exploitation of the increasing neg-entropy is continuing in our present development. Many aspects of these positive developments were mentioned in Norbert Kroo's talk at this conference.

The 70th Anniversary UN General Assembly in September 2015, has uniformly accepted [18] those goals (27), which serve the peaceful and sustainable development of humanity and the direction of this development.

Regarding the Energy, our Goal (7) is to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all, peoples and countries. In more detail (7.1) By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services; (7.2) By 2030, increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix (7.3) By 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency.

These goals should be reached by adequate Research, and the solutions should be available and applicable for Developing Countries also.

Let us close these considerations by the thoughts of Nobel Laureate (1978) Alexander R. Todd: The phenomenal rate of change which has characterized our material civilization during this century has been wholly due to the application of scientific discoveries to practical problems -in a word, to science based technology. ... automobiles, television, antibiotics and all the rest -have depended on science. ... Of course, no-one would claim that science has been a wholly unmixed blessing or deny that it has been on occasion misapplied. ... What I wish to argue is that, just as we owe our present civilization and standard of living largely to science, it is only through the further promotion of science and technology that we will find solutions to many seemingly intractable problems... (If) we continue to improve our natural knowledge all experience suggests that we will see changes which will radically alter the whole pattern of our lives - or if not of our lives then those of our children and grandchildren; and we shall survive.

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is supported by the New Central Europe II. project. The authors L.P.Cs., I.P. and Y.L.X. thank for the enlightening discussions at the Institute of Social and European Studies in Kőszeg, Hungary.

#### *References*

- [1] L.P. Csernai: Introduction to Relativistic Heavy Ion Collisions, (Wiley, 1994).
- [2] C.E. Shannon, A mathematical theory of communication. Bell Syst. Tech. J. 27, 379-423 (1948), and ibid. 27, 623-656 (1948).
- [3] Y. Liu, C.J. Liu, and D.H. Wang, Entropy 13, 211-240 (2011).
- [4] L. Penzes and L. Csernai, Zeitschrift fur Altersforschung, 35, 285-96 (1980).
- [5] W.R. Johnston, 29 December 2005, Online  
[<http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/environment/waterworld.html>];  
M.B. Lythe, D.G. Vaughan, and the BEDMAP Consortium, Journal of Geophysical Research B6, 11335-11351(2001);

- [6] NASA Goddard Space Flight Center: Satellite sea level observations 1993-present (2015). See: <http://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/sea-level/>  
R.Z. Poore, R.S. Williams Jr., and T. Christopher, U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 002-00, (2000), Online [<http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs2-00/>].
- [7] G.L. Stephens, J. Li, M. Wild, C.A. Clayson, N. Loeb, S. Kato, T. L'Ecuyer, P.W. Stackhouse Jr., M. Lebsock and T. Andrews, *Nature Geoscience* 5, 691-696 (2012).
- [8] M. Pidwirny. (2006). "Introduction to the Oceans". *Fundamentals of Physical Geography*, 2nd Edition. Online [<http://www.physicalgeography.net/fundamentals/8o.html>]
- [9] D.H. Meadows, D.L. Meadows, J. Randers, W.W. Behrens III, *The Limits to Growth: a report for the Club of Rome's project on the predicament of mankind*, (Universe Books, 1972), ISBN 0-87663-165-0
- [10] McDougall, T.J., R. Feistel, F. J. Millero, D. R. Jackett, D. G. Wright, B. A. King, G. M. Marion, C.-T. A. Chen and P. Spitzer, 2009: Calculation of the Thermophysical Properties of Seawater, *Global Ship-based Repeat Hydrography Manual*, IOCCP Report No. 14, ICPO Publication Series no. 134.
- [11] Guo-Yu Ren, Zi-Ying Chu, Ya-Qing Zhou, Ming-Zhi Xu, Ying Wang, Guo-Li Tang, Pan-Mao Zhai, Xue-Mei Shao, Ai-Ying Zhang, et al., *Climatic and Environmental Research* 4, 701 (2005).
- [12] Ko-Chen Chu, *Sci. Sinica A* 14, 168 (1973).
- [13] Shu-bing Wang, Yun-long Wu, Li-ang Xiang, Shu-qian Niu, *Climate Change Research Letters* 3, 185 (2014).
- [14] Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China, 'Climate and Natural Disasters', *China Environmental Bulletin* (2010). Online [[http://jcs.mep.gov.cn/hjzl/zkgb/2010zkgb/201106/t20110602\\_211563.htm](http://jcs.mep.gov.cn/hjzl/zkgb/2010zkgb/201106/t20110602_211563.htm)]
- [15] Quansheng Ge, Xiuqi Fang, Jingyun Zheng, *Advanced In Earth Science* 1, 23 (2014).
- [16] U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2015. Online [<http://www.marcon.com/marcon2c.cfm?SectionListsID=30&PageID=2803>]
- [17] G. Tverberg, 2012. Online [<http://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/09/17/the-close-tie-between-energy-consumption>]

employment-and-recession/]

- [18] "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", Unanimously Adopted Resolution of the UNs 70th General Assembly on Sept. 25, 2015. Document A/70/L.1. Online: <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=A/70/L.1&Lang=E>

# Potentials for Renewable Energy in the Kőszeg Region

Szabolcs Varga

## *Abstract*

The renewable energy potential of Kőszeg Region is examined by means of Google Earth Pro software and the available data sources (KSI, MET, World Bank, etc.). Our estimations show that the electric energy demand of the region can be satisfied by covering all roofs of the regions with photovoltaic devices and large battery systems. The hydroelectric power potential of the region is weak due to the low flow rate of the Gyöngyös. Electric energy production with wind turbines is also limited because of the proximity of the villages to each other. Other types of energy demands of the population such as the car fuels (petrol, diesel oil) and heat energy (wood, natural gas) can be produced in the arable lands and forests. However, our calculations show that very intensive use of the lands is required to provide enough renewable energies to fulfill the present energy need of the population. The total change from fossil energy resources to the renewable ones would dramatically change the landscape and the environment of the region. The sustainability of the region is questionable with the present size of the population.

## *Introduction*


The energy demand of the world is continuously growing due to changes of life style and globalization [1]. This tendency is equally true for both developing and developed countries even if there are some negative tendencies in some European countries, such as the Netherlands (-6,2%), Germany (-4.5%), and France (-4.1%), in Canada (-0.33%), and in China (-0.25%) for the period of 2014-2014 [2]. Energy consumption is more or less proportional to the gross national product and it grows exponentially [3]. To maintain the economic growth and fulfill the energy demand of mankind we must search for new energy sources in the earth because the fossil (non-renewable) energy resources are running out. Awareness of this issue has surprisingly long history. To mention just one example, in the 1970s the Saudi Oil Minister said that “the stone age didn’t end for lack of stone, and the oil age will end long before the world runs out of oil”[4]. As alternative energy resources the renewable energies are getting widespread due to their low impact on the environment and the climate and their minimization of CO<sub>2</sub> emission [5]. The share of renewable energies in total energy consumption is continuously increasing but it is still negligible compared to fossil energies. The aim is to replace

fossil energies completely by renewable ones in our planet to prevent global energy crisis in the future. It is still an open question whether the energy demand of mankind can be fulfilled completely by renewable energies, considering the present exponential growth of the economy and energy consumption. Hungary's situation is unfavorable, as the country is very poor in fossil energies and the energy density of renewable energies is below the world average [6]. Hungary is rich in biomass and geothermal energy but it is under the average of European countries in solar and wind energies. In principle, the size of the roof of family houses can serve enough electric and heat energies for an average family (4-5 people) using solar collectors and solar cells, however, the problem is the incoming energy being non-uniform, that is, energy production is high during the sunny hours but zero at night. In addition to this the amount of solar energy changes with the season (low in winter and high in summer). We have similar problems with wind energy, the speed of wind being very frequently below the minimum speed of energy production (the wind must rotate the blades of the wind turbines) and sometimes too high for energy production [7]. In order to fulfill the energy demand in 24 hours, some extra energy must be stored in batteries or in a water reservoir, which is still a challenging technical problem. Even the simplest pumped-storage hydroelectric technology [8], which converts electric energy into potential energy first (water is lifted to a higher level with a pump) and then converts potential energy back to electric energy with water turbines, gives rise to certain environmental issues, such as flood [9]. The energy supply of concentrated places such as big cities, industrial parks, and office building complexes is questionable with the locally produced renewable energies. To see the above mentioned issues more clearly on a local level, I determined the state of renewable energies in the region of Kőszeg and recommend some possible new developing directions to maximize the share of renewable energies. I search for the possibilities of making the Kőszeg Region energy independent by means of renewable energy resources. Furthermore, I examine the possibility of the sustainable development of the region with the assumption of constant population number and steady-state industry.

### ***Important Facts About the Kőszeg Region***


First I would like to review of the available statistical data about Kőszeg Region to help the estimation of the renewable potential of the region. In my study the area of the examined territory is 18507 hectares, which was collected from the Wikipedia data of 15 settlements (Figure 1). It shows that Kőszeg is the largest among them but there are also a few villages with large fields and forests, like Bozsok, Horvátzsidány, and Kőszegpaty. Regarding the number of inhabitants, 65% of the population lives in the city, while the rest is distributed in the surrounding 14 villages (Figure 2). The

density of the population is 97.68 pop./km<sup>2</sup>, which is below the 106 pop./km<sup>2</sup> value of Hungary, i.e. this region belongs to the less occupied part of Hungary.




**Figure 1:** Area of the examined settlements (1 city and 14 villages)

Regarding the distribution of arable lands, fields, forests, and occupied built-up places, we can see that forests and agricultural regions are in balance (Figure 3), which is not typical of Hungary. This is due to the fact that this region is very hilly, i.e. many places are not useful for agricultural purposes. It is important to mention that I obtained Fig. 3 using the Google Earth Pro software [10], which allows us to measure the area of the selected polygons. As a check of the software I constructed a polygon which covers the whole region and measured the area of the constructed polygon. I found that the total area of the region is 18446 hectares instead of 18507 hectares (Wikipedia data). Since the difference is just 61 hectares (the error is just a 600 m wide and 1000 m long land), I decided that I can trust the area measuring module of Google Earth Pro software (Figure 4).




**Figure 2:** Population number of the examined settlements (1 city and 14 villages)




**Figure 3:** Share of forests, arable lands, fields and built-up places in percentage

Using the software I constructed a map of the forests in the region (Figure 5). I found 11 separate larger than 4-hectare areas of forests (Figure 6). We can see that the Kőszeg Mountains (Kőszegi-hegység) and the Kőszeg Forest (Kőszegi-erdő) are the two most important



**Figure 4:** Google Earth map of the selected region (border of the region-orange curve)


forests. The majority of these forests are not in extensive forestry use, i.e. they are protected to maintain the original landscape and biodiversity (they are part of the Nature 2000 Network). As a result, the harvestable energy (trees) is limited in such places (Figure 7) because these places are not in use. From an energetic point of view, the forests



**Figure 5:** The forests of Kőszeg Region (green shaded areas)



I could not find data for the total energy use of the region. We can make a crude estimation for it from the available data of World Bank. In Fig. 8 we compare the total energy use of different countries having similar GDP.



**Figure 8:** The energy use (consumption) of different countries and the World. Energy use refers to the use of primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels (except ships and aircraft engaged with international transport). Source: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.PCAP.KG.OE/countries/1W-HU-BT?display=graph>

One can see that the energy consumption per capita shows decreasing tendency in Europe, while it is still growing in the rest of the World (Asia, Africa). The European tendency is due to the energy saving campaigns and the good political environment (isolation of the buildings, energy saving devices). Therefore we can assume that the present energy use is going to be less or the same in the future even if we use more and more electronic devices. In Hungary the total primary energy use per capita was 2313 kgoe in 2013, which corresponds to 96841 MJ. Taking this value as an average energy use per capita in Kőszeg Region, we get that the total energy demand is 1751 million MJ, as the population of the region is 18079 (KSI data, 2015). If we want to harness this energy from solar irradiance (insolation), we can calculate how much of the incoming solar energy should be captured by plants or photovoltaic devices. The annual solar irradiance is about 4500 MJ/m<sup>2</sup> [11], while the area of the region is 18507 hectares. **From these data we get that the capturing 0.21 % of the incoming irradiance would be enough for the whole region.** In the light of the 10-20% energy conversion efficiency of photovoltaic devices and the 0.5-1 % efficiency of photosynthesis [6], it seems that the required energy can be captured safely in the region. We continue our study by

considering several CO<sub>2</sub> free energy capturing methods in the next sections to answer whether our present renewable energy capturing methods are capable of satisfying our energy demand or not.

### ***Solar Energy Potential***

There are two possible ways of establishing farms of photovoltaic devices (solar cells): 1) fixing them to building roofs or concretes (places where there is no vegetation), 2) making a park of them in the green. One example for the first one is to make a shade for cars with solar panels (Figure S1), while a good example for the second one is the new solar power station built in the Mátra (Figure S2).

The first one is practical, because it serves as a parking place and saves the car from




**Figure S1:** Solar panels in parking places (UAM, Spain)



**Figure S2:** 15 MWp solar power station in the Mátra  
(Photo: Mátrai Erómű ZRt., Wire-Will Kft.)

solar irradiation. Regarding the second one, we can see that the vegetation is killed, i.e. the land cannot be used for agricultural purposes anymore. At this point it is worth examining the electric

energy conversion efficiency of solar power stations. The solar panels of Figure S2 are located on 30 hectares with a peak power of 15 MW [12]. The annual outcome of this farm is about 16.5 million kWh, which is enough for about 3854 people. The electric energy production on 1 m<sup>2</sup> is 55 kWh in one year. Dividing this number with the incoming annual solar irradiance (4500 MJ/m<sup>2</sup>) we get that the solar conversion efficiency of the solar power station of Mátrai Erőmű Zrt. is only 4.4 %. This shows that we are still far from the 10-20% efficiency of a single solar panel in practical use. It can be calculated that with a 4.4 % conversion efficiency



**Figure S3:** The settlements of Kőszeg Region (village and city - red shaded areas, forest- green shaded area).

about 140.7 hectares of green land should be used to satisfy the energy demand of Kőszeg Region. Instead of giving up the agricultural use of green lands, it would be more useful to use the built-in places for solar energy harness. For this reason we determined the size of the inhabited areas (the territory of buildings). Using the area calculating package of Google Earth




**Figure S4:** Kőszeg city and its surroundings (the area of built-in places - red shaded, forest- green shaded).



**Figure S5:** The inhabited part of Horvátzsidány (border –blue contour)

Pro, we made calculations for all the settlements of the region (see: red shaded areas in Figure S3). As a demonstration we show how the built-in areas of Kőszeg and Horvátzsidány look like in Figures S4 and S5. Our calculations show that the area of the inhabited places (buildings) is about 1127 hectares, which can be used for the installation of solar panels. First, we searched for the potentially applicable roofs for solar panels in Horvátzsidány, which corresponds to the ones facing south. This

is marked by violet polygons in Figure S6. In the selected part of the village we found 166 south roofs.



**Figure S6:** Roofs facing south (violet parts) in the examined part of Horvátzsídány (pink contour).

The total area of these roofs is about 1.02 hectares located on 32.6 hectares of land. This means that only 3% of the inhabited place can be used for solar harness with the proper solar panel direction. In the neighboring village (Kiszsídány) we measured the total area of the roofs with respect to the area of the inhabited place (Figure S7). We detected 61 buildings in Kiszsídány with 1.05 hectares of roof areas on the designated part of the village (with a total area of 10.8 hectares).



**Figure S7:** The inhabited part of Kiszidány and the roofs of the village



**Figure S8:** Measuring the solar power potential of the downtown of Kőszeg (the examined area - blue shaded, border of roofs- blue lining)

This shows that the roofs cover 9.5 % of the village. The same calculation executed in the centre of Kőszeg shows that the roofs cover almost 30% of the designated area (Figure S8). Here we have to mention that it is possible to install solar panels facing north, west, and east with about 20-30% loss

of energy harness compared to south direction installation. This is due to the fact that both direct and indirect (scattered) solar radiation can be harvested by solar panels. From these data we assume that 10% of the inhabited places are suitable for the installation of solar panels and the annual electric energy yield of 1kW solar panel is to be calculated only 900 kWh. Based on an online software I used to calculate the annual energy yield of solar panels [13], we can conclude that this annual yield is 20% less than the maximum yield measured in south direction. The total electric energy demand of the region can be calculated from the electric power use of the country, which was  $4219 \cdot 10^7$  kWh electric energy in 2013. Using the population number of the country and the region we get that the total electric energy demand of Kőszeg Region is about  $7739 \cdot 10^4$  kWh, which is just an estimation in the lack of real data for the region. To determine the electric energy capacity of the roofs, we need the energy conversion efficiency of the solar panel, which is taken to be 15% in my calculations. The result is that 1kW peak capacity requires about 6.4 m<sup>2</sup> flat surface. Using the data above, we can conclude that **the electric energy yield of the inhabited areas can be two times more than the electric energy demand of the whole region**. This is promising if we take into account that even roads and parking places can be covered with solar panels. However, it is vastly problematic that solar irradiance is not uniform, meaning that it can be seven times less intensive in winter than in summer [11]. This fact shows that the electric energy demand of the winter season cannot be satisfied with solar panels installed in the populated areas only.

### ***Biomass Potential***

One of the biggest challenges for our future is to replace fossil energy resources, such as coal, natural gas, and petrol in our energy portfolio, which is going to run out in our finite world [1]. This is especially true in Hungary, where the majority of natural gas and fossil fuels are imported [6]. To reduce the vulnerability of the country and also the emitted green house gases we must replace fossil energy resources with renewable ones.

In Hungary natural gas is combusted for heating buildings and producing electric energy in thermal power stations. Our annual use of natural gas takes about 12 billion m<sup>3</sup>. In the future the heat energy demand of the buildings will decrease due to energy saving isolations, i.e. less natural gas will be used in this sector but thermal power stations will consume more of it. Therefore, we cannot expect substantial change in the use of natural gas in long term. With the present natural gas combustion Hungary belongs to the big importers of natural gases in the World market, since our share is about 2% in this sector with a population less than 10 million [6]. At the moment it seems to be unrealistic

at the present rate of the usage of natural gas to replace it with other renewable gases such as biogas and landfill gas (Figure B1).




Figure B1: Sketch of a household biogas plant  
(Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biogas#/media/File:Biogas\\_plant\\_sketch.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biogas#/media/File:Biogas_plant_sketch.jpg))

The share of Kőszeg Region's natural gas combustion can be obtained from the ratio of local and country population number and the nation's natural gas usage. The result is that the natural gas share of Kőszeg Region is about 22012728 m<sup>3</sup>/year, which corresponds to 748 million MJ energy. If we take the average conversion rate of plants (trees) to be 0.5% [6], we get that we can collect about 21 MJ/ (m<sup>2</sup> year) chemical energy in the plants. With this energy density we can get the size of the land for producing equivalent chemical energy of the natural gas use of the region. This calculation gives that the size of the land should exceed 3564 hectares, which is about 43 % of the forests of Kőszeg Region. It is questionable whether it is possible to collect the tree leaves and cut down enough trees in this region for digestion and combustion as about 50% of the forests are protected and it is hard to reach them by vehicles. The case is similar if we want to produce this energy on agricultural lands. **We could replace our natural gas demand with the use of about 39.5 % of our agricultural lands in Kőszeg Region.**


The fuel demand of Hungary consists of gasoline (petrol) and diesel fuel combustions used mainly in vehicles. The annual petrol combustion of Hungary is about 1500 million liters, while diesel fuel use is approximately 3000 million liters. We can replace petrol with bioethanol and diesel fuel with biodiesel to make our economy less dependent on the rest of the World. We can produce bioethanol from maize (corn) very efficiently. In one hectare we can harvest about 7.5 tones of corn in an average year (7.5 tons/hectare yield), which can be transformed to ethanol with 1 liter yield of

ethanol from 3 kg maize [14]. This means that 2500 liters of ethanol can be produced in one hectare of field. Since the heat of combustion is less for ethanol than for petrol, we need more ethanol to replace the petrol. The heat of combustion of ethanol is 26.8 MJ/kg, while that of petrol is 43 MJ/kg. Therefore, we need more bioethanol with a factor of 43/26.8. The portion of the petrol consumption of Kőszeg Region is 2.75 million liters, which can be produced on 1766 hectares of land. This corresponds to 19.6 % of the available arable lands and fields. **We could replace our petrol (gasoline) demand with the use of 19.6 % of our agricultural lands in Kőszeg Region.** Regarding the satisfaction of our future diesel fuel demand with biodiesel, we can raise sunflower in our arable lands. With the harvest of the seeds, we can get biodiesel oil by the compression of the seeds and some chemical treatments. The yield of sunflower seeds on one hectare depends strongly on the quality of the soil and the climate. In an average year we can get 1000 liters of oils on one hectare (the yield is 1000 l/hectare). As the heat of combustion is lower for biodiesel than for diesel fuel, we need to multiply the necessary amount of sunflower by a factor of 43/37. As Kőszeg Region consumes about 5.5 million liters of diesel oil, we need to stock about 6396 hectares of land with sunflower to produce enough fuel for the region. **We could replace our diesel fuel demand with the use of 71 % of our agricultural lands in Kőszeg Region.** It is also possible to produce biodiesel from other crops like rapeseed and soybean but the yield of oil is just slightly better (10 % more). In tropical regions, where solar irradiance is much higher than in Hungary, it is getting widespread to grow oil palm trees with 5-6 times higher yield of oil [15]. This indicates that Europe cannot be competitive in bioenergy production for satisfying our future energy demand.

In summary, we can say that bioenergy is not a solution for our future energy demand if we do not reduce our energy consumption. **To maintain our present use of natural gas, gasoline, and diesel fuel, we would need an additional 2700 hectares of arable lands in the region.** This can be achieved only with a drastic change of the landscape. To do this we would have to give up the forestry activity in Kőszeg Forest and exploit the protected Kőszeg Mountains in replacing the natural gas with wood in heating systems and the industry. However, it can be shown that the heat energy demand of the region can be satisfied with wood from the nearby forests.

## ***Hydroelectric Power Potential***

The climate of the region cannot be defined well, as it is strongly affected by continental and oceanic weather formations and the vicinity of the Kőszeg Mountains. As a result, the annual precipitation of the region shows high variations from year to year. In rainy years precipitation can exceed 1000 mm, while it can be less than 800 mm in dry years. Monthly precipitation also varies substantially according to season. Therefore, the flow rate of local rivers and streams (water flows) is varying substantially in time. The most important river of the region is the Gyöngyös, which runs through Kőszeg and villages like Lukácsháza and Gyöngyösfalu in a length of 16 km (Figure H1).



**Figure H1:** Map of Gyöngyös (blue curve)


Due to the frequent and sudden changes of weather conditions the flow rate of the river can exceed  $100 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$  after very heavy rainfalls and it can be less than  $0.5 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$  in dry seasons. The average value of the flow rate is about  $2.1 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$ . The incoming altitude of the river from Austria to Kőszeg Region is 288 m, while the river leaves the region at 235 m altitude at the border of Gencsapáti. The height difference between the two ends is 53 m, which makes the river fast moving at several places, i.e. it has high kinetic energy. This high value makes the river interesting from an energetic point of view.

The hydroelectric power capacity ( $P$ ) of this river can be calculated from the following formula:  $P = \eta Q h \rho g$ , where  $\eta$  is the efficiency of energy conversion,  $Q$  is the flow rate,  $h$  is the height,  $\rho$  is the density of the water and  $g = 9.81 \text{ m/s}^2$  (gravitational acceleration) [16]. From this formula we can get that the electric power output can be about **930 kW** if  $\eta = 0.85$  and  $Q = 2.1 \text{ m}^3/\text{s}$  (the average flow rate of the Gyöngyös). Due to the unpredictable flow rate of the Gyöngyös after heavy rainfalls and several floods in Kőszeg and the nearby villages, the river was regulated at several points and two dams were built to protect the city. The older one is located at the felt factory and is about five meter high. The second one is newer and larger. It is about 9 meter high with a big water reservoir and it was built for the protection of Lukácsháza and Gyöngyösfalu (Figure H2).



**Figure H2:** Dams of the Gyöngyös: Lukácsháza (left), Felt Cloth Factory of Kőszeg (right)

The small dam is used permanently with its height difference for the water, while the other one is filled up with water in case of flooding. The accessible hydroelectric power of the felt factory dam using  $P = \eta Q h \rho g$  is about 21 kW, while it is about 157 kW for the temporary water reservoir. The first one would produce the electric energy demand of about 40 people. The Hydroelectric Station of Kőszeg Ltd. (Kőszegi Vízerőmű Kft.) is planning to construct a hydroelectric power plant here with an intention to build an electric generator into the dam. The case of the other dam is more complicated, as its water reservoir is used during flooding periods only, but it serves as a recreation area for the people and it is also a nature protection area with many protected animals and plants (Figure H3). The preservation of the Gyöngyös in its original state is also an important aim. Due to regulation, the settlements' activity, and its closeness to agricultural areas the river the river is disturbed and cannot be found in its original form in most of the places, except for this temporary reservoir (Figure H4).



**Figure H3:** The temporary water reservoir of Kőszeg Region for flooding periods.

As it is of high priority to keep this part of the region in its present form, it is not possible to fill in the reservoir with water for permanent use.




**Figure H4:** The unregulated Gyöngyös at the water reservoir

The missing electric energy equals to the electric energy demand of about 315 people, which is negligible in terms of the total population of the region. In the lack of other safety regions (settlements are far) where hydroelectric power plants can be established, we can conclude that the hydroelectric power of the region is negligible. However, some very small plants can be built to supply the demand

of a small amount of people along the river in the future, which can be very useful far from settlements, where energy independence can be crucial.

### ***Wind power potential***

According to the wind energy map of the Hungarian Forecast Service (OMSZ) the windy (high kinetic energy) places are located at the northern part of the region [17]. This is due to the fact that the direction of wind is mostly north-west and the wind is not blocked by high mountains. In the southern part of the region the energy density of the wind is very weak due to the blockage of Kőszeg Mountains. Therefore, wind energy can be harnessed only in the neighborhood of Horvátzsidány,



**Figure W1:** Possible wind turbine locations in Kőszeg Region (pink shaded areas)

Where there are arable lands but no forests and the distance between the villages is large enough to set up wind turbines between the villages. We can perform simple calculations using the average wind speed data of the place. If we assume that the wind speed is about 5 m/s 75 meter above the ground, which is realistic, we can calculate the energy intensity of the wind using the following formula for

calculating wind power:  $P_{wind} = \frac{1}{2} \rho_{air} v^3 A$ , where  $\rho_{air} = 1.25 \text{ Kg} / \text{m}^3$  is the density of the air at  $T=10$  °C,  $v$  is the average speed of the wind and  $A$  is the cross section area of air flow [16]. From the above formula we can conclude that  $P_{wind} / A$  is about  $78 \text{ W/m}^2$ . If the height of the tower of the wind turbine

is about 75 m and the diameter of the blade ( $D$ ) is also 75 meter, the harnessed cross section area is 4418 m<sup>2</sup> (almost half a hectare). If the energy conversion efficiency ( $\eta$ ) is taken to be 0.3 (Note that the theoretical maximum, which is called Betz-limit, is 0.59), the power output of a single wind turbine, which can be calculated from  $P_{wind\ turbine} = \eta \frac{1}{2} \rho_{air} v^3 A$ , is about 104 kW. In the light of the electric power use of Kőszeg Region ( $P_{electric} = 8835\ kW$ ), the number of wind turbines should be 85 to fulfill the electricity demand of the whole region. After the examination of the possible places around Horváthzsidány and bearing in mind to keep at least 500 m minimum distance between the wind turbines we can conclude that only 18 wind turbines can be constructed without going too close to the villages with the turbines (Figure W1). With this number of wind turbines it is possible to produce 21 % of the electric energy demand. However, the intermittence of wind energy raises the question of how to store the energy during the lack of wind periods.

## ***Conclusion***

We examined the renewable energy potential of Kőszeg Region in order to find the best strategy for fighting the problem of the possible shortage of fossil energy resources and the forthcoming climate change. Our results show that our present electric energy demand can be fulfilled with photovoltaic devices and battery systems. Wind farms can be also established to produce electric energy in the region. They can be helpful especially in the winter season, when the solar insolation is very weak. However, both the solar systems and the wind farms are intermittent energy resources, i.e. additional energy systems must work at the same time to ensure electric energy in the periods when the energy of the wind or the sun is not sufficient. These supporting electric energy producing systems can either be nuclear power stations or thermal power stations operating with biogas or landfill gas. The pumped-storage hydroelectric systems can be an alternative of power stations but they require big water reservoirs in the mountains. Our calculation indicates that the hydroelectric potential of the region is very weak. Even the watering of large fields would produce only the electric energy of a few hundreds of people. However, the most critical problem is the production of enough biofuel and biogas in the region. In order to fulfill the present food, natural gas, gasoline, and diesel fuel demand of the population, the size of the agricultural areas should be doubled, which is impossible to achieve in this region. All this leads us to the conclusion that our energy independence cannot be achieved by the use of renewable energies. Hungary and Kőszeg Region must depend on external energies, which can either be nuclear or even renewable coming from other parts of the World. Therefore, it is desirable to reduce our energy demand by the insulation of buildings, using

energy saving devices, and supporting public transportation. As the energy conversion efficiency of photovoltaic devices is 10-20 times better than that of photosynthesising plants, it would be useful to replace combustion engines with electric engines in transport. The increased electric energy demand could be satisfied with solar panels and wind farms easily. In addition to this, it would be possible to avoid the use of biodiesel and bioethanol in the energy portfolio. Social changes promoting the use of less energy are needed to make our future greener and avoid the energy crisis. Finally, new green technologies have to be developed and used in the near future to meet the demand of keeping the global temperature rise below 2 °C [18].

### ***Acknowledgement***

I acknowledge the financial support of the Hungarian State and the European Union under the TÁMOP-4.2.1.D-15/1/KONV-2015-0006 (The development of the innovation research base and knowledge centre in Kőszeg in the frame of the educational and research network at the University of Pannonia).

### ***References***

- [1] Donella H. Meadows, Jorgen Randers and Dennis L. Meadows: Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update (2004).
- [2] <https://yearbook.enerdata.net/>
- [3] [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World\\_energy\\_consumption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_energy_consumption)
- [4] <https://www.ecotricity.co.uk/our-green-energy/energy-independence/the-end-of-fossil-fuels>
- [5] The first decade: 2004–2014, 10 years of renewable energy progress,  
[http://www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/activities/Topical%20Reports/REN21\\_10yr.pdf](http://www.ren21.net/Portals/0/documents/activities/Topical%20Reports/REN21_10yr.pdf)
- [6] Vajda György: Energiaellátás ma és holnap, MTA Társadalomkutató Központ, Budapest (2004).
- [7] Tar Károly: A szélenergia magyarországi hasznosításának reális lehetőségei.  
[http://www.mettars.hu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Eloadas120418\\_Tar.pdf](http://www.mettars.hu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Eloadas120418_Tar.pdf)
- [8] <http://energystorage.org/energy-storage/technologies/pumped-hydroelectric-storage>
- [9] [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pumped-storage\\_hydroelectricity](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pumped-storage_hydroelectricity)

- [10] <http://www.google.hu/intl/hu/earth/>
- [11] [http://www.met.hu/eghajlat/magyarorszag\\_eghajlata/altalanos\\_eghajlati\\_jellemzes/sugarzas/](http://www.met.hu/eghajlat/magyarorszag_eghajlata/altalanos_eghajlati_jellemzes/sugarzas/)
- [12] <http://www.mert.hu/atadtak-magyarorszag-legnagyobb-naperomuvet>
- [13] <http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pvgis/apps4/pvest.php>
- [14] Radnóti Katalin, Király Béla: Modellszámítások az energia oktatásához, Fizikai Szemle, 413 (2013).
- [15] [http://www.soyatech.com/Palm\\_Oil\\_Facts.htm](http://www.soyatech.com/Palm_Oil_Facts.htm)
- [16] Bent Sørensen: Renewable Energy. Its physics, engineering, use, environmental impacts, economy and planning aspects. Elsevier (2014).
- [17] [http://www.met.hu/eghajlat/magyarorszag\\_eghajlata/altalanos\\_eghajlati\\_jellemzes/szel/](http://www.met.hu/eghajlat/magyarorszag_eghajlata/altalanos_eghajlati_jellemzes/szel/)
- [18] Christophe McGlade, Paul Ekins, The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global warming to 2 °C, Nature, vol. 517, 187

## **II. Central Europe in a Global Context**

### **The Fall of Communism**

*Changing Regimes in Central Europe in 1989-1990*

Iván Bába

#### ***Introduction***

The phenomenon of changing Central European regimes, in other words, the process of the fall of communism, should be treated as one comprehensive process, since the internal political processes of the five countries to be analysed – Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania – were mutually influencing, reinforcing or debilitating each other, so it was not by accident that the collapse of communism in Eastern Central Europe happened at the same historical moment.

Throughout the forty years of „real socialism” these societies considered the Russian-style Stalinist socialism forced upon them to be something alien, not relating to their own social traditions, with its aggressive totalitarianism dominating the whole society, its primitive and lying rhetoric, its economic policy contradicting every principle of economics, all the while permanently creating an economy of deficiency. And since it is not economic but intellectual and psychological oppression that humans perceive most unbearable, groups of various sizes of these societies rebelled against misguidance, lies, aggressive manipulations, even when the reason for their protests lay apparently in the unbearable social circumstances.

Revolts in these societies were continuous during the four decades of communist dictatorship. Different social groups were voicing their discontent in different ways – according to their own subculture, their socialization and their social position.

The first mass revolts openly aimed against communist dictatorship occurred in 1953 in Berlin and other East German cities, where workers went on strike, and demonstrated. Their action was immediately suppressed with considerable force of the Soviet army. This was followed in June 1956 by a rebellion in Poznan, Poland, that ended with a peculiar success. The hated Stalinist dictator Bierut was toppled, and in his place stepped the „national communist” Gomulka. The „success” in

Poland notoriously had a great impact on events in Hungary. On October 23, 1956 demonstrating university students chanted „Poland is showing us the way, and on their trail we're gonna stay”. Though the revolution in Hungary was overpowered by the Russian military, it remained an indelible dramatic memento in Europe's subsequent history. After years of bloody reprisal, in response to steady international pressure, in 1963 the ruling power granted an amnesty in Hungary. Most of the imprisoned were set free. The situation of those left in jail worsened, because international public opinion considered the „Hungarian issue” closed. These people were freed only after many years, some only in the 1970's. In the meantime, following the Polish example, the Hungarian communists offered a compromise to society. This became the Janos Kadar-led „consolidation”, involving in easing of repression, a gradual decrease in private life harassments, and the introduction of a „soft dictatorship”, giving birth to a kind of „goulash-communism”.

Not independently from the developments in Hungary, from 1965 throughout Czechoslovakia an intellectual ferment was in the making, mainly among writers, artists, philosophers and university professors. By 1968 this led to the Prague Spring. The political program of Czech intellectuals was based on a special tactical self-restraint. Namely, from the cruel crushing of the Hungarian revolution they drew the conclusion that it was not worth entering into frontal combat with Soviet communists. It was better to convince them that introducing reforms to existing socialism, transforming the socialist model into something more attractive, creating „socialism with a human face” was also in their interest, and that the Czechoslovak shift towards reforms were only aiming at that. Their attempts to convince did not succeed. Russian tanks crushed the Prague Spring just as they did twelve years before with the Hungarian revolution. Retaliation followed, and Czechoslovakian society suffered terrible human and intellectual losses.

In the days of the Prague Spring, in Paris and other cities of Western Europe, famous students' rebellions took place. This influenced students in Poland as well. The agitation of students caused only minor nervousness among the Polish party leadership, but two years later, in 1970 it did not hesitate to use arms to suppress the industrial workers' revolt. They did not count on what next, however: the radical crushing of the rebellion caused the fall of the party leadership. Gomulka, the „national communist” leader of 1956, had to step down, handing over the rule to Edward Gierek, a „Western communist”. Gierek grew up in Belgium, this being an important part in his political background and also in his program for national pacification. Nevertheless, since he was unable to improve the economic situation, within a few years social peace gave way to new tensions. In 1976 a new workers' rebellion broke out. But this time Polish intellectuals also went into action, granting legal and financial assistance to vilified workers through their newly created organization, the

Workers' Defence Committee (KOR). This was the first step towards the real massive social revolt in Poland, and the formation of Solidarity.

In 1977 the Czech intelligentsia, protesting against the restored Stalinist-type dictatorship, issued a pamphlet –the Charta 77 Manifesto. This proclamation was endorsed by intellectuals in Poland. The Hungarian reaction to it – a declaration of support signed by dozens of leading Hungarian intellectuals – can also be considered the starting point for the radical opposition movement in Hungary.

In 1980 the workers' strikes in Poland ended successfully. The communist authority was compelled to legalize the independent trade union, named Solidarity. This was the first mass movement against the communist rule, and the system was forced not only to accept its existence, but also to legalize it, following a pact. Nevertheless, this „tolerance” did not last long. On December 13, 1981 there was a military coup in Poland, and the army, led by General Jaruzelski, introducing a state of emergency, restored communist order. Through arrests, imprisonments and assassinations Solidarity Trade Union (by then having almost 10 million members) was forced to go underground, and thus to lose a good part of its influence.

By the beginning of the 1980s, significant number of groups, organizations and movements had sprung to life in all the Eastern European countries, which were „independent” or were professing programs of direct political opposition. Regardless of their targeted field, e.g. environmental issues, trade union pluralism, freedom of religion, questions of democracy, rule of law, these organizations were knocking against the wall of communist dictatorship. As time passed, methods of repression and retaliation were changing in the different countries, but the basic structure of society and power remained the same. The relationship between the groups demanding democratization and the basically Stalinist-type communist authorities could not be changed, while communists of Eastern European countries could rely on the Brezhnev doctrine, that is, expect the help of their „soviet comrades” if socialism was threatened. This situation lasted until 1985.

## **Gorbachev**

After a bunch of old, ill and mentally declining communist leaders – Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko – a relatively young vigorous and intelligent party secretary general, in his fifties, shook up world politics. He was already showing signs of starting a new era in the Soviet Union, searching for a way out of economic bankruptcy – called „stagnation” in the communist party language - through social dialogue and introducing certain democratic rights. This provoked surprise and hope as well as suspicion and fear among different social and political groups.

Gorbachev was a staunch communist and a staunch „anti-Stalinist”, coming from a family that had suffered from the terror under Stalin, even having relatives who had died in labour camps. As he explains in his memoirs, he was convinced that it was possible to build a non-Stalinist, that is, democratic socialist model. This Gorbachev-type socialist model was not based on an elaborate or complicated theory. The essence was that under the leadership of a functional, not too aggressive and not too corrupt party apparatus it is possible to mobilize the good will, force and talent of the people. All this – sensibly organized – could be sufficient to lead the Soviet Union out of stagnation, and set it on the path to economic progress. These were the considerations behind the programs of Acceleration (uskorenie), the following Open Social Dialogue (glasnost) and Transformation (perestroika).

At first he did not foresee the avalanche these actions were about to hurl upon the state and party leadership, or how freedom of speech would affect a society suppressed for decades, the kind of new tensions created by this transformation within society and the party leadership itself. He also failed to anticipate how difficult it would be to tackle the huge existing problems, without having the right political and legal framework in place. It quickly became clear that „acceleration” makes no sense without the acknowledgement of former errors, and that kind of investigation of failures and open discussion would lead soon to the basic problems of the political, social and economic system. Finding a way through the lack of democracy and rule of law, the unsettled character of the basic social institutions of a democracy, the total absence of a market economy proved to be a “mission impossible”.

Gorbachev transformed relations between the Soviet Union and the Central European countries. His decision to announce the end of the Brezhnev doctrine was of global strategic significance. He stressed that the socialist countries could choose the most appropriate measures to solve their own economic and social problems. With that decision he put an end **not only** to Moscow’s direct right of intervention, but also distanced Moscow from political responsibility. He let go of the hands of the old dictators like Honecker, **Ceausescu**, Husak, **Janos Kadar** and Todor Zhivkov. These old communist politicians suddenly did not know what to fear more: the dangers of facing their own societies, or the consequences of Gorbachev’s socialist reforms in their countries. The Czechoslovakian comrades, for example, chose their usual path of isolation, and banned selling Russian newspapers in Czechoslovakia. Janos Kadar, with good political insight, simply told one of his collaborators, a Gorbachev-enthusiast: „This man will dig the grave of socialism”. Kadar knew – from his experience of 1956 – that „existing socialism” cannot be anything else than the dictatorship of the communist party. He expressed this view at several party congresses after 1956. And though in Hungary we saw the most sophisticated form of communist dictatorship, where for example formal

censorship was abolished, transferring it into the conscience of newspaper chief editors and journalists, writers, or, where „goulash communism” and the „happiest barrack” was created, Kadar instinctively felt that socialism would survive only while the directing function and overall controlling ability of the communist party was upheld. That’s why he considered Gorbachev’s pursuits and experiments „life threatening”.

Gorbachev himself considered two Central European countries of special significance: Poland and Hungary. Though he renounced the Brezhnev doctrine, he did not plan to break up „the socialist camp”, dismembering the Warsaw Pact or the close economic interdependence, rather he wished to modernize them.

To achieve this aim, Poland’s present and future was of key importance. After taking position, he consulted several times exclusively Jaruzelski, trying to find a way to end the lasting Polish internal crisis. He had an important role in starting the dialogue between the big adversaries of the Polish political arena at the turn of 1987-1988. As far as Hungary was concerned, he visualized Hungary as a „small laboratory” where experiments of modernizing socialism were taking place, for example in the field of agriculture, retail trade, in the relative independence of the managers at big state owned firms. He had **already** visited Hungary in 1984, while he was the secretary of the Central Committee, responsible for agriculture, to study the „Hungarian model”. He didn’t know what to do with Janos Kadar, but he followed with sympathy the accelerating Hungarian transformations.

Gorbachev – recognizing the threat in the American “star wars plan” – changed world politics fundamentally, initiating and carrying through a substantial cut in the enormous Soviet and American nuclear arsenals. This was prompted on the one hand by his recognition of the historical necessity, that is, the recognition of the technological superiority of the USA, and on the other, by his own principles. Gorbachev pursued humane relations not only in internal but in foreign policy, too. He seriously believed in the possibility of „peaceful coexistence” between countries of different social systems, in the balance between competition and cooperation, and the global historic chances of socialism. He pursued balanced relations with the key influencers of international politics of the time – with Bush, Kohl, Thatcher, Mitterrand – because he wanted to incorporate the western model into the Soviet Union. He did so wishing to save socialism. He believed in a cooperation among partners of equal rights.

## *Poland*

Nobody contributed more to the toppling of the communist system in Central Europe than Polish society. A vast majority of the Polish nation never accepted „real socialism” as such, never reconciled with the Soviet occupation of the country and communist dictatorship. Poland was the only Central European country, where after the Second World War there was an armed resistance to Soviet occupation, through actions of remaining Home Army units. These forces were gradually destroyed by the Soviet Army and the Polish security services, nevertheless the memory of these legendary heroes lingered long.

During the four decades of communist dictatorship Polish society fought battle after battle against communist power. While in Hungary after 1956 and in Czechoslovakia after 1968 the opposition to the regime dwelled mainly among intellectuals, in Poland the biggest threat for the Polish United Workers Party lay in the discontent and riots of manual workers. This fact fundamentally distinguished Polish social opposition from movements in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

Though in 1968 it was still the students who rebelled against the party dictatorship, by 1970 mass groups of workers organized the strikes and demonstrations. These were uninhibitedly shot at by security forces, which acted similarly in 1976 in Warsaw and Radom. The party leadership did not understand that these drastic measures would lead to the „most dangerous” type of social opposition, that is, to a close cooperation of workers and dissenting intellectuals. It was the 1976 June events that speed up the formation of KOR, the Workers’ Defence Committee. Its activists organized aid for workers’ families, for family members of sacked, jailed or assassinated victims. KOR activities, besides provision of direct aid, gradually expanded to informing Western public opinion, drafting political declarations, organizing public debates. Within this framework a special opposition subculture formed gradually, members and leaders of which later became leaders of Solidarity. By 1977-1978 KOR grew into a nation-wide illegal network, with groups working in Warsaw, Wroclaw, Gdansk, Lublin, Poznan, and a membership of five thousand. These were people interested in politics that rebelled against the „existing situation”. They held monthly meetings – political debates in various private flats, where rank-and-file activists could get acquainted with the intellectual leaders of the organization. It was the time of the birth of the alternative political culture which became the moral basis and the practical experience supporting any opposition against the regime.

In 1978 a new blow hit the Polish communist leadership, and in general, the whole communist camp. Unexpectedly for the laic public opinion, Cracow archbishop Karol Wojtyla became elected head of the Roman Catholic Church. The new Pope became the first Central European and Polish pope. This dealt a blow to the Polish and European communists as great at least as had the size of the „star wars” plans of Ronald Reagan. This „success” had an enormously encouraging effect on the

masses of Catholic believers and on Polish society with its strong catholic identity. In October 1979, on the first anniversary of the election of the Pope, thousands of Cracow students went out to the main square, the Rynek, with guitars, to tell the world with singing and rhymes „We have a Pope. The Pope is ours!”

John Paul the Second did not help the communists to hang on to power. During the twelve years between being elected and the fall of communism he visited Poland three times, in 1979, 1983 and 1987. Upon landing and leaving the plane he always bent on his knees and kissed the ground of the Polish Motherland. During open-air masses he celebrated, where the attendance was always between 200 thousand and one million, he professed to his listeners: „Do not fear”. This biblical quote in the social context of the time was unambiguously political, encouraging people to declare their faith, as well as refuse and resist communism. Perceiving this new danger for communism, the KGB, involving its Bulgarian allies and a Turkish hired assassin, intended to murder the Pope in 1981. Nevertheless, the attempt backfired: the Pope, thanks to his faith and his trained physique, survived the attack, and in September 1981 issued his encyclical *Laborem excerens* devoted to workers, a clear signal of support for the Independent Trade Union „Solidarity”.

Permanent economic crises was the fundamental problem of Polish communism. It was the unbearable economic situation, the rebellion against poverty that overthrew Gomulka in 1970 and made way for Edward Gierk. Nevertheless neither was Gierk able to ensure a stable economic balance and acceptable living standards. By 1978-1979 the control over the economy had slipped out of the hands of the political leadership. A „price correction” announced on July 1, 1980 sparked off strikes by society. On August 14 the Strike Committee of Gdansk was formed, led by Lech Walesa. The wave of strikes first in the North, and later all over Poland forced the frightened political leadership to sign an agreement on the creation of an independent trade union, and later, in November, the authorities were obliged to register legally, after some procrastination, the Independent Self-governing Trade Union „Solidarity”. The union initially had 2.5 million members, but by the autumn of 1981 it increased to 10 million. The symbol of successful opposition to communism and the biggest and the best organized anti-communist movement of Central Europe came to existence.

Communist power, feeling the support and also the pressure of the Soviet party leadership at its back, was fighting an ongoing battle against Solidarity, resorting to political, administrative methods as well as intelligence. But it could not stop Solidarity from gaining momentum. It was a Polish general who finally had enough of the continuous loss of ground of the local communists. The political struggle of one and a half years ended on December 13, 1981 by a military takeover. A State of emergency was immediately introduced („state of war”), 6600 trade union and political activists were interned, 130 big industrial firms were put under military supervision. Workers of factories

where opposition were found were shot at. Although mass arrests and persecutions represented a heavy blow for Solidarity, not even terror tactics could break the resistance. In January 1982 the first illegal contacts were made, and in April a Temporary Coordinating Committee was founded. Solidarity prepared itself for acting underground making it clear in every communication that it was not giving up the battle against the rulers.

Working underground and the political oppression after the state of emergency had hardened and fatigued some of the leaders and members of Solidarity. The number of its members fell from 10 million but still added up to several hundreds of thousands. Though the above mentioned papal visits gave new strength to the organization, and the Nobel Prize for Lech Walesa also demonstrated unambiguous international support, the Polish military-political power was not embarrassed by these events and, trusting that the Soviets would come to their aid, was not very fastidious about choosing the means for reaching their internal political aims.

Not accepting the behaviour of the otherwise cautious Polish Catholic clergy, some Catholic priests took an open stand for Solidarity, and more, numerous parishes offered opportunity for meetings, or even provided conditions for clandestine printing and other activities. Polish security services were more or less informed about these practices, so they executed assassinations against priests as a means of intimidation and warning. International public opinion is most informed about the case of Popieluszko, abducted and killed by security forces (October 19, 1984). It is less known however, that the round-table negotiations between communist authorities and Solidarity were already under preparation in 1988 (!) when priest Nidzielak, who had cooperated with Solidarity, was assassinated in his house. Priest Suchovec, a secret member of the Intervention Committee of Solidarity was set to fire (!). These priests became part of Polish history as martyrs of Solidarity.

During the spring and summer of 1988, as a response to the government's economic measures, mainly price rises, a new wave of strikes started, to which even trade unions, reorganized by the communists in the 80s adhered. Jaruzelski and his government had got tired of the permanent struggle by then, and gave it up. But Solidarity and Polish society themselves had got tired, as well. By then Solidarity's leaders saw clearly that society and workers had lost „revolutionary fire” and „fighting spirit”. In May 1988, for example, at the famous Lenin Shipyard of Gdansk, birth place of Solidarity only fifteen hundred out of ten thousand workers took part in the strike, remaining only 600 until the end of the measure. It turned out that the strongest weapon of Polish society and of Solidarity, the strike, was not working anymore.

The communist government found itself in a new situation, too. By 1988 it had become clear for them that Gorbachev would not fall, and he was taking his ideas of social reform seriously. The withdrawal of the Brezhnev doctrine has caused uncertainty in Polish circles of power. The exclusion

of the possibility of Soviet political and/or military support created a new strategic situation, in which Polish and Central European communist leaders were compelled to do new calculations. They had to face their own nation and society without the foreign support, and being aware of the crimes committed it was not an easy task. The main motive of the Polish party leadership, however, was not to search for moral purification, but to avoid being brought to book, and to preserve its power for future days.

On August 31, 1988, that is, on the 8th anniversary of the famous Gdansk agreement, that set the foundation for Solidarity, the Minister of the Interior representing Jaruzelski, had informal talks with Lech Walesa, promising him to call to round-table talks. At that time within Solidarity there were two lines of thought. The first, radical wing was of the opinion that no negotiation should be held with the rulers, Solidarity should wait for, or better even speed up the collapse of the entire system. The other wing suggested/insisted on that talks should be initiated with the military-communist leadership to force it to share the power. This latter position was not too far from what Jaruzelski wanted, wishing to share power under the best terms for him, instead of giving it away.

A special role was played in this process by the Polish Catholic Church, in which „combative” priests and laics were left out in the cold – just like it happened to the already mentioned martyrs. Within the church those, wishing to maintain their positions started to gain strength. This was perceived both by the communist authorities and the leadership of Solidarity. The latter had the fear that Jaruzelski would form a kind of a pseudo-democracy, share power with the Church in the name of „national Christian Socialism”, gaining a significant mass base, thus ousting Solidarity to the margins of politics.

Finally, the „round table talks” ended up as a series of talks between two sides. The talks started on February 6, 1989 and ended on April 6. On one side of the table sat Lech Walesa and his collaborators representing Solidarity, while on the other side there were representatives of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) and its allies, the Catholic Church and some „independent” public figures. Negotiations were on their way in three commissions and 14 sections ending in a peculiar compromise: the PUWP accepted political pluralism, freedom of speech, the access to mass media by different political and social organizations, as well as the idea of introducing territorial self-governance. From the point of view of constitutional law the talks led to agreements on significant changes: Poland would be a „republic”, directed by a so called semi-strong president, laws will be adopted by a bi-cameral parliament, the Sejm as the lower house and a Senate. The „real compromise” saw the light in the field of the preliminary distribution of parliamentary mandates. According to that, 60 % of the seats of the Sejm would automatically go to the PUWP and its allies, 5% would be

occupied by delegates of the Church. Only 35% of the seats was left to be contested among independent candidates. All Senate seats were free to be accessed.

In the partially free elections of June 4, 1989, 62 % of the potential voters showed up to vote. The result was catastrophic for the communists in power, since the opposition, that is, Solidarity won all the freely contestable mandates. Nevertheless, the system of distribution of power, agreed in advance **obliged** Solidarity politicians. After a long bargaining, Tadeusz Mazowiecki was asked to form government. At the same time the military coup's head general Wojciech Jaruzelski was voted President of the Republic by the Sejm. Thus, a coalition government could be formed, led by Solidarity, but the PUWP and its allies also took important positions. (Communists got the interior, defence, foreign trade and transport portfolios.) On September 12, 1989 the maiden speech of the new prime minister reflected the heavy compromise. He stressed: „We are separating the past with a thick line”, and also „I will not be a puppet prime minister”. Though this latter sentence seemed to be directed to the communists, insiders knew that it was addressed not to Jaruzelski, but to Walesa and the dissatisfied radicals of Solidarity. Thus Mazowiecki opened a new front towards Walesa, leader of Solidarity, who found himself a bit marginalized.

The Mazowiecki government at the start had a huge, 90 % social support, but by the middle of 1990 this started to plunge due to the measures that had been taken to tackle the grave economic situation. Hyper-inflation, a huge public debt, the enormous budgetary deficit, the tensions deriving from the transformation of ownership structures put a huge unexpected burden on Polish society.

The first free parliamentary elections in Poland took place on October 27, 1991. Participation reached only 44%. This number indicated well the grade of disillusionment Polish society developed in two years. This „era of short governments” essentially gave left wing politicians an opportunity to recover and it also „wore out” Solidarity-based parties on the other hand. The early parliamentary elections held on September 19, 1993 brought about a clear victory of the left. The leftist electoral bloc led by Aleksander Kwasniewski won 37% of the votes, and in coalition with the Polish **Popular** Party they had 74% of the parliamentary seats. In 1995 Kwasniewski challenged Walesa and in tremendous battle won the presidency of the republic. (He was re-elected in 2000.) By the middle of the 1990s the Polish post-communist left reorganized itself and reappeared at the political arena as a „modern social democratic force”, renovated, younger and successful.

## ***Hungary***

Hungarian society as well as the forces and events underpinning regime change in Hungary were strongly influenced by the political process in Poland, despite the significant differences between the historical, political and social contexts of the two countries and between the Hungarian and Polish opposition groups. The 1956 revolution and war of independence was a decisive experience for the generations that **lived** it. This applied to the whole Hungarian nation, regardless of individual political convictions. Those who considered the revolution their own case never forgot it, remembering frequently the catharsis experienced by the fall of the hateful dictatorship, the sudden opening up of different ways of living, the appearance of hope for a dignified life. They also never forgot the heavy blow caused by the suppression of the revolution and the subsequent retaliations. Nor was the revolution forgotten by those who fought on the communist side of the barricade and who regained power with the help of Soviet tanks. In October 1956 they were well aware of their isolation, the hatred of society towards them and also of the power that swept them away in a couple of hours.

After 1956 the Hungarian authorities retaliated **strongly**. Summary courts declared several hundred death sentences, the majority on workers, and a significant number of those sentenced were executed. The intellectuals participating in the revolution were sentenced to several decades or even life imprisonment, of which normally 5-6 years were spent behind bars. The majority were set free after the amnesty of 1963 but the situation for those kept inside, for example of several catholic priests, worsened, not just in terms of their immediate environment, but also because they were practically forgotten by their own people and by the wider world. They were set free after 8-10 years, carrying for the rest of their lives the heavy psychological and physical consequences of their long imprisonment.

A separate problem for the communist rulers was the „management” of the case of Imre Nagy, prime minister of the revolutionary government. In 1958 Janos Kadar assumed the responsibility in the Imre Nagy case, signalling that Imre Nagy and his collaborators should be sentenced and executed. He worried that if he left the man alive and in Budapest, either under house arrest or as a free man, Imre Nagy would constitute a political magnet that could endanger himself and his aspirations. He shared the old bolshevik opinion that a counterpoint „within socialism” is the most dangerous of all. (Imre Nagy was a communist himself.) On the other hand he should have read Imre Nagy’s diary which indicated Kadar as his main enemy. By having Imre Nagy executed Kadar considered the issue closed. He suppressed every attempt to reconsider 1956 and the figure of Imre Nagy for three decades. However, contemporaries and eyewitnesses did not let the matter rest and Kadar had to face the consequences of his actions in the last year of his life.

The 1963 amnesty allowed Hungary to be **accepted back** into the international community and for the „Hungarian question” to be withdrawn from the agenda at the UN. The issue also disappeared from Hungarian political debate and during the Kadar era, that is, between 1956 and 1988, the topic became taboo. This was the „original sin”, from which Kadar’s regime was conceived, this was the issue that concerned Kadar in the most direct way, so in the evaluation of this question he never made a political concession until his fall in 1988.

After the 1963 amnesty Janos Kadar set out to encourage social and economic consolidation. Learning from the experience of the 1950s, he aimed to create a system, **i**n which by maintaining total power for the communist party, he would be able to win, even if only partially, the support of the people. The main – conciliatory – slogan for this policy was: „Those who are not against us, are with us”. It turned on its head the motto of the 1950s days of wild terror („Those who are not with us, are against us”), which forced people to express total and vocal support for the regime.

Kadar’s „big trick” was to allow people, after the years of retaliation, to create their partial „private sphere”, unique at that time in communist countries. He did not force people to continuously express their loyalty and reduced political pressure over society. The most important element of Kadar’s policy of consolidation was the New Economic Mechanism introduced in 1968. The idea of the Mechanism was to create a functional, effective economic system that would allow steady economic growth without affecting the political and ideological base of the system and its social structure. From 1968 until the mid-1980s, depending on the skirmishes within the upper circles of the **HSWP** (the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party) it was the struggle around „the Mechanism” that determined Hungarian political life.

By the mid-1980s the opposition groups (who had already been organising themselves for several years) or organizations critical of the regime followed two different strategies. The circle of „legal” non-governmental organizations was wide and colourful, and appeared in the form of clubs, societies, associations, youth camps. The most important of these „civilian” organizations turned out to be the Association of Hungarian Writers which became one of the centres of intellectual life. At their congress on November 29-30, 1986 through a democratic electoral process, collaborators of the ruling communist authorities were relieved from the leading posts in the Association, and were replaced by democrats. The party responded to this revolt in its own way. They ordered the press not to report on the issue; writers loyal to the regime withdrew from the association; rebellious writers were threatened; and the budget of the association was frozen. This was the first open rebellion of this intellectual circle against communist rule. Party authorities took the rebellion seriously, hit back, not realizing that their reaction would not weaken this rebel circle of intellectuals, writers, poets, historians, newspaper redactors, but would instead reinforce, motivate and stimulate them to act. They

also hit back, when on September 27, 1987 they held a meeting at the farm of writer and poet Sandor Lezsak at Lakitelek, which resulted in a communiqué. In the first half of 1988 the group held forum-type events, the first one concentrating on the topic of parliamentarianism. (The only reaction of the communist authorities to this was to prohibit participation to party members.) This is how a movement started, becoming in the following two years the biggest opposition organization, and winning the 1990 parliamentary elections under the name of Hungarian Democratic Forum.

Another group, calling themselves „democratic opposition”, in the second half of the 1970s, at the start of its activities, denounced the unwritten deal existing between the communist government and representative circles of the Hungarian intelligentsia. According to this deal, the intellectuals gave up their demands for democratic rights, gaining in return the „maximum benevolence” that could be granted in the shadow of the Soviet Union. People belonging to the democratic opposition considered this deal incompatible with their conscience and their self-esteem. They believed that it was unnecessary to make unwritten deals with the authorities and that it was possible to create autonomous organizations, independent newspapers, meanwhile they could be defended against retaliatory actions on behalf of the government. As a consequence they were convinced that a transition to political pluralism could start, first near the edges of the system, later moving towards its heart. Associations, organizations would start to work, newspapers and magazines would be published, without asking for preliminary permission from the ruling power. They would be open about the oppositional character of their behaviour. The organizers and participants knew to expect reprisals, but also knew that those reprisals would not go beyond workplace harassment, meaning that there was no chance of jail sentences or physical beatings. They based this conviction on the observation that the Hungarian State was hugely indebted, already heavily dependent on the West. Communist rulers could not have everything. Many people of this group were dismissed from their jobs, forbidden to publish in newspapers, had their passports withdrawn and their houses searched. They were harassed, but the retaliation went no further.

The development of Hungary’s international relations provided an important source of support for this group. The Hungarian government opened talks with the IMF in 1979. The country had been submerged in debt since 1973, but by the end of the decade there was a turning point, when the Soviet Union announced that it would not be able to distribute reduced rate raw material supplies. The IMF loan became vital. Another important international development was the signing of the Helsinki Agreement. The document implicitly recognized the division of Europe in two. In exchange the Soviet Union and the communist countries accepted the so called “third basket” concerning human rights. The idea of using international agreements and treaties of human rights against the regime came from Moscow – the first Helsinki Commission was founded by Yuriy Orlov. Then and there it

was very quickly and cruelly wound up, while in Hungary people gradually became more and more convinced it was possible to call the authorities to account over its compliance with human rights.

Democratic opposition became a loose conglomerate of many currents based on mutual solidarity. It had smaller well-organized groups but those never formed a unified structure. They had different views on the chances of political success. They shared the memories of the 1956 revolution, and the need to assume those publicly, and they shared the view that no democratic transition could be brought about without that tradition. Some of them were preparing for a new revolution, while others did not see any conditions for a revolution in Hungary and considered it more important to widen the political and intellectual field of action. But they all took the same political stance, placing themselves at a distance from official institutions and stressing their opposition role; and they all pledged themselves to human rights.

This group saw the future of Hungarian society in getting closer to the West. From an ideological point of view, they gradually moved from the ideas of the New Left to those of modern liberalism. The start of the democratic opposition traces back to 1979 when the campaign to collect signatures in solidarity with the imprisoned members of the Czechoslovakian Charta 77 brought about 250 signatures in Hungary. That was the moment, when the network of loosely organised private meetings, friendly reunions and intellectual subculture transformed into a political movement. This was also the time when the group of 1956 participants appeared on the political stage. Members of this group were all ex-convicts, who had directly experienced the 1956 Kadar retaliations, in the form of long imprisonment.

FIDESZ was formed on March 30, 1988 as a political organization of young people. It represented a special splash of colour in the local political palette. It grew out of the world of youth clubs, university colleges and summer camps. The ruling power at first did not react to this obviously provocative step, because at that time the party leadership was patiently analysing the level of possible retaliatory measures, its political gains and damages. Those were times of political ferment even at the highest and medium levels of the HSWP, as the party was preparing for an extraordinary conference.

By the beginning of 1988 Janos Kadar and his team became a burden to the party not only for the reformers, who were getting stronger every day, but also for the more cautious „realists”. Both groups feared that the old leader – with visible signs of mental decline – would be more and more dangerous for them during the rearrangement of power that seemed inevitable. Within the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party a growing number of groups/platforms were formed nurturing different ideas on possible reforms.

Janos Kadar could not understand what was happening in Hungary – or in the Soviet Union. He still believed in 1987-1988 that if he said „There is no crisis” that would be accepted by the party members and the wider population; and that his words would be reflected in reality. On the contrary, in 1987 there was a considerable decrease in real incomes and it became clear that the Kadar policy, based on falling into more and more debt was not sustainable and that Hungary was heading towards economic bankruptcy. By the beginning of 1988 it also became clear that Kadar would be unable to neutralize his potential successor, Karoly Grosz, who was already prime minister since 1987. On May 22, 1988 an extraordinary party conference was held by the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, during which approximately 40 members of the Central Committee were dismissed and replaced (out of 105). The forces of reform won the majority within the CC. The delegates voted Kadar’s supporters out of the Central Committee, meanwhile voting Kadar president of the party – a post without any power.

This was a decisive political breakthrough. The room for manoeuvre available to the reformist forces inside the communist party widened significantly. Everyone could feel that political change affecting the very basis of the existing system was inevitable. Gorbachev acknowledged the events in Hungary without comment. In 1987 Hungary was visited by Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB with the mission of finding out who could be Kadar’s successor. In his report he pointed to a Grosz-Kadar change as the possible solution. So the new Hungarian party leadership didn’t need to fear Moscow’s opposition. In May 1988 the Political Committee commissioned work on modifications to the Constitution. The elaborated plans were not very different from the version voted by the parliament later. In January 1989 the Parliament voted for a new law on the right of public assembly that became the basis for a legal multiparty system.

At the start of 1989 – in his capacity of the President of the Commission of Programming of the Central Committee of the HSWP – Imre Pozsgay unexpectedly announced that 1956 was a popular insurrection. Doing this he destroyed the biggest taboo of the communist dictatorship, and made possible the authorization of a funeral tribute to Imre Nagy and his companions, on which Imre Nagy’s daughter had been insisting for a long time. On June 16, 1989, the funeral of Imre Nagy and his companions became a huge mass demonstration, and a symbolic historic date for the collapse of communism in Hungary. During the ceremony politicians representing the opposition parties spoke, a guard of honour was offered, flowers and wreaths were laid by the highest level state and government officials, by the diplomatic corps and distinguished representatives of Hungarian cultural life. Janos Kadar and his accomplices had to watch from beginning to end. Kadar followed the events with a broken mind and three weeks later, on the same day when the Supreme Court declared its absolving sentence in the case of Imre Nagy and companions, he died.

On June 13, 1989 round table talks opened about the creation of the framework of a democratic state and the rule of law. The participants **were** the ruling HSWP, the biggest opposition parties that were gaining strength by then, and as the third party, representatives of the biggest social organizations. As the final result of the talks, between October 17 and 20 the parliament adopted the laws with the modifications to the socialist constitution, and on October 23, the 33rd anniversary of the 1956 revolution Matyas Szuros, provisional President proclaimed the republic. In a legal sense, this marked the end of socialism and communist dictatorship in Hungary, and the country could start preparing for free parliamentary elections.

Nevertheless peaceful transition had also significant opponents. These forces – belonging mainly to the secret services under the Ministry of Interior – had opposition politicians under observation even at the end of 1989 and beginning of 1990, reporting about them to the inner circles of the communist party. The case exploded in the beginning of 1990 and became known as the Duna-gate scandal.

Between October 6 and 10, 1989 the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party held its last congress, dissolving itself and splitting into two successor parties. The bigger one under the name of the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) approved a declaration adopting the system of values of the European democratic left, while the smaller one, under the name of Workers Party, assumed the task of taking further the communist system of values and ideology. Most of the leaders of the ex-communist party joined the new socialist party, freeing themselves from the political and ideological heritage of communism, and tried to present the image of modern European democrats of the left. The date for the first free parliamentary elections was fixed for March 25, 1990 by the provisional President of the Republic. For the elections a three-pole political playing field could be seen in Hungary. On the left, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP); the liberal SZDSZ and FIDESZ; and the rest of the centre right political parties. The elections were won by the MDF, forming a coalition government with the Independent Smallholders Party and the Christian-democratic Party. At the beginning the SZDSZ and FIDESZ on one side and the Socialist Party on the other side formed two poles of opposition to the government. Two years later the polarity changed, and the liberal SZDSZ joined up with the MSZP in an anti-government movement, remaining its coalition partner for 10 more years.

The Hungarian secret services made a last attempt to overthrow the new and inexperienced government in October 1990. „Topping up” the demonstration of taxi drivers against fuel price rise, involving truck drivers too, they blocked all the bridges of Budapest and the busiest traffic hotspots of the country. After some days of high tension, the government resolved the situation, but could not

neglect the serious warning. Taking political measures and modifying some laws it started a significant reorganization of the secret services.

As we can see, the engine of Central European political reforms was working in three countries: in the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary. The forces that wished to change the rigid communist political system were advancing in different ways but with the same determined dynamism, aiming to lead "real socialism" out of the crisis and transform it into a social and economic system that could function steadily in a sustainable way.

Political leaders of the other three communist dictatorships were standing on the opposite side, having contrary interests. By 1988 a Berlin-Prague-Bucharest axis was formed, where the three dictatorships cooperated in a kind of harmonized common defence against the unwanted effects of the Gorbachev-promoted reform process. While for example reform-inclined politicians in Hungary were constantly following whether Gorbachev's position was weakening or if there was any anti-reform turn in Moscow, German, Czech and Romanian party leaders were hoping to see such a turn. They were aware of the history of the USSR and therefore knew that an internal coup could change everything. It could lift their conservative comrades to power, thus reaffirming their own positions, too. These dreams were not totally unfounded since the coup attempt of 1991 was aimed at such a change, but failed. In any case, it came too late for the communists of Central Europe.

### ***The German Democratic Republic***

Leaders of the Eastern German communist state, the German Democratic Republic led by Erich Honecker tried to obstruct by any possible means the entry of Soviet reform ideas in their country. He was trying so hard that he even forbade the distribution of certain Russian papers – demonstrating clearly the level of desperation and paranoia of the German communists. The GDR as an independent state came to exist in 1949 due to a Soviet political decision (taken most probably by Stalin). In June 1953 in East Berlin and some other cities uprisings broke out and were suppressed by the rulers with the help of Soviet military power. After that, the extent and form of dictatorship did not change – unlike other, evolving dictatorships in other socialist countries. The power of the regime was based on three basic pillars: political support coming from the Soviet Union, inter-German economic relations, and a total isolation of the country, preventing its citizens from travelling to the West. Political support coming from the Soviet Union finished by 1988. They couldn't count on the several hundreds of thousands Russian troops either. The benefits coming from the inter-German economic ties – for example, the exchange of the two German marks 1:1, or the West German technology transfer – were not enough anymore to solve the problems of the economic crises. The

population chose a rather peculiar tactic to break travel limitations. On the summer of 1989 approximately 120 thousand people asked for permission and several dozens of thousands travelled to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where they simply occupied the embassy of West Germany. On top of that, around one and two hundred East German citizens applied to be accepted into Hungarian refugee camps every day. On August 19, 1991 during the so-called pan-European picnic in Sopron, border gates were opened between Austria and Hungary as a symbolic gesture, and 661 East German citizens took advantage of the moment and rushed over to Austria. On August 23 the Hungarian Government took its first official decision in this matter, allowing 117 refugee seekers that were queuing up at the West German embassy to leave Hungary for Austria with Red Cross documentation. The Hungarian prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs, being well aware that the road forward led to Bonn and not to Berlin at that moment, paid a personal visit to Chancellor

Kohl and foreign minister Genscher to tell them that the Hungarian Government was ready to open its Western border for refugees of the GDR. With this, the Hungarian side made it unmistakably clear that it considered the Geneva Convention on Refugees, signed in March of the same year, more important than the agreement signed with the East German state in 1969 about deportation of East German citizens detained during attempts at illegal border-crossing. The Soviet leadership did not get involved in the refugee affair, and the Hungarian Government opened its border to East Germans on September 10. Until the opening of the Berlin Wall approximately 60 thousand people had left the GDR through Hungary and Austria. Leading East German politicians accused Hungary of „betraying socialism”, while their minister of foreign affairs asked Gorbachev to convoke the consultative body of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet leader refused to do that. The Brezhnev doctrine was not active any more, and the East

German leaders were not supporters but more like enemies for Gorbachev.

From then on it was only a matter of time before the GDR collapsed – even if not many people dared to say it aloud. The different strikes and clashes that had been occurring more and more often for several months before the 40th anniversary of the existence of the GDR were not pointing exactly towards consolidation. Gorbachev at that moment told Honecker, as if wishing him well on the occasion of the anniversary: „The one who comes late will be punished by life”. On October 9 in Leipzig 70 thousand people were demonstrating against the regime, and the police did not intervene. On October 17 the top leaders of the party forced Honecker to resign.

With that the history of the German communist state reached the last chapter of its history. The announcement of the end of travel limitations started a mass movement that within hours demolished the 28 year old Berlin Wall. Willy Brandt, who as a Mayor witnessed the construction of the wall, said on November 10: „Now what belongs together - will grow together”. What followed

was only executing the practical tasks related to the unification of the two German states. The GDR ceased to exist on October 3, 1990.

### *Czechoslovakia*

In Czechoslovakia the changing of the regime brought about not only democracy but also the disintegration of the federal state. The question had already been lingering – openly or in a latent way – in political thinking and dialogue for decades. The widening of political possibilities opened the way for the separation and so it happened. In Czechoslovakia there were no opposition movements like in Poland or Hungary. In Bohemia Charter 77 and some human rights and independent initiatives tried to speak up while in Slovakia environmental and catholic activists expressed criticism of the system. Nevertheless the Czechoslovak communist dictatorship had neutralized successfully any opposition initiatives for two decades.

Marking a fundamental change, the „Velvet Revolution” broke out on November 17, 1989 when an official legal students’ march evolved into a demonstration against the regime. Police intervened on the first day, but on the following days the series of demonstrations practically became open forums of discussion. From this came the name of the Czech opposition movement: Civic Forum.

In Bratislava the movement Public Against Violence became the partner organization to the Czech movement, establishing official ties on November 21. On November 27 the Czechoslovak political authorities already spoke of personal changes and replacements. On November 28 negotiations began between leaders of the opposition and the Prime Minister. The communist leadership, showing good tactical sense, surrendered by December 10, so a government of national compromise was formed, headed by the communist

Marian Calfa as prime minister. On December 29 Vaclav Havel was elected provisional president of Czechoslovakia. Alexander Dubcek, the hero of 1968 became president of the federal parliament. The first act of the regime change in Czechoslovakia took place in 23 days, without blood and bigger tensions. **The strength of any revolution – the masses,** were provided by the students as in Prague, so in Bratislava. But the change itself was executed by the generation that had been active in 1968, learned politics in 1968-1969, and fell victim to the subsequent retaliation. That generation had the feeling that after 21 years they „were obliged to make another revolution”.

The second act of the revolution also took place very quickly. Czechoslovakia had been a federal state, having a federal parliament and two national ones – a Czech and a Slovak one. The personal changes, the relief of the most compromised delegates and their replacement **with** opposition

representatives in all these three parliaments contributed to the approval by the three parliaments of all the laws necessary for a complete political and economic change. On June 8-9, 1990 the first free parliamentary elections took place, closing the second phase of the political change. Nevertheless the relation between the Czechs and the Slovaks had been a permanent problem in the internal politics of the country, practically since its creation, that is, since 1918. The Czech domination, the asymmetric structure of the state served as a topic for Slovak literature, press and political discourse for 50 years. In 1969 Czechoslovakia became a federal state, and what is more, the Slovak Gustav Husak became the president of the party and of the republic.

But even this could not satisfy Slovak political ambitions, so the rearrangement of the Czech and Slovak relationship became one of the key topics of the regime change. As a result of this discussion, on November 25, 1992 the federal parliament adopted a constitutional law that declared the cessation of the joint federal state as of December 31, 1992. The Republic of Czechoslovakia came into existence in 1918 and ceased to exist in 1992, so it was present in European history for 74 years.

## *Romania*

Romania was the only communist country where the changing of the regime took place not in a peaceful way, but at the cost of mortal victims. The Ceaușescu dictatorship contained all the absurd features of “existing socialism.” The dictator succeeded, over the course of several years, in making enemies of the intellectuals, the top managers of the economy, the national minorities, his own political elite, the military (giving the control over the army to his own brother) and even his main support – the security services. Romania’s foreign policy manoeuvres – the attempts to increase its independence from the Soviet Union, recompensed by spectacular gestures on behalf of Western politicians – eventually proved to be meaningless bluffs after the party chief tried to create an anti-Poland and anti-Hungary coalition. In the meantime, Ceaușescu firmly rejected Gorbachev’s reform experiments. Romania was continuously criticized at the US Congress for its human rights and minority policies. Within the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Romania was continuously obstructing the supervision of compliance with human rights in the European countries. Ceaușescu kept fighting until the last moment against the „import of reforms”, defending Romania’s rigid communist system with Gorbachev’s thesis, according to which „each socialist country can determine the direction of its development **itself**”. In the end of 1989, there were no interest groups (except his immediate family clan) in Romania that did not wish for the fall of the old dictator.

Meanwhile by the end of November 1989 communist dictatorships were overthrown in all the other countries of the „socialist camp”, while the adversaries of Ceaușescu still were not finding the means of getting rid of him. The explosion happened in Timisoara on December 15 and the spark came from László Tőkés, a Hungarian protestant priest. László Tőkés was a young pastor who rebelled against the dictatorship, and was about to be transferred from Timisoara to a little village in order to diminish his intellectual and moral influence. He did not accept this transfer, and his forced dislodgement was impeded by a living chain of his Hungarian followers and a growing number of Rumanian sympathizers, who joined them. On the next day, December 16 security forces and the army shot at the people keeping guard, killing almost one hundred demonstrators. These were the first martyrs of the Rumanian revolution. On December 17 the minister of defence refused Ceausescu’s order to keep on shooting at demonstrators. On December 21 the communist party – as usual – organized a popular march to the party headquarters. But then something happened, something never seen before in the history of Romanian communism: the mass with its singing and shouting, obstructed the speech of the secretary general of the party. And everything was broadcast on live television.

It was followed by the „Romanian revolution” – also broadcast live by TV. After the spectacular helicopter escape of Ceausescu, the Front of National Salvation took power and announced „the revolution won”. Television showed the different street demonstrations and gave live coverage of somebody shooting into the crowd from somewhere. The TV footage was aimed at creating mass psychosis suggesting that forces of the old regime wanted to set free the already captured dictator. The new power thus created the pretext to execute the dictator who then was **put before a martial court** and sentenced to death with his wife. They were executed immediately. The TV footage about the execution was shown on TV several times a day. The governments of the US and of Western Europe recognized the Front of National Salvation as the legitimate government of Romania. Today it is widely known that the TV revolution was all staged and filmed after the pattern of the French Revolution.

The evaluation of the Romanian events of december 1989 are still debated. The main question is whether it was a popular uprising or a coup. The leaders of the Front of National Salvation – the majority of whom came from the communist party hierarchy or from armed institutions – wanted to create a revolutionary myth to prove their legitimacy. They wanted to suggest that the new organ of power/authority was created by the revolution. The objectives of the uprising and those of the coup were different. The uprising was directed to the overthrowing of the hateful communist dictatorship, while the coup was aimed at the removal of the dictator and the salvation of all the other representatives of the former regime. The uprising was spontaneous and proclaimed the ideals of

freedom. The coup was all planned and set up and used violence as its means. The further process of regime change followed a similar pattern to the other countries. Communist leaders became „reformers”, they saved themselves, later forming a new modern socialist party that did well at the next parliamentary elections.

### **Conclusions**

The fall of communism and the transformation of Central Europe happened in one historic moment, in 1989. No political leaders of any of these countries could resist the current of history. The unpopular or directly hated communists could not maintain power when the Soviet support ceased. They were swept away by their own people, by their own society, by their own comrades. At the same time it can be seen from the above mentioned facts that in spite of the similarities, the process of fall of communism **took place** differently in each country, depending on the internal conditions of each society. The decades-long wrestling in Poland, the bargaining in Hungary, the sudden collapse in East Germany, the „velvety capitulation” of Czechoslovakia, the bloody play in Romania – all these were consequences of the traditions and situation of that society. This paper has followed the events only until the end of the first part of the regime change, until the political change. The social and economic transformation after the collapse of „existing socialism” would be the subject of another essay.

### **Bibliography**

Bába, Iván: *Rendszerváltoztatás Magyarországon* (Political Changes in Hungary) Veritas – Magyar Napló, Budapest, 2015.

Dudek, Antoni: *Reglamentowana rewolucja* (Regulated Revolution), Horyzont, Kraków, 2014.

*Elbeszélt történelem* (Oral History), ICDT Budapest, 2011.

Mechyr, Jan: *Velky prevrat ci snad revoluce sametová?* (The Great Transition or Perhaps the Velvet Revolution?), Ceskoslovensky spisovatel, Praha, 1999.

*Proletárdiktatúrákból a polgári demokráciákba* (From Communist Dictatorship to Bourgeois Democracy), 1989-1992. MTA Társadalomtudományi központ, 2004.

# Memory and Legacy of Communism in Post-Soviet Eastern and Central Europe

Attila Pók

## *Topic and Methodology*

This essay is part of a book project on the politics of memory in post-communist Hungary. The topic is covered in a comparative way: putting this case into the context of similar issues in János Kádár's Hungary and post-World War Two Western Europe. The conceptual framework for the monograph owes much to David Lowenthal's famous book, *The Past is a Foreign Country*<sup>3</sup>. Numerous classical and more recent works have been written on the uses and abuses of the past in general and memory politics in particular and I found Lowenthal's work especially helpful for the categorization of these phenomena. Starting out from the argumentation of this book, I use the following categories to describe the main functional elements of the relationship between the past and the present:

- I. 'Wanting' the past, i.e. meeting practical present needs with the help of the past: the search for legitimacy, apology, reconciliation, appeasement, proving the victim-role, retrospective justice, self-appraisal, the search for a 'golden age', nostalgia
- II. 'Knowing' the past: historical research, memory, relics
- III. 'Changing' the past: construction of ideologies, symbols, renaming and restructuring public spaces, holidays, legislation, rhetorics, education, commercialization

The other constitutive element of the conceptual framework is the presentation of situations where the various functional elements of the past-present relationship become active. Here I differentiate between two basic cases:

- I. Political, social, economic crisis situations when both the political elites and the societies at large focus on some historical point of reference either in the positive or in the negative sense.
- II. Cultural or scholarly events: publication of books, screening of films, theatre performances, exhibitions, activities of well-known public intellectuals.

---

<sup>3</sup> Cambridge University Press, 1985. A new, revised edition will come out at the end of this year, 2015.

[With the help of these categories the book (in addition to the introduction and the conclusion) will have seven substantial chapters:

I. The history of the concept of the politics of history. I trace the origins of the concept back to the German term: 'Geschichtspolitik' as it emerged in the debates frequently described as the Historikerstreit.<sup>4</sup>

II. Wanting the past: political inspirations. Here I will focus on the victim-perpetrator-onlooker relationship, on the 'culture of defeat'<sup>5</sup> but will have subchapters on all the issues connected to 'wanting' the past mentioned above.

III. Wanting the past: scholarly, artistic inspirations. Here I will deal mainly with books and films that had a great impact, occasionally bringing about direct political consequences.

IV. Knowing the past: political inspirations. Here I will deal with national and international research institutions that were created for scholarly purposes but with open or hidden political agendas and compare them to other types of organizing scholarship. My intention here is not the ab ovo condemnation of connecting research to political agendas but rather trying to present the complexity of the relationship of political will and the world of scholarship.

V. Knowing the past: scholarly, artistic inspirations. Here I will give an overview how the results of the systematic work of established research institutions can influence public thought, social perception of historical legacies and how books, films can initiate serious research. Special attention will be devoted to 'infotainment' a peculiar mixture of scholarship and entertainment that pertains now especially the world of internet.

VI. Changing the past: political pressures. This will most likely be the longest chapter as it includes everything that political power is capable of doing from the creation of ideologies through legislation to transforming public spaces. I will not limit my investigations to political forces in power but will deal with oppositional politics as much as with politically active civil groups.

VII. Changing the past: the limits and possibilities of scholarship and arts. Case studies here will explore how certain powerful paradigms (as e.g. that of totalitarianism) can for long periods determine interpretations of the past. Much space will here be devoted to the commercialization of history, a best known example being the Hitler films, musicals, commercial posters.]

### ***Socialist in content, national in form***

---

<sup>4</sup> Stefan Troebst: Geschichtspolitik, Version 1:0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 4.8. 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Wolfgang Schivelbush: The Culture of Defeat. On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery. Picador, New York, 2004.

This essay will describe communist ways of 'wanting' and 'changing' the past.<sup>6</sup> It enlightens some aspects of the memories of communism in the historiographies and historical thought of the countries of the Soviet Bloc during the last two and a half decades, contrasting these memories with the impact of communism on historical scholarship in the same region. The legacy of communism will also be addressed as memory can hardly be separated from legacy: what and how individuals or smaller or larger groups of people remember is very much shaped by the layers of surviving traditions.

The literature to be surveyed examines how communist politicians and political thinkers were trying to combine communist proletarian internationalism with powerful nationalism in the countries of the Soviet Bloc between the late 1940s and the late 1980s. The failure of this 'blending' of nationalism and internationalism is frequently defined as one of the causes of the collapse of communist regimes in Central Europe and as a decisive factor in shaping the memory of communism there. Other selected issues in the historical works to be discussed include problems relating to the roots, embeddedness of communism in Eastern and Central Europe. Are the forty years of communist rule part of the "normal course" of national histories in the region or the communist political system and ideologies were just imposed on these societies by Soviet imperialism without substantially transforming them? A closely related question is the interpretation of the causes of the collapse of the communist regimes. Was it the consequence of the struggles for liberty of these freedom-loving nations or just the result of a deal between the US and the declining USSR? The paper will also critically analyse a few historiographical discussions on continuities and discontinuities of historical traditions in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc.<sup>7</sup> In addition to written sources the paper is also

---

<sup>6</sup> In this essay I used some parts of an earlier article of mine: *On the Memory of Communism in Eastern and Central Europe*. In: Stefan Berger and Bill Niven (eds.): *Writing the History of Memory*. Bloomsbury, 2014.

<sup>7</sup> Two recent books with extensive bibliographies can guide the interested reader further: James Mark: *The Unfinished Revolution. Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe*. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2010. *Politische Geschichtskulturen im Süden und Osten Europas. Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspektiven*. Herausgegeben von Stefan Troebst. Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen, 2010.

based on the author's experiences as a participant in a number of international historical research projects.<sup>8</sup> The analysis also relies on research in the political and social sciences.<sup>9</sup>

When does „contemporary history” start? When members of my '1968 generation'<sup>10</sup> in the countries of the Soviet Bloc went to university during the late 1960s and early 1970s, we did not speak of contemporary history, we used other chronological concepts to describe most recent history. We used the translations of the Russian term: *novaja i novejsaja istorija* coined by our Soviet colleagues. *Novaja* meant the time following the English 'glorious revolution', and *novejsaja* meant the period following the time period starting with the 1917 Great October Revolution (celebrated on November 7). We were educated in a spirit where revolutions arising from class struggles were defined as the most decisive turning points in history. The first bourgeois revolution started the age of capitalism, the first major socialist revolution started the age of socialism. It was assumed that all societies go through the evolution of the basic modes of production, i.e. from slavery via feudalism, capitalism and socialism (the preliminary stage to communism) to communist society. According to the basic teachings of 'scientific socialism' the fundamental difference between socialism and

---

An earlier book by Vladimir Tismaneanu: *Fantasies of Salvation. Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Communist Europe*. Princeton University Press, 1998 is indispensable when dealing with the memory of communism in Eastern and Central Europe.

<sup>8</sup> *European Historical Consciousness*: A cooperation between the Körber Stiftung in Hamburg and the Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities (KWI) Essen under the direction of Jörn Rüsen, from 1998 to 2000 resulting in the following publications: *Approaches to European Historical Consciousness. Reflections and Provocations*. Edited by Sharon Macdonald. Edition Körber Stiftung, Hamburg, 2000. *European History: Challenge for a Common Future?* Edited by Attila Pók, Jörn Rüsen, Jutta Scherer. Edition Körber Stiftung, 2002. *History for Today and Tomorrow. What Does Europe Mean for School History?* edited by Joke van der Leeuw-Roord. Edition Körber Stiftung, Hamburg, 2001. I profited a lot from my work as a member of the Steering Committee of the European Science Foundation Project: *Representations of the Past: The Writing of National Histories in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe (NHIST)* from 2003 to 2008. Publications of the project relevant for the subject of his paper include: *The Contested Nation. Ethnicity, Class, Religion and Gender in National Histories*. Edited by Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz. Writing the Nation Series Vol. III. European Science Foundation-Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. *Transnational Challenges to National History Writing*. Edited by Matthias Middell and Lluís Roura. Writing the Nation Series Vol. IV.. European Science Foundation-Palgrave Macmillan 2009. *The Nation as History.. National Identities and Historical Cultures in Modern Europe*. Edited by Stefan Berger and Christoph Conrad. Writing the Nation Series. Vol VI. European Science Foundation-Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. *A conference of the Historischer Kolleg in Munich in June 2002 on the role of history in the transformation process of Eastern, East Central and Southeastern Europe*, resulting in the publication: *Gegenwärtige Geschichte als politisches Argument*. Herausgegeben von Helmut Altrichter. Schriften des Historischen Kollegs. Kolloquien, 61.R. Oldenbourg, Verlag, München 2006. *A conference on How to write European History in Salzburg organized by the Herbert Batliner Europeanstitut* in October 2008 resulting in the book: Oliver Rathkolb (ed.) *How to (Re)Write European History*. StudienVerlag, Innsbruck, Wien, Bozen 2010. *The conference on Political Mythology and Historical Science at Sofia University* in April 2009 resulting in the book: Kostadin Grozev-Daniela Koleva (red.): *Isztorija, mitologija, politika*. Universitetszko izdatelstvo 'Szv. Kliment Ohridski'. Sofia, 2010. My experiences as a Hungarian coordinator of *the European Network of Remembrance and Solidarity* ([www.enrs.eu](http://www.enrs.eu)), my work in the Kuratorium of the *Willy Brandt Institut in Wrocław*, as chairman of the Scientific Council of *the Geisteswissenschaftliches Zentrum Geschichte und Kultur Ostmitteleuropas in Leipzig* and in the Beirat of the *Imre Kertész Kolleg in Jena*.

<sup>9</sup> A very special, most original piece in the literature of my subject is István Rév: *Retroactive Justice*.

*Prehistory of Post Communism. Cultural Memory in the Present*, Stanford University Press, 2005. An imagined prehistory of the collapse of communism using literary methods.

<sup>10</sup> I was born in 1950. Cf. the website: [www.single-generation.de/kohorten/68er.htm](http://www.single-generation.de/kohorten/68er.htm) that gives a list of some better known members of this generation and hosts a debate on their achievements.

communism on the one hand and all the other (slave-holding, feudal and capitalist) social formations is that the former ones eliminate private property and consequently both class struggle and exploitation.<sup>11</sup>

In all the countries of the Soviet Bloc the interpretation of the main course of human history as the road from various forms of exploitation to socialist and communist societies without exploitation of any kind was a mandatory element of dealing with history in any form and on any level. This ideological axiom was combined with the teachings on how the economic basis determined the formation of the social, political, cultural suprastructure and on how class struggles moved historical processes<sup>12</sup>.

According to the interpretation of communist ideologists it was historical laws and not great power games or the intricacies of domestic politics that made the ascendance of communist parties into power possible. The teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin (and up to about 1956 Stalin) were the sources defining the fundamental laws that governed the lives of human societies. The 'constantly developing' doctrine of scientific socialism and scientific communism incorporated the more recent historical experiences. They proved the inevitable, ultimate victory of communism (socialism being the first step in this process). The memory of the origins of communism as interpreted by communist ideologists in the countries of the Soviet Bloc was based less on an analysis of what actually happened in the past but it was much more an anticipation of an inevitable future. This 'memory' reflected how 'progressive' ideologies, movements and personalities paved the road towards the victory of the international working class movement led by the Soviet Union. Both in political rhetoric and education the emphasis was on presenting the 'objective laws' of history and a host of carefully selected historical events stood to illustrate these laws. 'Shallow empiricism' was considered to be one of the worst mistakes of 'bourgeois' philosophers and ideologists.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> Here is the root of the frequently referred to statement of the most creative and most influential Marxist philosopher of the twentieth century. György Lukács: 'the worst socialism is better than the best capitalism' (First stated in *Népszabadság*, the Hungarian party daily, December 24, 1967).

<sup>12</sup> Professor Georg Iggers gives a most succinct summary of the two axioms of the Marxist interpretation of history in a paper prepared for the 2010 Amsterdam World Congress of Historians. The one is the economic interpretation of history, to cite Marx, that "economic production and the structure of society arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the political and intellectual history of that epoch," that "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness". The other is a conception of history as an ongoing dialectical process by which the conflict between changing modes of production and property relations which takes the form of class conflict leads through several stages, from "Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production" to a classless, i.e. communist, society, overcoming the bourgeois order. These two ideas constituted the core of the ideology accepted first by the Second and then by the Third International which became the official doctrine of the Soviet Union and of Western Communist parties, often called "historical materialism. (The paper was sent to the author of this essay as a manuscript.)

<sup>13</sup> A typical formulation from a standard manual of Marxist philosophy: 'The positivists lead a crusade against scientific abstractions, that help us to define the essence of things, under the banner of a struggle against 'abstraction' and 'pure speculation' for positive (factual) knowledge.'" In: *A marxista filozófia alapjai* (The Basics of Marxist Philosophy. Kossuth, 1959. 352. (Translation of *Osznovi markszisztiszkoi filozofii*, Moszkva, 1958.)

## *National Identities and European Historical Consciousness*

A tremendous amount of Marxist-Communist literature addressed the 'national question'. Communism as a political ideology based on the philosophical teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin targeted the world wide victory of the proletariat in the global class struggle against the bourgeoisie. This struggle, however, had to be reconciled with presenting communists also as the best patriots of all nations of the world. Still, class conflicts were considered to be much more important than fights among nations: basic Marxist manuals argued that if the proletariat of the world unite, the conflicts among bourgeois national interests will be automatically resolved.

The memory of communism is therefore closely connected to the national momentum. If we are trying to find one core issue, a major point of reference in the voluminous literature of the last two and a half decades on the communist memory of the past and on the post-communist memory of communism, this issue is the relationship between national histories and regional and global developments. In other words: do the fundamental changes in the Soviet Union and the countries of the former Soviet Bloc in 1989-1990 reflect some general pattern of 'progress' from authoritarian dictatorships to well-functioning democracies or they are to be interpreted as a series of singular cases, incidentally showing some striking similarities due to the changes in the international balance of power? This question is closely connected to the problem of European historical consciousness: does it at all exist? Did the process of European political and economic integration, that got a huge impetus following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, bring about the emergence of a powerful European civil identity also rooted in a widely shared vision of a European historical legacy? In my analysis the concept of historical consciousness has a central role, its contents are best defined by Sharon Macdonald and Katja Fausser: "Historical consciousness" redirects the emphasis in historical analysis from what happened to how the past – and its relations with present and future – is understood ... "historical consciousness" takes us also into the debates about memory and forgetting configurations of temporality, narrative structure, and uses and abuses of history."<sup>14</sup> It is certainly not easy to find the 'carriers' of this historical consciousness and to point out its national and non-national components but the search for that might be a useful analytical tool.

---

<sup>14</sup> Sharon Macdonald and Katja Fausser Towards European Historical Consciousness. In: Sharon Macdonald (ed.) Approaches to European Historical Consciousness. Reflections and Provocations. Eustory Series. Shaping European History. Volume No. 1. Körber Stiftung, 2000. 10.

The principle of 'socialist in content, national in form' created by Stalin<sup>15</sup> permeated all fields of life in the countries of the Soviet Bloc. The official master-narratives were trying to prove that in spite of the regional peculiarities, the societies of all socialist countries go through all stages of social, economic, political development and socialism is basically the same social-economic-political formation in all the countries building socialism from Bulgaria to Poland.<sup>16</sup> The potential of national creativity can best flourish in the brotherly community of peace-loving socialist countries under the wise guidance of the Soviet Union: the world wide victory of communism under the leadership of the Soviet Union was an indispensable component of communist teleology. The concept of historical progress involved the milestones leading to this ultimate point of human development. This is how international solidarity, the superiority of class solidarity versus national conflict was to be reconciled with communists presented as the best possible patriots. Let me refer here to just one example: Poland. Namely, communism as the defender of the integrity of the nation played a very important role in Polish communist propaganda. There was a pressing political need to prove that following World War II the Soviet supported Lublin government was the true representative of Polish national interests versus the Polish government in exile in London just as much as in 1918 the Russian revolution and not Pilsudski's efforts made Poland's resurrection as a sovereign state possible.<sup>17</sup> Prof. Wandycz aptly summarizes the, as he calls it, 'geographic-historical reorientation' of Polish historical studies during the aftermath of World War Two, following the country being pushed to the west by losing Eastern and acquiring Western territories: 'Emphasis was to be placed on German-Polish relations and the medieval Polish (*Piast*) character of these "western lands". By contrast, the Jagiellonian period of Polish—Lithuanian union and eastward expansion was to be treated more critically and Slav unity stressed."<sup>18</sup> The dogmatic emphasis on the economic determinants of history paradoxically helped the continuation of an established 'bourgeois' tradition of economic history (Franciszek Bujak, Jan Rutkowski). The Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences created in 1952<sup>19</sup> encouraged respective research-projects. During the 1960s Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogmas were challenged in

---

<sup>15</sup> For a contemporary appraisal see: M. B. Mitin, M.D. Kammari, M. D. Aleksandrov: The Contribution of J. V. Stalin to Marxism-Leninism. In: *The Seventieth Anniversary of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin*, published in **Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Seria Istorii i Filosofii, Tom VII, Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, Moscow, 1950, pp. 3-30.** <http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv4n1/stalin70.htm>

<sup>16</sup> The best example for this approach is a comprehensive 10 volume History of the World published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences during the 1950s..

<sup>17</sup> Jerzy Tomaszewski: The Different Histories of Twentieth-Century Poland. In: Conceptions of National History. Proceedings of Nobel symposium 78. edited by Erik Lönnroth, Karl Molin, Ranar Björk. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin-New York, 1994. 233.

<sup>18</sup> Piotr S. Wandycz: Poland. The American Historical Review Vol. 97, Number 4, October 1992. 1018.

<sup>19</sup> FrankHadler- AttilaPók: "A DAILY WORKING GROUP TOGETHER IN ONE HOUSE" Research Institutes affiliated with the Academies of Sciences in East Central Europe. In: Iliria Porciani and Jo Tollebeek (editors) Setting the Standards. Institutions, Networks and Communities of National Historiography. Writing the Nation Series. General Editors: Stefan Berger, Christoph Conrad and Guy P. Marchal. European Science Foundation, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Polish historical scholarship. Even the most sensitive topics, such as the nineteenth century anti-Russian revolts were on the agenda of scholarly exchanges. The orthodox Marxist doctrine that 'the masses had always to be progressive and patriotic and the gentry reactionary and unpatriotic was at least partially abandoned'<sup>20</sup>.

### *Interpretations of communism*

Historiography on the legacy and memory of communism focuses on the place of communist rule in respective national histories. It is trying to answer the question: how do the decades of Soviet Bloc membership 'fit' into the 'organic' course of national history? A very influential tendency in historiography and historical-political thought presents both communism as an ideology and especially communism as a social-political system based on that ideology in criminal terms, as a deviation from a hypothetical 'normal' course of development.<sup>21</sup> According to this argumentation communism was imposed on various societies by an alien power, the Soviet Union, the communist power that in its murderous character does not differ from Nazi Germany. The military strength of this power reinforced by the subversive activities of a small number of domestic traitors tried to incorporate the conquered lands into an empire of the evil. The societies under attack, however, turned out to be much more resistant than originally assumed by the oppressors and finally, encouraged and enabled by the decline of the Soviet Union, these societies succeeded in getting rid of this brutal yoke. The pattern of the undue suffering of unfortunate peoples is an old stereotype of Eastern and Central European historical thought. It contrasts the unfortunate state of affairs of the age of the historian with

---

<sup>20</sup> Piotr S. Wandycz: op. cit. 1021.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Stéphane Courtois, Nicolas Werth, Jean-Louis Panné, Karel Bartosek, Jean-Louis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski: *Le livre noir du communisme*. Editions Robert Lafont-Fixot-Julliard, Paris, 1997. I used the English version: *The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, terror, repression*. Edited by Stéphane Courtois et al. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999. The book has been translated into close to 20 languages and is well known in the post communist countries. Numerous controversies emerged around the the comparison of Nazism and Communism in the book, especially on the two central issues. First, that the real motivation, source for the terror was originally Leninist ideology and Soviet political practice with concentration camps serving as an example for Nazis. Second, that the death toll of communism was much higher (100 million) than that of Nazism (25 million). The fact that the authors come from the leftist-liberal political camp and emphasized their motivation that revealing the crimes of communism must not be left to the radical right, intensified the debate. The most recent chapter in this debate was initiated by Timothy Snyder's *Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin*. Basic Books: New York, 2010. Snyder's argument focuses on the fate of the fourteen million people who were killed on the territories from central Poland to western Russia between 1933 and 1945 as a result of Hitler's and Stalin's policies. A critical review: by Stefan Troebst: <http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/d=16087>. Snyder's book does not yet have substantial echo in the region. It is remarkable that attempts at putting the origins and history of destructive hatred into a broader context (as Arno J. Mayer: *The Furies*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2000 or Daniel Jonathan Goldhagen: *Worse than war. Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity*. BBS, Public Affairs, New York, 2009.) were not echoed in the region. Most recently Christian Gerlach (*Extreme Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century World*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.) came up with a new approach to the history of the massacres of the twentieth century. He focuses not on large scale global ideological clashes and the confrontations of great powers but on the dynamism of local social movements, in other words: looks less for the ideological and political but more for the social roots of mass violence.

some hypothetical past or future 'golden age' and is looking for the causes of the decline and/or the potential of recovery. The golden age was frequently connected to great historical personalities as Jan Hus among the Czechs, in Romania Burebista, (and the whole issue of the Roman origins of Romanians)<sup>22</sup>, Stephen the Great (1457-1504 in Moldavia), Vlad Dracul III (1456-1462 in Wallachia), Mihai Viteazul (1558-1601, in 1600 temporarily uniting Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania under his control) who with slightly changing emphasis could be integrated into both communist and anti-communist historical narratives.

Another interpretation of the making and breaking of the communist systems in Eastern and Central Europe tries to investigate to what an extent communism permeated the social fabric of these societies and when explaining the collapse of the system, focuses more on the interaction of internal problems and external factors. External factors in this interpretation do not simply mean the Soviet Union but much broader the economic and geopolitical restructuring of the global world system. A Hungarian political scientist argues that the "The system change had not so much aims but rather and first of all causes and the international factors going beyond the local conditions both in terms of power politics and the economy determined the changes much more than the actors of changes would have assumed...it is to be questioned whether the meaning, substance of the changes as perceived by their actors is identical with the scholarly interpretation of the presumably unescapable changes."<sup>23</sup> Ralf Dahrendorf summarizes the respective views of a key figure of the Polish transition as follows: Adam Michnik likes to emphasize that the revolution of 1989 had no utopia, "no society or state ideal", though it had its dreams of freedom and rights and openness and the pursuit of truth. The dreams were and are justly cherished, but even they were not enough to create the elements of a liberal order.<sup>24</sup> Public opinion, argues József Bayer, hardly notices the results of historical scholarship: „...the analysis of the past in today's public discourse is basically limited to listing the crimes of communism or moral hysteria in connection with the (communist secret police) agents”.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup> For the origins of the myth the most comprehensive book: Adolf Armbruster: *Romanitatea Romanilor. Istoria unei idei*. Bucuresti, Editura Enciclopedica, 1993. 343 p. See a review by Ambrus Miskolczy: *Historical Verities*, Budapest Review of Books 1997/ 1/ 18-22.

<sup>23</sup> Bayer József: *A rendszerváltásról két évtized múltán*. In: *A rendszerváltás húsz éve: változások és válaszok*. Szerkesztette: Bayer József és Boda Zsolt. L'Harmattan-MTA Politikai Tudományok Intézete, Budapest, 2009. 13. The difference between the perspective of contemporaries and that of later historians is, of course, an old problem of historical theory and methodology. See especially the works of Reinhart Koselleck, in English an excellent selection of some of his most important essays: *The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts*. Stanford University Press, 2002. A recent summary of the key issues regarding this problem: Gábor Gyáni: *Történelmi esemény és struktúra: kapcsolatuk ellentmondásossága* (with an English summary: *Historical Event and Structure: the Controversial Nature of their Relationship*). *Történelmi Szemle* LIII (2011) 2: 145-161.

<sup>24</sup> Ralf Dahrendorf: *Universities after Communism*. Edition Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg, 2000. 11. The Michnik quote: *Lettre Internationale* 25, II/94, p.11.

<sup>25</sup> Bayer József: *op. cit.*, 14.

The pattern of the oppressed and exploited working people and nations in communist historiography has its mirror picture in certain pieces of the post-communist historiography of communism and in symbolic manifestations of the interpretation of the communist past. Such a pattern of thought assumes that there always exists a clearly defined border-line between victims and perpetrators and the perpetrators are responsible for 'derailing' history. The communist train was derailed by various bourgeois counterrevolutionary enemies of progress whereas an influential post-communist interpretation of communism blames communists for derailing the train carrying the peoples of the Soviet Bloc along the 'normal' track of history heading towards communism. The same pattern applies when the culprits for the nations' failures, great tragedies are named. The role of communists in the 1918-19 Central European revolutions is thus heroic from a communist perspective and a key cause of all later disasters from a post-communist anti-communist perspective. In the official and semi-official communist representations of Hungarian history in the twentieth century, the period of the Republic of Councils, between March 21 and August 1st 1919 played a key role. Namely, after the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy and following a short lived democratic republic, a Communist dominated coalition between Communists and Social Democrats took power in Hungary. According to the communist view, this proved the fact that communism was deeply rooted in Hungary. In the collective Hungarian memory and the post-communist master narrative, however, this event was described as a conspiracy and has been linked to the tragic territorial losses of the country after the First World War. It is assumed in the post-communist memory of communism in Hungary that the victorious entente powers sanctioned Hungary's dismantlement only out of fear that the country's communism would spread all over Europe. Results of decades of extensive respective research pointed out that this was not the case but the myth that in fact the communists, and not the traditional elite, had led the country into a lost war, survived and awoke with special force around the time of the post-communist transition in the early 1990s. In the political struggles of the early post - communist period liberals (a number of them children of former Communist officials) were frequently presented as the direct personal and political descendants of the communist 'squanderers of the country.' This phenomenon was closely connected to the fact that numerous military and political leaders of the countries of the Soviet Bloc could be and actually were blamed and sued for their anti-internationalist, anti-communist, anti-Soviet policies in the course of their trials following World War Two. After 1989-90 quite a number of them were rehabilitated and praised for their clear-sightedness concerning the criminal nature of communism. This way for example the attack

on the Soviet Union in June 1941 could be presented as a most legitimate preventive measure, as part of an anti-communist 'crusade'.<sup>26</sup>

### *Refighting past battles*

Spectacular events were organized to emphasise the post-communist view of national history: symbolic (re) burials, the removal of old monuments and the erection of new ones, the choice of new national holidays. In Yugoslavia the 1989 commemorations of the 600th anniversary of the death of Prince Lazar at the battlefield of Kosovo meant a return to the founding myth of the Serbian Kingdom, a myth that was to replace the cult of the Yugoslav partisans in the Second World War. The Croatian strive for independence was fought not only on the battlefields but to a very great extent in quite successful attempts at reshaping collective memory by symbolic steps, as re-erecting the monument dedicated to Jelacic<sup>27</sup> on the main square of Zagreb, first erected in 1866, removed in 1947 and, as it had been incidentally preserved, re-erected at the original location as part of huge festivities in 1990.<sup>28</sup>

The use of Fascism and National Socialism as non-analytical concepts but as curse words was quite common in both communist historiography and post-communist historical-political discourses. A random example: the front page of the Belgrade daily Politika argued on June 9 1990: Serbia answers the pro-fascist, rightish orientation in the North-west of Yugoslavia with a democratic, leftish, socialist orientation<sup>29</sup>. It is remarkable that the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer found no better way to describe Milosevic in 1999 than arguing that he was a new Hitler.<sup>30</sup> In the post-communist Serbian discourse the traditional subjects as World War Two, the struggle against Fascism did not disappear but were given new, nationalist interpretations. The ethnically, nationally neutral dichotomy of collaboration and resistance was substituted by the 'atavistic' struggle

---

<sup>26</sup> On July 30, 1990 the 90-year-old Kálmán Kéri, a high-ranking anti-Nazi officer of the Hungarian army during World War II, oldest member of the new, freely elected Hungarian parliament argued that though it was unfortunate that the Hungarian army got to the Don river, the army's struggle was just, it was fighting communism. In the ensuing debate the historian Prime Minister, József Antall, pointed out the great dilemma of Hungarian military and political leaders during World War II: the anti-fascist political forces allied for overthrowing Hitler's Germany included Stalin's Soviet Union as well. For Hungary fighting on the side of Germany meant fighting against communism, a right cause in this interpretation and at the same time against the anti-Hitler allies, a wrong cause from this perspective. Antall was trying to explain that far from justifying Hungary's participation in World War II on the 'wrong' side, the old officer defended the honour of his fellow soldiers who carry no responsibility for being sent to the front. <http://www.antalljozsef.hu/node/72>

<sup>27</sup> Jozef Jelacic (1801-1859), Croatian national leader, in 1848-49 had a decisive role in crushing the Hungarian anti-Habsburg war for independence. A symbolic figure of Croatian national identity and sovereignty.

<sup>28</sup> Iskra Iveljic: Cum ira et studio. Geschichte und Gesellschaft Kroatiens in den 1990er Jahren. In: GegenErinnerung. Geschichte als politisches Argument. Herausgegeben von Helmut Altrichter. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 2006. 197.

<sup>29</sup> Carl Bethke, Holm Sundhausen: Zurück zur 'alten Übersichtlichkeit'? Geschichte in den jugoslawischen Nachfolgekriegen 1991-2000. in: GegenErinnerung. Geschichte als politisches Argument. Herausgegeben von Helmut Altrichter. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 2006. 207.

<sup>30</sup> taz, 13.4. 1999. Cited by Bethke-Sundhausen op. cit. 217.

of the nations<sup>31</sup>. These ideas had well known tragic practical consequences: at the beginning of the 1990s large groups<sup>32</sup> of former Yugoslavia's population believed that they had to refight the battles of previous centuries and they can thus correct their outcomes.

The return of the heart of the Bulgarian Tsar Boris (who died in 1941 under unclear circumstances) to his homeland was a symbolic break with the communist legacy of Bulgaria<sup>33</sup> (that defined Boris' rule as Monarchofascism). 2001 gave Simeon II, the son of Boris, a chance to enter the political arena of Bulgaria and achieve a sweeping victory of his party, the National Movement Simeon II. The myth, however, did not work in politics in the long run, though his party still ranked second at the 2005 elections and was part of a big coalition from 2005 to 2009. It was not elected into parliament in 2009. Bulgaria is the country where the communist history propaganda failed most conspicuously. Boris, labelled as a fascist oppressor of his people by the communists, changed into the responsible, conscientious father of his people, and the saviour of Bulgarian Jews in post-communist Bulgaria. Parallel with the re-emergence of Simeon, the long term Communist leader Zivkov's power and prestige collapsed more dramatically than, apart from the bloody fall of Romania's Ceausescu, that of any other Soviet Bloc leader.<sup>34</sup> Communism in mainstream discourses of the memory of communism turned out to be a curse word similar to the use of Fascism in communist historical terminology and political rhetoric - not only in Bulgaria.

More efficiently than by speeches and publications, collective memories are shaped and mobilized frequently with the uses of public spaces and with the creation of special memorial places. This includes removing, re-erecting and erecting monuments and the building of museums on sites of former terror. In his extremely well documented and most inspiring book James Mark points out that the most successful Communist memorial museums contain "multiple histories of suffering", as for example the Sighet memorial in Romania: a jail under numerous subsequent regimes: the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Romanian state between 1919 and 1941, the Hungarian state from 1941 to 1944, then under the Romanian communist state following the Second World War. The House of Terror in Budapest was a torture centre used by the Hungarian Nazis during 1944, then it served as the headquarters of the Communist controlled state security<sup>35</sup>. This way Communist sins and offences appear as the climax of a chain of criminal offences, the latest and worst of all. The greatest

---

<sup>31</sup> Bethke- Sundhausen: op. cit. 211.

<sup>32</sup> Bethke- Sundhausen op. cit 218.

<sup>33</sup> Markus Wien: Die bulgarische Monarchie. In: GegenErinnerung. Geschichte als politisches Argument. Herausgegeben von Helmut Altrichter. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 2006. 219-236.

<sup>34</sup> The most recent and most detailed description of this process: Iskra Baeva, Evgenija Kalinova und Nikolaj Poppetrov: Die kommunistische Ara im kollektiven Gedächtnis der Bulgaren. In: Postdiktatorische Geschichtskulturen im Süden und Osten Europas. Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspektiven. Herausgegeben von Stefan Troebst. Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen, 2010. 405.-501.

<sup>35</sup> James Mark: The Unfinished Revolution. Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe. Yale University Press, New Haven and London., 2010. 67.

difficulty here is posed by placing the communist guilt next to Fascist, Nazi misdeeds, and the comparison of the suffering of Holocaust victims to those of Communism. James Mark has an excellent example for using the Holocaust imagination to demonize Communism: the Czech Vojna site (near Pribram, south of Prague). Originally a prisoner of war camp, built up by German soldiers after the Second World War, a political prisoners' camp of communist Czechoslovakia from 1949 to 1960, was transformed into a museum site<sup>36</sup> and at the entrance a board with the Czech equivalent of "Arbeit macht frei" was put up. Here the message was much more important than the originality of the exhibits (otherwise a guiding professional principle of museums): "...the sign was able to tap into the power of globally recognizable imagery drawn from the Holocaust in order to alert visitors to the continuities between fascist persecution and that of Communism after the war".<sup>37</sup> During the last two decades lots of books and documentaries examined the fate of deportees to the Soviet Gulag camps and as Gulag history was hardly known in the countries of the Soviet Bloc, explanation and interpretation is in most cases also related to the Holocaust. It is frequently argued that although the casualties of the Holocaust and that of the Gulag terror are comparable, much less attention was paid to the latter.<sup>38</sup> There is some confusion in properly identifying the victims of communist terror as war criminals and simple criminals could easily mix with real targets of destructive terror among the participants of the loosely defined national resistance against communism.<sup>39</sup> A bad scandal broke out in Budapest when a researcher proved that in the special section of the largest Budapest cemetery, dedicated to people who have sacrificed their lives for their homeland, a number of war criminals were executed in the aftermath of the Second World War were also buried.<sup>40</sup> The graves of the victims of the terror following the 1956 revolution are also located in a section of the cemetery where people executed for war crimes or manslaughter can also be found and, though certainly unwillingly, official tributes to the victims of communism honour simple criminals as well. When the present followers of Hungarian Nazis realized that some of their 'heroes' were buried on this site, they started using it as a meeting place of their own.

---

<sup>36</sup> [www.muzeum-pribram.cz/jazyky/anglicky/vojnmemorial/vojnmemorial.html](http://www.muzeum-pribram.cz/jazyky/anglicky/vojnmemorial/vojnmemorial.html). The museum opened in 2005.

<sup>37</sup> James Mark: op cit. 70.

<sup>38</sup> In addition to translations of *The Black Book of Communism* and Anne Applebaum's *GULAG. A History of the Camps*. Doubleday, 2003. numerous local research projects deal with the issue, Especially much has been published about the Hungarian victims. See a rich bibliography in Steven Béla Várdy and Agnes Várdy: *Stalin's Gulag. The Hungarian Experience*. Università degli Studi di Napoli L'Orientale. Napoli, Italia, 2007.

<sup>39</sup> For a general survey of the problem cf. István Deák, Jan T. Gross, Tony Judt (editors) *The Politics of Retribution in Europe. World War Two and Its Aftermath*. Princeton University Press, 2001.1

<sup>40</sup> Tamás Csapody: *Felmagasztosult keretlegények. Öt sír nyomában a Rákoskeresztúri új köztemető 298-as parcellájában*. Népszabadság, Hétvége, November 24, 2007.2-3. During the spring of 2008 a five member historians' commission examined the the graves and especially the large marble plaques where names of common criminals, murderers appear together with victims of communist terror. Their research proved that 40 per cent of the 315 names on the plaque were common criminals and therefore in June 2008 the plaque was removed but the corpses were not identified and were not removed.

Both politics and scholarship have recently started to look for new frameworks of interpretation of the murderous nature of communism, nazism and fascism. In the course of this search reconsidering the significance of 1945 as a chronological borderline is of a great significance. Namely, if the Stalin regime is as murderous as the Nazi one, the real turning point comes not with the end of the war but with Stalin's death. As Jan T. Gross put it: "In one part of the continent, the Nazi-instigated war and the Communist-driven post-war takeovers constituted one integral period. We could note this by pointing out the continuities in the transformation of the social fabric, as well as the affinities in the deployed strategies of subjugation."<sup>41</sup> If we are broadening the scope and take into account mass murders and other crimes of other regimes as well, including those committed by all the victors of the Second World War, the analysis is even more difficult. The broader the horizon, the larger the number of case studies, the more difficult it is to apply the intellectually and politically comfortable and reassuring separation of victims, perpetrators and onlookers. If we analyse the memory of communism in this broader context, we should pay attention to Jonathan Goldhagen's warning: "The difficulty of keeping distant the three tasks of definition, explanation, and moral evaluation muddles considerations of mass murder. The passions of assigning guilt, blame, or moral responsibility hijack the other two usually cooler enterprises. This happens constantly in discussions of the Holocaust...we can, as a matter of fact, call Truman's annihilation of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki mass murder and the man a mass murderer, putting Truman and his deeds into the same broad categories of Hitler and the Holocaust, Stalin and the Gulag, Pol Pot, Mao, Saddam Hussein, and Slobodan Milosevic and their victims, without giving the same explanation for Truman's actions as we do for theirs, and without judging them morally as being equivalent'."<sup>42</sup>

### ***The Memory of Communism: Backwardness***

It was especially Polish and Hungarian sociologists, social and economic historians<sup>43</sup> who during the 1960s started looking into the peculiarities of regional economic and social development 'East of the river Elb.' It was along the river Elb that Europe was divided into the group of liberal democracies and peoples' democracies after World War Two, so the historical question was politically highly loaded: to what an extent is this river the border between historically defined regions and not just a line of division arbitrarily imposed on Europe by the US and the Soviet Union?

---

<sup>41</sup> Deák-Gross-Judt: op. cit. 31.

<sup>42</sup> Daniel Jonah Goldhagen: *Worse than War. Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity*. BBS, Public Affairs, New York, 2009.

<sup>43</sup> The most well known scholars: Jerzy Jedlicky, Iván T. Berend, GyörgyRánki, Pál Zsigmond Pach, Miroslav Hroch, Emil Niederhauser.

As the outstanding Hungarian medievalist, Jenő Szűcs put it in a very influential essay on the regions of Europe: „A very sharp demarcation line was in fact drawn to cut Europe into two parts from the point of view of economic and social structure after 1500, divided off the far larger, more easterly part as the scene of the second serfdom. Europe in our time (the turn of the 1970s and 1980s), another 500 years later still is divided more clearly than ever before into two 'camps' almost exactly along that same line (with a slight deviation in Thuringia). It is as if Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt had studied carefully the status quo of the age of Charlemagne on the 1130th anniversary of his death”.<sup>44</sup> This question also included another fundamental issue: the origins of the backwardness of the societies of the Soviet Bloc. It was mainly Gerschenkron's and Immanuel Wallerstein's works that helped in putting this problem into a global context. Both social scientists of communist countries and researchers of the legacy and memory of communism had to face the hard question: did the socialist (communist) systems aggravate the gap between the regions symbolically East and West of the river Elb or just the other way round: communist systems were a monumental attempt at catching up, accelerating the modernization in the traditionally underdeveloped Eastern and South-eastern parts of Europe? Or, as some researchers argued, the question is not properly raised: there exists not one standard pattern of development<sup>45</sup> (i.e. the one shaped by the French political and the British industrial revolutions) but several alternative modes of European (and global) economic, social and political development. Any attempts at imposing the 'Western' model onto 'Eastern' societies can lead to disasters. From the early 1980s on the search for a definition of a transitory 'Central European' region<sup>46</sup> seemed to be fruitful but following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc this search for an 'in-between' area lost its relevance.

The new, topical question concerning the regions of Europe was: to what an extent are the possibilities, pace and methods of the Eastern enlargement of the European Union and NATO determined by deeper-lying, historically determined "hard facts" of long term economic, social and political development. Do the various "circles" of EU widening reflect just unfortunate current developments and the arbitrary decisions of unformed, uneducated "Eurocrats" and NATO officials or the truth is very different? In fact, the pessimistic hypothesis argued, despite the best intentions and great efforts of responsible politicians, history's specter is still haunting and puts East and Central

---

<sup>44</sup> Jenő Szűcs: The Three Historical Regions of Europe: An Outline. *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 29 (1983), 133.

<sup>45</sup> For a concise and lucid summary of the key issues of this debate cf. Andrew C. Janos: *East Central Europe in the Modern World. The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism*. Stanford University Press, 2000, especially 11-124.

<sup>46</sup> The first uses of concept go back to the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century but an impetus to this research was given by the famous writer, Miloslav Kundera with his famous 1984 article: *The Tragedy of Central Europe* *New York Review of Books*, Vol. 31, No. 7. April 26, 1984. For a short but thorough survey of these debates cf. an article by a young Czech historian with a broad horizon: Michal Kopecek: *From Kundera to Visegrad*. <http://www.visegrad.info?q=hu/node/78frk> (Published July 2004)

European societies on a "forced path". In search of the factors that enable the societies of the former Soviet bloc to join the European Union, both scholarly and political analyses focus more on intellectual and cultural legacies (with special emphasis on religion and churches) than on economic, social structures, political institutions. Here the unity of Western civilization is more apparent: numerous scholars argue that communism could be destructive in terms of ruining the economy, terrorizing the society but was unable to cut off the cultural roots. As part of this continuing discussion in the post - communist political climate a number of historians, who started their careers during the 1970s, suggested that the evidence on the early modern origins of the gap between Eastern and Western Europe presented by the previous generations, founders of Marxist historical scholarship in the countries of the Soviet Bloc<sup>47</sup>, served more political than scholarly interests. Namely, it wanted to supply historical arguments to legitimate the post-Second World War division of Europe. The ensuing discussion showed that since long before Yalta the diverging peculiarities of Eastern vs. Western economic and social development had been on the agenda of German, Hungarian and Polish economic history writing. Still, I think that it was fully understandable that when the Soviet Bloc seemed to be consolidated for eternity, research into the various aspects of European regionalism and backwardness carried a heavy political load. The definition of backwardness, underdevelopment, peculiarities and origins of regional differences in Europe are still on the research agenda of historians of the post-Soviet region but more embedded into a global context, the research of world systems. The present research looks at the fall of the European communist systems not just from the perspective of the victory of democracy over authoritarianism but at the same time it also focuses on the emergence and decline of neoliberal ideologies and political movements. The decades from the early 1980s to the present crisis hand witnessed the strengthening of East Central European alternative civilian movements, their becoming political factors. This long term and manifold process reached its climax in 1989-1991 with the coming down of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the Yalta system, and the desintegration of the Soviet Union. The same decades, however, also gave food to the rise and vanishing of neoliberal illusions connected to the global process of democratization, and the termination of the division of Europe, and the capacities of the welfare societies.<sup>48</sup>

### *Institutions as carriers of memory*

---

<sup>47</sup> Pál Zsigmond Pach: Die ungarische Agrarentwicklung im 16.-17. Jahrhundert. Abbiegung vom westeuropäischen Entwicklungsgang. Budapest, 1964. Hungary and the European Economy in Early Modern Times, Aldershot, 1994. For the critical approach: Gábor Gyáni: Történeiszviták hazánk Európán belüli hovatarozásáról. Valóság 1988/4/, Gábor Gyáni: Hol tart ma a történeiszvek régióvitája? Limes, 1999/3-4. 51-65.

<sup>48</sup> Ferenc Miszlivetz A világrendszer ingája és a Jövöegyetem. Beszélgetések Immanuel Wallersteinnel. Savaria University Press, 2010.10-11.- Ivan T. Berend: From the Soviet Bloc to the European Union. the Economic and Social Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe since 1973. Cambridge University Press, 2009.

A very rich literature<sup>49</sup> examines the institutional background of the memory of communism: History Commissions, Institutes of National Memory, museums set up on the premises of former terror sites, and statue parks. Based on the wealth of this literature in this comprehensive survey one can only point out some 'creative tensions' in the various forms of the institutional representations of the memory of communism. First, these institutions convey the message that communism just as much as fascism is a matter of the past, it has been defeated and has no chance to return. Still, they consider remembering absolutely necessary in order to re-educate post-communist societies because of the successful survival strategies of communist elites and their influence. Second, this historical rhetoric can be in sharp contradiction with daily politics. When the Chinese Prime minister visited Hungary in June 2011, his Hungarian counterpart, famous for his powerful anti-communist rhetoric since 1989 said that "In the past 24 years, ever since the last Chinese head of government paid a visit to Budapest, the world and Hungary had undergone big changes, but the friendship between the two countries had remained unbroken.... we respect one another's politics and this is a principle underpinning our cooperation....we wish China to continue the policies which have produced fantastic achievements over the past decade...we raise our hats to this fantastic success."<sup>50</sup>Third, most of these institutions convey the message that communism was aggressively and violently imposed on the societies of the countries of the Soviet Block but as soon as the external conditions made it possible, these societies successfully broke from their bonds. At the same time they emphasize how extensively the communist dictatorship ruined these societies. The best example of this institutional but controversial condemnation of the Communist past is the work of the Presidential Commission in Romania. The president who set up this commission, Traian Basescu, was a successful merchant marine officer during communist times, a position that could not be filled without ties to the communist secret service. As a second-tier communist party member, after the revolution he became a prominent figure among the reform communists ruling the new leading political power, the National Salvation Front. According to Romanian political scientists, around the beginning of the new millennium, "63 per cent of the current political elite had held positions in the Communist Party prior to 1989".<sup>51</sup> The 18 members of the commission included both professional historians and politicians. They focused on presenting how Romania and its citizens became victims of communism: "The

---

<sup>49</sup> The most comprehensive and most recent piece: James Mark: *The Unfinished Revolution. Making sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe*. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2010.

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.haon.hu/china-and-hungary-form-new-major-alliance>, June 25, 2011

<sup>51</sup> Adrian Cioflanca: 'Politics of Oblivion in Post-Communist Romania'. *The Romanian Journal of Political Science* 2 (2002): 90. Cited by James Mark: *op. cit.* 35. A good insight into the theoretical-methodological approach to communism represented by the commission is offered by a presentation of its prestigious chairman, Vladimir Tismaneanu, educated in Bucharest, since 1981 living in the West: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/241-understanding-radical-evil-communism-fascism-and-the-lessons-the-20th-century>.

Communist regime... was a regime of foreign occupation which liquidated the Romanian elite and its institutions of democracy, its market economy and private property. All this was annihilated for forty-five years, a false turn on the path of true modernization...it was a giant step backward, which led us to chronic poverty, the isolation of the country, the wasting of human and material resources, the alienation of the individual and the destruction of our traditions and national culture.”<sup>52</sup> On the other hand the report contains numerous names of Romanians who carried responsibility for the vices of communism and warns of the attempts at hijacking the revolution after 1989, naming among many others Ion Iliescu, the leader of the National Salvation Front, a surviving communist agent. The use of the first person plural (our traditions) creates a unity that never existed in Romanian society. Far rightist anti-communists, dissident communists, protesting students and workers all appear as freedom fighters against communist dictatorship. In spite of the spectacular timing of its presentation by president Basescu, just two weeks before Romania’s accession to the European Union on January 1 2007, and including its conclusions in school manuals, local experts argue that the report did not achieve its aims. It did not succeed in creating a solid consensus over the dominating and prevailing liberal democratic political tradition in Romania to which communism was presented as a major but successfully defeated threat.<sup>53</sup>

## ***Conclusion***

The dismantling of the communist view of history and of the communist approach to the past in the countries of the Soviet Bloc was not an abrupt, unexpected change (as the political transformation) but rather an extended process. There are essential stereotypes, patterns of thought, key issues that connect the communist view of history and the memory of communism in post-communist societies. The widest bridge here is connected to national identities: according to the communist view the peak of the progress of national societies is reached with the ultimate (and inescapable) victory of first socialism then communism in every single country, whereas in post-communist societies numerous conflicting views clash over the legacy of communism as to the use or harm it did to the national interests. A common trend in the literature presents the revival of nationalism in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc as a key issue: a strong political force and most severe danger. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Adam Michnik agreed that nationalism is the last, unavoidable stage of communism. A contrasting, more traditional view argues that the resurgence of radical nationalism is a reaction to its having been suppressed during communist rule and it filled the

---

<sup>52</sup> James Mark: op. cit. 40.

<sup>53</sup> James Mark: op. cit. 46.

ideological vacuum after the fall of communism. The third, most convincing, interpretation points out the permanence of nationalism in Eastern and Central Europe since the early 19th century: in spite of the internationalist rhetoric of communist ideology, nationalism and communism merged in most places, most of the time. After 1989, as Iván T. Berend argues, this “new-old nationalism, a consequence of ‘unfinished nation building’ in peripheral Central and Eastern Europe, became visible, unmasked and open.”<sup>54</sup>

These issues hardly fit into the mainstream of present day historical scholarship as research interests focus more and more on supra- and subnational problems. The nation, of course, remains a point of reference for historians, as ‘national history has been a dominant genre of history writing in Europe for almost two centuries’<sup>55</sup>. The national narratives, however, are more and more challenged not only by other national narratives but also by various types of comparative and transnational approaches (religion, class, ethnicity, race, gender, peculiarities of regions and empires), by examinations of the relationship between man and its natural and built environment. The role of the state remains a major research issue but not so much as the carrier of national interests but as a servant or oppressor of the citizen. Recalling thus the memory of communism from the perspective of national interests is not a key issue of mainstream historiography in the last quarter of a century. This memory is dealt with more from the above mentioned other perspectives, namely what did communism do to the environment, to the modernization of infrastructures, and to the quality of modern life. The most visible issue in exchanges about the memory and the legacy of communism, however, is still the responsibility of communism for the devastating wars and massacres of the twentieth century.

If we accept the point that the political changes in the Soviet Union and in the countries of the Soviet bloc were due to many factors that made the communist system unmanageable but, apart from the dismantling of the Soviet system, there existed no clear programs for the future, we can argue that the refusal of the communist past, the negation of communism gave a common identity to a very mixed group of agents of the transition period. Just as much as communist politicians and numerous communist ideologists wanted to ‘sweep away’ the past and praised their system for destructing the reactionary ‘feudo-capitalist’ regimes, communism was the „constituting other”<sup>56</sup> for post-communist regimes.

---

<sup>54</sup> Ivan T. Berend: *Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993. Detour from the Periphery to the Periphery*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.367-371.

<sup>55</sup> Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz: *Introduction: National History Writing in Europe in a Global Age*. In: *The contested Nation. Ethnicity, Class, religion and Gender in National Histories*. Edited by Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz. *Writing the Nation Series III*. European Science Foundation, Palgrave, Macmillan, 2008. 1.

<sup>56</sup> For the concept cf.: Iver B. Neumann: *Russia as Central Europe’s Constituting Other*. *East European Politics and Societies*. Vol. 7. No.2 Spring 1993, 349-369. Further on identity construction by negation: Chris Lorenz: *Representations of Identity: Ethnicity, Race, Class, Gender and Religion*. *An Introduction to Conceptual History*. In: *The Contested Nation* 25-26.

## V4 at 25: which way forward?<sup>57</sup>

Christopher Walsch

### *Abstract*

This essay analyzes Visegrad cooperation (V4) since its inception twenty-five years ago and in particular since Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary joined the European Union (EU) in 2004. The external dimension of V4 cooperation differs from the internal one. V4 was successful in external affairs like EU enlargement and EU neighbourhood policies. In EU budget affairs, V4 was able to secure continued EU funding for the region's cohesion efforts and agricultural as well as rural development for the period 2014–2020. However, the picture is more varied regarding the internal dimension, especially the Europeanization of sector policies and closer coordination between V4 partners in single policy areas. V4 has had some success in technical, not overly politicized, policy areas, e.g. transportation and energy security. It is recommended that cooperation in the V4 format should go much further, in particular in monetary affairs and economic policies because of the similar economic profiles of the four members. It is also recommended that V4 cooperation with neighbouring states in Central Europe should be more coherent. The author concludes that V4 is too reluctant to construct a common Central European identity. This is why highly politicized issues are profoundly circumvented and cooperation has remained a formality. Recently, V4's handling of the ongoing refugee crisis has changed perceptions of Western and Northern European EU partners towards the Visegrad states. This may lead to a renewed West-East divide within Europe.

### *Introduction*

In the first half of 2014 the *Journal of Common Market Studies* presented a special issue analyzing ten years of the European Union (EU) membership of eight East Central European states (ECE). The editors, Rachel Epstein and Wade Jacoby, state that EU membership of the eight, later ten, ECE countries has had an overwhelming impact on the economic field; however, the East–West divide has not yet been transcended. A second finding is that the impact of EU membership on political practice

---

<sup>57</sup> This research was realised in the framework of the “TÁMOP 4.2.1.D-15/1/KONV-2015-0006 – The development of the innovation research base and knowledge centre in Kőszeg in the frame of the educational and research network at the University of Pannonia” key project, which is subsidised by the European Union and Hungary and co-financed by the European Social Fund.

and democratic consolidation in ECE since the accession has overall been limited.<sup>58</sup> Likewise, *Europe–Asia Studies* assessed ECE accession to the EU. Paul Copeland comes to the conclusion that ECE states have merely been junior partners with little influence on EU affairs.<sup>59</sup> The two most comprehensive studies in Central Europe originate from the Institute of World Economics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.<sup>60</sup> Both stress the continued gap in economic and social development between the old EU-15 and the enlarged EU-28 despite a decade-long membership of the Central European EU members.

The Visegrad Group (V4) has always been the core of the ECE states. The Visegrad format has been **in place** for twenty-five years by 2016. It is considered *the* Central European regional cooperation scheme by nearly all V4 politicians and many analysts.<sup>61</sup> Hence, the assumption is that, under the leadership of V4 and partners, a united Central Europe could make its voice heard and its influence felt in EU affairs. In reality, this has rarely been the case; national approaches tend to prevail. V4's incoherence is the reason why the institution has had to listen to debates about the point of its mere existence ever since its inception. Furthermore, in 2014, the Bratislava-based Central European Policy Institute ran a series of articles titled “Does the V4 have a future?”<sup>62</sup> The recent refugee crisis only superficially reunites the Visegrad partners. Their common refusal of taking refugees based on binding EU quotas gives evidence that V4 is against a certain European handling of the issue. Instead V4 has thus far come up only with nation-state based solutions which seem to miss a broader European perspective on how to solve a European and global phenomenon.

Present contribution will first present the V4 history in a nutshell, then review whether a Central European identity exists, and then ask to which extent regional cooperation matters within the EU (sections one to three). The article will separate the external dimension of Visegrad cooperation from the internal one and will discuss missed chances of V4 due to non-cooperation in important policy sectors (sections four and five). It will further discuss the strengthening of the region

---

<sup>58</sup> R. Epstein, W. Jacoby, “Eastern enlargement ten years on: transcending the East–West divide?,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol. 52, No. 1, 2014, pp. 1–16, here pp. 1–3.

<sup>59</sup> P. Copeland, “Central and Eastern Europe. Negotiating influence in an enlarged European Union,” *Europe-Asia Studies* Vol. 66, No. 3, 2014, pp. 467–87, here pp. 483–4.

<sup>60</sup> See the following two volumes: Andrea Élterő (Ed.), *Mind the Gap. Integration Experiences of the Ten Central and Eastern European Countries*, Budapest: Institute for World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2014; and Gábor Túry (Ed.), *Prospects of Visegrad cooperation. Identifying converging and diverging factors*, Budapest: Institute for World Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2015.

<sup>61</sup> There is also empirical evidence that Visegrad is considered a relevant format by non-V4 actors, e.g. diplomats from other EU member states. See Rick Fawn, „Visegrad’s place in the EU since accession in 2004: „Western” perceptions,” *International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs* Vol. XXIII, No. 1-2, 2014, pp. 3-24.

<sup>62</sup> “A view on Central Europe I, II, III: Does the V4 have a future?,” *Central European Policy Institute*, Bratislava: July 9, 14, and 16, 2014. Available online: <http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/view-central-europe-does-v4-have-future>, <http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/view-central-europe-does-v4-have-future-0>, and <http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/view-central-europe-iii-does-v4-have-future-0> (accessed on July 29, 2014).

through the better inclusion of Austria and Slovenia into the V4 activities (section six). The article will evaluate the impact of the ongoing refugee crisis on Visegrad cooperation within the EU framework and finally conclude with contemporary challenges and policy recommendations (sections seven and eight).

### ***V4 history in a nutshell***

The Visegrad Group was established in 1991. The aims, as stated in the Visegrad Declaration, were to fully establish democracy and freedom and a market economy, as well as secure integration into Euro–Atlantic structures.<sup>63</sup> It had succeeded in this attempt by 1999 and 2004. V4 can boast having strongly supported post-Meciar Slovakia on its European and Western trajectory. The International Visegrad Fund (IVF) was established during that period.

2004 saw a new Visegrad Declaration with EU accession of the four: the Kroměříž Declaration. V4 prime ministers agreed to “focus on regional activities and initiatives aimed at strengthening the identity of the Central European region.” These are to be handled in a “flexible and open” way – hinting at the strong intergovernmental nature of the institution. Initiatives should be project-oriented.<sup>64</sup> This passage referred to the role of the IVF, whose annual budgets have considerably increased since (from one to seven million euros). V4 declared that it would open its format up to partners in the wider region. In terms of its agenda, V4 partners learned from past crises: they tacitly excluded nationally sensitive issues from their common agendas. Minority issues constitute a case in point, as are economic and monetary affairs. Hence, the focus shifted to more apolitical, technical agendas. The third and latest Visegrad Declaration, the Bratislava Declaration of 2011, reflected this change: then V4 declared it would cooperate in energy and transport.<sup>65</sup> It agreed to make a shared effort to secure continued EU financing in agricultural and cohesion policies. They were /eventually successful in this, with the 2014–2020 EU budget remaining stable in both areas. Finally, V4 declared it would strongly support further enlargement in Southeastern Europe and stress the importance of the EU’s Eastern Partnership. These topics have indeed dominated the V4 agenda since the Bratislava Declaration.

### ***Does a Central European identity exist?***

---

<sup>63</sup> “Visegrad Declaration 1991,” February 15, 1991. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412> (accessed on June 15, 2011).

<sup>64</sup> “Visegrad Declaration 2004: Cooperation of the Visegrad Group countries after their accession to the European Union,” May 12, 2004. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/visegrad-declarations/visegrad-declaration-110412-1> (accessed on June 15, 2011).

<sup>65</sup> “The Bratislava Declaration on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Visegrad Group,” February 15, 2011. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/2011/the-bratislava> (accessed on June 15, 2011).

Two questions should be asked in relation to a Central European identity. The first is: can Visegrad Four build on a common Central European identity? It seems to work in some respects. V4 partners unanimously reject the experience of totalitarian rule and strongly believe in the positive roles civil society can take up. The IVF supports activities with this aim. But in other respects, it does not seem to work. Historical remembrance in and between all four countries was often marked by mutual competition or ignorance rather than cooperation.<sup>66</sup> In addition, forceful actors from outside the region left their imprints. All this ceased to be the case in 1990. The fact that V4 and much of the wider region is developing into a single united European house is unprecedented. However, mindsets change only slowly in this respect. The dominant narrative of contested histories is only slowly being replaced by the notion of sharing common histories.

The second question is: Can Visegrad Four create a common Central European identity? Over time V4 countries can, but efforts (apart from IVF projects) have been more than reluctant or inadequate so far. Only recently have V4 politicians established contacts with their Scandinavian counterparts. In the Nordic region a much stronger common identity exists, so it is worth taking a glimpse at Nordic cooperation. The Nordic Council of Ministers established four distinct fundamental conditions and eight joint Nordic values (e.g. equality, short power distance, common work ethics, etc.) that are applicable to all members. For example, two fundamental conditions are that the Nordic countries understand each other's languages and that they have been using each other as primary frames of reference for many years.<sup>67</sup> Thus a culture of joint cooperation has developed over time, from the ministerial level, through professional organisations, and today it encompasses many layers of civil society.<sup>68</sup> More initiatives to promote this could be adopted in the V4 region in education and in the economy. Sharing information and acting together can create common identities over time and can help reduce dependencies from outside.

### ***Does regional cooperation matter?***

---

<sup>66</sup> The most revealing study in this respect is O. Gyárfášová, "Do we know each other? Public opinion surveys about the historical memory in V4," presented in 2011. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/download.php?docID=164> (accessed on July 30, 2014).

<sup>67</sup> As cited in P. Luif, *Die Zusammenarbeit in Mitteleuropa als Element der österreichischen EU-Politik*, Vienna: Bundesministerium für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasserwirtschaft, 2007, p. 13. Available online: <https://is.cuni.cz/studium/predmety/index.php?do=download&did=40045&kod=JMB223> (accessed on July 30, 2015).

<sup>68</sup> This is also well documented and analysed. An overview over Nordic-cooperation, listed by topic (some fifty), is available at [http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publication\\_topics\\_view](http://www.norden.org/en/publications/publication_topics_view) (accessed on August 8, 2015).

In what follows, this essay will present the (ir-)relevance of regional solidarity within the EU. Geographical proximity implies that countries have similar interests. In addition to Visegrad, there is the Nordic and Benelux cooperation scheme and, in a different way, the Franco–German axis, which can form regional voting blocks in the Council of the European Union. However, “region” is only one of several variables that can explain the interests and voting behaviour of a member state. In an earlier study, which analyzed EU-15, Michael Kaeding and Torsten Selck observe the following patterns in the EU Council of Ministers: a “north versus south” coalition pattern and one of net contributors versus net receivers of EU subsidies.<sup>69</sup> North versus South and contributor versus recipient may indicate that geography is a relevant variable, but the authors argue that decision-making is based more on culture and less on geography, although both factors are related: “Geographical proximity is often associated with shared cultural traits.”<sup>70</sup> Region as a variable brings mixed results. In this study, Scandinavian countries showed very similar voting behaviour, but the Benelux countries did not.<sup>71</sup> As far as the Benelux countries are concerned, Belgium and Luxembourg follow the same lines, whereas the Netherlands come closer to British or Scandinavian patterns.<sup>72</sup> Finally, France and Germany also often vote differently.

Member states’ interests are driven by such other factors that may be considered more important than location. The variables often overlap: big member state *versus* small member state, position as Euro zone member *versus* non-member, EU budget net contributor *versus* net recipient, old member state *versus* new member state, North *versus* South (*versus* East), exposed/crisis ridden/pro growth *versus* safe/growing/pro austerity; finally, and rising in importance, there are thematic coalitions.<sup>73</sup> Domestic considerations also have an impact: within coalition governments (e.g. Germany’s position is more centrist in the current centre-right–centre-left government constellation as compared to the previous centre-right–liberal coalition), within parties (e.g. the position of Prime Minister Cameron within his own party), and in the context of national and

---

<sup>69</sup> M. Kaeding, T. Selck, “Mapping out political Europe: coalition patterns in EU decision-making,” *International Political Science Review* Vol. 26, 2005, pp. 271–90, here: pp. 280–1.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 282.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 281.

<sup>72</sup> This is also supported by the 2007 study “Network capital and cooperation patterns in the working groups of the Council of the EU” by D. Naurin, as cited in P. Luif, “Forum on ‘Central Europe’: Austria and Central Europe,” *Perspectives* Vol. 18, No. 2, 2010, pp. 95–109, here p. 106.

<sup>73</sup> A typology set up by Julie Smith is strategic alliances (Benelux, Nordic, and Visegrad cooperation, France–Germany, Weimar Triangle) and tactical coalitions (bilateralism, Big Three and Big Six, thematic coalitions). See J. Smith, “Working together in Europe: the need for bilateral and small group cooperation in the enlarged Union,” in A. Agh, A. Ferencz (Eds.), *Overcoming the EU crisis: EU perspectives after the Eastern enlargement*, Budapest: Together for Europe Research Centre and Foundation, 2007, pp. 264–88, here pp. 275–83. Kaeding and Selck established an alternative typology of cooperation schemes: coalition patterns are power-based or ideology-based or interest-based. They find (analyzing voting behavior in EU15) that the interest-based pattern is by far the most important one. The behavior of a member state is linked to a concrete policy area and voting is issue-specific. See Kaeding and Selck *op. cit.*, pp. 280–2.

European elections (e.g. the pro-growth rhetoric of French President Hollande or Italian Prime Minister Renzi). In conclusion: next to regional markers, other aspects will always bear some importance when making rational decisions from a member state perspective. One can also state that a strong regional identity and a long and successful history of previous regional cooperation are factors that lend significance to a regional cooperation scheme.

### ***External versus internal: two dimensions of Visegrad cooperation***

Visegrad has a distinct external dimension. The Visegrad agenda has been very strong on the issues of EU enlargement and the Eastern Partnership.<sup>74</sup> At the core of V4 is the deep conviction that authoritarian rule can be overcome peacefully. Democracy and rule of law can be established and consolidated, and civil society is the driving force in this process. V4 considers itself a role model for political and economic transformation and integration into European and Atlantic structures. Hence, V4's experience should be shared with neighbours who are not yet members of the club. It is perhaps the single most important success of the new, i.e. Central European, member states that East and South East Europe have come much more into the focus of EU politics compared to the period before 2004. V4 states constitute an active interest group in the two geographical areas. They make sure that both policy areas stay on the EU agenda. This is a rational, interest-driven behaviour, which can be explained by geographical proximity and linked to former, security and economic interests. Currently V4's performance in this respect is overshadowed by a different **take on** Russia between Poland and the three others, as well as variations on how to handle the Ukrainian crisis. EU budget affairs are the second great success story of Visegrad interest representation in the EU. When negotiating the 2014–2020 EU financial framework, the Visegrad partners were successful in establishing a large and thus influential “friends of cohesion” group that argued for the continuation of cohesion funding and the Common Agricultural Policy. The outcome is that regional and agricultural development is well funded, at least until 2020 (and, when counting the fade-out phase, until 2022).

In part, the internal dimension shows a different picture. The essay turns to the topics of V4 governance in this paragraph and to areas of cooperation in the following one. V4 operates in a highly

---

<sup>74</sup> The two policy areas are also the subject of intensive research. Three in-depth analyses are: M. Nič, I. Gyarmati, J. Vlkovský, T. Žornaczuk, “The Visegrad Group: exploring a new agenda for the Western Balkans,” *Central European Policy Institute*, Bratislava, 2012. Available online: <http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/visegrad-group-exploring-new-agenda-western-balkans> (accessed on April 30, 2013); T. Strážay, “Visegrad Four and the Western Balkans: a group perspective,” *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* Vol. 4, 2012, pp. 52–64; C. Walsch, “Fostering EU enlargement. Is the Visegrad Group a credible advocate?,” *Andrássy Universität Budapest Donau-Institut Working Paper Series*, No. 29, 2014. Available online: <http://www.andrassyuni.eu/upload/File/Donau%20Institut/Working%20Papers/29DIWPWalschFosteringEUenlargemenfinal.pdf> (accessed on July 30, 2014).

intergovernmental mode without any institutions on its own.<sup>75</sup> This means that the four national governments decide the V4 agenda and the foreign ministries have a coordinating role. A rotating one-year presidency is in place. V4 presidency reports throughout the preceding years show that attention to common issues is gradually on the rise.<sup>76</sup> Administrative and thematic continuities, which sometimes overarch several presidencies, are now well-established. This is the heart of V4 governance.

The areas of cooperation encompass issues that are not overly politicised. These are for example infrastructure development in transport and energy, which are by far the two most important areas. Transport touches on old economic dependencies from Germany and the former Soviet Union. For this reason well-established East–West routes exist between the individual Central European states and their big neighbours to the West and the East. The intra-Visegrad north-south infrastructure is lacking and is now slowly being established or ameliorated. Energy is linked to the exposure and dependency of Central and East European member states on Russian gas supplies. Gas pipelines between V4 and other gas importing states in the region are being interconnected and linked to two liquefied natural gas terminals in the Baltic Sea (in Klaipėda, Lithuania, and in Świnoujście, Poland) and a prospective one in the Adriatic Sea (in Krk, Croatia). In some cases a reverse flow system is established.<sup>77</sup> Action in both fields is linked to EU transport corridors and EU energy policy. Hence, one of the reasons for the relative success of the two policy areas is European Union co-funding of the new cross-border infrastructures.

### ***Missed chances: non-cooperation over important sector policies***

Despite twenty-five years of cooperation there seems to be hardly any attempt at a “Visegradisation” (i.e. a strong coordination) of sector policies. The opportunity to continually coordinate common planning, consultation, and action in a number of economically relevant policy areas has never been taken up by the Visegrad partners. The failure to coordinate actions in adopting the euro is the most obvious example. Even more important – and hardly discussed in public – is the

---

<sup>75</sup> Bratislava based IVF was established as an institution on its own, but its mission is distinctively oriented towards civil society initiated projects, and thus must be separated from governmental administration.

<sup>76</sup> Presidency reports are available online at the group’s official website under <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/annual-reports> (accessed on August 8, 2015).

<sup>77</sup> R. Kaszab, A. Sobják, K. Takáč, V. Tejbal, “Once in a lifetime: opportunities for Visegrad in EU energy infrastructure plans,” *Central European Policy Institute*, Bratislava, 2013. Available online: <http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/once-lifetime-opportunities-visegrad-eu-energy-infrastructure-plans> (accessed on July 30, 2014). It also has to be said that cooperation in energy varies greatly from energy sector to energy sector. Only recently efforts have been made to better coordinate nuclear energy policies. See <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/presidency-programs/20142015-slovak> (accessed on August 8, 2014).

entire area of economic and competition policies, as well as labour and taxation-related legislation.<sup>78</sup> This is the single greatest failure of Central European regional cooperation within the framework of Visegrad cooperation. All four Visegrad countries have similar economic profiles; foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign-owned multinational companies (MNC) dominate economic performance and innovation in each of the four countries. Under the label of competition, offering skilled and – by European standards – cheap labour, the four have been competing against each other ever since the huge FDI inflows started twenty years ago. Would it not be in the interests of each V4 member, as Anita Sobják suggested in 2012, to develop common strategies on FDI and MNC in V4?<sup>79</sup> Would coordinating legislation on taxation and labour not have a positive impact?

The continued East–West divide mentioned in the introduction can be related to a scenario that stresses competition rather than cooperation. Gergő Medve-Bálint writes, building on the conclusions of Béla Greskovits and Dorothee Bohle: “Especially among the Visegrad countries, which [...] were structurally most similar to each other, a fierce ‘bidding war’ for foreign investments was developing.”<sup>80</sup> He also concludes that investments by MNC in the region have heightened the global competitiveness of these companies and led to a high degree of interdependence between Western and Eastern Europe.<sup>81</sup> Employees in V4, whose salaries are still considerably lagging behind West or South European standards, pay the price for the all too competitive edge in the economic policies of the V4 states. These are easily missed opportunities to foster convergence with western European economies and living standards. MNC lobbies would certainly oppose such action, but even the old EU member states (e.g. German, French, British, Italian, Austrian, and Dutch, where most European FDIs come from) and in particular the European Commission have a deep interest in an EU that converges faster rather than slower. These West European governments would not seriously oppose the idea that remuneration discrepancies should decrease within the EU. This is linked to several other aspects that pose threats to most new member states, including V4. Exchanging thoughts and information on all bread and butter policies would help to make the economy whiter and help

---

<sup>78</sup> In terms of a conceptualisation of the economy, the most obvious choice would be a strong market oriented framework (as ECE is deeply involved in the Single Market), buffered by a strong commitment to social and labour standards. The continental western European social market economy models could serve as examples.

<sup>79</sup> A. Sobják, “Rethinking the future of the Visegrad Group at a time of heated debate on the future of the EU,” *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* Vol. 4, 2012, pp. 122–39, here p. 132. See also C. Walsch, “Ein „mitteleuropäisches Jahr“ für Ungarn. Synergien der ungarischen Präsidentschaften in den regionalen Kooperationsforen Visegrád-Gruppe und Zentraleuropäische Initiative im Jahr 2013,” *Andrássy Universität Budapest Donau-Institut Working Paper Series* No. 24, 2013, here pp. 26–7. Available online: <http://www.andrassyuni.eu/upload/File/Donau%20Institut/Working%20Papers/24DIWPWalschEinmitteleuropaischesJahrfinal.pdf> (accessed on July 30, 2014).

<sup>80</sup> G. Medve-Bálint, “The role of the EU in shaping FDI flows to East Central Europe,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* Vol. 52, No. 1, 2014, pp. 35–51, here p. 43.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 48.

eradicate pockets of tax evasion at all levels.<sup>82</sup> Cooperation on company taxation would prevent the infamous race to the bottom, which MNC exploit.<sup>83</sup> Such action would boost the tax base of the emerging middle classes, the societal group that all new member states aspire to broaden. Cooperation and coordination would definitely help formalize labour practices, which are a crucial issue, and set regional standards and reference points. Such action may have the side effect of labour migration being better handled (the painful fact is that it is not the bottom, but rather the middle and top segments that are willing to migrate), which has posed a serious problem for Poland and Hungary recently. Such action may also help better deal with the marginalized bottom 25 per cent of the population of V4, who struggle to survive economically every day and who live at the risk of poverty or social exclusion (15 million citizens in V4) or in severe poverty (9 million out of the 15 million).<sup>84</sup> The at least moderate improvement of life chances of these millions of V4 citizens (nearly all Roma, but also innumerable non-Roma in all the four V4 states) are the ultimate test case of the success of the European integration of the Visegrad states. Yet, national pathways have been the traditional and preferred avenues for dealing with economic governance and questions of society.

This is a missed chance because strong coordination of sector policies among V4 partners would heighten the role and impact the group has within the EU. The self-interest of national politicians and the strong nationalistic tradition in the Central European region are the main reason why the internal dimension of V4 cooperation, i.e. the closer coordination of sector policies, has thus far remained in a small state. Having experienced Soviet type foreign domination, the “full restitution of state independence” was the right strategy after the regime change.<sup>85</sup> In a time of Europeanization and globalisation, interdependence has replaced independence, and thus solutions need to be found that transcend the national.

---

<sup>82</sup> Recently there have been V4 moves to deal with the issues of finance and the economy more intensively. The current Slovak presidency is keen to tackle the issues of information and cyber security, of tax fraud and tax evasion, and more generally of industrial policy. See section „3. Competitiveness, Finance and Economy” of the programme; available at <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/documents/presidency-programs/20142015-slovak> (accessed on August 8, 2014).

<sup>83</sup> E.g. Hungary has established strategic partnerships with 45 MNCs. The deal is that the MNC secures (ideally long-term) employment and the host country grants company tax breaks. Whether this practice is in the interests of the country is open to debate and depends on the conditions. The recent example of Nokia, which is now moving away from Hungary, shows that strategic partners do not feel obliged to stay when more lucrative opportunities arise elsewhere.

<sup>84</sup> The figures are from 2012. V4 countries differ greatly in this respect. In Hungary, one third of the population is „at the risk of poverty or social exclusion.” One fourth of the population lives in „severely materially deprived,” i.e. lives in severe poverty. Comparing the figures from 2008 and 2012 the numbers have risen in both categories. In Poland the figures are 26 percent and 13 percent. The numbers have decreased. In Slovakia the figures are 20 percent for those who live at the risk of poverty or social exclusion and ten percent who live in severe poverty. In the Czech Republic the figures are 15 percent and seven percent. In these two countries neither a decrease nor an increase has been observed. Data as provided by European Union (Ed.), *Sustainable development in the European Union. Key messages. 2013 edition* (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2013), chapter “Social inclusion”, pp. 97-130, here p. 106 and p. 116. Available online: [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY\\_OFFPUB/KS-02-13-237/EN/KS-02-13-237-EN.PDF](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-02-13-237/EN/KS-02-13-237-EN.PDF) (10. June 2014)

<sup>85</sup> “Visegrad Declaration 1991,” op. cit.

### *A stronger Central European region: Austria, Slovenia, Visegrad Four and the Slavkov Triangle*

Austria had a mixed economy in the post-war period and underwent painful transformations in the 1980s. As a result, the country was able to join the European Economic Area even prior to its EU accession of 1995. Ever since the Central European countries began transforming in the 1990s, Austrian companies have seen growing trade with and considerable FDI in V4 countries. Austria's financial sector has engaged particularly in wider Central Europe. By 2000, Austria had initiated a political framework to reflect the high economic exposure. This was the "Regional Partnership," consisting of Austria, Slovenia, and the four Visegrad countries.<sup>86</sup> The initiative, which formally came to a close in 2012, was by and large ignored by V4, who considered the Regional Partnership to be a competitor to Visegrad.<sup>87</sup> Engagement was high only on the side of Austria and Slovenia, precisely because the two lack permanent regional partners in the EU.<sup>88</sup> The greatest success has been the Salzburg Group and Salzburg Forum, a regular meeting of interior ministers, which helped the partners prepare to join the Schengen zone, and has since functioned as a forum to coordinate issues of cross-border criminality and prevention. Thus, despite rows over politics between older and newer member states in the aftermath of the 2015 refugee crisis, better coordinated cross-border policies may bring the Salzburg Group back to stage. One of Austria's greater misfortunes in that period was the barrier on labour mobility, retained for political reasons domestically, against citizens of the new member states until 2011. Since then, Austria has experienced a huge influx, in particular of Hungarian labour, and, since 2014, of labour originating from Romania and Bulgaria. Politically, next to the "Central European Initiative" regional organisation, which Austria presided over in 2014 and following Hungary in that function, the newly established macro-regional strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) brings new momentum to Austria's ambitions in the region. Austria's high engagement in both organisations demonstrates the country's interest in a stronger and wider Central Europe, reaching from Poland to the Black Sea, and including its neighbours, Germany and Italy.

In early 2014 the "Central Europe fit for the future" study (in which the Austrian-owned Erste Group Bank and Rainer Münz, its head of research, participated) argued for a closer approximation

---

<sup>86</sup> Official reports on Austria's Foreign and European policies are available at <http://www.bmeia.gv.at/aussenministerium/aussenpolitik/aussen-und-europapolitischer-bericht/archiv.html> (accessed on July 30, 2014).

<sup>87</sup> Deeper running V4 scepticism points back to the historical legacy of the Habsburg monarchy, which is linked to Austrian rule and partly connotes negativity.

<sup>88</sup> A leading analyst, who analyzed Regional Partnership extensively, is Paul Luif. See P. Luif, "Austria and Central Europe," in Z. Šabič, P. Drulák, *Regional and international relations of Central Europe*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 83–103.

of Austria to the Visegrad Group.<sup>89</sup> The argument is that V4 could profit from Austrian (and German) expertise and practice in the transformation from an efficiency-driven to an innovation-driven economy. Needless to say, Austria would welcome any move towards approximation by the V4. There is an extensive overlap in interests in many economic and euro oriented monetary matters. It seems the benefit would be mutual because of the high interdependence in capital and labour on all sides. Additionally, the “external dimension” described above indicates that there is significant overlap in positions. EU enlargement to South East Europe and the Eastern Partnership are priorities in Austria’s foreign policy. V4 could profit from Vienna being the top seat for international organisations in the region but may see this as competition against its own ambitions. Very distinct positions are held in two policy areas: security and defence, as Austria is not a member of NATO, and nuclear energy has been *the* contested issue between Austria and the Czech Republic, and also Slovakia, for many years. Best added value may be gained from mutual interests when V4 and Austria are prepared to find the best institutional format for long-term cooperation. This could be an improved institutionalized Visegrad Plus format, or making EUSDR flourish through active coordination, or a consultation mechanism and stronger coordination in the EU’s Council of Ministers on agreed topics.

In the aftermath of the failure of the “Regional Partnership” initiative, Austria changed her foreign policy paradigm from a fixed regional format to more variable patterns based on mutual interests. A pattern founded in 2015 and initiated by the Czech Republic is the “Slavkov Triangle.” The Slavkov format brings together the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria. It currently aims at cooperation in energy and transport infrastructures.<sup>90</sup> The initiative points to weaknesses of V4 and the enlarged V4 Plus format (for details on the format see policy recommendations) in this respect. Too little was done to include Austria in these two policy sectors. Another newer pattern is trilateral cooperation between Austria, Slovenia, and Croatia in the field of energy. The commitment of the three to a future without nuclear energy sets them apart from the nuclear energy based production profiles of V4.

Slovenia has a political and economic profile that is closer to that of V4 than Austria’s. Slovenia **sees potential** for cooperation. This small country would thus welcome any initiative on

---

<sup>89</sup> “Central Europe fit for the future. Visegrad Group ten years after EU accession,” *Central European Policy Institute*, Bratislava 2014, here p. 5. Available online: <http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/central-europe-fit-future-10-years-after-eu-accession> (accessed on July 29, 2014). In this report the term Central Europe is defined as the V4 countries and Austria. It is not clear whether Erste Group also funded this research. If so, this may have left an imprint on the findings of the report. The overall impression is that the role of Austria is considered more important in this report compared to other studies that deal with the region.

<sup>90</sup> J. Groszkowski, „The Slavkov Declaration. A new format of regional cooperation,” *Centre for Eastern Studies*, Warsaw, 2015. Available online: <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-02-04/slavkov-declaration-a-new-format-regional-cooperation> (accessed on March 14, 2015). See also M. Nič, V. Dostál, „Slavkov trilateral meeting: No challenge to V4,” *Association for International Affairs*, Briefing Paper 2/2015, Prague, 2015, available online: [http://www.amo.cz/editor/image/produkty1\\_soubory/amocz\\_bp-2015-02.pdf](http://www.amo.cz/editor/image/produkty1_soubory/amocz_bp-2015-02.pdf) (accessed on August 27, 2015).

behalf of V4 to cooperate more closely in political and economic affairs. Slovenia considers the Visegrad Group as a “natural partner.”<sup>91</sup> Politically, this encompasses in particular the closer integration of the Western Balkans into Europe.<sup>92</sup> V4 and Slovenia could cooperate in monitoring roles, e.g. concerning democratisation or rule of law issues. Security and defence cooperation could also be more active, in particular concerning the linkage of NATO and EU membership in the EU applicant states of the Western Balkans. The prime policy area in economic affairs is energy security. Slovenia, however, seems to be closer to positions of Austria concerning the diversification of energy sources. Compared to V4, the country is more focused on a proactive stance towards renewable energy sources. Slovenia would also strive for closer cooperation in financial affairs (e.g. the EU Banking Union), but also here the overlap seems to be bigger with Euro zone members, e.g. Austria but also Slovakia, than with those outside the common currency (other Visegrad states).

### ***V4 and the refugee crisis: European solidarity and the search for plausible alternatives***

The recent refugee crisis reunites V4 in their common refusal of taking refugees based on binding EU quotas. The outgoing Polish centre-right government, formed by the Civic Forum under Donald Tusk and led in 2015 by Ewa Kopacz, was not entirely in line with this position; it accepted the quota system. Today V4 are united again due to a government change in Poland. The nationalist populist Law and Justice Party led by Jarosław Kaczyński won a sound election victory in late October 2015. The new government announced to reject the binding quota. Disagreement within the EU on the issue runs along a disturbing West-East-line, which seems to divide older and newer member states, thus reinforcing an older division on the continent. The developments in handling the refugee crisis should be reflected by V4 along the themes of European solidarity and plausible European policy alternatives put forward by V4 members.

Solidarity within the EU is mainly exercised through cohesion funding and funding for agriculture and rural development. Cohesion budgets contribute up to five percent of the annual gross domestic products of the Central European EU member states who joined the Union in 2004. This story of solidarity will continue with the ongoing EU budget 2014-2020. Cohesion budgets are seen as the key instrument to overcome economic discrepancies between poorer and wealthier member

---

<sup>91</sup> Some of the points mentioned here follow the contribution of Mitja Močnik (Head of Department for European Policies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia) at the conference „Visegrad in the EU. How much do we matter?, *Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade*, Budapest, 26 May 2015. Also the citation comes from this contribution.

<sup>92</sup> For a recent case study see C. Walsch, “Visegrad Four in Bosnia-Herzegovina. State-building and EU approximation from a Central European perspective,” in *Society and Economy in Central and East Europe* 37 (2015) 4, pp. 427-441. The article speaks also about potential EU partners for V4 in the Central European region, including Slovenia and Austria (pp. 435-437).

states. The net contributing member states to this budget come from Northern and Western Europe. A strategic decision for V4 states must be more solidarity within the EU concerning the refugee issue. V4 self-interest alone can have detrimental effects in the mid and long run. V4 will face pressures from their wealthier partners when it comes to negotiating the EU 2021-2027 financial framework, as the four Central European states will also depend on cohesion funding in the likely future. In the course of the refugee crisis V4 construct a dangerous narrative as V4 states have so far been good in pointing to themselves when claiming higher cohesion budgets in the interest of EU wide solidarity. Now, as it is V4's turn to exercise solidarity the answer seems to be outright rejections, despite the fact that numbers in the prospective quota system are marginal for the V4 states.

The missing V4 solidarity is closely linked to a second topic of concern: to which extent is V4 capable of proposing plausible alternatives, i.e. European solutions to European problems? V4's reaction to the refugee crisis was initially either a non-reaction (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia) or a solemnly national one (Hungary). A step forward was a V4 joint statement, issued at the beginning of September 2015.<sup>93</sup> In this statement the partners lined up behind the policies of Hungary, which follows a strict law-and-order approach of defending its national borders. This action, however, has not stopped, but only diverted the stream of refugees. There has been no reflection among V4 members whether it is an act of "Europeaness" to build a barbed wire on the border with a prospective EU member (Serbia) and later against an existing EU member (Croatia) that is preparing for Schengen membership. During a brief period of time in October 2015 the Hungarian government contemplated the construction of a barbed wire on the border with the Schengen member Slovenia, but had to withdraw this thought immediately after harsh criticism from Brussels and EU capitals. Hungary's action, which was backed by the V4 states, met criticism from the EU applicant Serbia, the Central European neighbours and EU members Croatia and Austria, and a number of West European governments. Despite the fact that European solutions are scarce in general, also V4 was unable to forward any. On the contrary, all V4 governments insisted on national solutions to solving a European and global crisis. On the four grade scale of roles in EU politics, consisting of "agenda-setter", "decision-shaper", "decision-taker", and "veto-player" it looks that V4 has moved from the rather passive role of grade three down to grade four. A more proactive role would rather try to seek coalitions with like-minded partners in grades one and two.<sup>94</sup>

### ***Policy recommendations: V4 structure, policies, governance, and identity***

---

<sup>93</sup> Joint Declaration of V4 Prime Ministers, Prague, September 4, 2015. Available online: <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/joint-declaration-of-v4-150904> (accessed 11 September 2015).

<sup>94</sup> A similar case on the role of veto-player could be made in the field of renewable energy and climate change goals. The formerly communist states lag behind their Western European EU partners and try to block binding commitments.

In terms of structure, one feature of V4 is the size of Poland. Poland's population outweighs the other three by one and a half. Poland has links with Germany and France through the Weimar triangle. Visegrad Four should be careful not to change the established team. Central European influence in the EU depends entirely on V4 and the unity of the four V4 members.<sup>95</sup> V4 has been successful with the Visegrad Four Plus (V4+) format, which brings together more Central European partners in selected policy areas. V4 should build on this success and make V4+ more attractive and perhaps more permanent for partners from the Baltic to the Black Sea, including Austria, Slovenia, and Croatia. Depending on the policy area, every single country in the region is in principle ready to make partnerships in the V4+ format. Germany should be a strategic partner of the V4.<sup>96</sup> This choice may be the most rational one because of the economic interdependence and concurring approaches to economic governance in the EU.<sup>97</sup> As a group V4 is on a par with Germany, but there is a great power discrepancy in bilateral affairs. ECE and German combined action can help to exercise influence in the Council of Ministers, where since November 2014 voting rules changed at the expense of small member states.<sup>98</sup>

Concerning policies, the top priority should be to continue "business as usual" in transport and energy, and in enlargement and eastern neighbourhood policies. Intensifying cooperation in other non-political areas (e.g. issues regarding the climate and the environment) is highly recommended.<sup>99</sup> Much of the joint actions in the more technical policy areas can partially draw on EU funding, a carrot that should be taken up. Defence and security issues (e.g. the Visegrad Battle Group) should certainly remain on the agenda. Discrepancy between the former Polish and the Hungarian prime ministers on this issue seem to be no more with the coming to power of the new Polish government in November 2015.<sup>100</sup> Finally, a strong point was made in the section dealing with non-cooperation and missed

---

<sup>95</sup> E. Lucas, "Visegrád: nice but not necessary," *Center for European Policy Analysis*, 2013. Available online: <http://cepa.org/content/visegr%C3%A1d-nice-not-necessary> (accessed on July 30, 2014).

<sup>96</sup> The aforementioned report, "Central Europe fit for the future", (here pp. 5 and 7) argues in favor of stronger ties in the region, in particular with Austria, Germany, and the Baltic states.

<sup>97</sup> Like-minded members in EU economic governance, however, also include many other northern EU member states, most importantly Great Britain and the Netherlands, but also mid-range countries like the Scandinavian countries or Austria.

<sup>98</sup> Under old rules EU-28 had 345 votes. A qualified majority required 255. ECE10 (i.e. the "new member states") had 101 votes together and thus had veto power. The new rules say that a qualified majority is reached, when at least 55 per cent of the members (i.e. 16 of 28), who represent at least 65 per cent of the population, agree on a proposal. Hence, the blocking minority must be 12 or more countries or must be a group of countries who represent 35 per cent or more of EU's overall population. All the ECE countries and Germany could form this kind of minority group together.

<sup>99</sup> Many contributors to the Central European Policy Institute's "A view on Central Europe I, II, III: Does the V4 have a future?" debate come to similar conclusions. As does R. Fawn, "Visegrad: fit for purpose?," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* Vol. 46, No. 3, 2013, pp. 339–49.

<sup>100</sup> On the Donald Tusk *versus* Viktor Orbán viewpoints, see the comments of the "A view on Central Europe I, II, III: Does the V4 have a future?" debate. See also E. Lucas, "V4: grappling with irrelevance?," *Central European Policy*

chances about the potential for further Visegradisation and Europeanization of important sector policies. A comment from the *Economist* one year after EU accession shall remind us of the purpose of this: “[S]ince those aims [i.e. NATO and EU membership] were achieved a year ago, Visegrad has been falling, if not quite apart, then at least into insignificance.”<sup>101</sup> It may be that by 2016, on the organisation’s 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary, a new Visegrad Declaration will have announced the like-minded steps of an ever closer Visegrad Group that wishes to demonstrate a higher cooperation profile.

In governance, administrative continuity is the key issue. Extending policies in the manner mentioned above would certainly require some overhaul of the current V4 institutional set-up. At the heart of any efficient organisation lies the establishment of institutional structures with dense and reliable administrative processes. It may also be worth extending some institutional linkages and best-practices to spill over into V4 structures. For instance, the regional formats and the macroregional format could generally be better linked and coordinated. Cooperation in the Central European Initiative or in the Danube Region Strategy (the Baltic Region Strategy in the case of Poland) may be of use in Visegrad and *vice versa*. A creative idea could be having a lead country in a particular policy area, e.g. Poland for security and defence affairs, or Hungary for water and environment issues. In an earlier contribution, I suggested that a lead country function could be established in relation to the Visegrad Group’s approach to EU enlargement, taking account of the strengths of the country and building on bilateral experiences – for example, the Czech Republic could take the lead in educational exchange and human rights, Slovakia in state-building and public policy issues, Hungary in environment and/or transport, and Poland in security and defence.<sup>102</sup>

Finally, concerning V4 identity, V4 politicians may find it worth contemplating steps that lead to a more robust and deeper knowledge of each others’ societies.<sup>103</sup> Regular meetings between top politicians barely achieve a trickle-down effect. The IVF projects mainly benefit elites in education and culture. The current state of society-to-society relations gives the impression that each V4 state has far greater connections with Germany (and Austria, in the cases of Hungary and Slovakia) or Britain than with the other V4 states. It is only through cooperation that deeper knowledge of each

---

*Institute*, Bratislava, 2014. Available online: <http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/grappling-irrelevance-v4-after-its-split-ukraine> (accessed on July 30, 2014).

<sup>101</sup> *The Economist*, April 16, 2005.

<sup>102</sup> C. Walsch, “Ein „mitteleuropäisches Jahr“ für Ungarn. Synergien der ungarischen Präsidenschaften in den regionalen Kooperationsforen Visegrád-Gruppe und Zentraleuropäische Initiative im Jahr 2013,” *Andrássy Universität Budapest Donau-Institut Working Paper Series* No. 24, 2013, here pp. 8–9. Available online: <http://www.andrassyuni.eu/upload/File/Donau%20Institut/Working%20Papers/24DIWPWalschEinmitteleuropaischesJahrfinal.pdf> (accessed on July 30, 2014). In addition the bilateral format can be of help country-wise: Slovakia may have the confidence in the EU-skeptical camps of Serbia because of its non-recognition of Kosovo, or (together with Austria, which would be the link to V4+) a particular expertise in Bosnia that has developed with past and present EU High Commissioners coming from the two countries.

<sup>103</sup> The Czech V4 presidency of 2011–2012 has thus far been the only initiative in this respect. This line of thought is implicitly taken up again in the new Czech V4 presidency of 2015-16 under the motto “V4 Trust.”

other can be fostered. Educational policies, e.g. pupil and student exchanges, coordinated curricula including the partner's language, joint history commissions are actually important and are slowly starting to operate. City and community cooperation is another important field.

The long-term effect of such actions is that sensitive issues (e.g. minorities, historical perceptions, etc.) or debates on European affairs do not need to be painstakingly avoided and could eventually be addressed among V4 partners without immediately initiating an institutional crisis. V4 politicians currently do not approach or bring up sensitive issues when dealing with each other. For example Hungary, which has been governed since 2010 by the national conservative and populist Fidesz Party may profit from comments by her Czech, Slovak, and Polish interlocutors on issues like constitution-making, checks and balances of state institutions, media legislation and practice, and political culture in general. After all, the credibility of Visegrad Four as a whole is at stake. For example, is the Visegrad Group a credible actor and interlocutor with Western Balkan countries when it comes to EU enlargement? European Commission reports annually remind the applicant countries that independent media are a cornerstone of the EU's political *acquis*.<sup>104</sup> In the same reports, the Commission also urges the confrontational political parties in Western Balkan states to move towards greater cross-party consensus.<sup>105</sup> Visegrad Four has great experience in transformation and EU approximation and could serve as a prime interlocutor. V4 countries see themselves as role models of integration. It is a matter of course that the EU member states themselves fulfil such conditions. Hence a critical observer may ask whether the confrontation-oriented government of Hungary, which introduced all major legislation, including the country's constitution, by purely exploiting the two third's majority in parliament and without any sincere effort of reaching compromise with opposition parties, is such a role model for EU integration? Is the same V4 country, which streamlined audio-visual media and significantly curtailed all critical media, as the country that points the way to a free, democratic and law-abiding Europe? Many critical observers have doubts that it is.

The newly elected government of Poland with the nationalist-populist Law and Justice Party to be in power will demonstrate whether the most important V4 country is prepared and willing to

---

<sup>104</sup> "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011–2012," COM (2011) 666 final, European Commission, Brussels, October 12, 2011, pp. 6–7. Available online: [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2011/package/strategy\\_paper\\_2011\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/strategy_paper_2011_en.pdf) (accessed on May 2, 2013); "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2012–2013," COM (2012) 600 final, European Commission, Brussels, October 10, 2012, pp. 5–6 and p. 23. Available online: [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2012/package/strategy\\_paper\\_2012\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/strategy_paper_2012_en.pdf) (accessed on May 2, 2013); "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2013–2014," COM (2013) 700 final, European Commission, Brussels, October 16, 2013, pp. 6–7. Available online: [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2013/package/strategy\\_paper\\_2013\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2013/package/strategy_paper_2013_en.pdf) (accessed on October 30, 2013).

<sup>105</sup> Ibid 2011, pp. 13–20 and 31–71. Ibid 2012, pp. 12–19 and pp. 30–73. Ibid 2013, pp. 14–15 and pp. 24–45.

walk into considerable isolation within the EU as Hungary did in recent years. The Polish Kaczyński government which was in power from 2005 to 2007 had a reputation of being a veto-player in European affairs. It may be that the shared interests of the Four are strong enough to form a Central European lobby (which has to include more like-minded EU partners so as to form a blocking minority in the Council of the EU). So far, as the issue of refugees demonstrates, V4 can recognise what the group is against, but it does not forward a concise vision or programme for a better and more successful Europe. The refrain “no” originating from the Visegrad states may point to a new West-East divide on the continent. As economic power is highly asymmetric, the choices for the Central and Eastern European members are limited.

V4 should clarify and communicate better a positive vision: What kind of European Union they together wish to advocate and what role Central Europe should play in this vision or strategy. Currently, the refugee crisis and the issue of renewable energy are two solemn topics in which Visegrad Four is united. In both issues V4 have reached unity with a negative marker and by advocating the veto-player role. However, a wide array of policy areas exist in which agreement among the four partners, efforts for coordination and joint actions are scratching along on low levels. In the interests of long-term credibility, Visegrad Four politicians would be courageous if they were to step up in dialogue among each other about what the group wishes to stand for (similar to their reaction in the refugee crisis). This is the best basis for achieving, to use the influential British weekly’s term once more, some “significance.”

# Nationalized Citizenship in Central European Countries

Michal Vašečka<sup>106</sup>

## *Abstract*

Author argues that ethnization of principles upon which the state is built does not lead to awakening of the exalted nationalism. Problems of most of Central European countries are attached to an existence of banal nationalism, to the depth and permanence of nationalistic practices rooted in everyday activities and rituals. Although there are differences in constitutional codifications among Central European countries, citizens of these countries remain reduced into the membership in one collectivity – ethnical one. Natural coexistence of different national identities or of national identity with other collective identities is being questioned in Central Europe. Text analyzes discourses that lead to systemic nationalization of the concept of citizenship in Central European countries. Countries of Central Europe in some aspects neglect modern understanding of citizenship by, for instance, putting too much focus on rights of ex-patriots and communities living outside of the “mother country”. Confusion is visible mostly in inconsistent approaches to citizenship by mixing *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* principles. Author uses concepts of Jeffrey Alexander and his distinction of the “core” and “out” group within a society and evolutionist theory of Castles and Davidson to describe reasons behind deviation from egalitarian and inclusive concepts of citizenship. Author analyzes citizenship policies and trans-border affinities in Central Europe on the example of two countries – Slovakia and Hungary – that are unfortunate examples of these phenomena. Finally, author analyzes pre-conditions of shift from ethno-cultural to legal-political definition of a nation and potential for redefinition<sup>1</sup> of the core solidarity based on ethnicity to core solidarity based on modern citizenship.

## *Changes of citizenship concept in globalized times*

Modern citizenship is inherently egalitarian and it has been almost universally appealing since the dawn of modernity to majority of ideological streams of society (Faulks 2000). In its egalitarian mode citizenship has developed within liberal tradition and it turns to be a powerful idea – it recognizes the dignity of the individual but at the same time reaffirms the social context in which the individual acts. In liberal tradition, citizenship is portrayed as part of an evolutionary process towards a more rational, just and well-governed society (see for instance Marshall 1981). Citizenship therefore can be characterized as a membership status, which contains a package of rights, duties and

---

<sup>106</sup> Michal Vašečka operates at the Faculty of Social Studies of Masaryk University in Brno. His research is focused on ethnicity issues, nationalism, and migration in Central Europe.

obligations, and which implies equality, justice and autonomy. Citizenship itself could be thin and thick - rich sense of citizenship can only be achieved when the contextual barriers to its performance are recognized and removed.

One of these contextual barriers turned to be soon after the French revolution. On the one hand, liberalism, as the dominant ideology of citizenship, has stressed egalitarian and universal nature of the status (Faulks 2000). On the other hand, citizenship has been bound right from the beginning closely to the institution of the nation-state. Since 19<sup>th</sup> century, citizenship turned to be a meaningful status only in strong connection with the nation-state. Citizenship derives its power from the nation-state that represents often uneasy symbiosis of ethnic and civic elements. Countries, naturally so, differ significantly in the level they strengthen ethnic or civic elements.

Different dimensions of the modern citizenship that show both ethnic and civic elements have been described well by Brubaker (2002). Modern citizenship, according to Brubaker, ought to be egalitarian, democratic, socially consequential, sacred, national, and unique. While the first three of them (egalitarian, democratic, socially consequential) are following strictly civic tradition, others (sacred, national, unique) are from the ethnic dimension. The first three dimensions are present in all concepts of modern citizenships and we can find them in all modern states. Differences between states are therefore in presence of the later ones. In all Central European countries citizenship is being perceived to certain extent sacred, national and unique, although there are naturally differences in between them (more on the topic in 1.3.).

### ***Citizenship in Central Europe and understanding of a nation***

Civil society is always able to generate ethnic communitarism and nationalistic ideas which can even destroy it. Civic and ethnic traditions very often influence each other and politics of civic liberation goes often hand-in-hand with politics of ethnic identity (Taylor 1992). These ties between civic and ethnic politics are traditionally very strong in Central Europe - Polish Solidarity movement always have had traditional and nationalistic fractions, Hungarian nationalists came out of dissident movements, one stream of Slovak nationalistic traditions derived from the revolutionary structures of the Public Against Violence, etc.

Ethnic perception of a nation has not been historically necessarily anti-liberal and anti-democratic. Kymlicka rightly suggests that “*all existing nationalisms are complex mixture of liberal and non-liberal elements, although forms and depth of anti-liberalism is usually very different*” (Kymlicka 2001: 54). Nationalisms in Central Europe were differing since 19<sup>th</sup> century very much -

from Polish aristocratic nationalism, through loyalist Hungarian nationalism, up to Czech economic nationalism or Slovak plebeian nationalism.

One element has been, however, common for all countries of the Central Europe - influence of the metaphysical and organic German nationalism. Herderian ideas suggesting that nation ought to overlap with a state were extremely influential in all countries of Central Europe. Habermas' criticism over tribal and blood-based traditions of post-war Germany should be fully applied on most of Central European countries (see Habermas, 1998). The difference is, however, rather paradoxical - also thanks to long discussions initiated by Habermas Germany has been moving toward more inclusive and more civic practices of granting full citizenship to aliens. At the same time, policies of preferential treatment of ethnic Germans living on the Central and Eastern Europe have been slowly abolished. These patriarchal and strictly *ius sanguinis* policies were not abolished within Central Europe - actually they are in fact further developed, foster, and institutionalized by countries such as Slovakia and Hungary.

Challenges to modern citizenship that have been brought by processes of globalization provoked three very different theoretical answers. The first one can be represented by R. Brubaker (1992) who argues in favor of citizenship traditionalism, according to which there has been persistent divergence between states' national citizenship laws and policies. The second one, represented by scholars such as Soysal (1994) argues that national citizenship is in decline all around the world and that there is a convergence across states toward postnational membership schemes. Joppke and Morawska (2003), however, argue that instead of simply reaffirming national citizenship traditions or of devaluing citizenship as such, recent experiences with immigration and appearance of the trans-state nomadic life has launched a trend toward the de-ethnicization of citizenship. Morawska and Joppke (2003) argue that citizenship in countries of EU is becoming attributed by birth on territory and constituted by political values rather than by ethnicity.

Bearing in mind developments in the EU in general, the position close to reality is undoubtedly the one of Morawska and Joppke. They rightly argue that one element of de-ethnicized citizenship is the resurgence of territorial *ius soli* citizenship in Europe. Previously exclusively *ius sanguinis* states came to complement their *ius sanguinis* rules with the *ius soli* rules. The second element of de-ethnicized citizenship is the increasing toleration of dual citizenship in Europe. A third element of de-ethnicized citizenship is the most important as far as Central European countries are concerned - relaxed attitude toward minority identities and practices of multiculturalism. In spite of all concerns that European multiculturalism is dead (Mason 1995), to be a citizen of a liberal democratic country increasingly does not mean to be a member of a cultural community - the only culture citizens are asked to share is the political culture of a liberal state.

But are these developments relevant for Central European countries as well? I argue that not in the extent that might be expected bearing in mind legislative changes conducted as a compulsory move toward EU membership. Firstly, practically all countries of Central European region were combining *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* principles in the past and this chaos is up to the moment reflected in respective legislations. The process of getting rid of *ius sanguinis* principles will be therefore more complicated since they are overlapping in strange manners. Secondly, certain level of toleration of dual citizenship in Central Europe does not exclude trans-territorial ethnic-based legislative norms, or at least exemptions from the law, that go well-beyond non-ethnicized citizenship. Thirdly, the above mentioned thinning of naturalization requirements in liberal states somehow did not affect all of Central European countries. While civic codified Czech Republic follow the third element of de-ethnicized citizenship described by Joppke and Morawska, other countries such as Slovakia, are tightening respective cultural community even more that in the past. In this sense, scissors are opening within Central Europe - some of countries (Czech Republic, to certain extent Poland) rather slowly follow the path of Germany, Belgium, or Spain, though others (Slovakia, Hungary, to certain extent Slovenia) do reaffirm national citizenship traditions.

### ***Citizenship in Central Europe and constitutional codification***

A choice between civic and ethnic traditions has been viewed for a long time as contradictory from ideological point of view. Legal analysis shows, however, that selection of either of these traditions is not possible and most of national democratic states have been established upon political compromises between ethnic and civic traditions (Beck 1997). Central European countries create from this perspective interesting group - they do create a “cocktail” of civic and ethnic traditions, although most of them are rather ethnically defined with many differences in constitutional codifications of a nation. Citizenship, albeit being a mixture of *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* principles, is understood rather in ethnic terms. Lack of thinking in terms of postnational citizenship is characterizing all these countries.

Central European countries differ greatly in the way how a nation is constitutionally codified. These codifications do influence successful inclusion policies more than history, political representation, or even prevailing value orientation. An example of Visegrad group countries shows us a continuum from civic up to ethnic codifications:

1. Civic Codification (Czech Republic)
2. Patriotic mixture of ethnic and civic codifications (Poland)

3. Civic codification combined with externally focused ethnic codification (Hungary)

4. Ethnic codification that defines sovereignty of a “Volk“ as a participation and cooperation between ethnic majority and minorities (Slovakia).

In all countries of this continuum, however, tension between civic and ethnic traditions is of crucial importance. The continuum, at the same time, does not reject the importance of ethnic-cultural definitions of a nation in all of these countries. Even the Czech Republic reached its civic codification rather in the process of negation of Slovak codification, than just as a result of long-term process of overcoming ethnic traditions of 19<sup>th</sup> century.

Tensions between civic and ethnic traditions within Czechoslovak federation caused a splitting of the country into two national states at the end of 1992. Consequently, constitutions of both successor states are excellent examples of a very different understanding of a nation and nationhood. Constitution of Slovakia is strictly ethnic; it is an expression of the ethnic dominance of ethnic Slovaks in their country. Any other groups living in a country therefore can be only tolerated; their equality within a system can be always questioned<sup>107</sup>. The constitution of the Czech Republic, consequently, has been written as a reaction on Slovak ethnic approach toward nation and in result it constitutes by far the most civic defined constitution within Central Europe<sup>108</sup>.

As far as Polish constitution is concerned, preamble constitutes an interesting mixture of civic and ethnic patriotism. Polish constitution is overwhelmed by notes and messages on history, traditions, religion, and culture, while these rather ethnic elements are overlapping with universal human values. In other words - Polish ethnic patriotism is worth of its constitutional protection since it is heading toward universal humanity and toward civic culture.

Hungary is another interesting case showing that Central European countries have difficulties or even structural reasons why they tend to mix civic and ethnic traditions. Preamble of the Hungarian constitution is without any doubts civic-oriented, there are no messages concerning history, culture, traditions, or religion. There is, however, rather controversial paragraph 6/3 that states that “*Hungary takes responsibility over destiny of Hungarians living outside of its borders and it will be strengthening their relations with Hungary*” (Mediansky 1995:108). In 1993, new law on citizenship has been adopted based on this paragraph that foster *ius sanguinis* principle. Following the logic of paragraph 6/3, former Prime-minister of Hungary Jozsef Antall stated at he beginning of transformation process that he consider himself a Prime-minister of all 15 million of Hungarians, it means both 10 million of those living in Hungary and 5 living outside of Hungary. Since the beginning

---

<sup>107</sup> Recently (2007) this symbolic domination of ethnic Slovaks has been presented by Prime-minister Robert Fico who started to distinguish loyal and un-loyal minorities.

<sup>108</sup> The constitution of the Czech Republic define „nation“ exclusively in civic terms - citizenship, territorial unity, state history, universal values of human dignity, freedom, democracy a human rights.

of 1990s, ideological and political battles in Hungarian politics, as they are displayed by the paragraph 6/3, have been deepening. So-called Status Law that has been adopted in June 2001 is just a continuation of the battle of two antagonistic principles of Hungarian politics - internal civic codification combined with externally focused ethnic codification.

### ***Ethnization of the Concept of Citizenship in Central Europe - Structural View of Jeffrey Alexander***

How can ethnization of the concept of citizenship be explained using sociological terms? Scholars tend to explain the process of ethnization by using historical reasons, traditions, description of a legal background, etc. Structural view of Jeffrey Alexander offers a sociological explanation that rather than asking a question “How to include?” all members of society tend to ask a question “Where to include?”. Attempts to include the “others” in Central Europe usually show cleavages in majority identities, presence of the “other” always point out at cohesion and differentiation of the own community. According to Alexander (Alexander, 1988), modern national state has been established as a rational project and therefore there is hardly a space for irrationality without any function. What explains ethnization of otherwise egalitarian concept of citizenship is persistence of the “core group” and its “core solidarity”.

Nations were established by core-groups, whose members share certain characteristics and features, on which their solidarity was structured. Alexander suggests that each core-group needs an out-group. In Central Europe out groups are being defined ethnically and remnants of the ‘core’ solidarity is lasting until these days. Applying Alexander’s model on developments in Central Europe shows how continuum between civility (less emotional, on purpose constructed ties) and primordiality (preference of race, territorial, family, and religious ties) is switching systematically toward primordial sentiments in setting up principles for modern citizenships.

Author therefore suggests, applying Alexander’s model, that the crisis of non-ethnicized citizenship in case of the Central Europe is based precisely on inability to establish “the core” of the nation on other principles than ethnicity. Structural reason for failure of non-ethnicized policies in Central Europe can be explain by permanence, depth, and strength of the core solidarity survival. Alexander has asked also banal question that turned to be important one - where the “other” came from? Alexander suggests that those who should be included these days and granted a “thick” citizenship have been previously excluded during the process of ethnical differentiation. Alexander suggests, therefore, that these people can be included by acquiring solidarity within so-called terminal group of society, where solidarity can be exercise in terminal situations of a society.

The problem of some of Central European countries is therefore connected with identification of the group that should be included, to whom solidarity should be displayed. Core solidarity is defined in countries such as Slovakia and Hungary according to ethnic lines, no matter of the national state borders. The “core” solidarity should be shifted from ex-patriots to citizens of the country or people with a denizenship status.

### ***The Aim of Minority and Migration Policies in Central Europe***

It is questionable to what extent countries of the Central European region tend to include those who are not part of ethnicized “core” group. As author suggested, in some of Central European countries therefore autochthonous or so-called new (migrant) minorities are not object of integration in all of its dimensions. Policies are aimed on socio-economic dimension of integration and partially on civic-political one. Cultural integration is very often not required - out groups are in fact not welcome to try to penetrate into the core group. Hardly one can find more inconsistent stand-point. In fact, there are examples in the history of Central European countries that at the moment the process was in full swing, the majority yielded to “the racist paradox”. This paradox occurs when the minority fulfills the original demand, but is nevertheless then rejected as a danger to the majority. The majority originally demand that those ethnically different should be fully adapted, but when several failed to do so, the majority is rejected them.

The “racist paradox”, first described by political scientist Rainer Bauböck (1994), is not after all a new phenomenon in Central Europe - the same “racist paradox” led to the slaughter of European Jews during the Second World War. German and other Central European nations demanded full assimilation from the Jews as a precondition of their possible integration into society. However, when minority in many ways succeeded, especially in Germany, the majority felt menaced, and produced a new conspiracy theory to explain the processes taking place within the Jewish community.

Just as Germany, Central European countries too can overcome historical determinism; everything depends on how and whether it takes advantage of the opportunity provided. Shifting from a cultural definition of one’s nation to a voluntary definition does not mean that one has to give up one’s identity.

The important thing is that one’s nation professes universal values. According to the German sociologist Jürgen Habermas (1998), such values include the rule of law and democracy. Habermas’ “constitutional patriotism”, as the basis of loyalty to nation and state, for the first time gives countries like Slovakia, or Hungary the chance to bind people’s national loyalty not to an ethnic and cultural homeland, but to a legal and political space defined by the universal principles of freedom and

equality. These countries too, if they intend to succeed in integrating “others” into society, should choose an “elective” Renanian definition of nation that allows political and legal identity to be separated from ethnic and cultural membership. Otherwise the whole discussion on integration of “others” who are part of out-groups is useless - minorities would have nowhere to integrate. Following thoughts of Habermas, Central European societies need a new partnership agreement. One chance had been a proposed EU citizenship - the project that has not been utilized at all yet.

### ***EU Citizenship as a Lost Chance***

Nationalized citizenship of modern times that constituted an ontological security for its members is according to Castles and Davidson definitely gone (see Castles - Davidson 2000). Globalization in all of its dimensions challenges foundations of the national state construction. Even states locked in their voluntary autarchy are forced to face effects of globalization. States that are deeply rooted in ethnic definitions are increasingly facing conflicts that formulated within an ethnicized discourse. As Castles and Davidson (2000: vii) point out: *“Heterogeneity of cultural values and practices rises exponentially - there is hardly a time for processes of acculturation and assimilation”*.

Example of countries of Central Europe shows, however, that public policy makers in these countries are not fully aware of paradigmatic changes that have occurred over last few decades. Discussion on post-modern and multiple citizenship is missing in the public discourse and legislative plans for future. A chance that has been brought by a failed project of the EU constitution was not utilized at all in Central European countries - it meant neither appearance of de-nationalized discourse on post-modern citizenship, nor beginning of a discussion on European citizenship and its aspects.

It would be false, however, to point-out fingers in this respect only at Central European countries. Unfortunately, as Faulks (2000: 159) rightly points out, the creation of EU citizenship at Maastricht failed to take an excellent opportunity to sever the link between nationality and citizenship. According to EU law, member states can still assert their right to determine citizenship of their communities and, EU citizenship is limited to those individuals who are citizens of member states. And this is exactly the core of the problem that allows also Central European countries to continue ethnicized policies of citizenship that divide citizens into two categories: dominant ethnic group and potentially marginalized groups of other ethnic origin. As O’Leary (1998:100) argues, EU is actually far from being post-national organization. It is rather encouraging an exclusive European identity that sets cultural as well as legal limits on the expansion of citizenship. On top of that, the Amsterdam

Treaty of 1997 asserted that EU citizenship was to complement and not supersede national citizenship.

In this respect it is starting to be clear, that EU did not utilize the unique chance to move toward postmodern citizenship, although historically some of founding members of the EU had better structural chances to undertake these changes than countries of Central Europe. Weak legal background that does not reflect characteristics of a postmodern citizenship has been displayed also at the European Parliament, in the course of a colloquium “Europe of the Expatriates: the 26<sup>th</sup> Country of the Union?” that took place on April 28, 2005. Participants representing twenty member associations equalized in terms of numbers foreign ex-patriots from EU countries to population of Turkey. At the same time they complained on treatment and overlooking, but most importantly they outlined future trends: *“In spite of diversity and disperse all around the world this diaspora begins to unite. It does not have any doubts about its European identity in its everyday life”* (Vašečka 2006). Primordialism of the discourse of the above-mentioned colloquium is following the same lines as the trans-territorial attempts to extent citizenship in some of Central European countries.

### ***Redefinition of a nation and re-construction of national identities***

The more universal the definition of society’s identity, the more particular contents and groups it is capable of including. From this viewpoint, when introducing postnational citizenship, the starting position of countries with prevalence of ethnic and cultural self-identification is more problematic than of those where civic and territorial self-identification prevails. Central European countries, however, have a room for overcoming the historical determinism and everything will depend on how and whether they will take advantage of it. The shift from cultural definition of the own nation towards the voluntaristic one is not necessarily a sign of giving up one’s identity. **Perhaps the post-modern Central European countries should re-define as the focal point of their identities to democracy, human rights and the rule of law instead of ethnically defined membership.** Central Europeans can reach a new partnership agreement by systematic attempt to re-define and re-constitute their identities and to structure identity of a “core group” on territorial and constitutional basis, rather than on ethnic and endogamic basis as it is the case these days. The role of constitutional patriotism here is crucial, but countries of Central Europe should be cautious not to remove so called national identities completely. As Habermas suggests (1998), the role of constitutional patriotism is based upon inclusion and re-direction of national identities, pride and history. In other words in order to re-constitute national

identity into post-modern one enabling appearance of the postnational citizenship we should not reject completely the role that history has played in shaping modern identities of respective nations.

I would like to argue that strengthening of particular and universalistic identities instead of national ones will be the greatest challenge for Central European countries in the future. As Stuart Hall suggests (1992: 300) there are three scenarios as far as national identity is concerned:

1. Erosion of national identities due to cultural homogenization and global post-modernity;
2. Strengthening of particular or universalistic identities as a result of opposition against globalization;
3. Creation of new, hybrid identities.

In spite of on-going globalization processes, hybrid identities will be replacing national identity only slowly. Focus should be much more on strengthening of universalistic and particular identities (local, regional) at the same time. Coexistence of these two is not in contradiction – universalistic identity in the form of, for instance, European identity is not clashing with any particular identities. But there are also other chances how to avoid prevalence of ethnicized national identities. One of them could be re-surrection of pre-modern identities that were not ethnicized. Slovakia as the most ethnicized country of Central Europe might serve as an example.

Slovakia has been a part of Greater Hungary (Hungarian Kingdom) until 1918. Until the moment when process of nationalization and so-called national emancipation started in 19th century, Slovaks, together with ethnic Hungarians, Romanians, Germans, Croats, Serbs, Ruthenians and others possessed both territorial-based Hungarian identity (Hungarus) and their proto-national identities. Only the 19<sup>th</sup> century and Herderian wave of nationalism forced people to choose - to become a Hungarian, but this time in the sense of Magyar (ethnic Hungarian) identity. Hungarians started to mean Magyars and all non-Magyar ethnic groups had to choose - to identify themselves with a modern Hungarian nation or exclude themselves and to foster their particular national identities.

Therefore nowadays Slovak political nation should be built along several lines, but the beginning must be resurrection of Hungarian identity. This secondary “national awakening” might serve for reconciliation with Magyars, and for breaking tribal endogamic chains that excludes any successful accommodation of others into Slovak society. I understand the resurrection of Hungarian identity in 21<sup>st</sup>-century Slovakia as a chance to bind Slovak appurtenance primarily not to an ethnic and cultural homeland, but to a legal and political one defined by the universalistic principles of freedom and equality.

### ***Removal of preferential treatment and policies toward ex-patriots***

Preferential treatment of ex-patriot communities are by far the best example of ethnicized understanding of a “core group” and broadly of a citizenship as well. Since Hungarian Status Law is well-known and discussed example of preferential treatment of foreign countries citizens, author attempts to bring example of similar Slovak law on “Foreign Slovaks” that in the course of years after 1989 became an untouchable group. A fact that their unique status within the Slovak legal system has not been criticized by any of relevant political or social group within the Slovak society is not a sign of intellectual failure but rather perfect example of dominance of the primordial and ethnical perception of a nation.

The rights of “foreign Slovaks” are guaranteed by the National Council of the Slovak Republic Act No. 70/1997 on Expatriate Slovaks. An Expatriate Slovak is a person to whom such the status can be granted on the basis of his/her Slovak nationality in a foreign country or Slovak ethnic origin and Slovak cultural and language awareness. For the purpose of this law, the direct ancestors up to the third generation with Slovak nationality are eligible. The applicants prove their Slovak nationality or Slovak ethnic origin by presenting supporting documents (as a birth certificate, baptism certificate, registry office statement, and a proof of nationality or permanent stay permit).

It is perhaps interesting that the applicants have to prove their Slovak cultural and language awareness by results of their current activities, by a testimony of a Slovak countrymen organization active in the place of residence of an applicant, or by a testimony of at least two Expatriate Slovaks living in the applicants’ country of residence. The applicants submit a written application for the recognition of the Slovak Expatriate Status to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Slovak Republic or abroad at a mission or a consular office of the' Slovak Republic. The Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs decides on the application within 60 days from its submission. In case the application is accepted, the Ministry through the respective mission of the Slovak Republic will issue the applicant a document (Expatriate Card), identifying him/ her as a Slovak Expatriate.

What advantages does the status of foreign Slovak bring to its holders? For instance, the foreign Slovaks entering the territory of the Slovak Republic are not required to have a visa, if this is in harmony with bilateral agreements. They have **also** the right of permanent stay in the territory of the Slovak Republic - a circumstance that is very favorable for them. More importantly, the persons with the status of foreign Slovaks have the right to apply for admission to any educational institution in the territory of Slovakia, apply for employment without a work permit, apply for the state citizenship of the Slovak Republic, request an exception from Social Security payments. The foreign Slovaks have also the right to own and acquire real estates in the territory of the Slovak Republic,

which is not the case for any other category of migrants or aliens in the country.

In the sense outlined above, the provisions of the Act on Expatriate Slovaks are fairly advantageous for this category of aliens and enable them many exceptions and benefits during their stay in Slovakia. The following graph and table demonstrate some data referring to granting the status of foreign Slovak over the recent years. The majority of holders - utilizing the status of foreign Slovak to legalize their stay in Slovakia - aim at winning an official job in the country. Here, the situation is rather varied; e.g. ethnic Slovaks from Romania with a low level of education work primarily in agriculture, mining and building industry. Only a part of them is employed within more developed branches. A high quantity of Slovaks coming from former Yugoslavia is represented by students at universities (some 60 to 100 persons a year). Ethnic Slovaks from Ukraine are above all employed in building industry, engineering and services.

The status of foreign Slovaks stabilized and institutionalized in the course of last 6 years (since 2002). According to the Law on Foreign Slovaks (2005) the Office for Slovaks Living Abroad has been established. The Office therefore symbolically but also legally operates in favor of endogamic, tribally defined group. It is more than obvious that these kinds of legal and institutional provisions are in sharp contradiction with a modern citizenship.

### *Moving toward post-modern citizenship*

Countries of Central Europe on their long way toward postnational citizenship might follow the example of Germany with all of its recent constitutional changes. These countries are sharing the same tradition of tribal and blood-based affinities toward the state and therefore German example is worth following. Today these countries are unlike Germany good examples of imposing a *Leitkultur* (see Bassam Tibi) over minorities. Even such practices tend to be described as a proof of a good will and openness.

But Keith Faulks (2000: 166) goes even further in his thinking about chances to impose postnational citizenship. He argues that post-modern theories fail to identify the problem that the existence of the state creates for a universal citizenship. While reforms of the state, to enhance the democratic and inclusive nature of its institutions, are a necessary move, they are not a sufficient step towards fulfilling citizenship's potential. As long as people live in a world divided by territorial states, Faulks argue, citizenship's egalitarian logic will remain unfulfilled. Postmodern citizenship must be according to Faulks detached from its modernist associations with the state. It is questionable, in this respect, whether detachment from national states of the EU will be sufficient. EU proved to be build for the moment on some of similar principles typical for member national states.

## ***Conclusions***

The notion of self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe was primarily found on the 19<sup>th</sup> century concept of nationalism. Unlike in Western Europe and the United States that draw on the ideas of the Enlightenment and individual freedom, in Central and Eastern European concept of self-determination was characterized by the primacy of the group defined by ethnic, cultural, and linguistic aspects.

Castles and Davidson (2000: 153) suggest that idea of civic inclusion, based upon democratic active citizenship can be sustained only under condition that cultural community will be replaced by political community. First of all, state should be undetached from an idea of nation and replaced by fully democratic state based upon open and flexible coexistence. Secondly, and this is even greater challenge, such forms of political participation should be invented that go beyond borders of the state. Living together cannot be based upon group cultural belonging, but at the same time it should not ignore it at the same time. New forms of belonging together should be based upon both principles of individual equality and upon principles of collective difference (Castles - Davidson 2000: ix)

To conclude author stresses following structural needs for Central European countries:

1. Need to re-define the national identities but to leave space for uniting universalistic principles in order to secure social cohesion of post-modern societies.
2. Need of transfer from ethno-cultural to legal-political definition of a nation
3. Need of redefinition of the core solidarity based on ethnicity to core solidarity based on postmodern citizenship.
4. Need to “sell” constitutional patriotism to people who are locked in the cage of banal nationalism.

These changes will certainly not happen in Central Europe in a short-term perspective. Lack of discussions, active policies, and legislative changes might however turn against the interest of the whole EU. Otherwise some of the Central European countries (such as Slovakia or Hungary) might turn to be real trouble-makers within the EU in its attempts to move closer toward post-national citizenship. EU has not utilized yet its chances in the process of constituting a European citizenship based on other principles than of an extended national citizenship. But it does not mean that the process itself is irreversible.

Joppke and Morawska (2003) point out that de-ethnicized citizenship is certainly not happening everywhere. Authors conclude that it is an exclusively Western phenomenon whose “*true galvanizer is not so much immigration as the transformation of the North-America region from the Hobbesian zone of war into a Lockean zone of trade*” (Joppke - Morawska, 2003: 19). Following this logic, countries of Central European region might be just postponed, since they are enjoying

“Lockean zone of trade” just for less than two decades. Nevertheless, Central European countries showed rather spectacular abilities to speed up processes of catching up with the older EU members since 1989. Author suggests that this sphere should be put as a priority by policy makers of respective countries of the region.

### ***Bibliography***

Alexander, J.C. (1988): Core Solidarity, Ethnic Outgroup, and Social Differentiation. In: Alexander, J.C. (ed). *Action and its Environment. Towards a New Synthesis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Baršová, A. (2003): Dvojí občanství: lidské právo v post-nacionálním světě?. In: *Sociální studia* n.9. Brno: Masaryk University. p.51-64.

Bauböck, R. (1994): *Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in International Migration*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Beck, U. (1997): *The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in Global Social Order*. Oxford: Polity Press.

Brubaker, R. (1992): *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Castles, S. - Davidson, M. (2000). *Citizenship and Migration*. New York: Macmilam Press.

Faulks, K. (2000): *Citizenship*. London: Routledge.

Habermas, J. (1998): *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Hall, S. (1992): The Question of Cultural Identity. In: Hall, S. - Held, D. - McGrew, A. (eds): *Modernity and its Futures*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Joppke, Ch. - Morawska, E. (2003). Integrating Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices. In: Joppke, Ch. - Morawska, E. (eds). *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kymlicka, W. (2001): Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. In: Kymlicka, W. - Opalski, M. (eds): *Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marshall, T.H. (1981): *The Right to Welfare and Other Essays*. London: Heinemann.

Mason, D. (1995): *Race and Ethnicity in Modern Britain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mediansky, F. (1995): National Minorities and Security in Central Europe: The Hungarian Experience. In: Pavkovic et al (eds): *Nationalism and Postcommunism: a collection of essays*. Aldershot: Dartmouth.

Soysal, Y.N. (1994): *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Taylor, Ch. (1992): *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Vaculík, J. (2002): *Češi v cizině - emigrace a návrat do vlasti*. Brno: Masaryk University.

Vašečka, M. (2006): *Práva osôb patriacich k národnostným menšinám v stredoeurópskom priestore s dôrazom na postavenie osôb slovenskej národnosti*. Working paper for OLPR of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak republic. Bratislava: CVEK.

## **Openness towards Central Europe**

### **The Public Diplomacy Activities of the OSCE in Central and Eastern Europe**

István Kollai

#### **Abstract**

Present research paper tackles the question, how the public diplomacy functions within an international organisation. Firstly, the relatively new but popular phrase of “public diplomacy” is scrutinized: how its meaning has evolved through the 20th century, and how it relates to such expressions including “propaganda”, “soft power”, “place branding”. A main conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the public diplomacy is rarely mentioned in connection with international organisations.

These sections are followed by the investigation of the public diplomacy activities and tools within an international organisation, namely within the OSCE. The OSCE proved to be an ideal structure to analyse, due to its strong Central and Eastern European involvement and due to the lack of strong mandates within the OSCE. This latter results in a more dialogue- and cooperation-oriented operation which makes the organisation an ideal platform for public diplomacy tools.

After the categorizing of these tools from a practical point of view, some recommendations are put forwards. Among these remarks, the most important one concerns the need for launching a granting system for the NGO sector, with open calls for proposals. Examples of the European Union and the Visegrad cooperation shows that maintaining a well-elaborated granting system has proved to be not so complicated than initiating, elaborating, implementing and assessing the whole project solely by the financing organisation. An application system has several other additional advantages: it can represent and disseminate the main ideas of the organisation and can inspire brand new initiatives, grassroots and pilot projects. Moreover, an application system can answer to the challenge that many problems cannot be viewed as issues of given countries, so it is increasingly difficult to group the countries into “program countries” and “donor countries”. The mutual penetration of cultures or the enormous internal inequalities within states indicate local issues which can be strongly present within officially developed “first world” states. That is the reason behind the tendency, why the OSCE is not actively present in the Central European countries; still, their operating democratic structure does not mean the lack of serious “hidden conflicts” inside the state borders. Hence, a granting system can put the Central European region back to the mental map of the integration organisations which could be just fruitful for the countries in question. The already existing expert networks and facilities of the

OSCE could be an adequate platform for discussing this possible solution further.

### ***Introduction: The term of public diplomacy – the evolution of an expression***

The term of public diplomacy belongs to those academic words in the field of international relations which have been receiving an increasingly **lot of** interest in the course of recent decades, when the interdisciplinary approach has become an underlying method of social sciences and when the interdependency has been regarded as an underlying feature of globalised world. But it does not mean that the expression itself is the invention **of these days**. According to the academic consensus, the term of “public diplomacy” was introduced by Edmind Gullion in 1965 when he funded the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy.<sup>109</sup> He defined public diplomacy as the influence of public attitudes, which encompasses more dimensions beyond traditional diplomacy – it embraces the interaction of private groups, the intercultural communication, and the communication “between those whose job is communication” (like diplomats and foreign correspondents). Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that the expression was used even before Gullion, just its definition was not clarified and was not made a distinction from the phrase “propaganda”. Thanks to digitalized archives of newspapers and weeklies, we are capable to draw a clear line of evolution of public diplomacy. The first track traces back to 1856 when The Times used this term, a few years later it turned up in the USA as well. The recurrent and consistent usage of “public diplomacy” dates back to the WWI when the “diplomatie publique” became an opposition of “secret diplomacy”, therefore the calls for open diplomacy or the diplomatic struggle of Wilson were labelled with this concept. In this sense, public diplomacy was a synonym of “open diplomacy”.<sup>110</sup> After the WWI the term of public diplomacy lost its importance again and turned up just during the Cold War. At that time, public diplomacy was just some euphemistic synonym for propaganda so as to avoid this latter's negative connotation. For instance, the Reagan White House created an “Office of Public Diplomacy” which was, among other things, responsible for gaining public support of USA policy in Nicaragua. These tendencies could have deteriorated the expression of public diplomacy but it did not happen. After the Cold War and with the growing interdependency in the international relations, public diplomacy became a term which elucidates the various professional dimensions of diplomacy apart from the tradition diplomatic channels; in parallel with it, the institutionalised usage of the term as an academic and professional expression continued.<sup>111</sup> We can conclude that public diplomacy became a modern term just in parallel with the development of international relations and with the segmentation of mass societies.

---

109 Nicholas J. Cull: *Public Diplomacy Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase*. <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org> Apr 18, 2006.

110 In 1918, the German Chancellor Georg von Hertling endorsed to follow a principle which he called “Publizität der diplomatischen Abmachungen”. The London Times translated in as the “publicity of diplomatic agreements”, and President Wilson referred to it as “public diplomacy”.

111 For instance, the Tony Blair government also established a Public Diplomacy Strategy Board.

A new impetus for the strategic development of public diplomacy was given by the 9/11 terrorist attack, followed by the war on terrorism. US foreign policy had to recognise that they would not be able to wage a successful war on terrorism without a broad alliance of local powers, which is hampered by the deteriorated image of the US in the Arabic and Muslim world. *“This unflattering image is reflected in a Gallup attitudinal poll conducted in nine Muslim countries, a similar Zogby International poll conducted in ten countries, State Department and Council on Foreign Relations/Pew surveys of foreign attitudes, and media opinions and views of many observers in and out of government.”* This had led to the reinventing of the public diplomacy: an Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy was established by the Council on Foreign Relations, chaired by Peter G. Peterson.<sup>112</sup> The findings of this task force (or its members) are the following ones:

- A presidential decision (directive) should reinvent and bolster the public diplomacy of the US, which could indicate a new stage in this field.
- A key point is given to the task of coordination due to the recognition, that public diplomacy is not a one-channel or one-dimension process, and the activities of all the actors (government bodies, allies, and private-sector partners) should be harmonised.
- In addition, Peter G. Petersen proposed to create a not-for-profit organisation named “Corporation for Public Diplomacy” which would have had a key role in this coordination work.<sup>113</sup>
- As a consequence, US public diplomacy strategy is tending to focus on the Middle East region: *“Negative attitudes toward the United States and its policies are clearly most intense among Middle Easterners. Many do not trust what we say. They find our words are contradicted by our policies, particularly our tolerance for autocratic regimes in their region.”*

The core aim of such a strategy is to enhance the image of the United States which is leading us to the question: what is the difference between the public diplomacy and the propaganda? A *“greater recognition should be generated for U.S. government assistance to alleviate poverty, discrimination, and despair, especially those efforts on behalf of Muslims in Bosnia, Yugoslavia, and the Palestinian territories. Sound public diplomacy must also articulate a positive future for peoples throughout the developing world that shows understanding and support of their desires for increased prosperity, improved quality of life, and peace.”*

---

112 Peterson, Peter G.: Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2002), pp. 74-94.

113 The whole report supplemented by appendices can be available on the website of the Council: [www.cfr.org](http://www.cfr.org).

It is interesting that this American strategy highlights two priority areas regarding the thematic implication of the foreign policy:

- replacing the “conventional one-way, push-down mass communication” by a “customized, two-way dialogue”;
- need for involving the private sector.

### ***The connection of the term of PD with other definitions***

After scrutinizing the expression of “public diplomacy” itself, it is worth drawing parallels and distinctions between similar definitions used both on the professional and on the academic level of diplomacy.

#### Public diplomacy and propaganda

Both the academic and policy sectors of international relations is aware of the possible connection or overlapping between propaganda and public diplomacy: “*Any government attempt to broadcast directly into another society-literally or figuratively-runs the risk of this drift into propaganda*”.<sup>114</sup> So it is crucial to clarify what is the difference between them. Peter G. Petersen summed up perfectly the contextual difference between the public diplomacy and the propaganda. “*In the past, foreign policy was often the sole prerogative of nation-states. It historically involved interaction between leaders and government ministers. Today, people have far more access to information and more soft power to influence global affairs directly, indirectly, and through their governments. Globalization, the increased speed and greatly diminished cost of processing and transmitting information, the reach of 24/7 television programming, global news media (AM, FM, and shortwave radio, and satellite TV), growing Internet penetration, and "smart" mobile phones are central characteristics of the twenty-first-century foreign policy environment.*”<sup>115</sup>

#### Public diplomacy and Soft Power

There is a clear relation between the public diplomacy and the well-known category of "soft power". In Joseph Nye's formulation, soft power is the ability to get others to do what they would otherwise not do.<sup>116</sup> The connection between the public diplomacy and the soft power was clarified

---

114 Marc McDowell: Public Diplomacy at the Crossroads: Definitions and Challenges in an "Open Source" Era. p.9.

115 Peterson, Peter G.: Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2002), pp. 74-94.

116 Nye, Joseph S Jr.: The Changing Nature of World Power. *Political Science Quarterly*. Vol. 105, No. 2 (Summer, 1990), pp. 177-192.

in the work of Jan Melissen, who states that *“In a world made smaller by globalization, and one in which non-governmental actors and organizations (NGOs) exert increasingly greater influence, public opinion matters more, not less.”*<sup>117</sup> The authors of this comprehensive work pointed out the special role of public diplomacy in relation with the case of Central and Eastern European transformation processes: *„Another example that shows the power of alternative and more imaginative approaches, primarily in Eastern Europe where the state was in transformation rather than collapse, where the West had not been forced to intervene militarily and where civil society already existed, at least to some extent, there has been considerable success. A broad range of good-government, education, training and economic/commercial promotion programmes played a significant role in bringing these countries to the brink (and beyond) of EU membership.”*<sup>118</sup> In this respect, the main mentioned components in the set of public diplomacy are the exchange programmes and network-building initiatives between universities and schools, the support and promotion of independent media circumstances, *“especially one that is critical of the West and thus more credible (to this end, exchanges and networking between journalists and journalists’ associations)”*; cultural and sport actions; *“promotion of civil society activities that develop social capital; links and networking among political parties; and the role of religious organizations. An area that is often neglected, but that gives a flavour of the broader approach, is the promotion and protection of a vibrant SME sector.”*

We can conclude that this lists of activities shed light on the public diplomacy not as a specially invented branch of diplomacy, just as an adoption to the complex circumstances of the globalised and complex world where many non-state actors have the opportunity and the right to shape the inter-state and intercultural relations. It is very interesting and worth pointing out that the authors emphasize: credibility of this kind of public diplomacy largely depends on whether it is able and liable to give room for critical stances and feedbacks as well. Moreover, the authors stress the traditional diplomats are not able to conduct this work in a credible way.

### Public diplomacy and place-branding

Lastly, it is worth devoting some sentences to the connection between the public diplomacy and the place-branding. The obvious connection between the public diplomacy and "place branding" is clearly shown by the existence of Palgrave-Macmillan journal "Place branding and public diplomacy". In the Editorial, the editor draws the conclusion that the taxonomy can currently be

---

117 Melissen, Jan, ed.: *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p. 156.

118 Melissen, Jan, ed.: *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p. 184.

confusing and puts forward a series of logical questions: "*is public diplomacy synonymous with nation branding, or is one a subset of the other? Is destination marketing the same thing as country promotion? What is the difference between place marketing and place branding? Should we talk about marketing the nation, the state or the country? Is place branding nothing more than a modern euphemism for propaganda?*"<sup>119</sup>

Besides, this journal pays a great deal of attention to Central and Eastern Europe, tackling the national strategies of states in this region. An analysis investigating into the Polish country brand concludes that there is a tendency that economic productivity and commercial branches play an increasingly leading role in country/nation branding, so a very important governmental role in the branding process is to coordinate the relevant actors and foster the collaboration between the different territorial units, between the private and public sector.<sup>120</sup> Another analysis also stresses that the process of differentiated repositioning the nation-state can be successful by coordinated marketing and by highly visible events or places which draws a clear analogy between the place-branding, geo-branding and public diplomacy.<sup>121</sup> But staying in the Central European region, in connection with Slovenia, a clear conclusion is made by Janez Damjan that the older a brand is, the better it can hold its leading position. The Hungarian author György Szondi also presents CEE-experiences identifying a range of typical lacks (country branding or government branding, too much reliance on advertisement, no long-term strategy) and with some interesting examples, such as Poland strives to avoid the usage of the expression „Polish” concentration camps and Estonia had an attempt to rename itself in English to Estland with a view of better context of this latter word.<sup>122</sup> An also very interesting article portrays the European branding projects with a conclusion that modern branding tools can foster post-national loyalty.<sup>123</sup>

### ***Public diplomacy in the world of international organisations***

As far as the academic usage of this expression is concerned, the term of public diplomacy is used almost exclusively just in relation with states; or, if non-state actors are in the limelight, these represent the NGO sector or the corporate sector. As a conclusion, there is not any real serious and

---

119 Anholt, Simon: Editorial. *Place branding and public diplomacy*, 2004/1, p. 4-11.

120 Florek, Magdalena: The country brand as a new challenge for Poland. *Place branding and public diplomacy*, 2005/1., p. 205-211.

121 Quelch, John – Jocz, Katherine: Positioning the nation-state. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 2005/1, p. 229-237.

122 Szondi, György: The role and challenges of country branding in transition countries: The Central and Eastern European experience. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 2007/3, p. 8–20.

123 Aveline, Julie: Branding Europe? Branding, design and post-national loyalties. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 2006/2, p. 334–340.

exhaustive analysis of how public diplomacy is functioning in the world of international organisations. This finding is true from a practical aspect as well: most of the international organisations do not address the question of public diplomacy from a professional point of view, despite the fact that international organisations constitute a very important segment of actors which are elaborating and using public diplomacy tools. The experts conclude that "*little consideration has been given to the identity of the political communities that must grant legitimacy to an international organisation*".<sup>124</sup>

As an exception, the NATO created a Committee for Public Diplomacy (CPD) which elaborated the 2010/2011 NATO Public Diplomacy Strategy in 2009. The strategy focuses on communication challenges and defines two priority areas: these are the NATO's role in field operations and the overall strategy and the "identity" of the organisation. The strategy is to propose various communication methods and tools for enhancing public support for its activities and for bolstering the public reputation of the organisation. These tools are for instance youth fora, student fora, workshops, essay and film competitions. So as to reach out to the youth, NATO strives to work closely with Atlantic Treaty Associations for engaging educators and teachers in NATO-related programmes (summer schools, training programmes). These activities are complemented with surveys about public trends and image tendencies.<sup>125</sup>

### ***The OSCE***

Present research project does not intend to consider neither the history of the OSCE nor its historical evolution up to its today's character in any great depth. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting some basic features which can be interesting and relevant from the point of view of this analysis. The OSCE was established as a platform of East-West dialogue during the *détente* era, and evolved from the Helsinki Conference. The founding documents laid down the three main pillars (buckets) of the organisation's activities: these are the politico-military, the environmental-ecological and the human right dimensions. Logically, the fall of communism marked a milestone in the history of the OSCE, and the main programmes and initiatives have been shifted toward such aims like supporting the democratization processes, supervising the democratic institutions (e.g. elections), preventing conflicts and stabilizing post-conflict areas. The primary geographical scope of the organisation became the Balkan and the CIS region.

---

124 Symons, Jonathan: *The legitimization of international organisations: examining the identity of the communities that grant legitimacy*. *Review of International Studies*, 37, p. 2557-2583.

125 NATO Public Diplomacy Strategy 2010-2011. Published by the NATO North Atlantic Council, 7 December 2009.

However the disintegration of the Soviet Union made the OSCE possible to represent dominantly the Western patterns of democratization, its operations has remained consensus- and dialogue-based. This collective way of decision-making is largely viewed as the main obstacle to effectiveness and prompt reactions, but at the same time, it ensures that the OSCE's thematic and geographic scope is not limited to the Western world.<sup>126</sup>

According to the data sources from the year 2014, the OSCE engaged altogether 2537 colleagues.<sup>127</sup> The OSCE has altogether 19 Hungarian colleagues, which is a relatively high amount compared with other countries from the CEE-region (Slovakia: 7, Czech Republic: 8, Serbia: 10, Romania: 3). Just Poland trails Hungary with 23 colleagues within the OSCE.<sup>128</sup> OSCE has a budget amounted to 42 million EUR. The USA allowing for the 18% of the budget, followed by the European Commission (11,68) and by Germany (10,34%). Hungary sent in 2014 a donation of 113,494 EUR which is also a relatively high proportion compared with the region.<sup>129</sup>

### ***Public diplomacy tools of the OSCE***

The following section of the investigation, i. e. the listing and categorizing of the OSCE public diplomacy tools is a crucial element of this publication. The internal logic of this kind of grouping of practical solutions can be always somewhat questioned but we regard this step as a crucially important key element of the research work. Based on that will we be able to draw conclusions about how the public diplomacy works in the case of an international organisation.

After a preliminary analysis of public diplomacy activities, the following categorization proved to be the most appropriate one:

1. Categorizing can be accomplished according to the geographical scope of the public diplomacy actions: it can focus on one country (or on a borderland region between two or three states); or, it is able to tackle global or regional issues embracing a larger group of states.
2. The other aspect of grouping can be the target group of the activities. Certain actions would like to involve just a given section of the society – for instance, just the staff or experts of one public sector. In other cases, activities intend to reach out to the whole society, or at least there is not any given preliminary limitation concerning the target group.

---

126 Galbreath, David J.: *The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe*. Routledge, London-NewYork, 2007.

127 *Annual Report 2014*. Published by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, 2015, p. 120.

128 *Annual Report 2014*. Published by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, 2015, p. 109.

129 *Annual Report 2014*. Published by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, 2015, p. 107.

So, based on these logical approaching, the following table can be drafted (see Table 1.). On the next pages, we are going to highlight the most typical or characteristic public diplomacy actions of the OSCE within the framework of this taxonomy outlined above.

### ***Bilateral Public Diplomacy Actions – Towards Focused Target Group***

#### *Seminars, workshops, training courses*

Investigating into the actions of the OSCE, it is more than apparent that many public diplomacy actions are conveyed/structured by the logic of training sessions. There is a great variety of sessions, ranging from official training courses to interactive brainstorming, but from our point of view, they can be viewed as one large (if not the largest) category of PD actions. As far as the geographic focus is concerned, these actions are conducted most frequently in the former CIS region.

The most elaborated training courses are dedicated to develop some professional skills coupled with spreading democratic norms. For instance, the “Training against Hate Crimes for Law Enforcement” (TAHCLE) aims to develop police tools against hate crimes by preventing or responding them. These kinds of seminar topics are typical within the OSCE which indicates the doubled objectives of these tools: sharing practical knowledge and sharing a sense of democratic behaviour. For instance, the training course mentioned above pays attention to communication with victim groups and bolstering public confidence in this field. Many sessions are conceived and conducted by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). From a practical point of view, the best solution offered by the OSCE seems to be the “training the trainers” methodology which has a considerable multiplying effect.

#### *Scholarships*

As far as bilateral public diplomacy actions are concerned, scholarships could constitute a very important pillar of them but its popularity has been lagging behind other tools. Indeed, we can find just few examples of deploying this pool within the OSCE. One exception is the project “We Are Here Together – European Support for Roma Inclusion” which is co-funded by the EU and enabled 525 Serbian Roma students to have a scholarship, supplemented with a mentor programme.<sup>130</sup>

---

130 *Security Community. The OSCE Magazine*. 2014/4. Published by the OSCE Secretariat, Communication and Media Relations Section, Vienna. p. 24-25.

## ***Bilateral Public Diplomacy Actions – Towards the Overall Target Group***

### *Photo (or other artistic) contests*

Another existing and often-used tool within the OSCE is organising contests. Through contests and open calls, a great many people can be reached and not just those who are really interested in participating. Through its visualisation and availability, many important layers of the society can be involved apart from the direct stakeholders.<sup>131</sup>

### *Information campaigns*

The OSCE actions and documents elucidate that the organisation is liable and tends to run information campaigns in the mother tongue of the stakeholders or in English. For instance, in 2015 was the “Access to Justice” campaign launched in Kosovo on posters in Serbian and Albanian, with the following content: “*Every resident of Kosovo has the right to equal legal protection and unhindered access to justice, regardless of ethnicity, language, gender, religion, economic and social condition, disability, sexual orientation or other status. To exercise these rights, you can: Request a lawyer, request free legal aid, request protection of a victim's advocate, access information, speak your language!*”<sup>132</sup> Another campaign of this type is entitled “United in Countering Violent Extremism” which has embraced full-scale conferences with the participation of NGOs, tweet-messages, Facebook-posts and hashtags as campaign elements.

## ***Global or Regional Public Diplomacy Actions – Towards Focused Target Groups***

### *Colleges, Academies*

A relatively well-elaborated and stable form of global or regional public diplomacy tools are the academies and colleges with official premises and staff, and the OSCE seems to deploy this tool relatively intentionally. One very important institution in this field is the OSCE Border Management Staff College.<sup>133</sup> As part of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Border Management Staff College intends to teach and train border security and management officials. A very important horizontal issue of the College is to promote the co-operation between the border staff

---

131 See e.g. “The OSCE Annual Report 2013 Photo Contest” on the website of the OSCE: <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/110310>. Apart from this, documents about essay contests, video contests or article writing contests are also available.

132 Access to Justice campaign materials see here: <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/189381>

133 OSCE Border Management Staff College Factsheet. Published by the OSCE BMSC, 1. June 2015.

units of different nations, and elaborate the network of information flow between them. The College is located in Dushanbe, Tajikistan and in its life all the 57 Participating States are engaged.

The College approaches to the question of border security in an interdisciplinary way, being aware of the fact that border security and management has to solve so “border-related threats” like terrorism, organised crime, illicit trafficking of human beings, and debates related to border delimitation and demarcation. The whole activity is backed by comprehensive documents, like the OSCE Border Security and Management Concept.<sup>134</sup> *“It serves as a centre of excellence and a vehicle for the delivery of expertise and best practices in border management and security for the whole of the OSCE.”*

The College was launched in 2009; from that time, more than 100 training sessions and thematic events have been accomplished for over 2000 officials. The main product of the College of the one-month intensive Border Management Staff Course which is conducted three times a year. In addition, a two-semester learning course on Border Security and Management for Senior Leadership (BSMSL) is also offered. *“Utilizing the OSCE network to collect and disseminate best practices and lessons learned, it offers opportunities for in-depth analysis of international standards in border management, as well as the challenges of modernization in a world much focused on security matters.”* A newly elaborated Staff Course has been specialised for Women Leaders.

A very similar initiative is the OSCE Academy located in Bishkek, which was established in 2002 jointly by the OSCE and the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, with a view of delivering postgraduate as well as MA education and conducting security research. The courses are implemented with a Central Asian scope; after the first years' result, a new internship programme was launched targeting the colleagues of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs.<sup>135</sup>

### *Expert Networks*

Establishing networks of experts is also a rather well-elaborated scheme of many public diplomacy initiatives within the OSCE. These networks intend to spread some global ideas on local level, working together with other local or international institutions. For instance, there is a mentor network tackling gender issues and women rights launched by a kind of consortium, where the project partners are the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Danish Centre for Information on Gender, Equality and Diversity (KVINFO). It is interesting and worth mentioning

---

<sup>134</sup> *Border Security and Management Concept. Framework for Co-operation by the OSCE Participating States.* Issued by the OSCE Ministerial Council, 6. December 2005.

<sup>135</sup> <http://www.osce-academy.net>

that the Funding Partner is the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so, like in many other cases, the financing background was not secured solely by the OSCE itself.<sup>136</sup>

Similarly, an environmentally oriented network of centres – the so-called Aarhus Centres – was also established and launched by the OSCE, in a strong partnership with other international organisations.<sup>137</sup> “Since 2002, the OSCE has been supporting the creation of Aarhus Centres and Public Environmental Information Centres in close co-operation with the UNECE Aarhus Convention Secretariat including within the framework of the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC), a partnership between OSCE, UNEP, UNDP, UNECE, REC and NATO as an associated partner.”<sup>138</sup>

The most important and comprehensive network in this field is the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions which was established in 2013. A very interesting production of the OSCE Network is the *Threat Perceptions in the OSCE Area* which pointed out “the divergent perceptions of military and other external threats”.<sup>139</sup> The OSCE Network strives to provide constructively critical feedbacks to the OSCE bodies, for instance concerning open-ended dialogue processes which do not have clarified consequences and therefore impose the risk of communitaning *without acting and not for acting*: “one cannot continue with a routine dialogue as if nothing had happened”. In the case of this study, altogether 20 institutes participated in its elaboration, with a key role of the CORE. The stable financing background would be inevitable for sound and effective functioning: the above quoted study was financed by Swiss, German and Finnish governmental bodies, so out of the official OSCE budget.

### ***Global or Regional Public Diplomacy Actions – Towards Overall Target Group***

#### ***Information campaigns***

Information campaigns can be concluded not just on bilateral but on multilateral level as well. One of the biggest campaign in the history of the OSCE was the “We cooperate!” interactive campaign which reached 2million people, shared by other international organisations on social networks. It has aimed to motivate people to think over the issue of security and involve them in a

---

136 *Creating Mentor Networks in the OSCE Region: A Practical Roadmap*. Published by OSCE Secretariat, OSC/Gender Section, Vienna, 2014. These centres are producing many materials in local languages. There are some documents which are compiled and issued just in local national languages, for instance the OSCE's study about civil engagement practices on local level. (Issued in April 2015, in Serbian.)

137 *Capacity Building Activities in Support of Aarhus Convention*. Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, 2008.

138 *Inside the Aarhus Centres*. Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, Vienna, 2014.

139 *Threat Perceptions in the OSCE Area*.

creative way.<sup>140</sup>

### *Concerns, statements*

The issuing of written statements is one of the most frequently used tools of the OSCE, however their impact is very difficult to measure. The core idea behind this activity is to draw the attention to those affairs and concerning issues which is regarded by the OSCE as sensitive ones, and therefore the publicity can serve as a tool of pressure. In some cases, the conferences and meetings provide an adequate platform for presenting these statements.<sup>141</sup>

### *International databases, e-libraries and e-learning materials*

The OSCE has developed some e-databases which are offered through their website as „e-libraries” however some of them have other functions than original e-documentary services. The following webportals belong to this category:

#### *Hate Crime Reporting*

The website contains information from OSCE participating States about hate crime issues.

#### LEGISLATIONLINE

Legislationline.org is the database run by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights which is to allow access to human rights standards and norms and many other relating documents from the participating States. The most special target group of the site is the lawmakers in and out of the OSCE region.

#### POLIS digital library

The POLIS Digital Library tackles practical issues of policing, targeting primarily the police staff. The database has been developed and enhanced by policing experts.

#### Short-Term Observer E-Learning course

A special item within the OSCE e-databases is the e-learning material consisting four modules which address the work of short-term observers relating to election processes and election observation.

#### TANDIS: Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System

*“TANDIS is a tolerance and non-discrimination database of the OSCE participating States and provides information on special country initiatives, legislative issues, national bodies devoted to TND*

---

140 <http://wecooperate.hscampaigns.com/>

141 2015 OSCE HUMAN DIMENSION IMPLEMENTATION MEETING, WARSAW, STATEMENT FOR WORKING SESSION 4: RULE OF LAW I (25 September 2015) Statement by International Partnership for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Association for Human Rights in Central Asia, Civic Solidarity Platform, Human Rights Watch. A matter of international concern: Endemic Torture in Uzbekistan

*questions, international norms and tools, as well as the state reports and yearly summaries of international organisations.”*

### *Panel of Eminent Persons*

Establishing the Panel of Eminent Persons was one of the most innovative steps within the OSCE, however its impact has not exceeded the originally expected level.<sup>142</sup> The underlying aim behind the foundation of this project was to exploit and use the overall reputation of the OSCE and of renowned personalities. The Panel of Eminent Persons is “designed to provide advice on how to re-consolidate European security as a common project”. The Panel is to produce an Interim Report and a Final Report. The Interim Report focuses on operational questions, while the Final Report tackles the broader political consensus.<sup>143</sup>

As it is clear from the sources available, it became a platform of clashing Western and Russian narratives. The members of the Panel maintained their right to stress their personal views as well. Unfortunately, we have to conclude that the Report's main conclusions are rather general.

*“At the beginning of the 21st century, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) seemed to be in crisis: its usefulness and relevance were widely questioned; its budget had been reduced in real terms and its Ministerial Council had failed to agree on a communiqué for more than a decade. This changed in 2014 with the Organization’s response to the crisis in and around Ukraine. Ironically, the OSCE owes its renewed relevance to violations of some of its most important principles.”* The Panel Members served earlier as ambassadors, presidents, minister of foreign affairs. Timeframe: 2015. The Panel has 15 “eminent personalities”, as members, who have obtained deep career expertise in security matters.<sup>144</sup>

### *Contact points*

Similarly institutional phenomena are the contact points. The ODIHR strived to institutionalise its local engagement, through the establishment of a Contact Point in Warsaw, which “reviews and assesses progress”, “supports capacity building”, “conducts field assessment”,

---

142 *Security Community. The OSCE Magazine.* 2015/1. Published by the OSCE Secretariat, Communication and Media Relations Section, Vienna, p. 30-31.

143 *Lessons Learned for the OSCE from its engagement in Ukraine.* Interim report and recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project. June 2015, p. 2.

144 *Lessons Learned for the OSCE from its engagement in Ukraine.* Interim report and recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project. June 2015, p.22.

“promotes trust and understanding”.<sup>145</sup> Similarly to the contact points, the OSCE has a Mediterranean partnership programme, launched in the Budapest summit in 1994, with the Mediterranean Contact Group, and including Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Israel.<sup>146</sup>

### *Online questionnaires*

An interesting attempt to launch feedback-oriented activity was the online questionnaire concerning the online sexual intimidation of female journalists and bloggers. The OSCE intended to raise awareness in this field and debate the various possible strategies so an online questionnaire had been sent to potential stakeholders (media organisations, journalists, etc). After conducting a small-scale qualitative study, the office presented the survey's result. This pointed out that the initiative had remained a small-scale project rather with an experimenting feature. Out of 23 journalists whom the questionnaire was sent, 11 replied to it; five of the respondents mentioned that they had to suffer from death threats.<sup>147</sup>

## ***Cooperation Within the Public Diplomacy of the OSCE***

As a first conclusion drawn based on descriptive analysis above, we can find the most public diplomacy tools in the multilateral category. It indicates the international network-based functioning of the OSCE, as well as the struggle of tackling global or great regional issues. Apart from this, two crucial components of the public diplomacy activities have remained hidden in the listing above: the role of NGOs and the role of other international organisations in these actions.

### *Public diplomacy and the NGO sector*

As it was stated before, public diplomacy is a field of the international relations where the role of non-state actors is extremely important. As it is laid down in a OSCE paper: “*Protection of human rights and freedoms is mediated by multitudinous and varied international and domestic institutions, which compose a single system, where the most important role belongs to human rights NGOs. In times of armed conflict, this system, quite naturally, reconstructs and alters its goals and objectives, but the role and importance of human rights NGOs is not only reduces, but significantly increases both at national and international levels. NGOs*

---

145 ODIHR and Roma and Sinti issues. Published by OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Public Affairs Unit, 28 January 2015. p. 1-2.

146 *Security Community. The OSCE Magazine*. 2014/4. Published by the OSCE Secretariat, Communication and Media Relations Section, Vienna.

147 *Summary of the OSCE RfoM Questionnaire on Safety of Female Journalists Online*. Published by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, 26. August 2015.

*significantly activate its work, change shapes and objectives of activities orientation.*”<sup>148</sup> Practically, NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs) play important roles in actions “in the field”; here we highlight an Ukrainian example, where the OSCE strives to reach out to as most layers of the society as possible. CSOs in Ukraine launched dialogue on inter-regional levels, in the district in Odessa, called the “Odessa Dialogue process”, followed by same initiatives in Khiev and Harkov. These organisations have already experiences on how to manage these processes.<sup>149</sup> In these NGO-driven projects, the feature of feedbacks becomes more apparent. For instance, CSOs slightly criticised the slow or shallow, with none active mechanisms of OSCE Mission. Apart from this, the CSOs expected the enhancement of unbiased media coverage from the side of the OSCE. The unbalanced media circumstances were seen by them as a major obstacle of dialogue processes.

### *Public diplomacy and interplay with other international organisations*

Intersectoral cooperation between the international organisations is also a very apparent and frequent element of public diplomacy actions. In some cases it is very clear that a project launched by the OSCE is supported financially by another organisation. Or, on the contrary, programmes initiated by other institutes involve the OSCE as well. This is the case in the programme of the European Council entitled Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education, which is bolstered by an International contact group on citizenship and human rights education (ICG) where the OSCE also represents itself.

### ***Public diplomacy of the OSCE – Some Recommendations***

On the pages above, we were striving to give a comprehensive picture about the public diplomacy activities of the OSCE, as well as their practical and academic context. As a general conclusion, firstly we can state that public diplomacy does exist on the level of international organisations as well, however they are likely to lack a comprehensive and transparent strategy aiming at PD actions. It triggers the first recommendation: international organisations, such the OSCE, could enhance their effectiveness with a well-elaborated strategy on public diplomacy. These strategies should not be restraint just to general remarks and underlying principles, but is seems worthwhile to lay down the main types of PD actions, stressing their possible effectiveness and special risks.

A second recommendation tackles the structure of PD tools and the criticism concerning the need for local involvement in the OSCE projects. On the other side, the OSCE itself is liable to be

---

148 *Dissemination of knowledge about human rights and international humanitarian law in times of armed conflicts: role and tasks of non-governmental organizations and academic circles*. OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, 25 September 2015. Working Session 9: Democratic Institutions. <http://www.osce.org/odihr/185476>

149 *Civil Society and the Crisis in Ukraine*. Thematic Report, 11 February 2015. p. 8.

aware of the lack of expertise in local issues in many cases, and stresses the limitations of the organisations on this level (referring to the presence or absence of native speakers, and so on). These concerns, according to our standpoint, can be significantly diminished by launching a new type of PD tools: a granting system for the NGO sector, with open calls for proposals. In the case of the European Union and the Visegrad-4 initiatives, this solution was able to bring the supranational organisation closer to the people. In the other hand, it can ease the bureaucratic burden of the organisations: maintaining a well-elaborated granting system has proved to be not so complicated than initiating, elaborating, implementing and assessing the whole project solely by the financing organisation. An application system has several other additional advantages: it can represent and disseminate the main ideas of the organisation in the spheres of institutions being eligible for participating (NGOs, academic and university sector, local state bodies etc); it can sparked off in brand new initiatives, grassroots and pilot projects and it can take the task of creating project plans over to the side of partner organisations. Apart from this, an application system can enable the OSCE to react to a new security or conflict situation promptly. As far as the bureaucratic burden is concerned, there has already been well-elaborated methods of making these systems more effective. For instance, the two-round application structures or the preliminary registration of eligible partners can simplify significantly the application systems.

This recommendation can be judged as an overall proposal towards the whole scene of international organisations, who have had to face their ineffective way of functioning many times. Moreover, an application system can answer to the challenge that many problems cannot be viewed as issues of given countries, so it is increasingly difficult to group the countries into “program countries” and “donor countries”. The mutual penetration of cultures or the enormous internal inequalities within states indicate such local issues which can be strongly present within officially developed “first world” states. That is the reason behind the tendency, why the OSCE is not actively present in the Central European countries; still, their operating democratic structure does not mean the lack of serious „hidden conflicts” inside the state borders. Hence, a funding system can put the Central European region back to the mental map of the integration organisations which could be fruitful for the countries in question. The already existing expert networks and facilities of the OSCE could be an adequate platform for discussing this possible solution further.

## ***Bibliography***

Anholt, Simon: Editorial. *Place branding and public diplomacy*, 2004/1, p. 4-11.

*Annual Report 2014*. Published by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Vienna, 2015.

Aveline, Julie: Branding Europe? Branding, design and post-national loyalties. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 2006/2, p. 334–340.

Civil Society and the Crisis in Ukraine. Thematic Report, 11 February 2015.

Cull, Nicholas J.: *Public Diplomacy Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase*. <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org> Apr 18, 2006.

*Dissemination of knowledge about human rights and international humanitarian law in times of armed conflicts: role and tasks of non-governmental organizations and academic circles*. OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, 25 September 2015. Working Session 9: Democratic Institutions. <http://www.osce.org/odihr/185476>

Florek, Magdalena: The country brand as a new challenge for Poland. *Place branding and public diplomacy*, 2005/1., p. 205-211.

*A matter of international concern: Endemic Torture in Uzbekistan*. Statement by International Partnership for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Association for Human Rights in Central Asia, Civic Solidarity Platform, Human Rights Watch. 25 September 2015. [www.osce.org/ Documents](http://www.osce.org/Documents)

*Creating Mentor Networks in the OSCE Region: A Practical Roadmap*. Published by OSCE Secretariat, OSC/Gender Section, Vienna, 2014.

*Lessons Learned for the OSCE from its engagement in Ukraine*. Interim report and recommendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project. June 2015, p. 2.

McDowell, Marc: *Public Diplomacy at the Crossroads: Definitions and Challenges in an "Open Source" Era*.

Melissen, Jan, ed.: *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. p. 156.

*ODIHR and Roma and Sinti issues*. Published by OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Public Affairs Unit, 28 January 2015.

Quelch, John – Jocz, Katherine: Positioning the nation-state. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 2005/1, p. 229-237.

*Security Community*. *The OSCE Magazine*. 2014/4. Published by the OSCE Secretariat, Communication and Media Relations Section, Vienna.

Symons, Jonathan: *The legitimization of international organisations: examining the identity of the communities that grant legitimacy*. *Review of International Studies*, 37, p. 2557-2583.

Szondi, György: The role and challenges of country branding in transition countries: The Central and Eastern European experience. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 2007/3, p. 8–20.

## State dismemberments and their implications for Europe:

### How partitions affect the nature of democracy<sup>150</sup>

Stefano Bianchini

*1. Multilevel Partitions, Globalization and the Metamorphosis of the nation-state; 2. The lessons not learned from the Yugoslav dismemberment; 3. The crisis of the European project and the limits of its soft power; 4. How partitions affect the nature of democracy today; Suggested bibliography.*

#### ***1. Multilevel Partitions, Globalization and the Metamorphosis of the Nation-State***

In the last century, the American writer and Nobel Prize winner William Faulkner, declaring his support for the Supreme Court decision against school segregation in the USA, wrote one of his most famous sentences: *“To live anywhere in the world today and be against equality because of race or color, is like living in Alaska and being against snow”*.

In the last decades, **Europe has radically changed in a world undergoing deep transformations**. As soon as the Cold War was over, globalization and the development of new communication systems powerfully contributed to the reshaping of society. In this new environment, the EU integration process intensified, the EU expanded eastwardly, and a growing mobility of capital, labor, services, and peoples was promoted. Interdependence; mixed marriages; métissages; coexistence of diverse groups; internet communication, surfing, and cross-cultural relations, all in few years became given facts, like “the snow in Alaska”. This pluralism increasingly demands recognition, social commitment to equality, and powerful challenges – in political, social, cultural, and economic terms – of the homogenization and the standardization of the national form of State, promoted and forged for two centuries both within and outside of Europe.

Faulkner’s words of 60 years ago are, in many respects, still appropriate and can be applied to the current European context, where the reluctance to cope with the reality of integration is rooted in society at many levels. Mentally and culturally this resistance to integration is expanding well beyond far-right circles and parties, ultimately drawing in a plethora of contrasting interests, some of

---

<sup>150</sup> This research was realized in the framework of the TÁMOP 4.2.4.A/2-11-1-2012-0001 "National Excellence Programme" - a convergence regional program with the goal of elaborating and operating an inland student and researcher personal support system. The project was subsidized by the European Union and co-financed by the European Social Fund.

them even aimed to design unprecedented geopolitical balances, new state partitions, and new ethno-national mergers. This is not only a European phenomenon, as similar mechanisms are taking place on other continents. Nevertheless, it is in Europe that the nation-state has been historically forged in all its manifestations, including the most extremist and genocidal ones. Its patterns have generated consequences worldwide: as a result, the polarization between support and rejection of integration, between inclusiveness and the “us-them” dichotomy, is widely visible in a variety of contexts.

Simultaneously, however, Europe puts more effort into the process of integration than other continents. Therefore, Europe is also where the incompatibility between the traditional form of the nation-state and the new needs of transnational governance is escalating, with potentially far-reaching consequences.

Despite the hopes (or illusions) that the end of the Cold War and the process of European integration would encourage harmonization, cooperation, networking, tolerance, and peace, the dynamics of state partition have recently re-emerged at different levels. Claims for the independence of stateless nations and/or to “the restoration of full sovereignty” of national unities (whatever this may mean) increasingly attract wide popular consensus.

It should be also noted that the notion of “partition” is a broader political concept that may occur due to a variety of factors. Historically, power politics, interests, and ideological or religious confrontations beyond ethnic differences have frequently played a key role in this regard (Bianchini S., Chaturvedi S., Ivekovic R. and Samaddar R., 2005/2007). For example, the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth occurred due to the interests of power politics; the partitions of Germany, Korea or Vietnam after World War II came about due to ideological confrontations; and the partition of India and Pakistan was provoked by religious hostilities.

Nevertheless, it seems that nationhood and ethnicity have increasingly acquired relevance in state building processes in Europe since the 19<sup>th</sup> century. During this period, liberal and republican ideas about the “freedom of peoples” fused with the social democrat, and later communist, aspirations to self-determination and equality. At the same time they unintentionally inspired extremist and far-right irredentisms in support of ethno-national territorial unity.

A growing *transformative nature* has crucially marked the development of this modern form of state. In it, a comprehensive set of feelings connected to mass psychologies (i.e. frustration, victimhood, etc.), religious beliefs and identifications, and ancestral fears of “otherness”, interact with selected and favored memories, persistent ethno-national patriarchal hierarchies, economic protectionisms, and an education system biased toward populist political visions, there by heralding a pretended monopoly on effective forms of group preservations from external enemies or other potential risks (Huttenbach and Privitera 1999).

As a matter of fact, when the ideas of the French Revolution originally spread throughout Europe, nation-states were envisioned, and later constructed, with the aim of integrating territories that had been politically divided for long historical periods or incorporated within pre-modern dynastic Empires. This trend of nation-building was nurtured by policies that promoted common standard languages, a basic public education, and political authority increasingly legitimized by “popular will” rather than the “grace of God.” 19<sup>th</sup> century nation-building was also strictly connected to the needs of the industrial revolution, the search for new markets and production opportunities. The unification of Italy and Germany were the first examples in this sense; others followed, including among others Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland (Tamborra 1971, Valiani 1966, Dedijer 1966).

Still, the process of nation-state building has expanded and evolved in many directions since then. On the one hand, it offered a helpful environment for the affirmation of general suffrage, paving the way for a potentially democratic development; on the other hand, the need to control the implications of the people’s participation in selecting the elites persuaded leaders to identify and support new tools able to reinforce group identity, the homogenization of the population, and the mobilization of people’s emotions, often by affiliating with the support of a predominant religion. Additionally, public ceremonies, monuments, urban and rural topographies, and memorial sites were designed to serve these needs and construct the collective memory (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). In the most extreme manifestations, politics infused nationalist ideals with a sense of racist superiority, xenophobic behaviors, and violence against all those who were considered alien.

As a result, the original “*nation-state integrative process*” began to nurture powerful trends toward mono-ethnic predominance. Diachronically analyzed, the metamorphosis of the nation-state structure gradually generated a twofold, paradoxical, effect. On the one hand, nation-states actively promoted power politics strategies, treated minorities with suspicion, or even persecuted them, and perpetuated genocide and ethnic cleansing by inflaming mass military conflicts. Group security was the most powerful motivation behind these behaviors. Minorities were increasingly seen as a sort of “Trojan horse” within the state, where claims to homogeneity were intensified and later imposed. In the end, the collective defense of the majority group was identified with a coercive and uniform group’s self-identification (Motta 2013, Gurr 2000, Cuthbertson and Leibowitz 1993). On the other hand, nation-states offered a unique framework for democratic developments, the affirmation of human rights, and a higher level of political involvement due to the peoples’ new authority in legitimizing power. Appeals to active mass participation stimulated the activities of movements, associations, political parties, the development of the civil society, and an active public sphere.

Dialogue, mutual trust and cross-national communications became key vectors of individual and transnational knowledge.

Consequently, the claims invoking **collective security and democratic development were often incompatible**, or were considered compatible only *within* an homogenous group (or Nation), whose borders with the “others” have been previously and clearly established in terms of “in” and “out”. By contrast, through its promotion of dialogue, cooperation, networking and mobility, the European integration process is a dynamic strategy aimed to make security and democracy compatible *throughout* nation-states – whose domestic social structures are, however, becoming increasingly diversified and heterogeneous.

Meanwhile, the assertive policies of nation-states generated new national aspirations in stateless nations inspired by the ideas of freedom and equality (Guibernau 1999). As a result, a sort of matryoshka process, which threatened the existing geopolitical balance, was encouraged. As time passed, nationalism became increasingly tied to ethnicity. The 19<sup>th</sup> century “integrative processes” were seen as having denied the right of self-determination to a variety of other nations. Accordingly, these “newly oppressed nations” were improperly incorporated within the borders of the existing “nation-states” and suffered from the comprehensive implementation of homogenization policies. From Ireland to Croatia, from Catalonia to Slovakia or Macedonia, similar examples multiplied during the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Therefore, new stateless groups emerged: they defined themselves as nationalists, but they opposed – not promoted – integrationalist policies. As a result, they began to advocate independence, separation, or secession, thereby creating the fragmentation of political societies still dealt with today. Aspirations of nation-building have established a potentially endless mechanism. Desires to partition based on ethno-cultural, religious and/or linguistic arguments, together with the aim of protecting local socio-economic interests and/or specific political perspectives, began to mark vividly the geopolitical arrangements in place (Hale 2008).

In conclusion, while looking diachronically at the European experience since the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, both the perception and the praxis of the nation-state continuously changed, *either within* political societies, *or under* international influences (Goldmann 2001). In more recent times, after the end of the Cold War, these changes have indeed affected the national form of the state, however construed, despite Western emphasis on the “civic” dimension of the nation as a “positive prerogative” of Western societies against the “ethnic and negative” perception of Eastern Europe (and, above all, in the Balkans).

A **wave of neonationalisms** (Gingrich and Banks 2006), surfaced after the fall of the Berlin wall and has since strengthened under the economic and financial crisis that began in 2007. This new

wave has aggressively promoted the ethnic aspect of the nation and has made new ideological claims regarding group homogenization, despite the integration of Europe and the increasing globalization of the world. Thus, a crucial question follows: is *this ethnic evolution of the nation-state* an inspiring (and inevitable) source of partition? Or, in other words, what is the impact of globalization on nationhood and statehood under transformation?

This question poses a key dilemma for European societies stressed by the EU and member-state governance, radical demographic and climate changes, a sharp economic decline, regional and local divergence of interests, a still partial harmonization of laws, regulations and standards, and an increasingly tense and threatening international environment.

In this context, the year 2014 has been pivotal for Europe in many respects. Two main phenomena have interacted powerfully: multilevel trends to partitions and mutual sanctions have together challenged free market relations and global interdependence. Referenda on partitions have been held from Crimea to Scotland. Catalonia has claimed to proceed similarly, despite the sharp opposition of the government in Madrid and the silent concern of the European Commission. Republika Srpska's leadership has intensified its discourse in support of statehood. Incidentally, it was on the day of the Scottish referendum, September 18, 2014, that a former leader of an Albanian party of Macedonia made a formal declaration in Skopje for the independence of Ilirida (namely, North-West Macedonia where Albanian Macedonians are mainly concentrated), calling for a referendum and a future Macedonian confederation. Pinpricks, one can say, but still, this is a symbolic act that could potentially fuel new tensions. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom aims to hold a referendum in 2017 regarding its own EU membership. If it decides to leave the EU, the implications for Scotland may be unpredictable.

With the deepening of the Ukrainian crisis between 2013 and 2014, and after a contested referendum by the EU and USA, Crimea has been included in the Russian federation. Furthermore, the secession of Eastern Ukraine has provoked a war and the intervention of Russian volunteers, backed by the Russian army which has been deployed near to its borders with Ukraine. These events have fuelled a sharp international confrontation between EU/US and Russia. The previous mutual cooperation deteriorated rapidly, and sanctions have been applied by both parties. Since there is no ideological confrontation, as was the case during the Cold War, politicians have adopted economic measures against the free market, undermining the rationale of neo-liberalism and thus restricting the ability of global corporations to maneuver. At the end of the day, they have at a minimum postponed economic recovery in a period of crisis.

Meanwhile, new military clashes have occurred in the Southern Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan due to the territorial dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh. Other “frozen conflicts”, as in Prednestrovija/Moldavia or Georgia, might flare again. Indeed, local alarm is growing. Moreover, the destabilization in the Middle East in areas close to the Southeastern borders of the EU may lead to an independent Kurdistan against the wishes of Turkey (an EU candidate country), while the Flemish party advocates a Belgian confederation, or even a separation (van Grieken 2014). Others, such as the Basques in Spain (The Spain Report 2014) and the Catholic component in Northern Ireland (Halpin 2014), are still considering their course of action.

In the end, the European continent is facing a new wave of potential partitions (together with its economic difficulties). This would be the fourth such wave in a century. The previous three waves have been associated with the collapse of the pre-modern dynastic Empires, the colonial Empires, and the socialist federations. Nevertheless, the fourth one is going to be distinguished by specific characteristics, since the appeal of **partitions is also revealing a multi-level structural dimension**, which affects – with a multi-layering mechanism – the EU, member-states, and sub-national structures (regions, districts, minorities within minorities), in addition to families and individuals in their own everyday life, contacts, working organization, welfare access etc. Indeed every geopolitical and territorial transformation – however peaceful it might be – has a direct impact on human beings and their habits. We are speaking about a phenomenon that may profoundly and permanently affect people’s lives.

To sum up, together with (let’s call them “traditional”) trends that are affecting the integrity of existing states, as in the cases of United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ukraine, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, or Georgia, a newly *multi-level structural dimension of partitions* is concerning the EU as such. Each situation leads to a highly differentiated process in terms of political strategies and adopted policies, depending on the local contexts and the variety of the involved protagonists or activists. This process is *simultaneously* affecting **both** the development of the European integration **and** the stability of its member-states. Working as an intense mechanism similar to a “*matryoshka process*” (namely, a set of endless partitions as experimented with in other contexts, particularly in the former European colonies), this dynamic is in blatant conflict with the EU integrative mission.

Under difficult social and economic circumstances, which are challenging not only the effectiveness of EU governance, but also – and primarily – the idea of integration, the broader geopolitical configuration of Europe is suffering from an escalating trend toward the *renationalization* of member state domestic and foreign policies. More specifically, the EU project is threatened either by *temptations to withdrawal* (as in, the British Tories’ determination to hold an in-

out referendum on the EU), or by the EU far-right parties' attempts to establish formal relationships after the 2014 European Parliamentary elections, with the adamant aim of scaling down the process of integration by appealing to a "restoration of sovereignty". The success of Marine le Pen in France and UKIP in England may potentially generate far reaching, multilevel consequences and jeopardize the cohesion of the integration project.

Simultaneously, in fact, individual EU member-states are affected by *claims of independence* as well as *claims supporting the(re)establishment of sovereignty*: the former have been recorded in Scotland, Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia, Flemish Belgium, and Northern Ireland; the latter mainly in France and the United Kingdom (actually England), although a neo-nationalist ideology is emerging in a number of far-right movements in EU member states like Austria, Italy, Greece, Hungary, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Bulgaria, and most recently in Germany. Similar trends are materializing outside the EU as well, as for instance in Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine and Russia.

Given this framework, what are the main factors that make partitions appealing in Europe today? Actually, there are many factors, some of them referring to crucial issues, some related to everyday life and needs, some others related to identities, cultures, and emotions. Among the variety of reactions to the global economic crisis, the idea of protectionism - both in economic and social terms - is finding a great number of supporters, particularly when employment, immigration, high costs of living, cuts to welfare, and the relocation of enterprises are concerned. These concerns eventually generate forms of "economic nationalism". Furthermore, not less relevant is the crucial issue of security, perceived not only in military terms, but primarily in terms of "life security" dependent upon human rights protection and access to services increasingly associated with state sovereignty. As a result, any (cultural, financial, legal) change (or even restriction) in these fields is often considered an effect of a loss of sovereignty. Additional factors that contribute to making partition attractive include the "anti-bureaucratic reaction" against European rules, and the EU Commission officials' (supposed) behavior, brutally identified with the simple signifier "Brussels". In the end, the mixing of these beliefs leads some political parties to claim a "re-establishment of lost sovereignty" and group homogeneity (or "purity") in terms of civilization, language, religion, cultural "traditions", etc.

As a result, although globalization creates pressures for statehood and nationhood to be redesigned to the benefit of supranational/macroeconomic integrations, the ethicized nation-state political culture - nurtured for at least 200 years under different historical conditions - is fiercely resisting. Its hostility generates a multi-level *structural* desire for partitions, under the presumption that economic wealth and security will be better guaranteed in this way. Still, these claims may not necessarily lead to independent states. At the moment, analysts are recording an expanding trend,

although it remains to be seen if a majority consensus will be reached. To a large extent these developments may produce a variety of implications specific to local contexts. As Dejan Jović (2014), a prominent Croatian scholar, noted in an academically convincing article from September 2014, it is a nationalist myth that all nations are willing to have their own independent state, a narrative which has inflamed irrational and violent reactions in his country. The cases of Scotland and Québec, Jović says, are adamant confirmations that nations can desist from independence for a variety of reasons, both rational and emotional, stemming from concerns about the size of the country, the chance of success in a globalized world, a traditional loyalty to their broader political community, or a rooted sense of identity or patriotism. The fact should not be underestimated that even in the referendum for a reformed Soviet Union, held by Gorbachev on 17 March 1991, all 9 Soviet republics which participated in designing the Union Treaty in Novo Ogarëvo expressed majority preference to preserve the Union under new conditions, rather than see its collapse (Beissinger 2002, Hahn 2002, Cohen S. 2004).

In conclusion, partition does not appear as an unavoidable destiny of a State, despite the growing assertiveness of political movements and parties claiming such an outcome. Indeed, one can conclude that inclusive decision making and territorial devolution are the best tools for decreasing the appeal of partition, but the Yugoslav case shows that institutional regulations are not enough. Perhaps a rooted democratic environment, (as in the case of the Scottish and Catalan, but not Yugoslav, situations), may represent a crucial difference. Solid evidence in this regard is still lacking, however, as the Soviet referendum experience of March 1991 and the Irish war for independence suggest.

By contrast, historical experience also shows that radical and/or unexpected dramatic changes of local and/or international political conditions can rapidly reverse both the situation and the preferences of public opinion. In particular, prolonged instabilities and uncertainties are potential sources of discontent, able to generate drastic transformations. The case of Yugoslavia, whose implications have been to a large extent overlooked and marginalized in European political awareness – mainly, as we are going to see below, due to ideological reasons, persistent Western bias against Balkan cultures and behaviors, and political disregard for the Region once the Cold War confrontation was over – can offer remarkable insights and useful lessons about the conditions under which violent partitions take place.

## ***2. The lessons not learned from the Yugoslav dismemberment***

In an interview published by *Le Monde* in 2014, Jacques Rupnik said that “the greatest obstacle to the Europeanization of the Balkans is the Balkanization of Europe”. This sentence may seem alarming, particularly in circles that are accustomed to neglecting the impact of the Yugoslav war, or that simply nurture the illusion that some sort of pacification in the region is under way. Actually, there is a set of lessons left unlearned from the Yugoslav dismemberment, whose cultural, mental, and political implications are still producing effects.

As said, the general underestimation of the dynamics that led Yugoslavia to dismemberment traces its origin back to a variety of reasons. Among those, it is worth recalling (a) the role of anticommunist feelings, which were addressed not only against the Soviet Union and its camp but also against the non-aligned Yugoslavia, as Brzezinski explicitly stated in Uppsala in 1978 during the World Congress of Sociologists (Dizdarević 2009); in particular, these feelings reinforced the Western predisposition to support secessionist nationalisms when they appeared to serve the weakening and eradication of communism; (b) a widespread Western belief that the violence that erupted in Yugoslavia was an evident manifestation of an uninterrupted, medieval “Balkan” brutality, unrelated to the “European democratic traditions”; (c) the Western conviction that an international non-aligned position in Europe was unsustainable as soon as socialist statehood began to vanish in the late 1980s.

However Yugoslav federalism deserves special consideration, because the way in which its institutions worked – beyond the ideology of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the predominant role of the League of Communists – offers critical insight into experimented mechanisms of representation and decision-making in multinational societies (Đorđević 1982, Mirić 1984, Bianchini 2003, Mostov 2008).

Briefly, after the 1974 constitution Yugoslavia was closer to a confederation rather than a federation due to the remarkable empowerment of its units, the republics, and the regions. A deep decentralization in practice shifted the key powers to the republics and the regions, which were expected to negotiate and harmonize their interests within the federal bodies. With a yearly rotating presidency among these units, the representatives of the federal components had the right of veto, each of them expressing one vote regardless of the number of their members in the two parliamentary chambers. The federal government was set up on the basis of a rigid and well-balanced distribution of ministry responsibilities among republics and regions. Moreover, the representative groups of republics and regions mirrored an ethnic ratio according to census outcomes, although both republics and regions were supposed to represent, within the highest federal bodies, all the six “constituent

peoples” of the federation (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, Montenegrins and Macedonians) and the two main minorities (Albanians and Hungarians) (Bianchini 1984). Given this institutional structure, a better understanding of what happened in the Yugoslav federation during the 1980s will widely improve our interdisciplinary and comparative knowledge on the nexus among partitions processes, geopolitical balances, and the development of democracy.

In addition, the analysis requires a special consideration for another crucial aspect, based in this case on the key role played by the *international interdependence* that European socialist countries increasingly developed as soon as de-Stalinization and economic reforms were implemented, from the second half of the 1950s onwards. Indeed, this is an aspect that has been essentially ignored by the scholarly literature with rare exceptions. Nonetheless, it is a matter of fact that communist parties gradually abandoned Stalinist protectionist policy due to two main factors: intensification of the relations with the newly established postcolonial states (the so-called “Third World”), and access to international loans from the West. Despite the existing differences between socialist states, this approach was basically pursued by the leadership of the socialist camp, even during the Brezhnev stagnation (with the exception of Albania). However, Gorbachev was the first high ranking policy maker who explicitly elaborated both a domestic and foreign policy strategy based on the interdependence of “three worlds” (the capitalist, the socialist and the non-aligned). Meanwhile, Yugoslavia – which had not belonged to the Camp since 1948, but was a socialist country – applied the most radical reforms in this regard, strengthening its own ties worldwide and implementing peculiar forms of pluralism despite domestic social inequalities and political differentiations among republics.

In this way, *interdependence, as an early form of globalization*, deeply penetrated the socialist societies, and particularly the Yugoslav federation, generating far-reaching social and cultural consequences. The previous isolationist policy, characterized by notions of the “besieged fortress” and “socialism in one country”, later applied to an expanded socialist camp and proved to be unsustainable in the long term. Moreover, the desire to compete internationally in a comprehensive way, including the promotion of social patterns worldwide, increased dependency. Dependency, in turn, exposed socialist countries to fluctuating international contingencies, gradually contributing to their mental inclusion within a wider European context, and thereby putting to an end the variety of European communist experiences inspired by the Bolshevik revolution.

These aspects have been rarely analyzed in scholarly literature (Lavigne 1998, Berend 1998, Bianchini 2015), but are crucially important. Interdependence and globalization not only created the conditions for putting an end to the reality of the exhausting communist “otherness”, but also provided the broader cultural framework under which – once the socialist system collapsed – the dynamics of

EU widening and deepening took place, the Yugoslav federation was brutally dismembered, and the Soviet and Czechoslovak partitions occurred.

Consequently, an analysis of the *unlearned lessons* from the Yugoslav dismemberment requires both coping with such globalization and maintaining mentally a vivid connection with these lessons. To make visible the comparison between unlearned lessons and the dynamics of the incumbent multilevel process of partitions in Europe, the arguments are summarized below according to three main aspects graphically juxtaposed in two corresponding columns. These three aspects concern the impact of a prolonged economic crisis; ineffective governance and decisional uncertainties; and the nature of the appeal to mass mobilization.

A1. The first lesson concerns the impact that a **prolonged economic crisis may generate in inter/multi-cultural societies**. From the beginning of the 80s, the Yugoslav economic crisis was characterized by high foreign debt (20 billion dollars) with unproductive domestic investments. The amount of the debt was to a large extent contracted by republics and regions. Therefore, in order to avoid nationalist recriminations on responsibilities and repayments, the federal government published only the total amount, classifying the amounts per republics and regions. Then, restrictive austerity measures were adopted with a drastic import reduction in order to restore a budget balance. As a result, public investments rapidly declined, family consumerism (encouraged since 1965) was affected, and unemployment increased. The country was also suddenly excluded from new technology developments, particularly in the field of information technology (IT). The existing gaps in the development of republics and regions escalated severely. The perception that sacrifices were unequally distributed among republics and regions increased as well, fuelling frustrations and resentments. The repayment of foreign debt also proved to be extremely costly: at the end of the decade Yugoslavia had paid interest for an amount equal to the debt, but not the debt itself (Bartlett 1987, Brera 1985, Dizdarević 2009). Furthermore, as the crisis was deepening and Yugoslavia was a federation with a high level of devolution, the reaction of the authorities of the eight constituent units was to protect their local economies as much as they could. They also interfered in the business relations between republics and regions, hindering the contract implementation between enterprises. In so doing, they generated economic nationalism, which had a detrimental impact on the unity of the Yugoslav market (Korošić 1989, Horvat 1985, JCTPS 1982).

A2. Broadly speaking, the Yugoslav experience tells us a great about the consequences of tackling a **long period of economic crisis with austerity measures and without investments for growth**, as the EU has tried to do since 2007 when the crisis of sovereign debts exploded and monetary measures were implemented rather than social support investments. In a situation of rapid decline in the

standard of living, increased unemployment, and social impoverishment, restrictive measures produce divergent interests between the autonomous components of an integrated society and generate trends in support of economic nationalism (Yavlinsky 201, Duménil and Lévy 2010, Mencinger 2009). These trends become particularly acute when the economic and social differences between regions (or states) are escalating, and may encourage the adoption of a policy of “everyone for him/herself” in blatant conflict with the needs and advantages of free trade, free circulation of capital, labor, people and services, and the morality of solidarity and equality. The consequences are, on the one hand, a growing limitation on exchanges within narrower geopolitical spaces, which thus triggers further economic effects of recession. On the other hand, a worsening of the relations between regions (or states) arises, based on the perception that sacrifices are unequally distributed and that financial resources are diverted to some territories to the detriment of others. The political economy polarization caused by budget policies prioritizing expansive investments widens the gap not only in terms of strategies to be applied, but also in terms of social implications (Pogátsa 2011). This situation can encourage local authorities, bankers, and entrepreneurs to call for alternative solutions, derogations, and differentiations, which can ultimately result, for example, in conflicting economic visions between North and South, in divisive currency policy proposals (i.e. the creation of 2 or 3 Euro), or in more radical decisions via referendums for quitting a currency, the EU, or an existing nation-state. In substance, the arguments used to express discomfort within the EU, its member states, or third parties on the Continent following the explosion of the economic and financial crisis in 2007 are to a large extent reminiscent of the arguments that stirred opposition between the leaderships of Slovenia, Serbia, and Croatia between 1981 and 1988.

B1. A second lesson concerns **the effectiveness of governance and decision-making**. As said, Yugoslavia was a deeply decentralized federation, with an ethnic ratio of representation, regular one-year rotations in the representative bodies, and eight constituent units exercising *de facto* veto power. These mechanisms affected state institutions ranging from the League of Communists and other social organizations, to even the supreme command of the army, which also represented ethnic plurality. Nevertheless, in depressing economic conditions, the decision-making system crucially lacked effectiveness. In times of crisis, people need to understand who is responsible for what and how their civic and economic rights are protected (Bunce 1999). Furthermore, they expect from leadership a vision, a strategy and the decisional capacity to solve problems and pass consistent institutional reforms when needed and in a timely fashion. The Yugoslav federal system was unable to make rapid decisions, since the tortuous negotiations among the units of the federation (each unit needed to achieve its own consensus), imposed a timetable that was increasingly inadequate for meeting the fast

pace required when dealing with the economy. Particularly problematic was the adoption of budgetary measures able to significantly reduce welfare expenses without changing the political system to one that was ideologically unacceptable to the dictatorship of the proletariat. As a result, the decision-making system was increasingly powerless to reform welfare, and when the system was finally able to do so, it was too late to produce beneficial effects. Meanwhile, *ad hoc* commissions for reforms were established and worked for years without achieving any effective synthesis. Governmental attempts to introduce stimulating measures in economics and politics failed miserably because they were inadequate to meet the rapid worsening of the situation. Accordingly, republics and regions, as well as the population at large, increasingly did not see the advantages of sharing (ineffective) institutions; as a result, they started to search for alternatives (*separation*) outside Yugoslavia (Cohen L. 1995, Susan Woodward, 1995, John R. Lampe, 1996; John B. Allcock, 2000).

B2. Unlike socialist Yugoslavia, the EU member states are democratic states, but the **decision-making system of the EU has also proved so far to be too slow and inadequate** to face the crisis that started with sovereign debt and expanded to production and consumption. Divergent interests are multiplying as an effect of the economic crisis; different divides crosscut EU membership, from Eurozone policies to constitutional courts invited to scrutinize the legitimacy of decisions (as in the cases of Portugal and Germany). Furthermore, budgetary measures – which the most economically successful countries required of their economically insecure peers – have imposed austerity measures and higher taxation, generating dramatic social costs. As a result, angry social protests are intensifying, particularly in southern Europe. With the deepening of the north/south polarization, Euroskeptic and nationalist parties are trying to maximize their electoral benefits. In search for consensus, they are appealing to the “return” of an imaginary nation-state sovereignty, addressing their criticism to the hyper-bureaucracy of “Brussels” or to their own central governments. Since people have been inculcated with nation-state values for almost two centuries, the idea of taking shelter under the limits of a nation-state (regardless of the meaning of this notion) sounds persuading. Nevertheless, **neo-nationalist arguments** are increasingly in conflict with an everyday reality marked by globalization and societal diversifications, **two driving forces of post-nation-state configurations**. In such antithetical circumstances, the existing institutions (of both the EU and its member states), weakened by the crisis and inadequate to face it, are severely affected by multilevel challenges, while dissatisfaction with shared institution is intensifying all over Europe. The Yugoslav federation experienced similar dynamics. As time passed, (neo)nationalist arguments threatened its society, where both multiculturalism and interculturalism were operating: multiculturalism functioned in the institutional representation based on ethnic ratio, but without democracy (restricting

dialogue and mediation among ethnic groups); interculturalism effectively characterized social and individual realities. The simultaneous double crisis of (a) the economic (self-managed) system and (b) institutional governance, paved the way to a radical collapse of the federation, under the assumption that a democratic transition would have been possible only in its constituent units, rather than in a federal framework (Bianchini 1989, Goati 1989). Despite the differences between Yugoslavia and the EU (i.e., the former was a state under dictatorship, the latter is not a state but an original conglomeration of democracies), evident similarities can be recognized, particularly in consideration to the tensions between nationalist and integrative arguments. Therefore, it remains an open question **whether** democracy under a prolonged economic crisis and with inadequate governance can manage diversity in intercultural contexts and stimulate people's support for shared, reformed, institutions (Žagar 2007, Reichenberg 2001, Turton and González 2000). Similarly, the risk that neo-nationalist discourses will overwhelm the prospect of integration cannot be dismissed.

C1. The third lesson refers to the **quality of the appeals to people's mobilization in time of crisis**. We have mentioned above that the economic and institutional crisis encourages leaders to re-define their sources of legitimacy. In the Yugoslav case, this process was gradually influenced by the decline of the self-management system in the political and economic spheres. The decline affected the convincing role of ideology, which had been the lever of power legitimacy in socialist societies. Political elites consistently began to worry about their future role, and to look for electoral consensus. *Economic nationalism* and the institutional role of republics and regions offered them the opportunity to rely increasingly on territory (soil) and people, rather than ideology. With the aim of defending local interests and their own positions of power, communist leaders began to criticize the “hyper-bureaucracy of the federal government” in Belgrade. Milošević in particular encouraged an *anti-bureaucratic revolution* (Jović 2003, Gordy 1999, Obrenović 1992) that actually facilitated the shifting of administrative personnel in republics and regions from communist ideology to visibly supporting nationalist discourses. This development converged with the arguments of those intellectuals, mainly from the humanities, who were suggesting a primordialist vision of the nation. This approach, in fact, appeared to be helpful in many respects: the mental and cultural borders of the nation were supposed to be clearly marked, and the sense of group belonging would be reinforced by a solid call to ethnic recognition and solidarity in times of crisis and loss of political and social orientation. The ethno-identification between rulers and ruled sounded simple and effective, appealing to emotions (rather than to reason), facilitating a mass mobilization, and fuelling resentments against “others” who could be regarded as responsible for the crisis. Additionally, this approach made possible a convergence with part of the anti-communist emigration. In the end, a connection was firmly established between soil and blood (or group homogenization), in full contrast to the existing in-depth intercultural individual relations within the Yugoslav space. Predictably, this step paved the way to war and ethnic cleansing.

C2. **Ethno-nationalist claims appear to be less influential in the EU and within member states, but this is not accurate**. Indeed, political culture based on the “us/them” polarization, which adamantly rejects the “other” (whatever “other” means, in terms of gender, migrants, EU citizens from another member-state, people with different religious prescription, sexual orientation, transnational or cosmopolitan cultures, etc.), flourishes and is shared by a growing number of political protagonists, activists, and ordinary people. Consistently, racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism are feelings well rooted in the populations of European and easily spread worldwide by social networks. These attitudes persist despite their sharp rejection

by democratic political cultures, civil society projects of inclusion, and EU institutional behaviors. Migration flows, both between EU member states and from third countries, have been manipulated mainly by parties on the far-right as well as the media, particularly when they report news on criminality aiming to inflame mass hysteria against “otherness”. The economic crisis and the search for employment also contribute to inflame contentious situations when opportunities for employment are offered to migrants. Cameron’s suggestion in October 2014 to reduce the mobility of even EU people towards the United Kingdom is not only a violation of a key value of EU integration, but it is also a cultural failure of the conservative party and a dramatic concession to policies of exclusiveness promoted by UKIP’s far-right. In fact, public opinions are often and increasingly influenced by these attitudes. Even democratic mainstreams have been culturally contaminated by these phenomena, and democratic parties have compromised with these narratives. As a result, the third lesson that stems from the Yugoslav tragedy concerns the **mechanisms that determine how mutual trust evaporates**, how, in other words, the sense of threat is spread within and among ethnic groups or nations and how discriminatory and exclusive policies are justified and claimed. In the end, instead of strengthening democracy, the homogenization of groups on the basis of the “us-them” dichotomy demolishes bridges of communication, even potentially threatening peace.

### *3. The crisis of the European project and the limits of its soft-power*

In addition to these three main lessons, **a fourth one** can be also considered. Indeed, its character is mainly **encoded into the local (Balkan) context**. This lesson **includes a crucial political morality** whose implications concern liberal ideology, the political culture of the nation-state, and Western political behavior. In a sense, the considerations that follow are direct consequences of the three aforementioned lessons, but their content easily recalls Rupnik’s words quoted above. In fact, his alarming statement mirrors a broader concern about the mutual flow of negative interdependences that mark the relationship between a lack of reforms in the Western Balkans and the crisis of the European project.

Undeniably, the EU has undertaken a long-term commitment in supporting peace and stabilization in the Balkans since the beginning of the 1990s, but their concrete improvements in the region largely depend on, and are deeply affected by, **how peace has been established** between the Yugoslav successor states. Furthermore, since the EU project is going through a difficult time after the Constitutional Treaty was rejected in 2005, it is also necessary to question whether **potential EU integration will still have a conditional ability** to convince local

authorities to reform institutions by making them institutionally compatible with membership. In 1995, in fact, USA and EU diplomats negotiated a fragile peace treaty – the Dayton Agreement – with warlords. The treaty successfully put an end to war, but the ethno-national compromise that dominated the agreement made post-war decision making impossible, affecting prospects for the consolidation of peace.

This failure, however, stemmed to a large extent from the nation-state political culture to which the diplomacy of the US and EU perversely adhered during consultations with the warring parties. Consistently acting on the basis of this cultural background, they negotiated peace with leaders to achieve a crucial war goal: the establishment of ethnic nation-states. Despite the Western diplomats' rejection of violence, there was a strong cultural predisposition from both sides to find a solution that in effect respected a shared rationale: in the end, they were speaking the same national language (even if with different interpretations). Therefore, their mediation remained restricted within the nation-state cultural perimeter, leading them to accept ethnic separation.

When Western diplomats realized the mistake, they negotiated a different accord for Macedonia in 2001, rejecting the partition of entities, confirming the unity of the state, and assuming that municipal devolution was the only acceptable compromise capable of guaranteeing an equal representation of ethnic groups. At the end of the day, a contradictory message was launched, since these agreements (and the others that were signed between 1995 and 2003) could have been interpreted **either** as a temporary achievement *before* the final state partition, **or** as the *first step towards* the preservation of the territorial unity and, potentially, national reintegration (Bianchini, Marko, Nation, and Uvalić 2007). Consistent with this ambivalent rationale, even when social unrest emerged regardless of ethnicity – as occurred for a short while in Bosnia-Herzegovina in February 2014 – political parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as in Croatia and Serbia reinterpreted the events in ethnic terms, trying to annihilate any other discourse.

Ultimately, the Dayton Agreement represents a blatant cultural defeat of the Western liberal vision, based on a pretended supremacy of the “civic nation.” Indeed, the main characteristics of this liberal vision have been deeply tarnished by the predominantly ethnic solutions incorporated in the agreement. This paradoxical outcome was generated not only by the influential role of the warlords during the negotiations, but also – and more frightening – by the substantial cultural convergence of Western diplomacy, whose ethno-national inclinations quietly persist, despite their public rejection.

This effect is not surprising when considered in light of the historical experiences of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The civic/ethno ambivalence in liberal praxis has emerged repeatedly since the *House Inquiry* presented their conclusions regarding desirable peace arrangements after WWI to President Wilson, even while elaborating Wilson's famous 14 points (Heater 1994, Mamatey 1957). The way in which Great Britain withdrew from its colonies similarly indicates an ambivalence in liberal praxis. London rarely transferred civic values together with independence, as the ethno-national instabilities generated by the British *divide et impera* policy have confirmed in the cases of India, South Africa, Cyprus and the Middle East. Furthermore, the lack of recognition of any minorities in France stems from a rooted liberal belief according to which primacy is assigned to the rights of *citoyens* as individuals, therefore undermining the implementation of assimilation policies, though such policies are – or have been – actually practiced (and sometimes even violently pursued in the past). This approach has been absorbed by other countries in different contexts where, however, the obsession for security and territorial integrity has coincided with the belief that citizenship rights should be granted to an ethno-national homogeneous population without minorities. Greece and Turkey are two significant examples that have been inspired by French political culture. The Yugoslav monarchy and Czechoslovakism between the two World Wars are additional examples in this sense.

Truly, most of these behaviors subsided after WW2, particularly under the process of European integration. Suffice it to recall that Italy has recognized minority languages in its constitution, and France has provided some devolution rights to Corsica after the launching of the Balladur Initiative for a Pact on Stability in Eastern Europe (with the aim of isolating the “nationalist virus” ready to expand beyond the Yugoslav borders) and after the approval of the Copenhagen criteria, which required the respect of minority rights prior to submitting application for membership (Dunay and Zellner 1996, Bianchini 2013).

This consistency is, however, a key point. EU conditionality – as an expression of its soft-power – was successful in the 1990s due to two main factors (Atanasakis 2008, Grabbe 2006). On the one hand, a crucial role was played by the strong will of the political elite of candidate countries in joining the Union, regardless of their political orientations (to such an extent that alternate governmental coalitions never questioned EU membership, but worked to achieve the goal anyway). On the other hand, the influential capacity of the EU to convince candidates to pass reforms was consistently reinforced by the EU's serious commitment to increasing its inner harmonization, and to further integration by reforming and adapting its institutions to new challenges. In other words, the EU provided a convincing inclusive

perspective because its widening and deepening were simultaneously pursued political goals (Schimmelfennig Frank and Sedelmeier Ulrich 2005, Vachudova 2005).

As a result, 1995-2004 was the most successful and dynamic period for the integration of the Union and the affirmation of its soft-power to the external world. These transformations were positively perceived by many scholars and journalists overseas, who began to follow and analyze carefully the new input issued by former warrior states. In 2004, Jeremy Rifkin published his famous book under the title *The European Dream*, in which he captured the momentum by comparatively analyzing the declining “American dream” and the insurgent “European dream” (Rifkin 2004). He was particularly impressed by the fact that after a long history of violent clashes and genocide, Europeans were developing an integrative pattern based on cooperation, soft-power, democratic values, and peaceful coexistence. This pattern was additionally able to attract the former socialist countries of East Central Europe, jointly pass a Charter of Fundamental Rights, and pave the way to a Constitutional Treaty. His seminal book was not the only one that recorded this fervent phase of openness and reform. Previously in 2000, Elisabeth Pond addressed her passionate interpretation of Europe’s progressive resurgence to Americans, many of whom were still incredulous, in a book eloquently titled *The Rebirth of Europe* (Pond 2000). Similarly, the New York Times bestsellers series published another book in 2004 by T. R. Reid under the title *The United States of Europe*, with the very clear subtitle of “*The new superpower and the end of American Supremacy*”. Focusing on the ability of the EU to “invent peace”, the author extensively describes the European social model and the networking policy able to unite a Europe under deep transformation. He concludes by warning American readers that a revolution was taking place with “profound effect on the world” (Reid 2004). Other studies (Kopstein and Steinmo 2008) suggested that the EU and the USA might gradually diverge and grow apart.

To be concise, there was a time when the European integration project shook global consciousness, attracted international admiration, and stood as an evident novelty in a globalizing and uncertain world. Nevertheless, this proactive phase vanished in 2005 when the Constitutional Treaty was rejected in the French and Dutch referenda. Already at that time, the main contentious argument that led to the failure of the treaty proposal was related to the claim for a more social Europe, as a Gallup poll revealed after the vote (Manchin 2005), within a document that was expected to include in a clear and readable way the main legal principles on which the Union should have been based (S. Holland 2015). Instead, the document was a huge list of decisions approved by the European Councils without providing an inspiring projection for the future. This shortcoming played a key role in strengthening the negative vote, far beyond

criticisms of the Bolkestein Directive on services within the internal EU market. That directive did, however, create the potential for new divisive behaviors within the EU, epitomized by the critiques against the “Polish plumber”.

Significantly enough, the campaign against the “Polish plumber” was able to stimulate a critical public attitude against the free mobility of people within the EU, a few months after the first great enlargement of 2004 and following on years of excited rhetoric about the “reunification of Europe” upon the collapse of communism. Such a campaign was a divisive sign that revealed a growing reluctance of old member states’ populations to welcome the policies of inclusiveness so far pursued. Indeed, this was an indication that a “return” to national and sovereign values was again coming to the surface. Member state governments were able to seize the opportunity and take advantage of it. Consistent with this new “re-nationalization” trend, the new Lisbon Treaty, designed to replace the failed Constitutional Treaty, excluded references to any state-like symbols such as the flag, the anthem, or the coat of arms, which were included in the Constitutional Treaty. In this vein the Lisbon Treaty maintained only the Charter of Fundamental Rights. In contrast, the institutional provisions of the second part of the Constitutional Treaty were encompassed in the new one. As a result, the Union gradually abandoned the communitarian approach for a more assertive intergovernmental approach, imposed the approval of the treaty on a reluctant Ireland, and *in effect* reinvigorated public opinions’ negative assessments about the democratic deficit in the EU (Ziller 2007, Michalski 2006).

This reconstruction is crucially important for understanding the political impact of the economic and global crisis that started in 2007. Since then, in fact, enlargement has been increasingly perceived within the Union as a weight, rather than as an opportunity; moreover, EU institutional effectiveness was measured in relation to its managerial capacity to face the implications of the crisis. The outcomes so far achieved have registered a failure to promote first a general recovery, then a new phase of growth and social security, particularly in the Eurozone.

With the intensification of social and political uncertainties, the prospect of implementing the integrative project was affected, generating evident negative effects in some potential candidate countries in the Balkans. This includes especially Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, whose commitment to reforms had evaporated (Emerson, Aydin, De Clerck-Sachsse and Noutcheva 2006). Serbia and Kosovo have – under the pressure of the EU – made some efforts to normalize their relations, Belgrade and Tirana did organize the first visit of the Prime Minister of Albania to Serbia in 68 years, and Serbia and Croatia announced their first

joint military exercises of NATO in Serbia as well as a stronger cooperation in the healthcare system. Still, even considering these developments, the level of understanding, tolerance, and reconciliation remains poor in the social reality of the Balkans as a whole.

Several polls in different periods have recorded the persistence of animosities. Scholars and anthropologists with their methodological observations and contextual interpretations have easily confirmed the situation and called on authorities to take action on bridging this gap, despite efforts to do so on the part of civil society. In 2005 an International Commission on the Balkans, led by lawyer and former Italian Prime Minister Giuliano Amato, published a document on the future of the Balkans and included an interesting annex with polls on people's feelings regarding borders, potential new conflicts, and inclusion within the EU. From the figures, a sharp polarization emerged between Albanians (both from Albania and Kosovo) and Slavs (either Serbs or Montenegrin, Bosniaks or Macedonians). Albanians voiced opinions concerning potential changes to the borders (approximately 70% approved of border changes under an international community intervention), as opposed to a diversified opinion (between 14 and 29%) of the Slavs. Similarly, the idea to have a joint future within the EU was supported by up to 63% by Slavs and only by 35/42% by Albanians. The importance of the idea of nation was emphasized by 88.5% of the Albanians, but only by an oscillating percentage of between 50 and 65% of the Slavs. New military conflicts were expressed to be expected in Macedonia (76%), Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (28/29%), but in Albania only approximately 13%. Also quite interesting was the belief that the persistence of the status quo had to be considered as a way to avoid worst-case scenarios. The absolute majorities of the Slavs (with more than 60% of Macedonians and Montenegrins) held this belief, while only an average of 45% thought so among the Albanians (Amato 2005).

By contrast, in 2014 the Belgrade magazine "*Nin*" published a new poll conducted in Serbia, Albania and Kosovo, that offers insightful data. First of all, 62% of questioned Serbs admitted they had never visited Kosovo, nor Albania (97%). Furthermore, if 47% of Albanians support the project of Greater Albania, 43% believe they have more in common with the Serbs than they have differences. Nevertheless, 39% of the Serbs (as opposed to 37%) think that a long-term peace with Albania is impossible. The lack of trust is mutually evident when the question concerns dialogue between Belgrade and Priština: the majority of Kosovar Serbs (43% to 2%) believe that the dialogue is beneficial for Kosovo rather than for Serbia, while the general perception in Kosovo (34% to 19%) is that Serbia is taking advantage of the normalization process (Didanović 2014).

Despite the fact that these two polls cannot be compared in a scientific way, due to the evident differences in the posed questions, they nevertheless suggest that suspicions, mistrust, and a low level of mutual knowledge still persist, giving few hopes that the trend can be reversed even from a mid-term perspective. Under these conditions, a mere sports match can inflame team supporters in nationalistic terms, as occurred in Belgrade in October 2014 when a drone with a flag showing the map of Greater Albania landed in the playing field, unleashing violent reactions. On the other side, however, the EU is no longer an affirmative project. On the contrary, to the outside world it reflects its own sharp divisions over the future of its integration, of its economic policy, and its institutional reforms. In light of this, the risk of the EU suffering from what has so far been called a “Balkanization” cannot be dismissed.

As a matter of fact, the renationalization of member states’ domestic and foreign policies have dramatic implications when the time comes for making joint decisions in economic policy. This renationalization is already evident in, for example, the energy sector, the reluctance of old member states to comply with the directive of the European commission, and some national policies aimed to preserve bank autonomy. **The controversy over the most effective measures aimed at consolidating the common currency** is increasingly strengthening the decisional uncertainty of the Union. On the one hand, in fact, both the Bundesbank (more radically) and German Chancellor Merkel (more softly) are ideologically insisting on neoliberal principles, based on the priority of monetarist and budgetary policies (although agreed to by 25 out of 27 member-states when the Stability Treaty was signed in 2012). On the other hand, a wide number of economists writing in the news (from Joseph Stiglitz to Jean Paul Fitoussi and Paul Krugman) are fervently discouraging this option, supporting instead a neo-Keynesian approach. This attitude is also influencing the most recent behavior of the governments of France and Italy, who would prefer to focus on public investments for growth and welfare protection (Stiglitz 2013, 2009a and 2009b, Krugman 2013, Fitoussi and Le Cacheux 2009).

In addition to the internal implications of such a dichotomy, the divergent strategies in the political economy of the EU generate several external effects, among those the weakening of the effectiveness of conditionality. In fact, by propelling an image of uncertainty and the inability to make decisions, the persuasive power of the EU project remains deeply affected both among its own citizens as well as the Balkan countries that are interested in membership but still struggling with unimplemented reforms. In this context, the 2014 *multilevel* perspective of partitions within the EU – which is to a large extent the consequence of a multilevel *inadequacy* in facing the challenges of a multifaceted crisis – represents an aggravating blow, dramatically damaging to the comprehensive image of the Union.

#### ***4. How partitions affect the nature of democracy today***

In summary, the considerations so far developed suggest that a process progressing from *economic crisis to ineffective governance to mass mobilization based on an “us-them” dichotomy* – in a nation-state political-cultural framework – is likely to affect the nature of democracy. That is, if we assume that democracy *is not only about rules*, but also about *the recognition of diversities* and how to respect them within political societies under transformation. In a globalizing context – which is the main dynamic feature of societal development after the end of the Cold War – the relationship between representation, recognition of diversities (far beyond the mere notion of tolerance), and legislation is becoming a pivotal factor for the substance of democracy.

A large number of scholars (Schmitter 2015, 2004, Holland 2015, Follesdal, Andreas and Hix, Simon 2006, Crombez 2003, Moravcsik 2002) have extensively analyzed the roots and main features of the European crisis, the controversial issue of its democratic deficit, the limitations ascribed to its democratic mechanisms and institutions, the legislative process and the party system, together with the opacity of the decision-making process and voters’ fatigue. The topic has also been recurrently discussed by the international press, and contentiously included in some public statements of policy-makers while contesting decisions of the European Commission or the European Parliament. In other words, the matter has been widely scrutinized, particularly in regard to the functioning of the rules, the economic policy decisions, and the outcomes of public opinion polls (*Eurobarometer* at alia). Therefore, we do not need to concentrate again on these issues. However, there is one aspect of these deficiencies that has been neglected in the investigation of the roots of the European crisis: namely, the **increasing inadequacy of the functionalist or neo-functionalist method** in the management of European Affairs, both at the domestic and the international level. Joschka Fischer was one of the rare policy makers who, in a famous speech given at Humboldt University in 2000, publicly elaborated on the need to overcome the David Mitrany/Jean Monnet method (Fischer 2000). Politically, this is a crucial cultural challenge since the EU and its member-states’ institutions are still unable to face the ongoing liquefaction of the nation-state.

As Bauman suggested in his seminal studies (Bauman 2006, 2000 and 1997), most of the characteristics of the existing collective and personal links that solidified during the **nation-state** formation of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries are currently **in a process of fusion and amalgamation** into new, unexpected forms. Among those, suffice it here to recall the effects of this dynamic on national-cultural homogenization, the primacy of one standardized language,

the role of the traditional heterosexual family and the bourgeois ideas of respectability, the predominance of patriarchy and the challenges to hierarchical gender relations, perceptions of time and space (thanks to the new technologies and the faster trans-European communication systems under construction), the growing transnational recognition of legal and fiscal regulations, and the national link between blood and soil (Blagojevic, Kolozova and Slapšak 2006, Iveković 2003, Iveković and Mostov 2002). These melting and neo-crystallizing processes are increasingly produced by globalization in general terms, but more specifically by the impact of European integration and its enlargement eastward, despite weaknesses and contradictions in the process of widening and deepening.

In particular, these phenomena of **fusion have been accelerated by the implementation of the Schengen Treaty and the Erasmus program**. Their current impact and their further, potential role in the cross-national dynamics deserve greater consideration in the analysis of the current European social transformation. Admittedly, *the Schengen and Erasmus “silent revolutions”* are far from being culturally accepted by EU governments and peoples. The reference to the term “revolution” is not exaggerated. On the one hand, Schengen is representing a silent but tremendous, radical change whose rationale has not been yet understood. Indeed, Schengen has threatened, for the first time in a peaceful way, one of the key aspects of the Westphalian notion of sovereignty. Since 1648, the full sovereignty of the “Prince” (in Machiavellian terms) over a fixed territory with a *stable* population has been dogma. In contrast, by abolishing restrictions to mobility, Schengen is challenging the sovereign power over the stability of the population; therefore, the fluidity of exchanges among people is encouraged without the exclusive control of the EU member-state governments. Thanks to Schengen, the ability of individuals to search for new jobs or educational opportunities is expanding, and cultural syncretism and the mixing of populations are intensifying, in sharp contrast to claims for “purity” (Bianchini 2013).

On the other hand, the **Erasmus program** is deeply transforming the University system: student and staff mobility; international programs; joint, double, and multiple diplomas; all are paving the way for building up a new European ruling class, expanding multilingualism in teaching and learning experiences, gradually (although sometimes arduously) harmonizing administrative systems and regulations, and strengthening individual and institutional networks at both senior and junior levels. As a result, national borders are easily crossed by new generations of scholars and students, who are increasingly neo-nomadic in mental and cultural terms, while geographical and political borders are becoming irrelevant. This neo-nomadism, enhanced by the new communication systems (which do not respect any border restrictions)

and the international teaching of incoming students, dramatically contributes to the liquefaction of the old national élites and the uniqueness of self-identification with the nation-state. On the contrary, they make cross-cultural communication a social reality while expanding the self-identification of educated people to a broader European context, multiplying the identity-consciousness of individuals.

Furthermore, the link between “blood and soil” is challenged by other social phenomena that politics is visibly unable to control: **migration flows** and the freedom of movement for people as one of four liberties of the Union mark radical transformation not only in terms of demographic setting, but also in terms of cultures, religious beliefs, dietary habits, lifestyles, and work organization, generating new social pluralities and diversified market needs. This also therefore contributes to the liquefaction of national homogeneity and the primacy of “one religion in one state” (Donskis and Dabašinskigė 2010, Benhabib 2002, Coimbra Group 2001, Balibar 2001, Noiriel 2001).

Inevitably, adaptation to such radical and intensive changes is painful and controversial; it galvanizes fierce resistance, if not aggressive rejections, well encoded in populist and far-right political programs throughout Europe. Challenged by these radical social transformations and intimidated by far-right parties, member-state leaders are admittedly powerless in dealing with unexpected phenomena related to the broader mobility of people (from economic migrations to soccer game attendance). Therefore, they tend to react by suspending Schengen and blaming their neighbors for a lack of control over their borders, as in the case of Italy and France during the Lampedusa crisis in 2011, or in the case of Denmark against Germany and Sweden, also in 2011.

At the same time, people at large – despite the growing new transnational and neo-nomadic élite – are not necessarily prepared to face the effects of inclusiveness in their everyday life. They tend to react negatively to the demographic transformation of their cultural and social environment, and particularly when economic conditions decline. These dynamics explain to a large extent when and why ethno-nationalist, racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic reactions materialize (Taras 2009). Actually, there is a common mindset in their rejections of otherness. *Mutatis mutandis*, the policies that led to the violent dismemberment and ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav federation, and rationales supporting violent behavior in other established European ideologies of the far right, are all similar in nature. These ideologies are based on ignorance, prejudice, and exclusiveness; a sense of superiority alone – inherent in racist theories – may not be necessarily, or explicitly, asserted by ethno-nationalism, but this does not significantly change the substance of these ways of thinking.

Furthermore, the boundaries between ethno-nationalism and (civic) national identities are quite tenuous. I am not referring here to academic studies and analytical research: in this case, the peculiarities of these phenomena have been widely discussed and defined. By contrast, I am here referring to the behavior and statements of policy makers, journalists, and analysts when they appeal to emotions in order to mobilize consensus: from Milošević to the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) report, published in the US shortly after Sept. 11, the idea of nation-state has been deeply affected by this cultural volatility (Bianchini 2003, Puri 2004).

Admittedly, the *claim to group homogeneity* has played and still plays a crucial role in in/out polarization, stimulating neo-nationalist approaches. On the other hand, we have noticed that the nation-state was, under certain conditions, a functional breeding ground for the development of democracy. Schmitter explicitly says that democracy is a “national and sub-national product” (Schmitter, 2015). However, this process occurred in political societies whose democratic development progressed within a nationally homogenizing framework and was historically encouraged by a variety of phenomena, primarily the industrial need for workers sufficiently educated to understand the tasks of their job. As Gellner (1983) has convincingly argued, the convergence of industrial needs with a secularized monolingual compulsory school system was also beneficial for nation-state military organization, power politics implementation, and the establishment of a public educational structure – in antithesis to the longtime traditional role that religion played in this sphere.

Nevertheless, at the time when these reforms were passed and then implemented, the process of fusion and amalgamation underway generated the transition from pre-modern agricultural societies to industrial modernity. New societal relations based on industrial production, innovation, mechanics, and urban rationalization, were established together with policies aimed to guarantee economic protectionism, national custom policies, and a more broadly developed national market that competed fiercely with other national markets. These radical changes generated a new and intensely different context, in comparison with the pre-industrial past, paving the way for imperial and/or ideological confrontations, while domestic national homogenizations appeared to be consistent with the state requisites and the international standards of the time being.

Two centuries later, with the enhancement of cross-national cooperation, interaction, and interdependence in trade, economic development, technologies, new communications systems, etc., a new phase of human civilization began, paving the way to globalization. A new period of fusion and amalgamation has followed, involving primarily the nation-state

configuration. It has been in this context that the following developments should be framed: (a) the collapse of the socialist federations, (b) the revival of neo-nationalisms, and (c) the weakness of liberal ideology in confronting either of these phenomena, as well as the inadequacy of neo-functionalist methodologies alongside post-Cold War challenges stemming from new societal pluralities and cultural identities in Europe.

This is indeed a comprehensive and far-reaching transformation. Nevertheless, the EU and its member states do not seem equipped to tackle the implications, due to the failure of constitutional referenda, the consequent undermining of the project of integration and, a few years later, the dramatic impact of the economic and sovereign debt crisis. As this situation has persisted since 2007, the perverse mechanism encoded into the dynamic of *economic crisis – ineffective governance – mass mobilization based on the “us-them” dichotomy* has started to play its game, galvanizing parties and movements that at local, regional, and national levels raise their voices promising security (in a broader sense, including cultural and linguistic exclusiveness) together with socio-economic protection (or privileges). The restoration of an imagined “purity” in terms of group homogeneity, or the emphasis to the return to a “full sovereignty”, are key factors (if not obsessions) of those populist and far-right ideologies that are increasingly influential in a number of countries. They pretend to represent the cultural and political shield of the group against the risk of “contamination” by the “others”. Furthermore, they believe they more effectively protect the threatened (or supposedly threatened) standard of life of the local population by directly controlling the currency (i.e., by abandoning the euro) and the natural resources (particularly if crucially important), while redefining the rules of group belonging by which access to rights and social services are determined. And, in fact, historical circumstances show that a powerful breeding ground for spreading and reinforcing trends of state partition (or dismemberment) along ethnic lines is characterized by phases of prolonged economic crisis when the ineffectiveness of the governing powers becomes blatant. The still unfinished process that led Yugoslavia to fragmentation is the most recent case in this regard, but similar processes are in action in other European contexts, even if public opinion and policy makers underestimate them. Rare concerned voices have been raised about situations that appear as the tip of the iceberg, since they mirror a powerful mechanism working under the surface and are able to become visible only when it might be too late to control it. In other words, the fact that the Scottish referendum produced negative results for the supporters of independence from the United Kingdom is not a sufficient reason for undermining the relevance of partition arguments, which might take root in other countries soon.

Three of these arguments sound to me particularly relevant for consideration. The first one concerns the contested legality of partitions; the second one the prospective ethnic unification *within* the EU; the third one the relations between ethnic unification and border changes.

*a. Contested legality of partitions*

The first argument refers to two opposite cases: the Scottish and the Catalan (Dardanelli and Mitchell 2014, Guibernau 2014). In the United Kingdom, a referendum was summoned after agreement was achieved between the parties involved (as it was in the past the case of Norway, Québec and Montenegro). In Catalonia, the central government has been adamant in rejecting any agreement about a referendum, which has been declared unconstitutional. The social tensions between partitions and territorial integrity may lead in the latter case to violence if the Catalans insist on carrying out the referendum, as happened in Yugoslavia in 1991-1992. In both Scotland and Catalonia a decision in support of secession would have affected the integrity of the European Union and, in the case of Catalonia, also the euro. Surprisingly enough, the European Commission limited its public interventions to a few alarming statements about the consequences and the re-negotiation of membership, without offering any guarantees of success to the seceding part. However, no clear steps towards regulating such a potential event have been made. The issue remains therefore potentially devastating, since a referendum could be claimed in other EU contexts (as, for instance, in the Basque country, Northern Ireland, and Flemish Belgium)(Krugman 2014, McKirdy, Jones and Cullinane 2014, McKittrick 2014).

It is a matter of fact, however, that the mechanism of partitions can also involve the seceding part: when Québec held its referendum in 1995, the Creek and Inuit populations threatened to hold their own referendum for quitting Québec in the case of Québécois independence. A similar threat came from the islands of Shetland on the eve of the Scottish referendum. When the Yugoslav federation was dissolving, similar declarations were made by both the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia, and the Croats of Herzegovina, but they were obliged to step down from their claims by USA and EU intervention. On the contrary, no referendum was held for the independence of Kosovo in 2008, nor for the Czechoslovak dissolution in 1992. Nevertheless, even the legitimacy of referenda, when held, has been contentious due to the gaps between political decisions and legal interpretations of norms. The EU and the USA, for instance, have vehemently questioned the validity of the referendum in Crimea in 2014, assuming that it was unfair, not free, and lacking an international agreement – despite the presence of international observers. By contrast, the Badinter Commission, appointed by the EU, recognized in 1992 the

validity of the referenda in Slovenia and Croatia on the basis of their unilaterally modified constitutions, disregarding the lack of any agreement with both the other federal units of Yugoslavia and the federal government (who attempted in vain to achieve a new federal contract). They also disregarded the aggressive political atmosphere at the polls, as well as the fact that the Croatian constituency never voted for independence but only chose between a federal and confederal option. When Dejan Jović raised exactly this point in his previously mentioned article, the nationalist reaction was so powerful as to force Croatian President Ivo Josipović to revoke Jović's cooperation with the Presidential office. The reasons why Western countries treated these events differently remain controversial, unless the explanation is found in the context of power politics. This briefly sketched picture shows how deep the lack of consistency is in the international arena, and in the liberal-democratic world when a claim of partition is concerned.

*b. Prospected ethnic unification within the EU*

The second argument worth mentioning is connected to the aspiration of ethno-national unity within the EU. As marginal it may appear to Western observers, this question has repeatedly inflamed the interested parties involved when they believe that their ethno-national unification has been so far obstructed by negative international events. This has been the case for the Albanians, when the head of government Sali Berisha made a set of public statements in 2012 and 2013 during the celebration of the hundredth anniversary of the Albanian state, emphasizing how integration within the EU would effectively achieve the unification of the Albanian people. A similar declaration was made by the Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta on September 17, 2014, when he referred explicitly to the Romanian ethnic unification in coincidence with the inclusion of Moldavia within the EU, and alleged a new enlargement eastward that would incorporate Ukraine as well. He even gave a date for the achievement of this goal: 2018. Both of the aforementioned statements triggered inflammatory reactions in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldavia, and Russia. Indeed, it is undeniable that EU membership and Schengen are making national borders invisible and ethno-national separations imperceptible; however, they do not challenge the administrative competence of the member states over their territories. Nevertheless, it is just this aspect that is perceived to be put in question by political statements referring to ethno-national unification within the EU.

In other words, the territorial and ethno-national questions of Europe, which are still considered unsettled by the parties involved, remain politically highly sensitive, and confirm how the rationale that led to two World Wars still affects the mental geographies of local national mainstreams. On the other hand, the argument linking “ethnic unification” with EU membership is in blatant conflict with the aspirations, mentioned above, of some EU member-states’ territories or regions, which seek independence despite their inclusion already within the broader umbrella of European integration. Under these conditions, why should the Basques – who are living between Spain and France – claim readjustments of the borders between these two countries if Schengen has annihilated them? Why is Spain still insisting on claiming Gibraltar back from Great Britain? And why do Flemish nationalists in Belgium want to separate because they feel Belgium is an “artificial state”? These rhetorical questions shed light on the still vivid appeal of a nation-state perspective, however mutable.

*c. Ethnic unification and border changes.*

Finally, the two aforementioned narratives meet the third one, which is potentially the most unpredictable for the stability of Europe. The argument based on the right of “nations” (ethno-nations) to unify in independent states, most frequently outside the “EU umbrella”, was widely discussed during an international conference on the Right of Self-determination and the role of the United Nations in Geneva in 2000 (Kly and Kly 2001). Most recently, the reasoning has been resumed and broadly articulated by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, in his speech in Crimea on March 18, 2014. Among other arguments, expecting some sort of gratitude or at least understanding from Berlin, Putin has referred to the process that allowed the unification of Germany in 1990 to claim that a similar right should be recognized for Russians as well. Furthermore, he mentioned that Crimea’s declaration of independence followed “word for word” what Ukraine did after holding a second referendum for independence from the Soviet Union in late 1991. Then, Putin turned to remind Americans that they also declared independence by violating a national law. America, however, did not violate an international law, as the International Court of Justice noted while addressing the issue of the legitimacy of Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. Rhetorically, Putin raised the question as to why a similar recognition should not be applied to Crimea (Putin 2014).

The speech was an adamant collection of arguments emphasizing the lack of international agreement regarding ethno-national partitions/unifications, precedents (like Kosovo) or, again, legally ambivalent arguments that offer room for action in other contexts and by powers other

than Western ones. Similar arguments about ethno-unification via border changes were used by both Serb and Croatian leaders in Yugoslavia on the eve of its fragmentation, and even later between 1992 and 1995 when they disputed the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serb and Croatian leaders failed due to the military intervention of NATO, but it seems rather unlikely that a similar pattern might be used against a nuclear power. During those years, Romania raised the issue of a restoration of unity with Moldavia. As a result, a secessionist war occurred in Prednestrovija (or Transnistria) with the support of the Red Army, and Gagauzia proclaimed its independence while the president of Hungary, Antall, threatened a revision of the Trianon Treaty on Transylvania. Bulgaria, in turn, questioned the existence of the Macedonian nation, leaving room for potential territorial inclusiveness. These trends intensified, particularly in 1992, when the war for Nagorno-Karabakh exploded between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The potentially inflammatory content of these statements was, however, gradually contained and then scaled down by the EU and particularly France with the Balladur Initiative and then the Copenhagen criteria.

As a result, the implementation of still-contentious partition/unification desires remains bound to the local impact that the balance of powers is able to make at that given time, and/or when positive circumstances unexpectedly materialize. In any case, equal treatment cannot be guaranteed. It appears evident that the intensification of claims for fragmentation and the rearrangement of territories, identities, and communities are generated by a cultural inability to face the liquefaction of the nation-state after two centuries of metamorphosis. On the contrary, resistance to the process of fusion in favor of preserving the nation-state, even only in ethnic form, only multiplies opportunities for new groups to nurture aspirations for independence, even while interdependence is increasingly becoming essential to the future development of people on a shared planet. As a result, this process leads to a dead end, as a cartoon published in the Yugoslav magazine “NIN” in 1991 effectively symbolized by simply reshuffling the colors of the Yugoslav flag into a road sign.

Undeniably, it is the *ambivalence, encoded in the notion of the nation-state*, which remains the main catalyst for evoking partitions. Even when political movements do not assert ethno-national identity protection as the main reason for separation, preferring (for instance) to focus on *local economic interests*, their priorities appear to be *not only in contrast with* advantages and obligations incurred with the rest of the country, *but also in counter-tendency with* the mainstream economic orientations that are challenging the national forms of production. Transnational corporate powers, transnational environmental policies imposed by climate

change, even transnational criminal trafficking, as well as cross-border and cross-cultural dynamics, characterize our societies in an increasingly interdependent and globalized world.

Consequently, and crucially, the future of democracy remains anchored to the capacity of politics to identify effective rules and contexts that go far beyond the constraints of the nation-state, and of neo-functionalist and neo-nationalist approaches. Such politics are needed to courageously face the implications of the post-modern social processes of fusion that lead to new complexities and generate a variety of heterogeneities, métissages, and neo-nomadisms (Braidotti 2011a 2011b, Callari Galli 2005, Wieworka 2001).

At the moment, the European approach to these challenges remains inadequate and culturally backward. Public declarations made in 2010-11 by Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, Prime Minister of Great Britain David Cameron, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy stating that **multiculturalism has failed** in their own countries is fuel for inciting feelings against people's mobility, the common currency, and even EU institutions. Without offering any alternative vision during a time of economic crisis and weak shared governance, the leaders of Germany, the United Kingdom, and France confirmed to what extent policy makers are still unable to look beyond the parameters of the nation-state (Friedman 2010, Kanli 2010, Heathcote 2010).

By contrast, and paradoxically (just to make the picture even more confusing), one can also notice that claims for dissociation from existing nation-states (as in Spain, Belgium, or the UK) sometimes do not contest EU membership, or do envision the adoption of the euro currency, even if the state to which they still belong has so far opted against. Still, according to recent public statements, post-partition controversies cannot be excluded on this matter.

The picture is complicated further since claims of **partitions**, projects for EU integration, and governmental statements by existing nation-states in support of territorial integrity all **refer to democracy**, particularly after the fall of communism and despite their evident, mutual incompatibility. Even when appealing to "purity", or to the protection of group homogeneity, arguments in support of a freely expressed decision of separation, for instance via referendum, are presented by their activists – from Crimea to Catalonia – as an evident form of democracy, respect for rules, and the desire to let people freely express their own will. As a result, these contradictory pronouncements in support of democracy (or "national" democracies?) open new questions.

As stressed above, during approximately the last two centuries, the development of political, civil and social rights has taken place *within* the framework of the nation-state, despite all forms of resistance, power control over media and people, dictatorships, and totalitarianisms.

Meanwhile, human societies have increased in complexity and interdependence. Pre-existing social links are radically changing: traditional habits, family settings, class relations, urban/rural geography, gender relations, and the neighborhood are all under drastic transformations that affect a nation-state discourse predominantly based on an imagined homogeneity, one standardized language, one predominant religion, one defined territory with stable population, and a well-defined cultural recognition between rulers and ruled.

Under these circumstances, **is the democratic system as we know it doomed to remain restricted within the nation-state discourse**, allowing for (peacefully-accepted) partitions and raising new borders between communities? Or, **does democratic development circumvent nation-state discourse**, which is increasingly becoming a straitjacket for democratic development? In other words, will democracy exist only within (pretended) “homogeneous” societies, given that “national democracy” is the only viable option, even if the term is uncomfortably reminiscent of “national socialism” in a social reality increasingly characterized by pluralities *across* groups and individuals? Or, by contrast, will the essence of democracy be forced to face the great challenge of recognizing and dealing with diversities *within and across* political societies under transformation, rather than *only between* them as separated communities? Should democracy be “national,” or altogether open to multiplicities and syncretisms?

The failure of multiculturalism that prominent national policy makers in Europe have denounced has actually been determined by the fact that ethnic communities may live side by side peacefully without interacting (Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer, 2012). Remaining foreigners to each other, they therefore lack mutual knowledge and do not build trust or empathy. ***Without trust and empathy***, violent confrontations between groups can easily explode, even as a consequence of an apparently minor event, or as an expression of social distress (Trout 2010, Rifkin 2009). The idea that democracy is compatible with the coexistence of separate, juxtaposed groups is reminiscent of Machiavelli’s understanding of diversities, when he interpreted the multi-state system of Europe as an expression of republicanism and freedom against the prevalence of despotic absolute monarchies in Asia. Similarly, if referring to the Balkan peasant tradition, this idea of “**democracy in separateness**” is also reminiscent of the system of TOR, enclosures for cattle grazing within whose rigid borders anyone may feel secure. In both cases, however, history says that the balance of powers and a side-by-side system of closed homogenous societies have repeatedly led to wars, rather than to peaceful coexistence.

By contrast, can a potentially fluid, post-nation-state and comprehensive democracy offer a shared public space for the management and the development of a variety of forms of interculturalism, syncretism, nomadism, and métissages that regularly stem from interpersonal relations? Can this variety of forms become a lever for re-designing the form of the state, despite overcoming the current limitations of the traditionally conceived nation-state?

Some recent historical experiences in Europe are likely to show controversial effects when democracy is connected to diversity. Admittedly, today the democratic nature of European societies cannot be denied, despite some rare exception (i.e., Belarus) and even if the level of democratic development is not necessarily the same. Nevertheless, when communism collapsed and post-socialist federations started a painful transition to democratic standards, the *Euro-Atlantic liberal democracies proved to be powerless in offering a convincing pathway* to make possible the evolution *from the dictatorship of the proletariat to democracy without dissolving the federations*. I would say that they did not even try to offer such a pathway. No connection was made with the Swiss liberal experience, which is seen more as an exception rather than an inspiring model. A few theoretical attempts to connect the liberal democracy approach with diversity and partitions have been bravely made by Kymlicka (1995) and Buchanan (1991); other authors have focused on power sharing (Sisk 1996, Horowitz 1985) and consociationalism (Lijphart 1984). However, these attempts remained culturally encoded with the constraints of nation-state form.

Meanwhile, the failure of liberal democracies to face the collapse of socialist federations has had far-reaching consequences whose effects can be felt even today, specifically in how the deep economic and sovereign debt crisis is affecting stability and governance in the EU. The Yugoslav experience should serve at least as a political warning in this regard. On the other hand, although the **EU is still an unfinished project**, there is no doubt that its founders – from Jean Monnet to Altiero Spinelli (1991) – were well aware of the limits of the nation-state. The political rationale they elaborated at the end of WWII envisioned a potential pathway for overcoming this form of state (which they considered an agent of war) through a European integration process able to guarantee peace in the future. This was also the hope of Mazzini and other visionary revolutionaries of the 19<sup>th</sup> century who were inspired by ideas of national freedom in the framework of an inclusive European brotherhood. Moreover, it was thanks mainly to this cultural background that the EU was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2012.

Nevertheless, it is still to be seen whether the EU is an incomplete project that will be implemented consistently. Political efforts to strengthen integration and the effectiveness of governance are still very poor and shy in a time when member states and Europe as a whole are

facing the challenges of economic globalization, as well as meeting the needs of a fluid society whose nomadic and hybrid characteristics are already in conflict with the constraints of the nation-state.

At the same time, in this ambivalent and transitional situation where the “landing point” is still unknown, the EU project, however incomplete, represents a unique institutional opportunity to drive the still culturally painful transformation from the nation form of state to a post-nation-state society, whose success, however, is not to be taken for granted (Menon and Wright 2001). Indeed, the future implementation of the project suffers from increasing disagreements within the EU, disagreements that reveal a multilevel dimension. The economic and financial crisis, for instance, is putting northern and southern member states in opposition, not only relating to their own impact on production, employment and growth, but also in terms of reforming measures, budgetary policies, and medium-term strategies to be adopted in order to revitalize the economy. A neoliberal and monetarist vision endorsed tenaciously by Angela Merkel is contested in countries like France and Italy, who are inclined to favor a more social Europe. If anything, the paradox is that the “market social economy” has been proudly labeled and implemented by Germany since its reconstruction after WWII (Zweig 1980).

Furthermore, the Eurozone and the Schengen area are triggering frictions with the countries that opted out or who do not yet participate in integrative schemes. In particular, the monetary measures that are taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) have an impact on other currencies, raising governmental concerns in the non-Eurozone area of the EU. On the other hand, facing the electoral success of the far-right UKIP party in England, Prime Minister Cameron has threatened to establish limitations on the free circulation of EU citizens in the United Kingdom, raising sharp criticism particularly from German Chancellor Merkel, since the proposal questions a key value of the Union (Castle and Smale 2014). Cameron is again advocating a referendum on renewed EU membership terms.

An even more frightening political trend is the rise of Marine Le Pen in France. Despite her failure to build a far-right group at the European Parliament (including the Italian Northern League), she may seriously affect relationships within the Union if the sharply declined popularity of President Hollande and the opposition in the center-right bloc offer her an unexpected opportunity to achieve excellent results at the next presidential and parliamentary national elections. Meanwhile, Le Pen is leading a campaign in support of a “restoration of sovereignty” of EU member states, while the “Five Stars” populist party in Italy is campaigning against the common currency. Other centrifugal inputs concern the future of Spanish integrity and the Flemish nationalist N-VA party proposal in support of a Belgian confederation of two

states. Moreover, racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-immigrant feelings, and intolerance against minorities are inflaming social tensions in a number of EU member states.

Against these divisive phenomena, an opposed visionary policy is lacking: as we have already said, the renationalization of domestic and foreign policies is a matter of fact and, sometimes even unintentionally, reinforces centrifugal aspirations, thus deflecting cultural and political attention away from post-nation-state democratic challenges. By contrast, radical changes in terms of space and time are reconfiguring what it means to belong: suffice it here to recall that low cost flights are bringing urban centers across national borders nearer and nearer, while the distance between cities and countryside is growing mentally, geographically, and practically (for instance in terms of travel time). Furthermore, the end of the privileged role of standardized languages, EU multilingualism, the multiplication of religious beliefs, Erasmus mobility, inter-university cooperation, and transnational economic production and management, all create a **highly diversified society across Europe** causing, potentially, new socio-cultural polarization and an elite class where **the level of knowledge** is the crucial factor of social divide.

Under these circumstances, partition might be seen as a way to preserve the “solidification of soil and blood” (to again quote Baumann) typical of the nation-state, although within new borders. Nevertheless, even assuming that partitions can be carried out peacefully (which is historically a rare event), policies aimed at building new walls can be extremely costly in economic and political terms. They can lead to socio-cultural decay and dependence and, finally, they do not guarantee security. The post-Yugoslav scenario blatantly confirms this assumption: despite the end of military operations, tensions still sharply divide the region, reconciliation remains a dream, and governance is mainly ineffective. In this context, the resurgence of nationalist intolerance in Croatia against the Serbian minority and those who identify with non-normative sexual orientations, together with aspirations aimed to rehabilitate Ustaša’s personalities with the support of the Catholic church, indicate a frightening cultural regression and decline of democratic values in the youngest EU member-state. Outside the EU other cases present similarities, and in order to survive Ossetia, Abkhazia, Prednestrovija, North Cyprus, and others rely on their powerful protectors, as does Kosovo.

To conclude, the **nature of democracy is affected by these opposing dynamics of integration and disintegration**, and the **content of democracy is changing** due to expanding access to rights, the need to recognize pluralities, and the development of syncretisms. Although the rules are often formally respected, the dichotomy of inclusiveness and exclusiveness creates new forms of discrimination against different groups of minorities, as well as migrants,

nomadic, surfer, métis or hybrid individuals. Despite the predominant narratives in Western liberal societies about respect for human rights, a functional pattern of democratic management and recognition of diversities is still to be achieved, not only in severely divided communities but also in liberal-democratic societies. The main reason for this difficulty lies in the *persistence of nation-state institutions and political cultures, which are hindering future developments in intercultural, post-nation-state society*. The EU might offer a new frame of reference in this regard, but its policy makers do not manifest the courage and vision to carry out a project based on intercultural governance and education beyond the constraints of the nation-state. As a result, Europe as a whole, its communitarian institutions, and its member states are mentally and politically unprepared to face the current challenges posed by societal fusion and amalgamation. Democracy as a tool for accommodating and representing the diversities and pluralities of social reality might fall victim to the process of renationalization of territorial unities, which will then be exposed to the risk of new wars, rather than guaranteed a prospective peace.

### ***Bibliography***

Allcock John B. (2000), *Explaining Yugoslavia*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Amato Giuliano (ed.)(2005), *The Balkans in Europe's Future*, Sofia: International Commission on the Balkans.

Anastasakis Othon (2008), *The EU's political conditionality in the Western Balkans: towards a more pragmatic approach*, in «Southeast European and Black Sea Studies», n. 4, Dec., (365-377).

Balibar Étienne (2001), *Nous, citoyens d'Europe?, Les frontières, l'État, le peuple*, Paris : La Découverte.

Barbé Esther and Johansson-Nogués Elisabeth (eds.) (2003), *Beyond the Enlargement: The New Members and New Frontiers of the Enlarged European Union*, Barcelona: IUEE.

Bartlett Will (1987), *The Problem of Indebtedness in Yugoslavia: Causes and Consequences*, in “Rivista internazionale di Scienze economiche e commerciali”, 34, 11-12(1179–1195).

Batt Judi and Obradovic-Wochnik Jelena (2009), *War Crimes, Conditionality and EU Integration in the Western Balkans*, Chaillot Papers, n. 116, June.

Bauman Zygmunt (2000), *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge: Polity press.

Bauman Zygmunt (2006), *Liquid Times. Living in an Age of Uncertainty*, Cambridge: Polity press.

Bauman Zygmunt (1997), *Postmodernity and Its Discontent*, Cambridge: Polity press.

Beichelt Tim (2004), *Euro-Skepticism in the EU Accession Countries*, in «Comparative European Politics», n.1, Apr., (29-50).

Beissinger, Mark R. (2002), *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Benhabib Seyla (2002), *The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*, Princeton: Princeton U. Press.

Berend Ivan (1998), *Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993. Detour from the periphery to the periphery*, Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.

Bianchini Stefano (1984), *La diversità socialista in Jugoslavia. Modernizzazione, autogestione e sviluppo democratico dal 1965 ad oggi*, Trieste: Editoriale Stampa Triestina/Založba Tržaška Tiska.

Bianchini Stefano (ed.) (1989), *L'enigma jugoslavo. Le ragioni della crisi*, Milano: Angeli.

Bianchini Stefano (ed.) (2013), *Self-Determination and Sovereignty in Europe. From Historical legacies to the EU external role*, Ravenna: Longo.

Bianchini Stefano, Chaturvedi Sanjay, Ivekovic Rada and Samaddar Ramadir (2005), *Partitions. Reshaping States and Minds*, London: Frank Cass (Indian Reprint in 2007).

Bianchini Stefano (2015), *Eastern Europe and the Challenges of Modernity 1800-2000*, London-New York: Routledge.

Bianchini Stefano, Marko Joseph, Nation Craig, and Uvalić Milica (eds.) (2007), *Regional Cooperation, Peace Enforcement and the Role of the Treaties in the Balkans*, Ravenna: Longo.

Bianchini Stefano (2003), *Sarajevo: le radici dell'odio*, Roma: Edizioni Associate.

Blagojevic, Kolozova and Slapsak (2006), *Gender and Identity. Theories from and/or Southeastern Europe*, Belgrade: Women's Studies and Gender Research Center.

Braidotti Rosi (2011a), *Nomadic Subjects. Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory*, Second Edition, New York: Columbia University Press.

Braidotti Rosi (2011b), *Nomadic Theory. The Portable Rosi Braidotti*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Brera Paolo A. (1985), "L'économie yougoslave face au programme de stabilisation," *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, 16, 1, (121-152).

Buchanan Allen (1991), *Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*, Boulder: Westview Press.

Bunce Valerie (1999), *Subversive Institutions. The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State*, Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.

Callari Galli Matilde (2005), *Antropologia senza confini*, Palermo: Sellerio.

Castle Stephen and Smale Alison (2014), *Britain gets Warning not to Test EU Principles*, in “International New York Times”, Nov. 4 (1, 4).

Cohen Lenard J.(1995), *Broken Bonds. Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, Boulder: Westview Press.

Cohen Stephen F.(2004), *Was the Soviet System Reformable?*, in “Slavic Review”, vol. 63, n. 3, fall, (459-488).

Coimbra Group (2001), *Migration, Minorities, Compensation. Issues of Cultural Identities in Europe*, Brussels: Coimbra Group.

Croft Stuart, Redmond John, Rees G. Wyn, Webber Mark (eds.)(1999), *The Enlargement of Europe*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Crombez Christophe (2003), *The Democratic Deficit in the European Union: Much Ado about Nothing?*, in “European Union Politics”, March, n. 4 (101-120).

Cuthbertson Ian M. and Leibowitz Jane (eds.)(1993), *Minorities: the New Europe’s Old Issue*, Prague: Institute for East-West Studies.

Dardanelli Paolo and Mitchell James (2014), *An Independent Scotland? The Scottish National Party’s Bid for Independence and Its Prospects*, in “The International Spectator”, vol. 49, n. 3, Sept. (88-105).

Dawson Andrew H. and Fawn Rick (eds.)(2002), *The Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe*, London: Frank Cass.

Didanović Vera (2014), *Hladnje glava ili odnosa (Freezing heads or relations)*, in “Nin”, 23 Oct.(11-13).

Dizdarević Raif (2009), *From the Death of Tito to the Death of Yugoslavia*, Sarajevo: Šahinpašić.

Donskis and Dabašinskienė (2010), *European Memory. A Blessing or a Curse?*, Ravenna: Longo.

Đorđević Jovan (1982), *Federalism*, in Đorđević Jovan, Jogan Savin, Ribičič Mitja and Vratuša Anton, *Self-Management, the Yugoslav Road to Socialism*, Beograd: Jugosloveski Pregled.

Duménil Gérard and Lévy Dominique (2011), *The Crisis of Neoliberalism. From Subprime Crash to the Great Contraction*, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Dunay Pál and Zellner Wolfgang (1996), *The Pact on Stability in Europe - A Diplomatic Episode or a Lasting Success?*  
[http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/yearbook/english/95\\_96/Dunay.pdf](http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/yearbook/english/95_96/Dunay.pdf).

Emerson Michael, Aydin Senem, De Clerck-Sachsse Julia and Noutcheva Gergana (2006), *Just what is this “absorption capacity” of the European Union?*, Brussels: CEPS Policy Brief, September.

Fischer Joschka (2003), *From Confederacy to Federation: Thoughts on the Finality of European Integration*, published in Peter A. Poole, *The EU’s Eastern Enlargement*, Westport: Praeger(191-202).

Fitoussi Jean-Paul and Le Cacheux Jacques (2009), *Report on the State of the European Union. Crisis in the EU economic governance*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Follesdal Andreas and Hix Simon (2006), *Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik*, in *JCMS (Journal of Common Market Studies)*, vol. 44, n. 3 (533-562).

Friedman George (2010), “Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism,” in “*Stratfor Global Intelligence*,” 19 October.

Gellner Ernest (1983), *Nations and nationalism*, Ithaca: Cornell U. Press.

Gingrich Andre and Banks Marcus (eds.) (2006), *Neo-nationalism in Europe and Beyond. Perspectives from Social Anthropology*, New York: Berghahn Books.

Glenn John K.(2004), *From s to Member States: Accession Negotiation as an Instrument of Europeanization*, in «Comparative European Politics», n.1, Apr. (3-28).

Goati Vladimir (1989), *Politička anatomija jugoslovenskog društva*, Zagreb: Naprijed.

Goldmann Kjell (2001), *Transforming the European Nation-State*, SAGE, London.

Gordy Eric D.(1999), *The Culture of Power in Serbia*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State U. Press.

Grabbe Heather (2002), *Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process*, Turin: Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops.

Grabbe Heather (2006), *The EU’s Transformative Power. Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Guibernau Montserrat (1999), *Nations without a State. Political Communities in a Global Age*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Guibernau Montserrat (2014), *Catalan Secessionism: Young People's Expectations and Political Change*, in "The International Spectator", vol. 49, n. 3, Sept. (106-117).
- Gurr Ted Robert (2000), *Peoples versus States. Minorities at Risk in the New Century*, Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press.
- Hahn, Gordon M.(2002), *Russia's Revolution from Above, 1985–2000: Reform, Transition, and Revolution in the Fall of the Soviet Communist Regime*. New Brunswick, and London: Transaction Publishers.
- Hale Henry E.(2008), *The Foundations of Ethnic Politics. Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World*, Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.
- Halpin Padraic (2014), *Nationalists push for Irish unity vote after 'inspiring' Scottish referendum*, Thomson Reuters, Sep. 19, available at <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/19/uk-scotland-independence-northernireland-idUKKBN0HE1J620140919>
- Heater Derek (1994), *National Self-Determination: Woodrow Wilson and his legacy*, New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Heathcote Edwin (2010), "Down, Socially Cleansed and Out in Paris and London," *Financial Times*, 30 October (7)
- Hobsbawm Eric and Ranger Terence (eds.)(1983), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- Holland Stuart (2015), *The Life and Death of Democracies*, in Jody Jensen and Ferenc Mészlivetz (eds.), *Reframing Europe's Future. Challenges and Failures of the European Construction*, Abingdon/New York: Routledge (189-206).
- Horowitz Donald (1985), *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley: U. of California Press.
- Horvat Branko (1985), *Jugoslavensko društvo u krizi*, Zagreb: Globus.
- Huttenbach Henry and Privitera Francesco (eds.)(1999), *Self-Determination from Versailles to Dayton*, Ravenna: Longo.
- Isak Hubert (ed.) (2007), *A European Perspective for the Western Balkans*, Wien: Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.
- Iveković Rada (2003), *Dame Nation. Nation et Différence des Sexes*, Ravenna: Longo.
- Iveković Rada and Mostov Julie (2002), *From Gender to Nation*, Ravenna: Longo.
- Jensen Jody and Mészlivetz Ferenc (eds.)(2015), *Reframing Europe's Future. Challenges and Failures of the European Construction*, Abindgon/New York: Routledge.
- Jović Dejan (2003), *Jugoslavija država koja je odumrla*, Zagreb: Prometej.

Jović Dejan (2014), *Samo u mitovima svaki narodželi državu. U stvarnosti – ne*, in “Politička Misao”, n. 2, a. 51.

Jugoslovenski Centar za Teoriju i Praksu Samoupravljanja (JCTPS)(1982), *Društveno-ekonomski aspekti međunacionalnih odnosa u Jugoslaviji*, Ljubljana: DelavskaEnotnost.

Kanli Yusuf (2010), “Multiculturalism,” *Hürriyet Daily News*, 25 October;

Kly Y.N. and Kly D. (eds.)(2001), *In Pursuit of the Right of Self-Determination. Collected Papers and Proceedings of the First International conference on the Right of Self-Determination and the United Nations*, Atlanta: Clarity Press.

Konrad Zweig (1980), *The Origins of the German Social Market Economy. The Leading Ideas and their Intellectual Roots*, Adam Smith Institute, available at <http://www.adamsmith.org/wp-content/uploads/social-market-economy.pdf>.

Kopstein Jeffrey and Steinmo Sven (eds.)(2008), *Growing Apart? America and Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.

Korošić Marijan (1989), *Jugoslavenska Kriza*, Zagreb: Naprijed.

Krugman Paul (2013), *End this Depression Now!*, New York: Norton & Co.

Krugman Paul (2014), *Scots, What the Heck?*, in “New York Times”, Sept. 7, available at [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/opinion/paul-krugman-scots-what-the-heck.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/opinion/paul-krugman-scots-what-the-heck.html?_r=0)

Kymlicka Will (1995), *Multicultural Citizenship*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lampe John R.(1996), *Yugoslavia as History. Twice there was a country* Cambridge: Cambridge Press.

Lavigne Marie (1998), *The Economics of Transition. From Socialist Market to Market Economy*, New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Lijphart Arend (1984), *Democratic Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries*, New Haven: Yale U. Pres.

Mamatey Victor. S.(1957), *The United States and East Central Europe 1914-1918*, Princeton: Princeton U. Press.

Manchin Róbert (2005), *After the Referenda*, Brussels: Gallup Europe, 29 June.

McKirdy Euan, Jones Bryony and Cullinane Susannah (2014), Five secessionist movements that could learn from Scotland, CNN Sept. 19, available at <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/17/world/scotland-five-other-separatist-movements>.

McKittrick David (2014), *Scottish referendum results: Outcome divides opinion in Northern Ireland*, in “The Independent” Sept. 19, available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/scottish-independence/scottish-referendum-results-outcome-divides-opinion-in-northern-ireland-9745192.html>.

Mencinger Jože (2009), "The Global Financial Crisis and the European Union," paper presented at the international conference *The EU, Russia and the Global Crisis*, Forlì, 17-18 April.

Menon Anand and Wright Vincent (2001), *From the Nation State to Europe?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Michalski Krzysztof (ed.) (2006), *What holds Europe together?* Budapest: CEU Press.

Mirić Jovan (1984), *Sistem i kriza*, Zagreb: Cekade.

Moravcsik Andrew (2002), *In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union*, in *JCMS (Journal of Common Market Studies)*, vol. 40, n. 4, (603-624).

Mostov Julie (2008), *Soft Borders. Rethinking Sovereignty and Democracy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Motta Giuseppe (2013), *Less Than Nations. Central and Eastern European Minorities after WWI*, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars publ.

Noiriel Gérard (2001), *État, nation et immigration. Vers une histoire du pouvoir*, Paris: Belin.

Obrenović Zoran (1992), *Srbija i novi poredak*, Niš: IFDT.

Pogátsa Zoltán (2011), *Heterodox International Political Economy*, Sopron: University of West Hungary Press.

Pond Elizabeth (2000), *The Rebirth of Europe*, Washington D.C: Brooking Institutions Press.

Puri Jyoti(2004), *Encountering Nationalism*, Malden-Oxford: Blackwell publ.

Putin Vladimir, *Address by President of the Russian Federation*, March 18, 2014, available at <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6889>.

Reichenberg Neil E. (2001), *Best Practices in Diversity Management*, New York: UN Export Group Meeting on Managing Diversities in the Civil Service, 3-4 May.

Reid T. R.(2004), *The Unites States of Europe. The new superpower and the end of American supremacy*, New York: Penguin.

Rifkin Jeremy (2009), *The Empathic civilization. The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis*, New York: Penguin.

Rifkin Jeremy (2004), *The European Dream*, New York: Tarcher/Penguin.

Schimmelfenning Frank and Sedelmeier Ulrich (2005), *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press.

Schmitter Philippe C. and Trechsel Alexandre (2004), *The Future of Democracy in Europe Trends. Analyses and Reforms*, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publ.

Schmitter Philippe, *The Crisis of the Euro, the Crisis of the European Union and the Crisis of democracy in Europe*, in Jensen Jody and Miszlivetz Ferenc (eds.) (2015), *Reframing Europe's Future. Challenges and Failures of the European Construction*, Abingdon/New York: Routledge, (181-188).

Sisk Timothy D. (1996), *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.

Spinelli Altiero (1991), *La crisi degli Stati nazionali*, Bologna:Il Mulino.

Stiglitz Joseph E. (2009 a), *Interpreting the Causes of the Great Recession of 2008*, Lecture to have been delivered at BIS Conference, Basel, June, available on line at

[https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/cfusion/faculty/jstiglitz/download/papers/2009\\_Interpreting\\_Causes.pdf](https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/cfusion/faculty/jstiglitz/download/papers/2009_Interpreting_Causes.pdf).

Stiglitz Joseph E.(2009b), *The Current Economic Crisis and Lessons for Economic Theory*, in “Eastern Economic Journal”, 35, (281–296)

Stiglitz Joseph E.(2013), *The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future*, New York: Norton & Co.

Tamborra Angelo (1971), *L'Europa Centro-Orientale nei secoli XIX e XX*, Milano: Vallardi edit.

Taras Ray (2009), *Europe Old and New. Transnationalism, Belonging, Xenophobia*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

The Spain Report (2014), *Catalan and Basque First Ministers Discuss Independence and Rajoy's Recentralization*, May 2, available at <http://www.thespainreport.com/6201/catalan-basque-first-ministers-discuss-independence-rajoys-recentralisation>.

Triandafyllidou Anna, Modood Tariq and Meer Nasar (eds.) (2012), *European Multiculturalisms. Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh U. Press.

Trout J.D. (2010), *Why Empathy Matters*, Penguin, New York.

Turton David and González Julia (eds.), (2000), *Ethnic Diversity in Europe. Challenges to the Nation State*, Bilbao: University of Deusto.

Vachudova Milada Anna (2005), *Europe Undivided*, Oxford: Oxford U. Press.

Valiani Leo (1966), *La dissoluzione dell'Austria-Ungheria*, Milano:Il Saggiatore.

Van Grieken Tom (2014), *Flemish independence: better to become good friends than stay together in a bad marriage*, in “RT.com” Sept. 18, available at <http://rt.com/op-edge/188684-flanders-independence-referendum-belgium>.

Van Meurs Win (2003), *Prospects and Risks Beyond the EU Enlargement. Southeastern Europe: Weak States and Strong International Support*, Opladen: Leske+Budrich.

Vladimir Dedijer (1966), *The Road to Sarajevo*, New York: Simon and Schuster Inc.

Wieworka Michel (2001), *La différence*, Paris: Balland.

Woodward Susan (1995), *The Balkan Tragedy*, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Inst.

Yavlinsky Grigory (2011), *Realeconomik. The Hidden Cause of the Great Recession (and How to Avert the Next One)*, New Haven: Yale U. Press.

Žagar Mitja (2007), “Diversity Management and Integration: from Ideas to Concepts,” *European Yearbook of Minority Issues*, 6 (307–327).

Ziller Jacques (2007), *Il nuovo trattato europeo*, Bologna: Il Mulino.

## Interpreting populism: A Rorschach test for social scientists

Bence Kocsev

*“... today populist discourse has become mainstream in the politics of western democracies. Indeed, one can even speak of a populist Zeitgeist.”*  
(Mudde 2004:252)

*“De populist weet wat het volk wil, en dat moet volstaan. Daardoor duldt hij geen tegenspraak, daardoor heeft hij een gloeiende hekel aan het debat. Het parlement, de grondwet, de gebruikelijke democratische procedures zijn voor hem eerder hindernissen dan politieke verworvenheden.”<sup>151</sup>*  
(Reybrouck 2011:5)

In 1989 the unthinkable happened: the communist system, dominated by the Soviet-Union and the era of the socialism (at least in many countries) came to an end. The end of the bipolar world, foreshowed by the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, ushered in an optimistic era of democratic change for members of the former Eastern Bloc, and the expansion for the European Union (EU). Liberal democracy had triumphed. In Fukuyama's view, democracy was able to win not only because it produces material prosperity, but also because it is thymotically<sup>152</sup> fulfilling.

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.<sup>153</sup>

Most scholars argue that this post-1989 era can be divided into three periods: a short period of initial euphoria directly after the transition, an optimistic term until the end of the

---

151 “The populist knows what the people want, and that should be suffice. Therefore he tolerates no contradiction, therefore he has a glowing hate on debate. The parliament, the constitution, the usual democratic procedures rather obstacles than political achievements to him.” (Own translation)

152 Fukuyama relates Socrates' ideas about Thymos and desire to how people want to be recognized within their government.

153 Fukuyama 1989.

1990s, and recently a decade of increasing complications.<sup>154</sup> The challenges of this latter period are wide and varied: the honeymoon period is definitely over.

Within a brief survey – venturing a tour into the domains of history, sociology and political science – we would like to cover a broad range of topics which are closely related to these post-transition challenges. Moreover, the following paper is essentially a work of exposition that offers only – as Jon Elster would say – nuts and bolts, cogs and wheels. These can be used to explain some complex phenomena including, to refer to a few key issues, democracy, populism and Euroscepticism. In the meanwhile, of course, we are bearing in mind Peter L. Berger's recommendation to all social scientists:

It can be said that the first wisdom [of sociology] is this: things are not what they seem. This too is a deceptively simple statement. It ceases to be simple after a while. Social reality turns out to have many layers of meaning. The discovery of each new layer changes the perception of the whole.<sup>155</sup>

## **Overview**

*“I think authors ought to look back and give us some record of how their works developed, not because their works are important (they may turn out to be unimportant) but because we need to know more of the process writing...”*<sup>156</sup>

It is not so long ago that our opinion about research on democracy (and on related topics) was very disparaging. Yet research on this topic is merely an opportunity to reformulate old solutions to old problems. We were certain that all the important aspects had been researched before. Accordingly, a new “investigation” would have no added value.

However, our position on this has changed significantly. We have realized that such explorations are neither finished nor completed, and therefore additional research needs to be carried out. Therefore, we would like to contribute to the contemporary efforts to construct a broader framework for analysing populism, one that closely considers the diverse features of populist politics. This paper (at least we hope) is both academically and politically relevant, as

---

154 cf. Ekiert 2008

155 Berger 1963:7

156 Fairbank 1969:5

the state of democracy is one of the most fervently discussed topics in European political and academic debates. However, needless to say these aims are quite, perhaps too, ambitious. Of course, in most cases further elaboration is needed. For this reason, in the following pages we will simply run through a couple of elements that were raised in the first (theoretical) part of our research.

It has become quite commonplace in recent years for the malaise around democracy to attract large-scale interest from social scientists, just as from political commentators and journalists. The two eminent scholars of the Harvard Weatherhead Centre, Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, noticed that this phenomena has been defined based on political, economic, social, and discursive features, and analysed from numerous theoretical (structuralism, modernization theory, social movement theory, political psychology, political economy, democratic theory etc.) and practical (archival research, discourse analysis, and formal modelling) perspectives.<sup>157</sup>

Catherine Marshall and Gretchen Rossman speak of a “conceptual funnel” through which a researcher's interest becomes focused.<sup>158</sup> In our case this conceptual funnel looks like the following:

- Is right/left still a relevant partition in Central Europe?
- Can a conceptual framework of populism – based on the Begriffsgeschichten concept of Reinhart Koselleck – be created?
- Is there any connection between the rise of the (World) Risk Society and populism?
- Has the comparative method any relevance? Are there any differences between populism in West and in Central Europe?

The main purpose of our research, of which just a few of the results are presented on the following pages, was to provide a complex view on some crucial issues. For this purpose the research is structured in three main parts, which are (or at least intended to be) continuously interlocked. The first part is focused on the current situation in Europe, and in particular Central Europe, with respect to recent questions such as the relevance of the right/left partition. Next, we examine the relationship between populism and democracy in an uncertain climate, as well as the ideological variation in populist claims. Our initial aim was also to provide a definition

---

157 Gidron – Bonikowski 2013.

158 Babbie 2010: 124.

of key terms, and a historical introduction to the matter through researching dependencies that have shaped public attitudes towards populism. Thirdly, we focus on semi-peripheral countries, in order to analyse political practices coming from countries with both different and similar economic development.

In this specific paper we are going to discuss different definitions and approaches to the study of populism, and compare their theoretical assumptions as well as their methodological implications. The following text also addresses questions regarding practices which might be linked to populism, such as Euroscepticism. Are these practices linked to populism? How do those practices affect political participation? Appropriate strategies at national as well as European levels are mentioned in the third part, in order to face upcoming political, economic and social challenges in Hungarian and (Central) European society.

### *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*

After the collapse of Francisco Franco's and Antonio Salazar's dictatorships, and thus after the "Huntingtonian" third wave of democratization, democracy expanded around the world like never before. Moreover, since its inception, the European integration process has aimed at strengthening liberal democracy across Europe. However, some scholars are arguing that democracy is in recession, and that one of the challengers is populism.

It is common knowledge that populist parties of various kinds, of course, pepper the political landscape across Europe. On one side of the political spectrum, we have the Partij voor de Vrijheid van Geert Wilders<sup>159</sup> in the Netherlands, Front National in France, the slightly faded Vlaams Belang in the Flemish Region of Belgium, the Independence Party in the United Kingdom, Die Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria or Jobbik in Hungary. To mention a few from the left "hemisphere," we have Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and the Socialistische Partij in the Netherlands. What are the main patterns behind this menace? Asked differently: is this a menace at all?

Until the 1990's, the behaviour of (most) political parties and voters alike was largely structured by left/right. Citizens used these political "hemispheres" to orient themselves in a complex political world. When "smart voting" was not even a possibility, they used information about their left/right positions to assess which party is ideologically closest to their own position and which party to vote for at the ballot box. Similarly, political parties referred to their left/right

---

<sup>159</sup> It is worthy to emphasize the leader of this party because it has Geert Wilders as its sole member making the party unique in the Dutch parliament.

orientation to inform voters about their positions on concrete issues. Given these characteristics, left/right has been the most important predictor of party support in (at least European) democracies. However, there are reasons to believe that the capacity of left/right to structure party competition and voter behaviour has weakened over the last, approximately, two decades.<sup>160</sup> The relevance of the left/right partition is over, and one of the challengers is populism.

Before the rise of these parties, high profile intellectuals like Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Slavoj Žižek sounded the alarm on Europe's post-democratic, if not outright authoritarian, "mutation". They highlighted the need for European politics to return to the rough grounds of "the people". Beck – in his concepts about the (Welt-)Risikogesellschaft and globalization – spoke of the influence of "sub-politics"<sup>161</sup> (Giddens calls them "life politics"<sup>162</sup>), referring to political engagement that rises from below and can have a significant impact upon the exercise of political power, and upon the representative institutions of the political system of nation-states. Additionally, sub-politics can provide opportunities to weaken the Weberian "iron cage" of bureaucratic and state-oriented politics, and to effectively resist populism.

The Beckian sociologists have also been arguing that we are living in conditions of "*radical uncertainty*".<sup>163</sup> Developments of the "Risikogesellschaft" have weakened traditional structures and have produced new forms of social/political/ecological/etc. order. It is a world of ontological uncertainty, which cannot be calculated or priced. A world of unknown-unknowns, into which we seem to have sleepwalked. As Ulrich Beck puts it, "*Uncertainty returns and proliferates everywhere.*"<sup>164</sup> Considering democracy in this uncertain world, Ferenc Mészlivetz – in his article "Lost in Transformation" – is clear about the consequences:

The crisis of democracy as a set of legal regulations, procedures and institutions is one of the major and most outstanding and surprising symptoms of this robust transformation process. The entire set of institutional structures might disappear or get lost in the labyrinths of the global transformation, whereas new forms, structures, procedures, players and institutions might emerge.<sup>165</sup>

---

160 Walczak 2012.

161 Beck 1992.

162 Giddens 1990.

163 Beck 1994: passim

164 Beck 1994:12.

165 Mészlivetz 2012.

Consequently, all these factors are creating an atmosphere of uncertainty and fuelling fears for the future. As a result, populist groups and parties, most of which have only a short life span (e.g. Fremskridtspartiet in Denmark, or the Lijst van Pim Fortuijn in the Netherlands), become a core part of the political scene, as do many other forms of informal grouping.

Nevertheless, we admire the scientific oeuvre of Beck and Giddens, though it's worthy to note that some researchers (perhaps the most prominent among them being Chantal Mouffe) are very unsatisfied with the Third Way view developed by Anthony Giddens in Britain, as well as with the Radical Centre developed by Ulrich Beck in Germany. As Mouffe pointed out, these two doyens of recent sociology were arguing that it was important to have some consensus at the centre between left and right, out of what centre-left and centre-right emerged, because there seemed to be no alternative. They presented it as progress for a democracy that was becoming more mature. The critics of the Beckian way are arguing that this is not progress for democracy. According to these critics, there is no possibility through traditional representative democracy to offer alternatives to the existing political, social and economic order.<sup>166</sup>

Like all ideologies, populism proposes an analysis designed to respond to a number of simple but essential questions, such as “what went wrong; who is to blame; and what is to be done?”<sup>167</sup> Put simply, the possible answers presented are as follows:

- (a) the government and democracy, which in its original condition should reflect the will of the people, have been occupied by corrupt elites<sup>168</sup>;
- (b) the elites and ‘others’ are to blame for the current undesirable situation in which the people find themselves;
- (c) the “vox populi” must be re-recognized and the power must be given back to the people through – of course – the populist leader and party. This view is based on a fundamental conception of the people as both homogeneous and virtuous.<sup>169</sup> The above mentioned Dutch politician, Wilders, formulated it as follows:

But finally, after silently watching for years the immense damage done to our nation by the elite's policies, the Dutch people had enough.<sup>170</sup>

---

166 Mouffe 2014

167 Bets and Johnson 2004:323

168 Another aspect should be noted here. Two scholars of the University of Leiden, Mark Bovens and Anchrit Wille argue that the Netherlands has become a diploma democracy in which the higher educated dominate all fields of political participation and thus shape policy in their favor. Bovens-Wille 2011

169 cf. Teixeira 2012

170 Wilders 2008:282

These points are closely linked to what Slavoj Žižek summarized in his essay “Against Populist Temptation”. Additionally, the Slovenian political thinker connects these factors with the marketization of politics via the elite. There is global and local competition for the raw political material (votes), and for further commodities (power, influence etc.) carried out by the elite, in this case by professional politicians. It is clearly evident that too few people control too much money and power.<sup>171</sup>

However, the main threat to democracy in today's democratic countries resides in none of these two [viz. right and left] extremes, but in the death of the political through the ‘commodification’ of politics. What is at stake here is not primarily the way politicians are packed and sold as merchandises at elections; a much deeper problem is that elections themselves are conceived along the lines of buying a commodity (power, in this case): they involve a competition among different merchandises-parties, and our votes are like money which we give to buy the government we want... what gets lost in such a view of politics as another service we buy is politics as a shared public debate of issues and decisions that concern us all.

### *Conceptualizing populism*

Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner began their classic edited collection on populism by paraphrasing Marx and Engels’s famous opening line: “*A specter is haunting the world – populism*”.<sup>172</sup> Even as a rising tide of populism can be argued, at the same time we can find ourselves in a terminological swamp. Paraphrasing the eminent political scientist Larry Diamond, defining populism is a bit like interpreting Talmud (or any religious text): ask a room of ten rabbis (or political scientists) for the meaning, and you are likely to get eleven different answers.<sup>173</sup> Although it is not by accident that the topic of populism has received a great amount of scholarly attention, the catch-point, that is the conceptualization of populism itself, still exists. The difficulty lies in the fact that the term populism has been attached to many different phenomena. Initially, the term “populism” originated from Latin “populus”, meaning “the

---

171 In this case worthy to mention Francis Fukuyama who noted in one of his essays, that a study carried out by Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez shows that in the last three decades, the share of U.S. income accruing to the top 1 percent of American families jumped from 9 to 23.5 percent of the total. These data, according to the argumentation of Fukuyama, point clearly to the stagnation of working class incomes in the United States. Fukuyama 2012

172 Gellner 1969: 1

173 Cf. Diamond 2008: 21

people”, which implies strong connection to “democracy”, itself a term that originates – taking another classic language into consideration – from the Greek δημοκρατία (rule of the people). In one of his books, Robert Morstein-Marx, Professor of Classics at the University of California Santa Barbara, gives a detailed account of antiquity, or more precisely Roman, politics. The essence of his description is as follows:

Our chief contemporary witnesses to the political life of the late Republic, Cicero and Sallust, are fond of analysing the political struggles of the period in terms of a distinction between optimates and populares, often appearing with slight variations in terminology, such as Senate, nobility, or boni versus People or plebs. But what precisely is denoted and connoted by this polarity? Clear enough, one who is designated in these sources as popularis was at least at that moment acting as 'the People's man,' that is a politician — for all practical purposes, a senator — advocating the rights and privileges of the People, implicitly in contrast to the leadership of the Senate; an 'optimate' (optimas), by contrast, was one upholding the special custodial and leadership role of the Senate, implicitly against the efforts of some popularis or other.<sup>174</sup>

Populism, however, is obviously not peculiar to Roman democracy. More generally we can assume that where there is democracy, there is populism. The concept of populism became commonly used in political vocabulary during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, particularly referring to the Latin American experiences of Peronismo and Getulismo. It is a broad and undecided concept that centred first around people and their aspirations, and it has been used extensively in the last two decades. Political theorists have put a lot of effort into developing an unambiguous definition of the concept. Even so, we believe that the ambiguity of populism makes it impossible to create one, single definition of this phenomenon. According to Joseph Held, “*a certain shapelessness in ideas and organization is inherited in populism*”.<sup>175</sup> Isaiah Berlin claimed that the concept of populism suffers from a Cinderella complex: “*there is a shoe in shape of populism, but no foot that will fit into*”.<sup>176</sup> University of Sussex professor Paul Taggart emphasized similarly that “*populism has an essential chameleonic quality that means it always takes on the hue of the environment in which it occurs*”.<sup>177</sup> Berlin’s comparison and Taggart’s statement aptly illustrate how difficult it is to define this phenomenon.

This paper covers the so-called “new populism”, a term first used by the above-mentioned Paul Taggart in his article.<sup>178</sup> It refers to a political culture which is still emerging in

---

174 Morstein-Marx 2003: 204-205

175 Held, 2001: 63

176 Karstev, 2008: 43

177 Meny – Surel, 2002: 6

178 Taggart 1995

the post-Cold War world, and is used by historians, sociologists, political scientists, and even economists.<sup>179</sup> This new populism is typically confrontational in style, and it claims to represent the rightful source of legitimate power: the people, whose interests and wishes have been ignored by self-interested politicians and politically correct intellectuals.<sup>180</sup> The Princeton dictionary defines populism as “*a political doctrine that supports the rights and powers of the common people in their struggle with the privileged elite.*”<sup>181</sup> According to the frequently quoted Flemish author, David van Reybrouck:

Het is inherent aan de populistische retoriek dat er wordt gesproken over een kloof. De populist werpt zich op als bruggenbouwer tussen volk en elite. Hij beweert altijd dat de elite niet meer weet wat er speelt bij het volk en dat hij de laatste is, of de eerste in lange tijd, die de mening van het volk kan verwoorden.<sup>182</sup>

To quote a more scientifically elaborated notion, Margaret Canovan wrote in a 1999 article about populism as a “*shadow [which is] cast*” by democracy. She then developed her argument further, claiming that populism is in fact the necessary by-product of the interaction of the “*two faces of democracy*”.<sup>183</sup> Building on the distinction between Michael Oakeshott’s “*politics of faith*” and “*politics of skepticism*”,<sup>184</sup> she argues that democracy is a permanent tussle between its two constitutive faces: a redemptive (heroic) face (“*the promise of a better world through the action of a sovereign people*”) and a pragmatic one, which is in fact the “*grubby business of politics*”<sup>185</sup>, the practices and mechanisms used to deal with conflict without having to resort to repression or violence. Populism, Canovan argues, occurs when the gap between the two appears too great and pragmatism seems to overtake the redemptive dimension of politics. Populism emerges as an attempt to fill the widening gap and assert the people’s need to re-establish control over some key areas of their lives.

---

179 The Populist economics they are (especially one of the celebrity economists of the political left, Thomas Piketty) advocating are to be contrasted with the so-called “Rich-ist economics” as currently and globally practiced. The 685-page book (*Capital in the XXI<sup>th</sup> century*) of Thomas Piketty about wealth inequality heading the best-seller lists along with Danielle Steele’s steamy new novel.

180 Canovan 2005: 25

181 <http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=populism>

182 “*It is inherent in the populist rhetoric that there is a cleavage. The populist presents himself as a bridge-builder between the people and the elite. He always says that the elite does not know what is going on with the people and that he is the last, or the first in a long time, which can express the views of the people.*” (Own translation - BK)

183 Canovan 1981: 12

184 Michael Oakeshott is – many might say – the foremost British political philosopher of the twentieth century. In his book (*The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism*), as Timothy Fuller summarize it, “*Oakeshott argues that modern politics was constituted out of a debate, persistent through centuries of European political experience down to our own day, over the question: what should governments do?*” Oakeshott 1996

185 *ibid.*

This is the relationship between the people and the elite. Canovan claims: “*populism in modern democratic societies is best seen as an appeal to the people against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society*”.<sup>186</sup>

According to Cas Mudde, the situation is slightly different. He describes the above-mentioned dual perception of the political landscape as follows:

An ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the pure people versus the corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people.<sup>187</sup>

More recently, he expressed his point in the German national weekly newspaper *Die Zeit*:

Populismus ist eine Ideologie, die Gesellschaft in zwei Gruppen teilt. Auf der einen Seite die 'reinen' Menschen und auf der anderen die 'korrupte' Elite. Populisten glauben, dass sie den Common Sense kennen, also den eigentlichen Willen der Menschen. Der Populist will eine echte Repräsentation dessen, was von ihm als rein wahrgenommen wird.<sup>188</sup>

We totally agree with a lecturer at the University of Amsterdam who argues that, at least in the past quarter century, populism has become a regular feature of politics in Western (including Central and Eastern European) democracies. According to Dutch scholar Matthijs Rooduyn, within the Dutch language there are more than 10 (quite recently) published books with the words populism or populist in their titles.<sup>189</sup>

---

186 Canovan 1999: 3

187 Mudde 2004: 543

188 “Populism is an ideology that divides society into two groups. On the one hand, the 'pure' people and on the other the 'corrupt' elite. Populists believe that they know the common sense, therefore, the actual will of the people. The populist wants a true representation.”Mudde 2015.

189 To amplify the list of Rooduyn: Blommaert, J. (2004) *Populisme*. Antwerpen: Epo; De Mul, J. (2011) *Paniek in de polder: polytiek en populisme in Nederland*; Heijne, B. (2011) *Moeten wij van elkaar houden? Het populisme ontleed*. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij; Heinisch, R. (2003) ‘Success in opposition; Lucardie, P. (2008) ‘The Netherlands: Populism versus Pillarization’, in D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell (eds.), *Twenty-First Century Populism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 151–65.; Pels, D. (2011) *Het volk bestaat niet: Leiderschap en populisme in de mediademocratie*. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij; Te Velde, H. (2010) *Van regentenmentaliteit tot populisme*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker; Van Reybrouck, D. (2011) *Pleidooi voor populisme*. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij; Van Rossem, M. (2010) *Waarom is de burger boos? Over hedendaags populisme*. Amsterdam: Nieuw Amsterdam; Van der Zwan, A. (2003) *De Uitdaging van het Populisme*. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff; Wagenaar, M. (2005) *Het einde van de buitenspelcultuur: een democratisch antwoord op het populisme*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker; Zijdeveld, A. C. (2009) *Populisme als politiek drijfzand*. Amsterdam: Cossee; Voerman, G. (2012) *Populisten in de polder*. Meppel: Boek Boom.

Because populism is often conceived of as a threat to liberal democracy, and therefore as a pathological case of politics, most of the contributions to the debates “*are of an alarming nature*”.<sup>190</sup> Countless publications are dealing with this populist “threat” to liberal democracy. While populism is still mostly used by outsider or challenger parties, mainstream politicians, both in government and opposition, have been using it as well – generally in an attempt to counter the populist challengers.<sup>191</sup>

Another approach can be found in David van Reybrouck’s book titled “A Plea for Populism”, published in 2008. The Flemish author attempts to make a distinction between “good” and “bad” populism. He describes “bad” populism as a contemptible thing, and pays little attention to it, suggesting that this type of populism is not prevalent in Belgium and in the Netherlands. The other form of populism, he argues, which does not aim to drive the “people” out of politics but instead to build politics on the wishes of people, has much greater significance. Similar ideas – even if they are not so explicit – can also be found in the books of the well-known Dutch sociologist, Herman Vuijsje.<sup>192</sup>

### ***Populism, Demokratieunzufriedenheit and Euroscepticism***

In 1990, when the system in Eastern Europe had only just begun to change, an essay appeared entitled ‘The Necessity and Impossibility of Simultaneous Economic and Political Reform’. Its author was none other than Jon Elster (1990); this brilliant theoretician needed only to glance at the unfolding events to reach the simple conclusion: impossible!<sup>193</sup>

It has become a commonplace observation that the countries in Central and Eastern Europe struggle with the so-called post-accession blues. In other words: while the systemic transition to multi-party democracy and a capitalist market economy has been generally completed (it is another question how successfully), and in most of the countries the speed of democratic consolidation (defined as improvement in the areas of political rights, liberties, and democratic practices) was unexpectedly fast, the fine-tuning of these young democracies will take many more years. A great deal of the work will have to focus on the elusive concept of political culture. However, reports on current political developments in these countries conclude that popular democratic consensus has eroded since the initial wave of enthusiasm

---

190 Mudde 2004: 27

191 Mudde 2004: 551

192 Cf. Vuijsje 2008, Kocsev 2012

193 Merkel 2008: 12

during the immediate post-Cold War years.<sup>194</sup> The transformation period was at least partly inspired by “Return to Europe” or “Return to the European family” metaphors. Additionally, this was the time when Central European states were integrated into the West, or to use the terminology of Immanuel Wallerstein, into the “core”. However, euphoria among the citizens of Central and Eastern Europe has faded significantly.

Since the time of Max Weber, it has been acknowledged that the stability of any political regime is dependent not only on the structures, but also on the extent to which it is socially and culturally anchored.<sup>195</sup> The democracies of Central and Eastern Europe are no exceptions. Did the above-mentioned changes firmly anchor these societies to stability? In his interesting essay – which we often cite as foundation – André Gerrits poses a few more questions about the current situation. How do we define and explain the political and social trends in Central and Eastern Europe today? Are they as worrisome, as disturbing as they are often perceived? Is Europe facing a populist *Zeitgeist* at all? Is there any (and if yes, to what extent) relation between the assumed weakening of democratic (or some might say liberal) consensus, and the increase of Euroscepticism in this region of the Union?<sup>196</sup> These are questions which will be (briefly) featured in the upcoming paragraphs.

Central and Eastern Europe is – again, a commonly recognized claim – a highly diverse region which copes with a series of shared historical, economical, political, and social issues and concerns. Despite downgrades in democracy scores during the last decade, most of the countries still score exceptionally high on the scales of most democracy observing institutions. The CEE region (including the Baltics and part of the Eastern Balkans) performs relatively well compared to Latin America or Asia. It would seem that the countries in this geographic area share a common ambiguity of periods characterized by impressive democratic progress contrasted with periods of specific political drawbacks and disillusionment. Of course, a dozen explanations can be given about the latter. Among the following are the most frequently mentioned problems of democratic government in the former Eastern Bloc states – on the supply side:

- neopatrimonialism, patronage and clientelism,<sup>197</sup>

---

194 Gerrits 2008: 52

195 Weber 1987

196 Gerrits 2008: 57

197 Neopatrimonialism – derived from Max Weber's term, patrimonialism, is “*a form of organisation in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines.*” The more serious variant of the neopatrimonialism is the Latin American “Caciquismo” which has been used to describe a democratic system subverted by the power of local bosses

- behind-the-scenes (outside of formal channels) decision- and deal-making,
- corruption,
- political intolerance and intimidating moral rhetoric,
- creating political paranoia.

On the demand side of politics, we witness these worrisome trends:

- a decrease in social trust in democratic institutions and procedures,
- declining voter turn-outs (higher level of electoral abstentionism),
- growing electoral volatility,
- declining party identification,
- decreasing party membership,
- a widening gap between citizens and politics.<sup>198</sup>

In sum, these shortcomings and problems are demonstrating that the progress of democratic transformation has been slowing down. On the other hand, popular dissatisfaction with the current political order could be seen as a positive phenomenon. Citizens may not be dissatisfied with democratic government; they are critical about their flawed – to use Philippe Schmitter's term – “real existing” democracies. The hidden picture suddenly appears: we are faced with a *Demokratieunzufriedenheit par excellence*.<sup>199</sup> It is a comforting but not a very convincing interpretation. There is a real – and as it seems increasing – lack of interest, trust, and participation in democratic government on the part of Central and Eastern Europe's citizens. As Gerrits remarks “*the rightwing-socialist coalition government in Slovakia or the seven months political stalemate in the Czech Republic – all amply demonstrate a rising tide of dissatisfaction of democracy in many of the CEE members of the European Union.*”<sup>200</sup> Moreover, my on-going empirical research also confirms that a huge percentage of respondents do not believe that the current democratic institutions are working properly.

---

(caciques) who successfully influence the electoral process in their favour. More about neopatrimonialism see Eisenstadt 1973.

198 This last point relates to precisely what Reybrouck is concerned about: “*While technology has diminished the gap between politicians and citizens, in other ways this gap has widened. At the level of personal integrity, we do not trust our parliamentarians anymore. The gap between voters and their representatives is actually widening.*” Reybrouck 2011:55

199 More about this term see: Freyberg-Inan 2009

200 Gerrits 2008: 55

According to André Gerrits there are three possible explanations:

- Disillusionment with the so-called liberal consensus:  
It would seem that the spell of the “invisible hand” is no longer restricted to the market, it is now operating in the political realm as well.<sup>201</sup> Nevertheless, the people have grown tired of the liberal parties and politicians that have dominated politics for more than a decade. They are distressed by the speed and disappointed with the social consequences of market reforms.
- The structural nature of the region’s democratic malaise:  
Current dissatisfaction is due, above all, to the liberal consensus. Of course, this goes hand in hand with the unbridled (semi)peripheral version of capitalism. Voters in Central and Eastern Europe have not only punished the political forces that stood behind the liberal consensus of the last decades; they reject political and economic liberalism as such.
- The crises of democracy as a such:  
Gerrits probably exaggerates a bit when he states that the political problems in Central and Eastern Europe reflect the malfunctioning of representative democracy, if it is not a case of the crisis of democracy per se.<sup>202</sup>

These factors are partly the symptoms of the so-called post-accession<sup>203</sup> or post-Maastricht<sup>204</sup> blues, which could be seen as the “return of politics” to the region. There is room for real politics again: for non-consensus, for participation, for political choice, in other words for real democratic accountability.<sup>205</sup> Of course, this return of politics may have some unpleasant features and effects, but it is no serious threat to the democratic gains. ‘Real-existing’ democracies (RED's) – according to Philippe Schmitter – can be reformed and brought into improved conformity with democracy’s two enduring core principles: the sovereign equality of citizens and the political accountability of rulers.<sup>206</sup>

---

201 Böröcz 2005: 167-168

202 Gerrits 2008: 60-61.

203 Gerrits 2008

204 Eichenberg and Dalton 2007

205 Cf. Reybrouck 2011

206 Schmitter 1996

Returning to populism, as the German scholar Frank Decker notes, populism can also be seen as a threat to democratic systems with regards to its political assumptions.<sup>207</sup> Many hold that the ancient Greek politician Pericles once said that the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly debated. Populist parties, because of their plebiscitary view on democracy (cf. with the above mentioned remarks), inevitably become victims of this truth. Influenced by public opinion and mood, populist decision-making can become more responsive and at the same time more irresponsible. Favouring decisions more than patient negotiations, they diminish the quality of the decision-making process.<sup>208</sup> They cannot be called outrightly anti-democratic, but they can undermine the operation of full procedural democracy.<sup>209</sup> Jacques Thomassen concludes – in Dutch – almost the same:

In de derde plaats is de democratieopvatting van het populisme gebaseerd op die van de directe democratie. De wil van het volk moet zo direct mogelijk in beleid vertaald worden. En die volkswil moet zo weinig mogelijk in de weg gelegd worden. In die opvatting is er weinig geduld met klassieke instituties als de scheiding der machten, met inbegrip van een onafhankelijke rechter. Die instituties worden al snel ervaren als hindermacht die de wil van het volk maar in de weg staan. En ook deze weinig respectvolle omgang met instituties staat op gespannen voet met de rechtstaat.<sup>210</sup>

Populism is thus an attractive notion: ill defined, with clear political connotations and high emotional value. In light of this it is sufficient, and therefore frequently used, to explain the current crisis phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe. Populism reflects a rather simplistic and dichotomous world outlook (us versus them) combined with a specific political strategy.

It is obvious that populism is not an equally prominent force in all post-communist countries, and even in those countries where it has gained in political strength, the representatives of radical populism never reached beyond 10% of the general vote. Additionally, populism is not an *ab ovo* destructive political phenomenon. It has “*distinctive virtues and vices*”.<sup>211</sup> Therefore, identifying the rise of populism with democratic backsliding is not the way forward. On the contrary, several – initially Dutch<sup>212</sup> – academics have suggested

---

207 Decker 2003

208 Decker 2003

209 Gerrits 2008: 65

210 “Thirdly, the democracy conception of populism is based on that of direct democracy. The will of the people must be translated into the different policies immediately. And the will of the people should not be banned. In this view, there is little patience with traditional institutions such as the separation of powers, including the independent judiciary. These institutions are perceived as hindrance to the will of the people but get in the way.”

211 Krastev 2007: 60

212 Herman Vuijsje 2010, Reybrouck 2011

that populism can actually benefit democracy. In Central Europe, where populism is regarded as an arch-enemy, for this to become true requires a more elaborated approach to the following question: is there such a thing as “good” and “bad” populism as Reybrouck or Vuijsje claim? In Hungary, for instance, the question may seem absurd. The widespread view is that there is only one kind of populism and the possibility of it being “good” does not even arise.

In the middle of it all, we should notice that populism may have beneficial effects on democratic government. Populist politicians could engage the so-called marginalized into the demos as well as into political process again. Populism may dissolve and heal paralyzed political practices and institutions (including political parties). And it is able to put issues on political agendas which mainstream political parties are either reluctant or afraid to openly debate.

We agree strongly with Robert Dahl who outlines his approach as follows: “*a democratic polity is better served by criticism and disagreement, than by artificial consensus.*”<sup>213</sup> Even political distrust, which seems so widely spread in today’s Central and Eastern Europe, could ideally function as a democratic control mechanism – as long as distrust is balanced by a minimum measure of political confidence and, to quote Dahl, as long as “*a substantial majority of citizens prefer democracy and its political institutions to any non-democratic alternative and support political leaders who uphold democratic practices*”.<sup>214</sup> The discussion on populism and related phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe, thus, would gain from a more sophisticated interpretation of dissatisfaction with democracy.

Above we have sketched out plenty of dilemmas faced by the new, post-communist members of the EU. One more factor, Euroscepticism, however, remains unaddressed. There is as little consensus on this issue as on the critiques of democracy already explored. Several scholars have distinguished between “diffuse” and “specific” support for European integration.<sup>215</sup> The former refers to “*support for the general ideas of European integration that underlie the EU*”, the latter denotes “*support for the general practice of European integration; that is, the EU as it is and as it is developing*”.<sup>216</sup> From a different perspective, Paul Taggart and his colleague Aleks Szcerbiak refined the definition of Euroscepticism by making a distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism. While the former implies outright rejection

---

213 Dahl 2000: 157. Cf. Reybrouck 2011

214 Dahl 2000: 158

215 Kopecky – Mudde 2002: 300

216 *ibid*

of the entire European project, the latter involves “*contingent or qualified opposition to European integration.*”<sup>217</sup>

In the growing literature on the role and relevance of regional organizations in national democratization processes, the enlargement of the EU is routinely presented as one of the most successful international democracy promotion strategies. Europe is a prime example of Philippe Schmitter’s observation that the context of successful democratization is neither national nor global, it is primarily regional.<sup>218</sup> Indeed, among regional organizations, the EU in particular has had a strong and beneficial influence on the transitional and consolidation phases of democracy through both its “deep integration” processes and its several mechanisms for democracy promotion: control, contagion, convergence and conditionality. The rarely used but often referred to articles 6 and 7 of the EU Treaty provide a mechanism for EU intervention if the values of the rule of law or democracy are violated in member states. Still, the EU has successfully proven that an external democratization strategy based on agreement is more effective than one that is based on pressure. We agree with Gerrits that despite the fact that the pursuit of membership is often considered causally related to the development of democracy, it remains extremely difficult to demonstrate to what extent each of the several conditionalities applied by the EU has exactly influenced democracy.<sup>219</sup>

As is well known, an existing democratic system with – among other aspects – respect for political and civil rights was the *sine qua non* condition for accession. Thus far, however, discussion has focused mostly on the pro-democracy effects of enlargement. The impacts of the EU accession process, and later full membership, on the quality and consolidation of the quite new democratic regimes in these countries were analysed in detail. With so much focus on the fact that the EU enlargement in 2004 was one of the most significant EU accomplishments, the possible negative effects of regional integration on democratization have received little attention.<sup>220</sup> On the one hand, thus, there are some scholars who doubt that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit; on the other hand, mainstream political science literature on European integration criticizes the lack of democratic control, accountability, transparency and responsibility. Therefore, some questions can also be raised regarding the possible co-relationship between the state of democracy and European integration.

---

217 Taggart 2001: 5

218 Schmitter 1996

219 Gerrits 2008: 59

220 *ibid.*

After all, enlargement was not only, and perhaps not even primarily, a strategy of democratization, but of integration – a strategy of integration in which the Union itself was a major stakeholder in its success. Hypothetically, various features of this democratization/integration strategy may have negatively affected the current state of democracy in the Central and Eastern Member States. As there is an internal centre of dominance in the EU (represented by the core members) and a periphery (represented by the new members), the societies of Eastern and Central Europe quickly fell into a new situation of intense, singular dependence. The enlargement of the EU was an elitist enterprise. As József Böröcz concludes, the EU represents an “elite pact” between some of the world’s most powerful business organizations – transnational corporations based in and/or active in Western Europe – and the “political entrepreneurs” of the Brussels Centre.<sup>221</sup> The accession strategy to the EU was built on “forced”, artificial consensus. Firstly, the EU benefited from a relatively weak civil society and low political participation.<sup>222</sup> Secondly, despite the widely shared ambition to join the EU, accession was poorly legitimized and suffered from a clear lack of accountability.

Paradoxically, the EU exerts less influence on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe today, now that they have joined the union, than it did before, during the accession process.<sup>223</sup> From an institution that requires compliance, the EU became one that can be disputed.

Some researchers are arguing that if the current problems with (and of) democratic politics in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe are at least partly related to their accession to the EU, we might expect another causality: that between a- or antidemocratic attitudes and Euroscepticism. To prove this hypothesis, several research initiatives indicate that on average new members of the EU show a higher measure of Euroscepticism in combination with a lower level of European identity.<sup>224</sup> Of course, the backlash against the liberal consensus – the advance of political populism, the rise of democracy dissatisfaction, and Euroscepticism – form an unattractive mix. They may be the symptoms of the flaws of the democratic order in Central and Eastern Europe, but this *Demokratieunzufriedenheit* should not be identified with either a crisis of the government or with a full rejection of the European project. In our interpretation, however, these member states of the EU represent a political reality which is neither very appealing nor particularly dramatic.

---

221 Böröcz 2005: 165

222 Studies of ‘social capital’ in the region found lower levels of social trust, community engagement, and confidence in social and political institutions across the region.

223 Cf. Gerrits 2008

224 Gerrits 2008, Kopcky – Mudde 2002

Importantly, the discontent with Europe is predominantly soft, as the democracy critique is primarily of an “a-democratic” form,<sup>225</sup> and these factors do not have any significant relation.

### *Some Remarks*

We must acknowledge that, while democracy is the only mode of government ensuring lasting solutions to (almost endless) problems facing these societies, it can take on – despite the several shared issues and concerns – different forms from country to country. The shapes of these different forms depend on the political and social traditions, and political and social culture, of each state. However, making democratic institutions work is a multi-stage process and therefore it is worthy to note that new policy making practices might be born out of the need to enhance the legitimacy of the policy making process, not out of the wish to strengthen the quality of the policy-oriented deliberation. A “modest” or a “good” (as David van Reybrouck would call it) form of populism, which does not want to drive the “people” out of politics but wants to build politics on the wishes of people, has thus a great significance. Through this modest view of populism, the building of a political spectrum (which has been and is still lacking) in which voters can identify themselves to be taking part to democratic life is needed. In our humble view, it would mean creating an open a space for democratic discussion, participation, and deliberation at the national level. Furthermore, at a time of uncontrolled inequalities, and in a period when the social gap between skilled elites and poor educated individuals continues to deepen, the social project cannot be left aside. In our point of view to achieve this modest goal the following steps are needed:

- To avoid “bad” (counterproductive) populism, act as a bridge between divided groups (which still characterizes the CEE societies), build consensus, and strengthen the moderate and still-lacking middle ground.
- Establish channels for dialogue between the political elite and the “demos/populus”. This would not only improve parties’ capacities, but would also be a first step in regaining society’s trust, which has been declining since the transition.
- Sometimes *“one gets the feeling that democracy has become a sort of export product:*

---

<sup>225</sup>“A distinction could be made between anti-democratic and a-democratic thinking. Anti-democratic ideas and practices openly and pro-actively seek to impose limits on the democratic process in general. A-democratic ideas and behaviour express themselves in generalised political discontent or institutional distrust within formally democratic systems.” Gerrits 2008: 59

*ready-made, neatly packaged, signed and sealed for delivery. Democracy becomes an IKEA kit for free and fair elections, to be assembled by the recipient upon arrival, with or without the use of the enclosed instruction booklet.*"<sup>226</sup> Therefore, stakeholders in the society should lead the strengthening and protection of democracy (appropriate for CEE conditions) by embodying democratic principles and exercising democratic values.

- Besides fostering democracy inside the different CEE countries, it is important to note that within the CEE region the Visegrad 4 (V4) countries<sup>227</sup> have – although it seems to be forgotten – democratization experience. Therefore the role of the V4 countries in promoting democracy – primarily in the region and secondly abroad – should be given more prominence.
- To share the clear vision of Ulrich Beck, individuals should be able to feel that not all of the risks are being dumped onto their shoulders. They should feel that something exists that deserves the name “European Community”, because it takes *“the renewal of social security in these unsettled times as its programme and guarantees it. Then the auspicious concept, „European Community” would stand not only for the experience of freedom and for the maximization of risk; not only for an epicurean Europe, but also for a social Europe.*”<sup>228</sup>

### **Concluding Notes**

In the first part of this article (theory: definition of key terms and historical introduction) I intended to make a comparative – mostly historical and sociological – analysis. The sections above – although containing little in the way of new findings – deal with this aim. In addition, another, more comprehensive, theoretical study is currently in the making.

The elaboration of the second, more practical, part of our research is still in progress. However, here I face some problems as well. Besides the potentially problematic aspect of populism as a scientific concept (on the grounds of its conceptual sensitivity), scholars have not yet developed systematic methods for empirically measuring populism across cases and over time. There have been some empirical investigations into populism, but most of these are single case studies. I face many of the same difficulties in the case of Euroscepticism. A more

---

226 Reybrouck 2013: 15

227 The so-called Visegrad Group or V4 is an alliance of four Central European states – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – for the purposes of furthering their European integration as well as advancing their military, economic and energy cooperation with one another.

228 Beck 2013

systematic and comparative perspective is still lacking. In my forthcoming research (based on the findings of Matthijs, Rooduijn, and Teun Pauwels) two different methods for measuring populism will be compared: classical content analysis and computer-based content analysis. The analysis of the above-mentioned Dutch scholars (regarding the political situation in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy) demonstrates that both methods can be used to measure populism across countries and over time. A few small changes will be needed, but the method is perfectly applicable also in the Central-European region. My hope is that these results can be utilized in many fields.

### ***Bibliography***

Babbie, Earl (2010) *Introduction to Social Research*. Wadworth

Beck, Ulrich (1994) Reinvention of politics: towards a theory of reflexive modernity. in Beck, Ulrich – Giddens, Anthony – Lash, Scott (1994) *Reflexive Modernisation*. London: Polity Press

Beck, Ulrich (2013) Towards a European Spring.  
Retrieved from <https://www.opendemocracy.net/ulrich-beck/towards-european-spring>

Beck, Ulrich (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. New Delhi: Sage

Berger, Peter L. (1963) *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective*. Doubleday

Betz, Hans-Georg – Johnson, Carol (2004) Against the current – stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9 (3): 311-327.

Bovens, Mark – Wille, Anchrit C. (2011) *Diplomademocratie: Over de spanning tussen meritocratie en democratie*. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker.

Böröcz, József – Sarkar, Mahua (2005) What is the EU? *International Sociology* 20 (2):152-173

Canovan, Margaret (1981) *Populism*. Houghton Mifflin Hmh.

Canovan, Margaret (1999) Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. *Political Studies* 47 (1): 2-16.

Canovan, Margaret (2005) *The People*. Cambridge: Polity

Dahl, Roald (2000) *On Democracy*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press

Decker, Frank (2003) The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy. Berliner Republik, 3.  
Retrieved from [http://www.fes.de/ipg/ONLINE3\\_2003/ARTDECKER.PDF](http://www.fes.de/ipg/ONLINE3_2003/ARTDECKER.PDF)

- Diamond, Larry (2008) *The Spirit of Democracy*. New York: Holt
- Eichenberg, Richard C. – Dalton, Russell J. (2007) Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973-2004. *Acta Politica* 42 (2–3): 128–152.
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel N. (1973) *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Ekiert, Grzegorz (2008) Dilemmas of Europeanization: Eastern and Central Europe after the EU Enlargement. *Acta Slavica Iaponica* 25:1-28
- Fairbank, John King (1969) *Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast*. Stanford: Stanford University Press
- Feryberg-Inan, A. (2009) Demokratie okay, aber für alle? Demokratieunzufriedenheit und selektive Demokratie in Mittel- und Osteuropa. *Berliner Debatte Initial* 20 (4):104-119.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1989) The End of History?  
Retrieved from: <http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm>
- Fukuyama, Francis (2012) The Future of History: Can Liberal Democracy Survive the Decline of the Middle Class?  
Retrieved from <http://www.aigaforum.com/articles/francis-on-democracy.php>
- Gerrits, André (2008) *Democratic regression, rising populism and the pitfalls of European integration*. Brussels: PSE.
- Gidron, Noam – Bonikowski, Bart (2013) Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda. *Weatherhead Working Paper Series* No. 13-0004  
Retrieved from [www.scholar.harvard.edu/.../varieties-populism-literature-review-and-researchagenda/](http://www.scholar.harvard.edu/.../varieties-populism-literature-review-and-researchagenda/)
- Giddens, Anthony (1990) *Consequences of Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Held, Joseph (1996) *Populism in Eastern Europe. Racism, Nationalism and Society*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Ionescu, Ghita – Gellner, Ernest (1969) *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*. New York: Macmillan Co.
- Kocsev, Bence (2012) Tolerancia határok nélkül, határok tolerancia nélkül. *Szociológia Szemle* 21 (2): 163–173
- Kopecky, P. – Mudde, Cas (2002) The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe. *European Union Politics* 3 (2002) 3:300
- Krastev, Ivan (2008) The Populist moment. *The Prague Journal of Central European Affairs* 11(4), 43-45.

Mény, Yves – Surel, Yves. (eds.) (2002) *Democracies and Populist Challenge*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

Merkel, Wolfgang (2008) Plausible Theory, Unexpected Results: The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal for International Relations and Global Trends* 2008 (2): 12-29.

Miszlivetz, Ferenc (2012) Lost in Transformation: The Crisis of Democracy and Civil Society. in *Global Civil Society*. New York: Palgrave – Macmillan

Mouffe, Chantal (2014) Democratise democracy!  
Retrieved from: [www.transformations-blog.com/we-propose-democracy-interview-with-chantalmouffe/](http://www.transformations-blog.com/we-propose-democracy-interview-with-chantalmouffe/)

Morstein-Marx, Robert (2003) *Mass Oratory and Political Power in the Late Roman Republic*. Cambridge University Press

Mudde, Cas (2004) The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition* 39 (4): 542-563.

Oakeshott, Michael (1996) *The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism*. (Ed. by Timothy Fuller) Harvard University Press

Rooduijn, Matthijs (2010) *A Populist Zeitgeist? The Impact of Populism on Parties, Media and the Public in Western Europe*. Oosterhout: Almanakker

Schmitter, Philippe (1996) The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies. in Laurence Whitehead (ed.), *The International Dimension of Democratisation: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Taggart, Paul (1995) New populist parties in Western Europe. *West European Politics* 18 (1): 34- 51.

Taggart, Paul – Szczerbiak, Aleks (2001) *Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe*. Sussex European Institute

Reybrouck, David van (2013) *Tegen verkiezingen*. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij

Reybrouck, David van (2011) *Pleidooi voor populisme*. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij Varga, M.

Zielonka, Jan (2007) The Quality of Democracy after Joining the European Union. *East European Politics & Societies* 21 (1):165.

Žižek, Slavoj (2006) Against Populist Temptation.  
Retrieved from <http://www.lacan.com/zizpopulism.htm>

Vuijsje, Herman (2008) *Korrekt Hollandia*. Budapest: Gondolat.

Walczak, Agnes (2012) *Is left/right still the 'super glue'? The role of left/right ideology and issues in electoral politics in Western and East Central Europe*. Amsterdam: AISSR

Weber, Max (1978) *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*.

Retrieved from:

[https://archive.org/stream/MaxWeberEconomyAndSociety/MaxWeberEconomyAndSociety\\_djvu.txt](https://archive.org/stream/MaxWeberEconomyAndSociety/MaxWeberEconomyAndSociety_djvu.txt)

### **III. Transnational Economies and Management**

#### **Progress - and Regress - in Change Management in Health Services**

Stuart Holland and Teresa Carla Oliveira<sup>229</sup>

##### ***Abstract***

‘Change management’ can have progressive resonance, and substance. Thus the New Deal of Franklin Delanore Roosevelt changed the management of the US economy rescued it from The Depression and restored faith in American democracy. Yet change also can be regressive as the chapter submits has been the case with so called New Public Management in health services in the UK and especially when its implicit economic logic is gaining cost savings through Fordist economies of scale. By contrast, as shown in the chapter from the case of a major teaching hospital in Sweden change management can gain both economic efficiency and social efficiency, where the latter means enhanced wellbeing for the public by post-Fordist economies of scope or doing more *with* the same, including the skills and experience of health workers, rather than more *of* the same as in seeking only cost reductions by economies of scale. The chapter also draws on the concept of innovation-by-agreement recommended by one of us to, and endorsed in, The Lisbon Agenda 2000.

##### ***Introduction***

Throughout Western Europe there is increasing demand for health services with ageing populations at the same time as governments are seeking to reduce the costs of health provision. Implicit within this are different paradigms of health and hospital organisation, different institutional logics, and different perceptions of change at different management levels. There

---

<sup>229</sup> This paper is a chapter from *Change Management – What Went Right, What has Gone Wrong and How to Learn Up* – by Teresa Carla Oliveira of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Coimbra and Stuart Holland, ISES Senior Fellow, with scheduled publication in the autumn of 2016.

also is a presumption in some European countries that the New Public Management reforms in the UK NHS (and, since devolution, in England) offer a template for change management.

There is less awareness outside the UK that these have revealed conflicting rationalities between government insistence on more market criteria in health provision and opposition to this from health professionals, or that criticism of the reforms for lack of consultation on how they have been introduced has been persistently voiced by the British Medical Association, the Royal Colleges of Nurses; the Royal College of General Practitioners and the Royal College of Midwives (Pollock, 2004; Leys & Player, 2011; Warwick, 2012; Laja, 2012).

The explicit logic of the reforms had been to devolve responsibility for costs and performance and increase efficiency by introducing market criteria or ‘quasi-markets’ into the NHS as well as out-sourcing some services. But their implicit logic has been Weberian in terms of pyramidal top-down authority, Fordist in its preoccupation to increase patient throughput to reduce unit costs, and Taylorist in terms of constant surveillance of performance criteria. While the outcome of increased layers of supervision has not reduced, but trebled administrative costs as a share of total costs from under 5% to over 14% (Taylor, 1911; Leys & Player, 2011).

This is not to imply that the case for reforms in health organisation in the UK or elsewhere lacks justification. Health provision can be compromised by organisational inefficiency, including under-utilisation of capacity and skills; lack of ‘patient path planning’, and therefore failure to reduce waiting time for patients from lack of integration of diagnosis and treatment; lack of retraining for nursing staff, lack of internal ‘voice’ (Hirschman, 1970) for both nursing and other staff on feasible gains in efficiency, as well as stress from overwork and absenteeism. But only some of these have been redressed by the New Public Management reforms in the UK and, after devolution for Scotland and Wales, the English National Health Service.

This chapter addresses such issues not only because of extensive failures in terms of change management in the NHS reforms, but also the degree to which this relates to de-legitimation of the democratic process. For many of the reforms did not concern legislation proposed to parliament and submitted to committee scrutiny but were introduced without primary legislation. What started as a case for market criteria to increase efficiency changed to a design to privatise the NHS. As Leys and Player (2011) have well chronicled, this began under New Labour from 2000. But then was followed by the Liberal Party, which had included a commitment in its 2010 election manifesto to reverse ‘top down’ market reforms of the NHS, when in coalition government, it supported them.

The chapter then reports on a counter case of change management in the Karolinska teaching hospital in Stockholm that was inspired by its manager, Jan Lindsten, who was familiar with the distinction between Fordist economies of scale – more of the same - and post Fordist economies of scope – more with the same. Lindsten applied this at Karolinska with dramatic results, reducing costs by 15% rather than increasing them as in the British NHS reforms, and increasing patients treated by 20%. This involved a challenge to the interests of some health professionals such as consultants and other doctors, as in requiring multiple use of operating theatres and wards, and by transferring control of ‘patient path planning’ to senior nurses. Yet which doctors came to accept when the time saving meant that they could have one day a week free from diagnosing or treating patients for research (Kaplinsky, 1995).

Part of the agenda of the chapter is to address issues of both economic and social efficiency in health and hospital organisation, where social efficiency means a service which can enhance patient wellbeing - such as reduction of waiting time for operations - and also can respect the commitment of employees to healthcare as a value based vocational commitment. The concept of social efficiency is consistent with the claims of Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) and Womack and Jones (1996) on ‘lean production’ and reducing wasted time in addressing patient needs. Kaplinsky (1995) also drew on the ‘lean production’ production model in a study of effective change management at the Karolinska teaching hospital.

Inversely, with pressure to reduce costs and increase patient turnover, health professionals are increasingly under stress. The chapter submits that conflicts between economic efficiency and social efficiency can be resolved in a symbiotic manner in which not only the interests of patients, but also the wellbeing of health professionals, can be reconciled. It relates this to the concept of innovation-by-agreement, including the right for work-life balance, proposed by one of us for, and endorsed by, The Lisbon Agenda 2000 of the European Council. This also has been elaborated in terms of both efficient economies and efficient societies by Holland (2015).

### ***Fordist Production and Weberian Hierarchy***

The National Health Service introduced in the UK by the postwar Labour government was driven by social rather than market values, and its explicit logic was that the service would deliver health care financed by taxation but free at the point of use. Aneurin Bevan, as Secretary of State for Health, and who managed the Herculean task of introducing the NHS within three postwar years in a climate of economic austerity, related it to a social philosophy in which he

observed that self-interest was less typical of the human condition than concern for others either within a family or in groups, which also had been observed by Darwin to be one of the reasons why humankind itself successfully evolved (Bevan, 1952; Darwin, 1859).

But there are underdrawn parallels between the British NHS as introduced in 1948 and Henry Ford's initial ambitions as a social engineer (Lacey, 1987). Ford's social philosophy was that everyone, rather than a privileged few, should have access to reliable and high quality personal transport. The commitment of the postwar Labour government was that everyone should have reliable access to a high quality health service. There also were other similarities with Fordism in the early NHS, even if these only later were explicitly problematic. Fordism depended very much on stable technologies to achieve standardised production. So did the NHS. Hip and heart transplants and a host of entirely new medical techniques were unknown at the time.

Geometric progress in medical techniques and health technology in due course were to increase demand for diversified rather than general health services, while the very success of Labour's postwar welfare state, which the Conservatives until the 1970's did not risk challenging, meant improvements in nutrition, housing and other social services which lengthened life expectancy and therefore the volume demand on the NHS. This was paralleled in other countries which introduced national health systems, such as Portugal after its 1974 revolution restoring democracy, which thereby, on the same principles of service according to need, within three decades increased life expectancy by 15 years (Oliveira & Holland, 2007).

The postwar British NHS also embodied an implicit, if mainly benign, authoritarianism. Unless they could pay for private provision, people got the health system the NHS could deliver. They had little option on when they would be treated or by whom, or how. Even if the social value principle remained that they would get the best of what medical practice available, this differed between teaching hospitals in metropolitan areas which were at the frontier of medical innovation, and gained preferential funding, and general hospitals elsewhere which could in due course learn from them, but were less privileged.

The social efficiency of the initial NHS therefore varied. Its structures were hierarchical and Weberian. There were 'baronies' within it in which heads of departments could, sometimes jealously, defend their own autonomy. Bevan also was strenuously opposed in introducing the NHS by the British Medical Association and admitted that he won by 'stuffing their mouths with gold'. Many hospital managers also now admit that gaining a balance between economic efficiency and social efficiency in terms of patient needs is difficult to achieve. Too often

procedures can be perceived by both staff and patients to be inflexible. Especially, in a Fordist paradigm of health organisation, there is a tendency to fit the patients into the production schedules of health provision rather than fit the production schedules to the needs of patients.

Further, the organisation of most hospitals reflects the multi-divisional model by which Sloan at General Motors overcame Ford's own refusal to delegate (Lacey, 1987). Just as large companies are organised in production, finance, marketing, sales and other divisions, so hospitals are organised in departments. Each department in a hospital tends to have its own operating theatre, its own diagnostic unit, its own wards, its own nursing and other technical medical staff as well as, in teaching hospitals, their own research units.

Moreover, while Ford endorsed Taylor's task specialisation for line workers, nurses and other line workers in hospitals are multi-tasked and need to be multi-skilled. With only a few exceptions, such as anaesthetics, specialisation in hospitals tends to be intra-departmental. Gynaecology and cardiac surgery may share some techniques and technologies, but are not identical. Their specialists need to be near the frontier of knowledge in their area. In a teaching hospital, they will be on or advancing the frontier of best practice. But while such specialisation is needed to assure professional success it may outcome in inertial institutional logics and deny a more lateral organisational logic of 'boundary spanning' as those concerned defend their own domain in terms of autonomous operating theatres, wards, and claims on autonomous rather than shared budgets for them (Oliveira & Holland, 2013; Mørk, Hoholm, Maaninen-Olsson and Aanestad (2011).

### ***The British NHS Reforms***

Such vested interests and inertial logics, if without conceptualising the latter, were among the reasons claimed in the UK for reform of the NHS. The Thatcher and Blair governments in the UK did not overtly aim to privatise the National Health Service, but their presumption was that a flexible private sector always is more efficient than inflexible public sector 'bureaucracies'. The explicit logic was the introduction of an 'internal market' to the health service, and also out-contracting services which had been internal to hospitals or health centres. It was claimed that this would raise quality and widen freedom of choice (DHSS, 1983; Department of Health, 2004). Its implicit logic was that with more out-contracting, and shorter term contracts, the power of professional associations and trades unions in the National Health Service would be decreased (Le Grand, 1997).

The case for change management was set out in the Griffiths Report (DHSS 1983). National Health Service hospitals until the Thatcher reforms used to be managed by boards jointly composed of doctors and a senior representative of nurses, as well as local elected officials - local councillors - with knowledge of the related local problems of health, education and housing, Griffiths recommended that hospitals now be governed by specialist managers with more rigorous private sector experience.

Making first 'trust' and then 'foundation' hospitals responsible for their own finance would encourage efficiency, while in the latter case of foundation hospitals, their being able to fund how and what they wished without approval from the Secretary of State for Health should both widen choice and attract more external finance. The model for foundation trusts was the so-called health foundations – *fundaciones sanitarias* - set up by the People's Party in Spain. These were publicly-built hospitals that were handed over to private companies to run for a fee. They had freedom from the health ministry and could set their own terms of service for their staff (Leys & Player, 2011).

The Community Care Act of 1990 offered a new voluntary scheme of GP 'fund holding' by which local doctors in larger group practices could gain more funds with more responsibility for their use, including the right to purchase hospital treatment or community care for patients, thereby introducing an internal market of 'purchasers' and 'providers', rather than a capitation principle based on a flat rate for every patient. General practitioners or GPs for the first time since the foundation of the NHS were given the right to influence the provision of hospital services. The hitherto powerful British Medical Association opposed this on the basis that it would tend to privilege bigger practices and also reinforce the imbalance of provision in favour of the South East of England, but was overruled. Over half the general practices in the UK signed up to the new 'fund holding' scheme with, shortly thereafter, a marked decline in independent small scale practices (Pollock, 2004).

The implicit logic of the shift to privileging larger general practices was Fordist on the basis that they would provide models of greater efficiency which others then could emulate, rather than the 'craft' provision of services by doctors working from one room surgeries or even from their own homes. But the outcome of devolving responsibility for budgets to general practice level was both more direct external surveillance of how they used them by the government, and new internal surveillance by doctors in group practices in order to avoid sanctions limiting their funds. Initially, there was increased money, but within 'no excess' limits to spending. Doctors within general practices took to monitoring their own time and motion

practice on a Taylorist basis, with the outcome, for the first time, of recommended limits to the time for consulting patients, such as that it should average not more than seven minutes (Pollock, 2004).

The logic of the Conservative government reforms was supposed to be more effective internal accountability. A new Clinical Governance principle resulted in boards being set up which should monitor information on admission and readmission rates, length of waiting lists for surgery in different departments and specialisations, drug prescription costs, complaints, health and safety accident reports, etc. These boards were given enough authority to effect change in systems and services. But this new internal management logic was contradicted in practice by not delving down to learn up from medical professionals what was or was not needed to reconcile economic with social efficiency, combined with an implicit logic of continually taking money out of the NHS on the grounds of already having achieved ‘cost-improvements’ (Leys & Player, 2011), even though costs in practice were increasing.

Since the start of the second Blair government in 2003 more money was undoubtedly invested, but a rhetoric of ‘devolved power’ in fact increased bureaucracy at what was the former NHS Health District level, while external control was more heavily exercised from the centre on a divide and rule principle between those opting for ‘fundholding’ and those who did not. Another related problem was that ‘change overload’ created an environment of ‘change-on-change’ which meant that there rarely was time for a new policy change to be followed through and the effects evaluated, before the government decided to try something else. Overall, the rhetoric of ‘devolving power’ was contradicted by continued top-down demands for ongoing change, imposed and monitored from the centre (Leys & Player, *ibid*).

### *New Taylorism*

The outcome of more centralised control contradicting a rhetoric of ‘devolving power’ was a focus was on process and outcomes, with mission statements, target setting, practice protocols, performance appraisals, vacancy reviews, quality audits, and ‘clinical managers’ similar to the line supervisors in Fordist production. ‘Practice protocols’ gave step-by-step details of how nursing should be performed as if nurses had not come to appreciate both this and the ethos of nursing in training. While the incoming New Labour government in 1997 nominally dropped the main features of the internal market in health, it quickly reintroduced them when Tony Blair reversed the instruction of its first Secretary of State for Health, Frank

Dobson, that private sector hospitals could take patients only if NHS hospitals were at full capacity and could not accommodate them (Pollock, 2004). It also, consciously or otherwise, continued the culture and practice of Taylor's (1911) theory of scientific management, or neo-Taylorism.

The outcome by 2004 had been a reduction in waiting lists. Therefore, the new Taylorism did achieve more patient throughput and thus higher productivity. But the ongoing pursuit by government of higher Fordist volume on the presumption of economies of scale, rather than of scope, also posed 'size' problems. Some of the new chief executives chose to take early retirement rather than manage trusts that the government enlarged, and then enlarged again, since in their view they then would have been too big to be able to know what was going on, far less achieve 'change management by consent' (Somekh, 2006).

In a general hospital case study, Bolton observed that in the New Public Management reforms in the National Health Service there 'a logic that emphasizes contradictory elements: the hospital must cut costs but also deliver a quality service... As nurses account for the largest part of the hospital budget, and also are accountable for how the quality of bedside care is perceived, these contradictions deeply affect their work' (Bolton, 2004, p. 320).

However, as a 2014 report from the New Economic Foundation put it, Government reforms of the NHS over the last three decades not only have transformed a democratically controlled public service into an open competitive market, but also increased rather than reduced costs. The costs of maintaining market mechanisms in the NHS have been conservatively estimated at £4.5 billion a year – enough to pay for either ten specialist hospitals, 174,798 extra nurses, 42,413 extra GPs, or 39,473,684 extra patient visits to Accident and Emergency Units in hospitals (NEF, 2014).

### ***Lack of Voice***

Albert Hirschman in his *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (1970) stressed that economic efficiency not only was a matter of 'exiting' from a transactional relationship if either party were dissatisfied but depended essentially on 'voice' between buyers and suppliers to improve relations between them and also, crucially, on 'loyalty'. Little to no such 'voice' from base-up rather than top-down has been typical of NPM reforms in health in the UK, with the outcome of deeply straining 'loyalty' (Beardwell, 1998; Morrison and Milliken, 2003) and also operational efficiency (Edmonson, 2003).

Thus Bolton (2004) found in her case study that nursing staff resented that while the new 'consumers' of health service were given a formal voice, they as providers were not. The fact that the senior nursing officer under the New Labour reforms was a member of the new 'management board' was a voice too far removed from the 'shop floor' of operating theatres and wards.

Language also changed. 'Patients' now were to be 'customers', as in the privatisation of rail services were 'travellers' also became known as 'customers'. There was resentment of being told to 'smile' at 'customers' of their service as if nurses never had smiled at patients before, or as if they now were hostesses, with tacit resistance expressing itself in various subversive ways such as smiling at but disregarding a tiresome 'customer' in the manner earlier identified by Hochschild (1979, 1983) in his analysis of how markets can result in the commercialisation of human feelings (Bolton, 2004).

As with the American ritual of 'have a nice day' which, varying with the speaker and context may be sincere or, if the customer has been tiresome, cynical. Nurses in particular resented the implication that they were 'doing a job' rather than being able to demonstrate commitment to giving a service. Granted that most of them were not paid anything like the 'rate for the job' which would have obtained with such hours and for such 'customer' commitment in the private sector, this was doubly offensive. As Bolton (2004) comments:

Nurses have patients' welfare at heart and are generally supportive of management schemes that are seen to benefit patients. However, while welcoming moves towards empowering patients, the notion of aggressive consumerism remains an alien concept. Nurses have taken on the guise of entrepreneurs, but in order to further their own definition of quality care. Nurses feel that they do not need to become customer focused as they are already patient focused, and they remain attached to a public service ethos (Bolton, 2004, p. 330).

But the lack of voice was not only internal within hospitals or trusts. It was national in that the series of 'health reforms' introduced from the 1980s through to the health care reform bill introduced by the Conservative-Liberal coalition in England in 2011 were strenuously opposed either for lack of consultation or for lack of response to warnings in such consultations from the British Medical Association, the Royal College of Nurses, The Royal College of General Practitioners and the Royal College of Midwives that it could 'destroy' the National Health Service (Warwick, 2012; Laja, 2012).

## *Challenge on Outcomes*

With investment also of more resources from Labour's second election success in 2001, the outcome of both the Conservative and New Labour changes was an increase in patient admissions and patient-staff ratios. Therefore, Fordism in terms of a higher rate of patient throughput appeared to be working, although both admissions and patient-staff ratios fell after this dash for growth or what Cousins (1987) had earlier called the 'factory-like logic' of the 'new' National Health Service.

But there has been serious challenge to key figures published by the New Labour governments. For instance, one of its highest profile targets for the NHS was that no patient should spend more than four hours in a hospital Accident and Emergency unit. Government figures claimed that by 2004 the target was being missed for only 4% of patients. But a survey by the British Medical Association found that scarcely more than a quarter of those sampled who had used such units were accurate. A 2003 report by the Public Administration Committee of the House of Commons cited evidence where maximum waiting times in the units 'were being circumvented by imaginative fixes'. (House of Commons, 2003). As *The Economist* (2015) chose to put it the official figures started to reflect a parallel world created by administrators striving to hit the target'.

The focus on internal cost reduction logic by externalisation of services defeated the explicit logic of delivering a better service to patients. For instance, infections have always been acquired in hospitals, whatever the rigour with which nursing or other employees seek to avoid them. But in NHS hospitals they increased significantly since out-contracting of cleaning and its subjection to Taylorist criteria. To increase their internal rate of return, contractors limited the disinfectant which cleaners could use and increased the wards they had to clean in a given time, meaning that they could not change the water or add cleaning fluid over allotted cost, time and motion limits. Cleaners were swabbing different wards with the same bucket of increasingly dirty and infected water. The result was an infection crisis in hospitals from the summer of 2003 caused by lack of hygiene, including MRSA (Revill, 2005).

Some of the new hospital management boards knew what the problem was but could do little about it since out-sourcing was part of the government's national strategy for reducing internal costs in hospital provision. Further, in its initial response to the hygiene crisis, rather than restoring control of both hygiene and health to nursing staff, the government mirrored the Sloan version of Fordism by appointing new national, regional and local hospital 'hygiene

managers’, quickly dubbed ‘health commissars’ by the national press. Several of these claimed that their inspectors could not find evidence for the attribution of increased infection to out-sourcing. The government also recognised an increase in MRSA related deaths only in those cases where they had been directly attributed by coroners. Yet, even on this basis, the government’s National Audit Office recognised that as many as 5.000 persons may have died of hospital acquired infections in 2004 alone (Revill, *ibid*).

Polly Toynbee, a deputy editor of *The Guardian* newspaper, recognised that: ‘It is phenomenally faster to get into hospital under Labour - but one in 11 will catch something nasty when they get there’ (Toynbee, 2005). Countering Tony Blair’s comment that the problem was that ‘there are good cleaners and bad cleaners’, Toynbee responded that the problem in fact was: ‘squeezed cleaning budgets with contracted-out minimum wage cleaners using watered-down detergents, aged mops, no training, no equipment, one cleaner to five wards and 30% vacancies in London’ (Toynbee, *ibid.*). She also found that one reason the government claimed that its inspectors could not agree with the diagnosis of the problem was that they gave notice of inspections in advance to hospitals, ‘with managers bringing in all the night and weekend cleaners to thoroughly clean the areas to be inspected’. Overall, Toynbee commented: ‘This is a New Labour parable... the excellent new NHS pay system that rewards acquiring skills with extra pay, doesn’t apply to contracted-out cleaners, porters and security guards (who) should ‘now be brought into the mainstream NHS team’ (Toynbee, *ibid*).

### ***The Costs of Out-Sourcing***

A further New NHS parable comes from the contradiction of internal and external logic in the out-sourcing of cataract operations. In 2003, the New Labour government listed new ‘diagnosis and treatment centres’ or DTCs. These were mobile clinics which the health minister John Reid claimed at the time would provide cheaper services than the NHS, cut waiting lists and offer patients a choice of where and when they have their operations.

The Radcliffe Eye hospital was at first bemused and then affronted by this, and wrote in protest to its member of parliament. In May 2002, the health department had explained that the clinics would ensure that ‘no cataract patient is waiting more than three months by December 2004’. But this was precisely the target the Oxford eye hospital already was meeting. Almost all the cataract patients then handled by the hospital were to be referred to the DTC. The

exceptions were to be complex rather than routine cases. The routine cases were to be treated in a mobile DTC clinic which would visit their area, according to an internal departmental memo, on only one day in every 10 or 11 weeks. To 'save money', the memo indicated that the clinics might operate 'on both eyes at once'. NHS surgeons operate on only one eye at a time, in case an infection leaves a patient completely blind (Monbiot, 2003).

Most of the cataract operations at the time conducted by the Radcliffe therefore were to be transferred to the foreign company running the new diagnostic and treatment centre. But while it cost the eye hospital £685 to perform each cataract operation, the internal departmental memo revealed that the private company was being offered £799.6 One of the reasons why the private surgery was more expensive is that surgeons needed to be flown in to perform it, and would be paid between £450,000 and £500,000 a year. Consultants employed by the NHS at the time were paid £60,000 a year. There also were negative implications for hospital training. The Oxford eye hospital had used routine cases to introduce apprentice surgeons to cataract techniques before bringing them onto cases which were more complex. But the routine cases now were to be out-sourced (Monbiot, *ibid*; Pollock, 2004).

This out-sourcing principle not only did not increase choice, since the mobile units would only come on scheduled days for one day only every ten or eleven weeks. It also entirely contradicted the main textbook principle of external economies in which, since Marshall (1870), it was presumed that firms only would out-source if it saved them money. It also wholly ignored the 'rational' transaction cost principles of Williamson (1979) and Teece (1992, 1997), that organisations will 'rationally' decide whether to internalise or externalise operations on a cost-effective basis.

### ***Social Inefficiency***

The new Taylorist focus on internal hospital efficiency also neglected resulting social diseconomies. For example, part of the increase in patient admissions was due to them spending less time in hospital and thus an externalisation of post-operative care from hospital staff to general practitioners or health workers visiting patients, or families, whose members could have to take time off work to care for those concerned who had been sent home to recuperate. Faster throughput also has meant a higher rate of re-admissions of patients who formerly would have stayed longer in hospital. Perversely also, although suiting managers' claims on admissions, the total admission figures include those who have had to be readmitted because of complications

or failure to recuperate, with a ‘revolving door’ effect that sending patients home early raised ‘success’ in later re-admission rates (Stern, 2006).

The introduction of new hospital managers and a change in the composition of governing bodies also meant a loss of ‘externalities’ of interrelated local knowledge and experience of the causes of health problems. For instance, it is commonplace for local politicians to receive letters from a local doctor stressing that there was nothing that he or she could do to remedy a patient’s chest condition until the damp problem in his or her local authority housing had been remedied. With more broadly community representatives including local councillors on the governing bodies of hospitals and local and regional health authorities until the early 1980s, such problems could be voiced and addressed in a relatively integrated manner.

But this is less the case when the managers are from the commercial sector rather than the local community, have no direct knowledge of it if they live elsewhere, nor the power of a local councillor to do something about it. The readmission of the individuals with a chronic and recurrent chest complaint therefore will increase the internal performance benchmark of admission rates, while doing nothing to resolve the underlying housing problem causing the patient’s ill health.


### ***New Bureaucracy***

Also, despite the explicit claims of both Conservative and New Labour governments that market solutions would reduce bureaucracy, the ‘new’ National Health Service proved more rather than less bureaucratic. New layers of management were established for supervision and control of ‘internal market performance’ at national, regional and local levels. Doctors needed to commit to time and motion resource allocation in their local surgeries or health centres. Previously their main focus was on patient care, even though they knew that they were working within general guideline limits on resources. Now they also have to manage their own budgets, and justify them according to a host of specific performance indicators which include quality indicators but whose main focus is client turnover. According to former Health Secretary Frank Dobson, on the basis of parliamentary questions, the administrative costs which in the pre-reform NHS were less than 5% of the NHS budget, by 2005 were approaching 15% (Carvel & Woodward, 2006). The government then said that it would reduce this by 2010. But by 2011 this still was near treble the pre-reform level (Leys & Player, 2011).

The outcome was not better patient care, or ‘customising’ care to patients’ needs, but focus on timed throughput of patients, just as Taylor timed work operation to raise the throughput of vehicles in production. Quality, as in classic Fordism, was subsumed to higher volume. The government admitted some of the limits of the new Taylorism in its NHS Planning Framework to 2008. Published in June 2004, this claimed to be ‘three big shifts’: (i) putting patients and service users first through more personalised care; (ii) a focus on the whole of health and well-being, not only illness; and (iii) more devolution of decision-making to local organisations. These shifts were to be paralleled by moving away from a system that is mainly driven by national targets to one in which: (a) standards become the main driver for continuous improvements in quality; (b) greater scope was allowed for addressing local priorities; (c) all relevant local organisations rather than only hospital boards were to play a part in service improvement (Department of Health, 2004).

But this again proved rhetoric, not least when the increased funding for the NHS came to an end. By March 2006, the health service reforms were in disarray and the chief executive of the NHS resigned as a result of cash limits, overruns and deficits. 4,000 jobs already had been lost in two weeks in NHS hospitals, and some estimates were reported that 15,000 would have to go (Carvel, 2007). The senior civil servant who was chief executive of the new managerial NHS resigned after telling the heads of 28 strategic health authorities that he would hold them personally responsible for any discretionary spending over pre-agreed limits. The Royal College of Nursing said a preliminary analysis claimed that nurses on the basic grades bore the brunt of cuts, with work transferred to lower-paid healthcare assistants. Inversely, NHS Trusts were trying to recruit senior nurses to take on some tasks previously performed by doctors not as assurance of a career path that could be integral to more efficient hospital organisation, but as a stop-gap reaction to a funding crisis (Carvel & Woodward, 2006).

**Figure 1**  
**Weberian Hierarchy, Fordism and Health**



The underlying reasons related precisely to the difference between treating labour as a variable cost, and the high HRM commitment to labour as a fixed cost. The NHS reforms had been based on the principle of reducing the cost of labour on the implicit logic of raising its efficiency through increased surveillance rather than a change in methods of work operation or hospital organisation. Rather than recognising the vocational commitment of medical staff and seeking dialogue with them to increase efficiency through new methods of work operation, both the Thatcher and New Labour governments distrusted them. When limits were reached at higher unit costs through the external logic of out-sourcing than would have been the case through internal NHS provision the government simply declared that the costs of its reforms had hit its targeted ceiling, refused more money and blamed NHS managers for their own failure to manage the budgets that had been devolved to them.

## *Change by Stealth*

The Weberian and Fordist logic of New Public Management in the NHS is stylised in Figure 1. Yet this only captures part of the picture, for there also was another hidden agenda. In their analysis of what has transpired, Leys and Player (2011) have chronicled a ‘stealth agenda’ to privatise the English NHS. This neither was overt in the Thatcher governments’ agenda, nor in the agenda of New Labour, nor in the manifestoes of the Liberal Party before it formed a coalition with the Conservatives in 2010. They trace this to when then New Labour Minister of Health Alan Milward in July 2000 was negotiating a so-called concordat with the Independent Healthcare Association.

Three major changes in the NHS were required. First, the taboo on private provision of NHS clinical services had to be overcome, and a bridgehead created for the private sector in the NHS. Second, NHS organisations had to be converted into ‘real businesses’ rather than the ‘make-believe’ businesses of the so-called internal market. Third, the ties between the NHS workforce and the NHS had to be weakened, so that enough NHS staff would be ready to transfer to private sector employment as private providers took over more and more NHS work. According to Leys (2011):

All of these changes were major. Yet most people were largely unaware of them and certainly unaware of where they were leading – and that includes many MPs and even many clinicians. And not just because the NHS is complex, and organisational changes don’t make sexy headlines. It is above all because the changes were made covertly, using government powers that did not require primary legislation. The true purpose of a series of so-called reforms was deliberately concealed. It is because of this that what has happened deserves to be called a plot. (Leys, 2011, p. 1)

None of the changes were sanctioned by an electorate. They had been explicitly disavowed by the Liberal Party which in its earlier election manifesto had declared that it would reverse top-down changes in the NHS. This parallels the disenfranchising of electorates stressed in chapter 1 in the case of the Eurozone crisis and the manner in which it was assumed that elected governments could not be trusted to manage public finances responsibly. Which depended on the cases in question, in which Greece had failed, yet Spain and Ireland before the crisis had been impeccable, with levels of debt lower than Germany.

## *Alternative Logics*

By contrast, there are alternative logics in post Fordist paradigms of health care and provision. For instance, since WW2 Sweden has enjoyed one of the leading world healthcare systems. But by the early 1990's, rising healthcare costs prompted an incoming Conservative government to reduce central government funding to local authorities for health provision. In Stockholm, the city council cut funding for hospitals across the board by 15%. Most hospitals in Sweden did what they thought was their only option - downsizing by nursing staff thereby increasing demands on those remaining in terms of labour intensity, and the threat of sanctions for non-performance.

Consciously influenced by an earlier introduction to the conceptual framework of post Fordism, and rather than implementing a downsizing programme, Jan Lindsten, executive director of the Karolinska hospital, with over 4,000 employees, commissioned a study of patient flow both into and through the hospital, similar to analysing the flow of work-in-progress in the production sphere (Kaplinsky, 1995). The results showed that average waiting time for surgery was eight months. Surgeons spent as much as two thirds of their time between operations, much of it waiting for the next patient, frequently because of lack of an anaesthetist. Operating theatres for several specialisations were idle for up to a third of normal working hours. Others were over pressured.

Lindsten's change management programme had three objectives: to improve the quality of service to patients; to enhance operational efficiency but, also, and notably missing from NPM reforms in the British NHS, to improve employee morale. It identified four key problems.

### *1. Under-Utilisation of Capacity and Time*

The diagnostic phase of started with surgery and directly addressed the issue of under-utilisation of capacity. It showed that 59 per cent of potential operating time was not being utilised.

### *2. Skill Bottlenecks*

One reason was a relative shortage of anaesthetists and anaesthetic nurses. Anaesthetists were spending 85 per cent of their time with patients, but surgeons only 25 per cent in surgery.

### *3. Slow Changeover Time*

Another was slow changeover procedures between operations. In one operating theatre, nearly a fifth of operations were cancelled. Less than a third of the cancellations were because the patient did not show up; the others were due to inadequate organisation.

### *4. Lack of Patient Path Planning*

Before Jan Lindsten initiated change management, there was no coordination of patient flow from reference by a doctor through diagnosis to operations. People were referred to different specialisations and services in haphazard manner, needing to make several visits to the hospital on different dates. As an outcome waiting lists of up to seven months were common. But, after the change management, dramatically reduced.

Lindsten's principle was similar to post Fordist customisation: putting the patient first. But this was not simply re-branding patients as customers. Nor did it deny the commitment of medical staff to focus on patient care. It enhanced it by addressing both the operational logic of how things were done, and extending this to the organisational logic of the hospital itself. Improving service to patients would be the focus of all organisational structure, flow and methods of work operation within the hospital.

#### **Box 1**

##### **Success in Post Fordist Hospital Organisation**

The change management programme at the Karolinska Hospital made it possible to realise the following.

1. Flexible capacity use of operating theatres was on the likely duration of the operation rather than the type of operation. As a result all theatres were segmented in four groups – fast, medium, slow and emergency.
2. Flexible theatre use was matched by flexible use of wards. Underlying this was the principle of clustering 'families of service' both within the organisational logic of the hospital and the operational logic of departments and units.
3. With multiple use of operating theatres, two were closed, thereby reducing overhead costs.

4. More anaesthetists were hired, and new pre-operation anaesthetic unit established, with anaesthetists available to service operating theatres on a more programmed basis.

5. New 'nursing coordinator' posts were created to assure patient path planning on the principle that all diagnosis, other than in highly complex cases, should be in 'one scheduled day'

6. While doctors initially resisted nurses scheduling appointments for them, Lindsten offset this by assuring them that the 'one day' principle for diagnosis, on which they had to be present, would assure them a guaranteed 'free day' for their own research.

□ The new position of 'nursing coordinator' also created a career path for senior nurses, drawing also on their better practical knowledge, than that of doctors, of why there had been delays in 'getting patients into ops'.

□ The time between operations was cut by up to half. Average waiting time for surgery was reduced from six to eight months to six to three weeks, and in some cases one week. As an outcome, patient throughput also increased by a quarter.

□ Overall unit costs were cut by 15%. Unlike 'downsizing', no one was made redundant. Karolinska had become 'lean' by cutting wasted time and under-utilisation of staff, skills and fixed resources.

The change management achieved at Karolinska is summarised in Box 1. It identified shortcomings in operational logic and addressed inertia in organisational logic arising from them. It involved 'boundary spanning' between different departments. Such spanning (Cross & Parker, 2004; Nicolini 2011) can mean that operational managers within different units can gain from synergies that can be mutually beneficial

On the other hand, the Karolinska model should not be idealised. Many of the medical staff at Karolinska felt that they knew what the problems were before the change management exercise was undertaken, and that it should have been 'driven internally' rather than imposed top-down. What had been gained was remarkable, but as much flexibility-by-constraint, including the initial pressure from government to reduce costs, rather than flexibility-by-consent.

Swan *et al.*, (2007) nonetheless found that sustained success in boundary spanning requires negotiation and reconciliation of different interests since if boundaries are changed or

shifted, some actors' interests will be or reduced or displaced rather than enhanced (Guston, 2001). Both Guston (ibid) and Mørk *et al* (2012) have stressed the importance therefore of recognised procedures not only to facilitate 'voice' but to follow this through by the mutual adoption of innovative practices. This is consistent with the proposals that one of us made for innovation-by-agreement between social partners (Holland, 2000).

### ***Innovation-by-Agreement***

The case for 'flexible production' explicitly drawing on post Fordist Japanese flexible production was advocated by one of us to Jacques Delors (Holland, 1993) and informed his White Paper *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment* (COM 1993). This then informed the recommendation to the Portuguese Presidency of the 2000 European Council of the case for innovation-by-agreement, which was then endorsed by the Council in the 'Lisbon Agenda'.(European Council, 2000).

A common and in part justified perception of the Lisbon Agenda 2000 is that it has failed, not least in its claim that within ten years Europe should be the most competitive economy in the world. But one of the reasons why it did not succeed is that governments failed to endorse that its recommendation for innovation-by-agreement between social partners should be part of the *acquis communautaire*, i.e. citizenship rights for all members of the EU, and thus part of a European Social Model.

The proposal to the Council for innovation-by-agreement included:

- achieving better work-life balance by allowing negotiation of the incidence of individual working time to non-work time to suit family or other personal needs;
- recognising a share of overtime working as 'time credits' which employees later can draw on as paid 'under-time';
- enabling individual proposals for new methods of work operation to be individually recognised and credited, as in Japan;
- combining flexible methods of work operation with job variation including horizontal mobility to offset alienation from routine, as also in Japan;

- ‘enhanced competence profiling’ to extend and diversify the application of skills;
- skills path planning for both lower line managers and workers rather than only career paths for middle or higher levels of management;
- The right to life-long learning in the sense of funded retraining or further professional qualifications.

The proposal for Innovation Agreements therefore had the potential to combine economic efficiency for an organisation through Japanese models of continuous improvement with what most Japanese firms had *not* achieved - both economic efficiency *and* social efficiency in the sense of more effectively meeting the personal needs of employees, especially for work-life balance. This case was reflected in the text of the Lisbon Presidency Conclusions for:

restoring the European Social Model [by] agreements between social partners on innovation and lifelong learning, by exploiting complementarity between lifelong learning and adaptability through flexible management of working time and job rotation,... reducing occupational segregation, and making it easier to reconcile working life and family life. (European Council, 2000).

Lisbon, therefore, was less a call for flexibility-by-constraint or ‘structural reforms’ under threat of closure or down-sizing, than for innovation-by-agreement between management and labour at plant, branch or other local level to gain and sustain both economic and social efficiency and thus reinforce a Social Europe model.

The EU Commission followed Lisbon through with two documents which made this explicit: ‘The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and change’ (COM, 2002), and the Communication on ‘Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe – Enhancing the contribution of European social dialogue’ (COM, 2004). These therefore stressed that the Lisbon Agenda was not only about competitiveness or technical innovation, as it since has been perceived, but for gaining mutual advantage for employers and employees which could enhance both economic and social efficiency.

### ***Gaining Mutual Advantage***

The case for innovation-by-agreement including the right to work-life balance was intended to be a European citizenship right. But, as endorsed in the Lisbon Agenda was only a recommendation.

- It nonetheless could be adopted either at a national level or the level for an individual hospital or group of hospitals in a regional or local health authority.

To operationalise it implies procedures to enable proposals for innovative methods of work operation to be recognised, and their added value to the organisation shared, few employees including middle management will be motivated to propose them. This has several implications.

- Employees proposing innovative methods of work operation, including middle managers, must know that they are not thereby innovating themselves or colleagues out of a job.
- Multi-skilling and multi-tasking may not reduce stress, but skill profiling and skill path planning can enhance individual fulfilment, while horizontal mobility both can provide job variation and lessen the incidence of intensive ‘front line’ work pressure.
- Gaining work-life balance through being able to customise individual working time can reduce or avoid ‘burnout’. Absenteeism is one of the biggest problems facing health systems, especially in hospitals, over stressing also other health employees. The right to work-life balance could redress it.
- Innovations in methods of work operation focused on cutting wasted time and better use of fixed resources are a key alternative to longer hours or cutting jobs.
- The best resource for gaining this within an innovation trajectory rather than only a cost cutting trajectory is employees themselves. It is they rather than top level health administrators who best know what is frustrating operational and organisational learning.
- Effective mutual feedback is vital if both management and employees are to be able to voice not only their own interests, but also their earlier learning from experience on how operational logic can be improved. Such voice should be able to articulate and improve what otherwise is implicitly assumed, or has been eroded.

## ***References***

Beardwell, I., (1998). Bridging the gap? Employee voice, representation and HRM. In P. Sparrow, and M. Marchington, (1998). *Human Resource Management: The New Agenda*. London: Financial Times – Pitman Publishing.

Bevan, A. (1952). *In Place of Fear*. London: MacGibbon & Kee.

- Carvel, J. and Woodward, W. (2006). Thousands of jobs go in NHS cash crisis. *The Guardian*, March 24<sup>th</sup>.
- Carvel, J. (2007). MPs criticise ‘boom and bust’ NHS planning. *The Guardian*, March 23<sup>rd</sup>.
- COM, (1993). *Growth, Competitiveness, Employment: The Challenge and Ways Forward into the 21st Century*. Brussels: EU Commission.
- COM, (2002). *The European social dialogue, a force for innovation and change*. Brussels: European Commission.
- COM, (2004). *Partnership for change in an enlarged Europe – Enhancing the contribution of European social dialogue*. Brussels: European Commission.
- Cousins, C. (1987). *Controlling Social Welfare: A Sociology of State Welfare Work and Organisations*. Sussex: Wheatsheaf.
- Cross, R.L and Parker, A. (2004) *The Hidden Power of Social Networks: Understanding How Work Really Gets Done in Organizations*. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
- Darwin, C. (1869), *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*. (5th ed.). London: John Murray. ,
- Department of Health, (2004). *National Standards, Local Action Health and Social Care Standards and Planning Framework 2005/06–2007/08*. London: HMSO.
- DHSS, (1983). *The NHS Management Enquiry*. (The Griffiths Report). London: HMSO.
- Edmonson, A.C. (2003). Speaking Up in the Operating Room: How Team Leaders Promote Learning in Inter-Disciplinary Action Teams. *Journal of Management Studies* 40: 6, 1419-1452.
- European Council (2000). *Presidency Conclusions*. Lisbon: June.
- Guston, D. H. (2001). Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and Science. In *Science, Technology, & Human Values*, 26: 4, 399-408
- Hirschman, A. (1970). *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
- Holland, S. (1993). *The European Imperative: Economic and Social Cohesion in the 1990s*. Foreword Jacques Delors. Nottingham: Spokesman Press.
- Holland, S. (2000). *Innovation Agreements*. Advisory Paper for the Portuguese Presidency of the European Council. Lisbon: Office of the President of the Council of Ministers.
- Holland, S. (2015). *Europe in Question – and what to do about it*. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.
- House of Commons (2003). Public Administration Committee. *NHS Public Service Targets*. Hansard.

- Kaplinsky, R. (1995). Patients as Work in Progress: Organisational Reform in the Health Sector. In Andreassen, L., B. Coriat, F. den Hertog and R. Kaplinsky (Eds.) *Europe's Next Step: Organisational Innovation, Competition and Employment*, London: Frank Cass.
- Lacey, R. (1987). *Ford: The Men and the Machine*. London: Heinemann and Pan Books.
- Laja, S. (2012). Lansley's health bill amendments fail to placate medical bodies. *The Guardian*, February 3<sup>rd</sup>.
- Le Grand, J. (1997). Knights, knaves or pawns? Human behaviour and social policy. *The Journal of Social Policy*. April, 149-169.
- Leys, C. and Player, S. (2011). *The Plot Against the NHS*. London: Merlin.
- Marshall A. (1870). *Economics*. London: Macmillan
- Monbiot, G. (2003). The Patient is Dying. *The Guardian*, September 30<sup>th</sup>
- Morrison, E.W. and Milliken, F. (2003). Speaking Up, Remaining Silent: the Dynamics of Voice and Silence in Organisations. *The Journal of Management Studies*. Special Issue. 40:6, 1353-1568.
- Mørk, B. E, Hoholm, T., Maaninen-Olsson, E. and Aanestad, M. (2011). Changing practice through boundary organizing: A case from medical R&D. *Human Relations*, 65: 263-88.
- NEF (2014). Markets are the wrong medicine for the NHS. London: New Economics Foundation.
- Nicolini, D. (2011). Practice as the site of knowing: Insights from the field of telemedicine. *Organization Science* 22(3): 602–620.
- Oliveira, T.C. (2007). Delving Down to Learn Up. Plenary Presentation to the Sloan MIT-Portugal Conference on New Developments in Management, Lisbon, June.
- Oliveira, T.C., da Costa, J. F. and Lira de Carvalho, F. E. Hierarchies or Holdings? (2014). In C. Machado and J. P. Davim, (Eds). *Effective Human Resource Management in Small and Medium Enterprises: Global Perspectives*. IGI Global Associates, 342-376.
- Oliveira, T.C. and Holland S, (2007a): Innovation-by-Agreement: Activating the Lisbon Agenda. *Notas Economicas*. Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra. December.
- Oliveira, T.C. and Holland S, (2007b) Alternative Paradigms of Hospital Work Organisation and Health Provision, in *Revista Portuguesa de Saúde Publica*. Lisbon: July.
- Oliveira, T.C. and Holland S, (2013) Institutional Logics Promoting and Inhibiting Innovation. In C. Machado and J. P. Davim, (Eds). *Management and Engineering Innovation*. IGI Global Associates. 2013, 179-216.
- Revell, J. (2005). Special News Investigation on the NHS. *The Sunday Times*, March 6<sup>th</sup>.
- Stern, S. (2006). It is time to end our unproductive fixation with productivity. *The Financial Times*, April 11<sup>th</sup>

Swan J, Bresnen, M, Newell S, and Robertson M (2007). The object of knowledge: The role of objects in biomedical innovation. *Human Relations* 60(12): 1809–1837.

Taylor, F. (2011). *The Principles of Scientific Management*. New York: Harper and Row.

The Economist (2013). The NHS: Curing All Ills. May 25th

Teece, D. J. (1992). Competition, co-operation, and innovation. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organisation*, 18, pp. 1–25.

Teece, D. (Ed.) (1997). *The Competitive Challenge*. Cambridge MA: Ballinger.

Toynbee, P. (2005). ‘Blair's reality gap’. The Guardian, January 14<sup>th</sup>

Warwick, K. (2012). Deliberately or not, the NHS is being set up for failure. *The New Statesman* January 22<sup>nd</sup>.

Williamson, O. E. (1979) Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations. *The Journal of Law & Economics* 22:2, 233-261

Womack, J. P and Jones, D. T. (1996). *Lean Thinking*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

# **Locational advantages within production networks of transnational corporations and the role of industrial clusters<sup>230</sup>**

Anikó Magasházi

## ***Abstract***

The paper connects the research area of global developments, Global Value Chains / Global Production Networks with localized/regional developments of industrial clusters to investigate how to be successful with local merits within the new world economic structure, where majority of trade and investment relations are concluded within transnational corporations' network. The East Asian countries, having the longest experience of development within cross-border production networks, first gave their local – by now increasingly regional answers with industrial clusters formed by private initiatives and consciously supported by national and regional governments. This set out a clear “high road” economic development strategy, with less government interference but still with broad-based support characterizing European best practices: in Ireland and in Austria. Hungary's 25 years' inclusion in global production networks and 15 years of existence of clusters offer both statistical and empirical results of the development. The paper offers policy recommendations on how to catch up with the European champions and suggestions to keep this target as a priority agenda in the regional economic development.

## ***Introduction***

The unipolar world order after the Cold War, international liberalization of trade and finance, revolutionary developments in information and communications technology as well as in transportation led to accelerated globalization worldwide, which fundamentally reshaped the global economic system. The ICT revolution made it possible to coordinate complex networks at a distance, and the huge differences in wage cost between developed and developing/emerging nations made separation of production stages dispersed geographically profitable, called by Richard Baldwin as the 2nd unbundling of globalization. (Baldwin, 2012).

---

<sup>230</sup> The research was conducted with the support of the European Union – Hungary, within the TÁMOP 4.2.1.D-15/1/KONV-2015-0006 identification number– Scholarship for Hungarian and foreign students and researchers – in the framework of the development of Kőszeg innovative research base and knowledge centre within the professors' and research network of Corvinus University, Budapest

The major part of the world trade is conducted nowadays within internal networks of transnational corporations (TNCs). The question arises as to what role institutions of nation states, regions, local communities can play in the new environment in order to navigate towards and increasing the well-being of their societies.

Within the role of FDI, globally expanding TNCs have played an increasing role in the catching up endeavours of emerging economies. The current study put special emphasis on the Southeast Asian and CEE region to identify the interaction of globalization and localization effects in the economy with impact on the society.

In the academic literature of world economic adjustment increasing attention has been devoted from the eighties to the rapidly expanding newly industrializing countries (NICs) in Southeast-Asia (SEA) - South-Korea, Singapore, Hongkong and Taiwan -, referred today by the terminology of newly industrialized entities (NIEs). They relied predominantly, some of them partly on FDI, pursuing however deferring economic development strategies. The rise of China from the nineties opened new economic opportunities not only for Hong Kong and Taiwan but for the whole East Asian region, too. Singapore's small local market size and scarcity of resources was efficiently counterbalanced by its increasing economic ties with its ASEAN neighbours. Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia have moved up in the meantime on the development ladder as a next group of emerging economies.

Meanwhile Hungary and its post-socialist neighbours entered as well from the nineties the global economic arena, the collapse of COMECON, and the old economic order have left their governments with urgent tasks in world economic adjustment. The FDI-driven economic policies of the new emerging region brought all the Visegrad Four (V4) countries by the end of the century into the epicentre of globalization, too.

This research has concentrated on two aspects, which has been gaining increasing importance in recent years in the V4 region, as well:

- 1.) The characteristics of global value chains and their impacts
- 2.) The emergence and role of industrial clusters in innovation, internationalization of domestic firms, upgrading

In order to reach the aim of the paper, a brief review of the relevant literature follows in Section 2, connecting also the global and local aspects, leading to the research question. In Section 3, we provide a summary of empirical results, case studies available through secondary sources on the Southeast Asian development. Then in Section 4 the developments in the CEE region are discussed, with special attention to Hungary. There is hardly any research connecting both global and local aspects in the CEE region, especially not in the last five years. In the final

section conclusions, policy recommendations and possibilities for further research are formulated.

### *Literature Review and Research Question*

About 60% of today's global trade, amounting to 20 trillion USD, consists of intermediary goods and services which are combined at a later stage to create final goods. (UNCTAD, 2013). The fragmentation of production processes have led to transnational and cross-border production systems, causing much more intense integration, functional interconnectedness. The two distinct areas within globalization research analyzing this process are the global value chain (GVC) – growing out of the still existing global commodity chain (GCC) concept and the global production network (GPN) research. From the firm-perspective, while GVCs concentrate more on value creation, contribution to value added of the individual chain elements, the latter deals with the separate functions of each of the stages from the perspective of the final products. Coe define GPNs as the globally organized nexus of interconnected functions and operations by firms and non-firm institutions through which goods and services are produced and distributed. (Coe et.al. 2004: 471-473).

Although global chain and network theories have roots in the 80's, the unfolding of accelerated globalization in the nineties induced to develop a concise and till today continuously expanding concept of global commodity chain coined and published initially by Gereffi and Korzeniewicz in 1994, following its presentation at a conference already in 1992 at the Duke University. They drew their initial inspiration from Immanuel Wallerstein's World System Theory published in 1974. The early Commodity Chain concept by Gereffi expressed the intention of establishing a meso mode of analysis below and above the nation-state, revealing macro-micro linkages. (Yeung, 2015: 9).

By 2000 the concept was further developed into the framework of global value chains (GVCs). Their importance is seen in the way how they „link together workers and consumers around the world an often provide a stepping stone for firms and workers in developing countries to integrate into the global economy (Gereffy and Stark, 2011:2). GVC framework concentrates on sequence of value added from conception to production and end use. From top down view it examines how lead firms govern globally its affiliates and suppliers, from bottom up view, how GVCs impact the trajectory of economic and social upgrading of the firms of the given economy/region.

Based on Gereffi (1995) and Gereffi and Stark (2011) we can identify five main elements of analysis of GVCs:


1. An input-output structure - showing the whole flow from raw materials till the end product.
2. It has a geographical aspect
3. A governance structure which detail how the GVC is being controlled
4. An institutional context
5. Upgrading, which describes how producers move between various stages of the value chain.

Gereffi (1999) and Humphrey and Schmitz introduced the definition of upgrading, describing it as movement towards higher value added, and analyzing what movements occur between different stages of the value chain. (Humphrey-Schmitz, 2002) (Gereffi, G.& Stark, F. 2011:4). Humphrey – Shmitz (2002) defines economic upgrading, evaluated on the firm-level into four main types, which has been seen as a widely accepted typology since then:

1. product upgrading: moving into more sophisticated product
2. process upgrading: transforming inputs into outputs more efficiently by reorganizing the production system or introducing superior technology
3. functional upgrading: acquiring new functions in the chain (or abandoning existing functions) to increase the overall skill content of activities
4. inter-sectoral upgrading: using the knowledge acquired in particular chain functions to move into different sectors

A well spread visualization of the different qualities of stages of GVCs is the so called „smile curve”, showing also the deepening of the smile in th 21st century value chain, as the stages before and after the production proved considerably higher value added.

**Figure 1. The smile curve**



*Source: Baldwin – Evenett (2012:90)*

As GVCs became more and more widespread, a further important contribution created a more refined typology of governance structure by lead firms, adding beside the traditional market and hierarchical governance, modular, relational and captive governance types as well. (Gereffi, et al. 2005). The different governance types can exert an effect on the upgrading of supplier firms.

- 1.) Market governance: simple transactions, central governing mechanism is price
- 2.) Modular governance: production or service according to customer's specification, supplier produces independently, take full responsibility for production
- 3.) Relational governance: complex interaction between lead firm and supplier involving tacit knowledge exchange and knowledge spill-overs
- 4.) Captive governance: high level of control by the lead firm, small suppliers may find themselves locked in, dependence on a single lead firm
- 5.) Hierarchical: vertical integration and managerial control within a set of lead firms that develops and manufactures products in-house; products are complex, lack of highly competent suppliers (Cattaneo et.al.,2013)

The Global Production Network (GPN) framework was developed in the first years of the 2000s. It defines its roots in Actor – Network Theory (ANT) from the sociological – cultural perspective as well as brings in the territorial logic from the discipline of economic geography to include development impact on the territories these networks encompass. The first contributors in creating the GPN framework were Dickens and Henderson, the ideas of GPN and regional development were initially developed by Coe et.al. (2004) and further enhanced

by Yeung (2009) extending the research to strategic coupling and regional development. (Coe &Yeung 2015: 15)

Proponents of the GPN concept Neil M. Coe and Henry Yeung state that GPN “brings together a wide array of economic actors, most notably capitalist firms, state institutions, labour unions, consumers and non-government organizations, in the transnational production of economic value.” It is a broader framework, stressing GPNs role in economic development. Their most recent book defines the new framework named in the book GPN 2.0, with the aim to contribute to explanations of uneven territorial development in the global economy. (Coe & Yeung, 2015)

Coe underlines that despite the different approaches, there is a growing consensus that an important key to understanding the complexity of the global economy is the concept of the network. They see however a major difference between Global Commodity Chain (GCC)/ GVC and GPNs firstly, GVCs are more linear, while GPN research aims at including all kinds of network configurations. “Secondly GCCs/GVCs focus narrowly on the governance of inter-firm transactions while GPNs attempt to encompass all relevant sets of actors and relationships”. (Coe et. al. 2008 : 272). We find it important to add a further quality of GPN research, whereas „the precise nature and articulation of firm-centred production networks are deeply influenced by the concrete socio-political contexts whithin which they are embedded” (Henderson et. al, 2001: 445-46 in Yeung 2008).

The value chains and global production networks have not only become a major organizational innovation in global operations, but they also acted as a catalyst for international knowledge diffusion (Ernst – Kim 2001). Although in the academic literature the terminology of GVCs is most wide-spread, we use the global production network (GPN) terminology referring to regional development, with the exception, that the referred author belongs to the GVC research school.

While GPNs intend to explain the impetus for economic development generated by globalization impacts, industrial and business clusters enhance the local element. In relation to GPNs and competitiveness, regional competitive advantage, opportunity for economic and social upgrading, we believe that the appearance and development of industrial/service clusters is an important research area. Porter’s widedly accepted definition of industrial clusters describes the phenomenon as a geographic concentration of interconnected firms and associated institutions. As Porter states that although old reasons for clustering of firms diminished with the globalization, „new influences of clusters on competition have taken on growing importance in the increasingly comple, knowledge-based, and dynamic economy”. (Porter, 2000: p 15.).

Clusters „can transact more flexibly, share technologies and knowledge more readily, operate more flexibly, start new businesses more easily, and perceive and implement innovations more rapidly. (Porter 2007: p. 2). They increase trade and investments in the broader agglomeration through cost-savings through linkages. An interesting dimension in academic literature addresses the impact of clusters on entrepreneurship. (Delgado, Porter, Stern 2010). We believe GPNs and clusters are in many ways interconnected, still there are only very few examples in academic literature to combine them in a research.

Humphrey and Schmitz linking first industrial cluster and GVC research in 2000 raised the question of the scope of local development strategies and local competitive advantage based on industrial clustering in an increasingly globalized world. While GVCs can provide the possibility of certain capability building for local firms, the diffusion of information required to enhance the local area's competitiveness can happen through clustering. Upgrading aimed at repositioning of the cluster itself is already a more risky, complex task to reach new market, or old markets in new ways. For a successful local industrial policy to achieve radical product or functional upgrading a coalition of all actors concerned is an absolute minimum requirement both from the side of the public and the private sector in an even policy network architecture, without top down approach. (Humphrey-Schmitz, 2000: 28-29)

In a later research they examine value chain relationships and upgrading in clusters concluding that upgrading prospects of clusters differ according to the type of value chain they feed into. Thus while a quasi-hierarchical chains, characterized by power and uneven relationships, promotes product upgrading, it is not beneficial to further diversification, functional upgrading. Those chains, which are characterized by even networks – supposing equally high level of competences - constitute ideal upgrading conditions in all respects. (Humphrey-Schmitz, 2002: p. 1023). Thus the local aspect, how innovative, supportive the environment around the local firms is in establishing local, regional network possibilities for joint improvement of their skills and competences represent a crucial element for a more beneficial impact of accessing GVCs. The different type of chain relationships have crucial effect for upgrading in clusters, may even change the quality of the cluster itself.

The limits to functional upgrading can as well be temporary in quasi-hierarchical GVC, as power is relational – assumes the powerlessness of the other party. In a conducive environment producers or their spin-offs may acquire further capabilities, e.g. product development, design, acquiring new markets, investing strongly with own or public funds in the future. The importance of such learning have been supported by the example of the Taiwanese electronics industry, how they achieved to be part of shared supply networks,

making design supplied by one customer and then make adaptations and supply other customers with other markets. The rise of China as production base however raises the need for even more differentiated approach in fostering innovation, from “manufacturing first” to “idea first” approach. (Sturgeon-Lee 2004: 43)

Based on the literature discussed, we would like to add another element of GVC- cluster interaction. What role national and local public authorities can play to enhance an innovative environment conducive to upgrading of the member firms of industrial clusters within GVCs? An overview of international best practices will lead to conclusions for the Hungarian developments. We believe that in the next decades research on interaction between TNCs and host regions, should gain increasing importance. Both the theories and empirical studies are fractional, often ambivalent. We agree with Rugraff, that a critical, empirical approach is missing from the academic literature, which examines the development versus heterogenic character of TNCs, and the fact, how decision-makers of host economies can influence better TNCs (Rugraff, E. 2012: 90).

### ***Overview of Literature and Empirical Findings in East-Asia***

The East –Asian literature on production networks has its roots in the Japanese economist, Akamatsu’s Flying Geese paradigm, dating back to 1935. He described the interconnectedness as “V” shape structure how Japan led the “Greater Prosperity Sphere in East-Asia” followed by groups of countries on lower level of development, transferring production there following its military expansion. It re-emerged in the 1970’s-80’s, especially after the “Plaza Accord”,<sup>231</sup> when Japanese companies settled their manufacturing units of products of lower technological level in Southeast-Asian countries– the first group being Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan, followed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines (Xing, 2007), by the means of economic expansion. (After the transition German, Austrian and Italian companies represented this form of FDI in the textile, shoe and electronic industry of the V4 countries).

As the rise of China coincided with the new global economic structures emerging in mid-nineties, where TNCs “fine-sliced” and transferred vertically parts of their production processes according to comparative and competitive advantages, China’s huge production base was

---

<sup>231</sup> The agreement of the G5 countries (US, Japan, German Federal Republic, France and UK) signed in the New York Plaza hotel about the depreciation of the US dollar against German mark and Japanese Yen to correct huge trade imbalances between USA and Germany, USA and Japan. The unprecedented trade and investment invasion of Japan into Southeast Asia followed unplanned.

included in this process. Thanks to its strong private sector activity, China has become an important player within the global value chains in the last decade, referred to as “Bamboo capitalism” in the literature, with major impact on trade and FDI in East-Asia. (Xing, L. 2007, *The Economist* 2011).

Regarding industrial clusters the East Asian academic literature also created a symbolic terminology, the so-called “water lily model” describing the most recent developments through industrial clusters, pointing at the regional competitive advantage with international integration, saving link costs, increasing trade and investment in the wider agglomeration. (Park 2005 in Han 2012). Clusters emerged first in Japan, then parallelly in Korea, Taiwan and later in China as “floating lilies”. A typical East Asian example is the development of the LCD panel manufacturing industry, which started in Japan, then moved to Korea, thereafter to Taiwan and finally to China. Today Korean firms (LG Panel, Samsung), Japanese companies (Sharp) and Taiwanese companies (Nam et. al. 2010) produce 90 % of the world LCD panel production (Han, Oh, Yoo 2012).

A number of empirical works in East Asia demonstrated the utility of strategic coupling and regional development, which has driven economic growth in Asia. Coe and Yeung detail identified cases of international partnerships between lead firms and local firms, in which development takes place through direct connections of regions into GPNs in e.g. in Taiwan, Singapore, or through indigenous innovation driven by industrial policy in case of the South-Korean chaebols. (Coe-Yeung, 2015:30).

A concise account of interconnectedness between GPNs and industrial clusters with case studies is provided in Yeung’s very conclusive paper (Yeung, 2008). It underlines that accelerated globalization rendered the region as most significant site of competition across the global economy, starting from the macro regions of the important Triad or “motors” (North-America, Western Europe and Southeast Asia) (Ohmae, 1995, Scott 1996, 1998 in Yeung, 2008:3) or smaller crossborder regions, as well as subnational regions. The eminent role of Southeast Asia can be partly attributed to the process of economic development and regional transformation, driven by the emergence of industrial clusters in high growth regions in specific Southeast Asian countries. Such examples are the electronics clusters in Penang and Johor in Malaysia, Greater Bangkok Area in Thailand and in Singapore as well as the automobile cluster in Bangkok and Rayong in Thailand, the chemical and biomedical clusters in Singapore. These examples lead to the concept of seeing “GPNs a globalized/decentralized phenomenon and industrial clusters as a localized/concentrated constellation. The former operates on a global scale and is constantly searching for better production locations whereas the latter is developed

to “bring down” and “localize” this highly globalized production activity.”(Yeung, 2008: 3-4). The supportive role of the state and its manifestation in local and regional institutions, availability of economy of scale through technology- or expertise specific productions systems, economy of scope in case of co-presence of different industries, availability of local or non-local financial capital, all contribute to higher value-added activity to be created and captured in these locations. TNCs are even ready to transfer coordination centres for their GPNs in case the location well plugged into both local and non-local forms of capital, as the examples of Singapore and Hong Kong demonstrate.

An important aspect of contemporary GPNs is their changing organizational dynamics – caused by new critical success factors of competitiveness, time-to-market pressure and extreme cost consciousness in many industries, thus TNCs are searching for strategic partners. Although Asian firms were latecomers in global competition, they pursued certain competitive strategies that promoted their cost advantages and production capabilities – and *together with their global lead firm customer have started to organize their production activities on a regional basis in Southeast Asia*. Since the 1990s upstream and downstream specialization of global lead firms, have opened new possibilities for technological upgrading for the Southeast Asian local firms, integrated in value chains of GPNs. This possibility occurs because global lead firms can benefit from concurrent R&D, co-evolution of product/process technologies in their strategic partners. Meanwhile electronics manufacturers have been quick to capitalize on their established market positions and production know-how and they have emerged as manufacturing partners in the global electronics industry.

The emergence takes place in industrial clusters of high growth regions mentioned above. How clusters contribute to local firms’ success in Southeast Asia? First of all local and regional institutional capacity in many regions has been strengthened introducing pro-business structures (Penang in Malaysia, Singapore), clusters are seen as solution to local and regional development attracting policy and public interest. Secondly e.g. in the global electronics industry, Singaporean firms are able to benefit from acquiring technological know-how and marketing expertise through accumulated experience supplying lead firms in clusters, e.g. in the hard disk drive (HDD) sector, the Singaporean local company MMI supplies Seagate, Western Digital. Furthermore it must be noted, that Singapore’s infrastructural development, its attractivity towards global third party logistics player plays an important role in the success as well. Singapore’s HDD cluster contributed to become the world largest producer in the 1990s, in 2000 Seagate and Flextronics chose to locate its operational headquarters in Singapore. The Singaporean MMI – which started as OEM supplier of Seagate in 1989, today

operating in geographical proximity to Seagate's R&D activities transferred to Singapore, participates in HDD product development right at the beginning of the product life cycle – enabling greater co-development product knowledge. On the other hand MMI and some Taiwanese firms opened one affiliate in HDD cluster of Thailand and one affiliate in personal computer industry cluster in Penang, and three others in Johor, Malaysia to sustain price competitiveness.

Together with Singapore and Thailand, Penang is an integral part of the *Southeast Asian "golden triangle"*. After over three decades of active promotion at the federal and state level, Penang is now well placed in electronics GPNs, as host of several global lead firms, such as Intel, Dell, AMD, Hewlett Packard, Seagate. The Penang Development Corporations (PDC) plays a critical role in the development of the cluster not only by facilitating intra-firm networks in the electronics industry, but introducing IT into the supply chains of local firms and maintaining an excellent air hub with links to Singapore, Taipei and Tokyo.

Just like in the case of Penang and Singapore, the Thai government's supportive industrial and economic policies played a highly significant role in the formation and development of its giant automotive cluster. Development of sector-specific industrial estates, leadership role in regional cooperation initiatives have been important contributions to the success. Without embarking on a national car project, as Proton in Malaysia or Kia-Timor in Indonesia, they chose the strategy of plugging the Bangkok-Rayong region into GPNs of lead firms of the industry. In the cluster of 12 automobile assemblers, more than 700 foreign and Thai-owned first-tier suppliers benefit from a wide range of internal economies – such as lower transport and logistics costs and greater certainty in inter-firm transactions.

A third convincing case study of cluster economies was provided in Wang and Yeung's (2000) paper about Singapore's petrochemical cluster located at Jurong Island. While geographical advantages evidently played a role, but in the last three decades continuous supportive policies, conducive business environment were needed to establish and sustain its role as regional production and trade centre of international oil, petrochemical and chemical companies. Under Manufacturing 2000, the Chemical 2000 study was completed with recommendations to enhance the chemical cluster and reinforce Singapore's position as chemical hub in the Asia-Pacific region, reaffirming the role of government in developing the cluster. The government invested S\$7.2 billion to build a chemical island, combining seven offshore islands of Singapore into a single landmass. (The combined output of chemicals and petro-chemicals accounted for 31.2 % of total output in Singapore's manufacturing sector) Exxon-Mobil and Sumitomo Chemicals contributed to the cluster development strategy. The

reinforced attraction of Singapore as manufacturing base of the chemical industry is confirmed by new FDI projects realized in the chemical cluster. The Evonik concern headquartered in Germany erected a new manufacturing facility with a total investment of 500 million EUR in 2014 in addition to its already existing facilities there. (Annual Report Evonik 2013).

The interconnectedness of government's long-term strategy and the importance of cluster in realizing the strategy is well illustrated in Singapore's Living Digital Hub Initiative, elaborated in 2003 to be implemented by 2012, which aims at increasing the contribution of the ICT industry from 7 to 10 % of the GDP and doubling employment in the traditionally fastest growing service sector. The Vision and Strategy created in consultations between government experts and 130 industry participants envisage the country as a Digital Living Lab, where innovative, complex ICT solutions are created, tested, commercialized and deployed. The concept also included the creation of creative clusters, setting up centres for innovation and experimentation to enhance capabilities. These centres should focus on the research and understanding the way ICT technologies will impact the people live, work etc. They should be equipped with state-of-the art equipments and facilities, and will be accessible to individual firm, which financially could not otherwise afford such investments. (Singapore Living Digital Hub, 2012). The scope was enlarged and in September 2015 was announced, that Sembcorp Industries' facilities will be Singapore's first industrial „living laboratory” for test-bedding water and environmental technologies. The company has entered into a partnership with the Economic Development Board (EDB) to grant firms providing these technologies access to its wastewater treatment and waste-to-energy facilities and use them to conduct research and development in areas such as smart water systems. They jointly invest USD 8 million for commercialization of R&D projects (StraitTimes 2015).

Empirical results regarding global production networks, clusters and development are showing also locational advantages in studies on successful development of taiwanese electronics outsourcing industry, as well. Yeung defined explicit and implicit coupling with global lead firms. Examples for explicit coupling, which is driven by local government initiatives between Taiwanese Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs)/Original Design Manufacturers (ODMs) can be found in Zu Suzhou's notebook production computer cluster, while implicit coupling with bottom up dynamics associated with Taiwanese firms in the Dongguan's desktop cluster. Similarly, Yeung et. al. (2009) confirmed geographically concentrated strategic coupling in three science parks in Taiwan. (Yeung, 2015:27).

Studies on China in this respect show a more nuanced picture. The study on the Chinese computer manufacturing industry concluded that the nature of strategic coupling between GPNs

and regional product clusters varied depending on the functionalities of those clusters within the broader GPNs and „the way they were shaped by local institutional and economic context.”

However in certain cases regional institutions may mobilize their specific assets (if they possess), to bargain with the lead firm, not in an asymmetric power relation. This bargaining power is especially high, if „the region specific asset is complementary to the strategic need of the lead firm”. (Yada, 2009 in Yeung, 2015: 21). The concept of embeddedness in local environment is not confirmed by the Taiwanese PC investments in China, resulting in no substantial industrial upgrading over the past two decades, differently from other empirical experiences of TNC-driven clusters in other countries in East Asia. Yang and Liao concludes in their study that cross-border production network of Taiwanese PC investment in Dongguan is an exclusive network, characterised by closed backward linkages with pre-established Taiwanese electronics suppliers, thus with relatively weak ties towards local suppliers in the Dongguan cluster (Yang-Liao, 2009).

In a study conducted in 2004 on the successful Taiwanese electronics outsourcing industry, the question was raised for policy-makers and entrepreneurs in Taiwan, what to do next. How they themselves can develop lead firms from local firms with strong global brands and continuous innovation related to their products, approaching the markets they serve as outsourcing partner. Sturgeon and Lee delivered an explanation why the electronics industry in Taiwan could excel in some areas, such as large scale manufacturing and post-architectural design, while being unsuccessful in other areas, namely product definition, brand development, and new market creation. They claim that the new structure, the value chain modularity, allow these sets of functions to be efficiently coordinated among separate firms and separate locations, making Taiwan be a vibrant hub for component and contract manufacturing. Making the next step, developing higher value added capabilities such as branding and product strategy, was feared by EMS and ODM contractors and customers respondents of the field interviews of the researchers, as competing with customers, even in small ways, risks “killing the golden goose.” To make a step forward, the authors suggested to encourage Taiwanese hardware start-ups to rely on the extensively existing contract manufacturing capacity in their neighbourhood, just like start-ups in the Silicon Valley, requiring an „idea first” instead of „manufacturing” first approach in setting up new firms. The rapid shift of production including employment to China urged the answer to the question raised. (Sturgeon- Lee, 2004: 41)

By now several Taiwanese enterprises have succeeded in taking the suggested step, they are today Original Brand Manufacturers (OBMs), multinational hardware and electronics corporations specializing in advanced electronics technology, such as Acer or Asus, 4th and 5th

computer vendors on the world. In the early 2000s, Acer implemented a new business model, shifting from a manufacturer to a designer, marketer and distributor of products, while performing production processes via contract manufacturers. In addition to its core business, both Acer and Asus own giant franchised computer retail chains in Taipei. ACER provides e-business services to businesses, governments and consumers. The achievements of ASUS in innovation and product design resulted in launching the world's thinnest PC at the end of 2010 and their products were honoured by 4256 international prizes within one year in 2013. (Wikipedia, websites)

For further enhancing Original Brand Manufacturing, since February 2015, government negotiations aim at establishing Taiwanese industrial parks in India. The Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs offered as part of the Make In India long-term economic development program a Taiwan-India partnerships based on an unique original brand manufacturer (OBM) model. According to the model, Taiwanese manufacturers will set up factories with Taiwan-developed technologies, while Indian partners market the products under Indian brands in different sectors, such as electronics, ship-building and textiles. (The China Post, 2015)

On the other hand multinationalization and extreme expansion was pursued also by those remaining specialized in contract manufacturing, such as the case Foxconn. Today the largest contract manufacturer, and the third largest IT company by revenue in the world, Foxconn, employs 3-400.000 people only at its biggest factory in Shenzhen, China evoking however worldwide criticism for labour conditions there.

Both Singapore and Taiwan became worldwide positive examples of government policy fostering R&D and innovation, helping clusters to strengthen and creating science parks. As countries seek their ways out of the 2008 crisis a comprehensive study of the US Academy of Sciences puts the - which region, country will lead the knowledge-based, first economy in the 21st century - issue - even into security policy perspective (Wessner, Wolf eds. 2012). Another important Washington-based think tank to advise government policy, the Brookings Institute addresses the question of the missing middle. "Washington, in short, has for decades lacked what Karen Mills, Andrew Reamer, and Elizabeth Reynolds call a "middle" or "meso-" strategy—one that seeks to strengthen the institutions, networks, and regional economies that support business activity to address companies' needs collectively, not individually, through relevant joint actions." (Mauro – Katz 2010:7).<sup>232</sup>

---

<sup>232</sup> They state positive US examples as well, such as for the "innovation economy" in Northeast Ohio, where more than 600 firms now comprise a biomedical cluster which grew at an annualized rate of 7.4 percent from

South Korea's special economic development trajectory creating "national champions" – chaebols has put earlier than its neighbours into the position of home country of lead firms. As discussed in the Asian academic literature, Samsung's successful strategic move to change its GPN architecture earlier into modular governance, than any of its competitors in Asia, has resulted in its worldwide leading position in important sectors in the electronics and ICT industry. Samsung's global production network also encompasses the V4 region, therefore it will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

We agree with Komura however in the distinctiveness of international production networks in East-Asia, playing a decisive role in the economic development of the countries, and extensively covering the whole region. "Although we observe similar cross-border production sharing in the US-Mexico nexus and in the Western Europe (WE) – Central/Eastern Europe (CEE) corridor, they have not reached the level of development that East Asia has accomplished." (Kimura, 2006: 326.)

### *Overview of Europe and Chances for Hungary*

Even if the East-Asian experience with GPNs is exceeding developments in all other parts of the world, Europe has experienced a decisive impact of cross-border networks of international corporations following the East-West divide from the nineties, too. The process further accelerated after 2004, with the 10 new member states joining the European Union. The impacts on intra-industry semi-finished goods trade in the electronics, automotive and machinery industry, manifold increasing bilateral trade volumes in those categories within the Visegrad Four region in the first decade of the 21st century, are clear signs of this development (Magashazi 2014), based on the theory that intra-industry and intra-firm trade strongly correlate. (Ng and Kaminski 2001). These findings underline the intense inclusion of the V4 region into the Global Production Networks as well.

Simultaneously the emergence of clusters in Europe accelerated from 2000, as the Survey of the European Cluster Observatory clearly documents.<sup>233</sup> The majority of the respondents had a regional character, while 13 % of the clusters already were claimed to be transnational

---

2003 to 2008 and in 2008 alone attracted \$395 million in venture capital and National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding. (Muro – Katz 2013: 13)

<sup>233</sup> The European Cluster Observatory, launched in June 2007, is the most comprehensive database on clusters, cluster organisations, and cluster reports in Europe. It is managed by the Center for Strategy and Competitiveness (CSC) at the Stockholm School of Economics and funded by the European Commission's Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry.

(Viahka, 2012:8). Mark Muro and Bruce Katz calls our decade the New “Cluster Moment”, how regional innovation clusters can foster the next economy, as clusters are the locations most likely to deliver a new economy that is export-oriented, lower carbon, innovation-driven, that through a combination of higher productivity and collaboration further enhance the development of high potential locations. The question of clusters came into light under deep uncertainty following the 2008/2009 crisis with the urgent importance of value-creation in local economies, whether high-tech or manufacturing. As global examples show clusters as public policy tools can create synergies and efficiencies without particularly high cost, ranging from the Silicon Valley technology cluster to the Vermont cheesemaking cluster. Thanks to clusters, firms, regions, and the nation are more productive than they might otherwise be. Policymakers and economic scholars around the world agree that the primary source of economic growth, competitiveness, and increases in standards of living in a globalized economy is innovation in the form of new products and services, more efficient production processes, and new business models. (Muro-Katz 2010).

The European Cluster Observatory developed in its 2014 report a mapping tool, by establishing so-called “Hotspot” indicators. It gives an assessment of the overall cluster strength across a region. Cluster strength is measured on four performance drivers: size, specialization, productivity, dynamism (latter measured by employment growth). There are still simplifications in the new extended mapping tool e.g. it has to consider which data is available comparably in Europe, thus it measures productivity by wages per employee.

For cross-sectoral clusters in the 10 emerging industrial categories<sup>234</sup> defined, hot spots are generally found in certain Western-European regions: Ireland as a whole, South-France, Cote d’Azur, the Stuttgart area, Oberbayern Area, South Sweden, Helsinki area, and in capitals like Berlin, Vienna, and alone from the V4 region only the Budapest area (Central-Hungary). In general they are Europe’s traditional economic centres, or Europe’s innovation leaders – Scandinavian and Baltic hotspots and some urban centres, which are able to overcome the burden of the weaker surrounding environment. (European Cluster Panorama 2014: 14).

---

<sup>234</sup>The 10 selected emerging industries cover 22 % of employment and 35 % of payroll in Europe, average wage, average wage and value added is higher than for the economy, outperform either in growth or productivity. They include advanced packaging, biopharmaceuticals, blue growth industries (new islands of activity), creative industries, environmental industries, experience industries (SMEs in intersection of arts and business), logistical services, medical devices, mobility technologies.

### *Best practice examples in Europe*

Given the good country size, FDI-driven development comparison to Hungary, it is worth dwelling into the Irish cluster experience and the factors behind its outstanding ranking in the top 10 emerging industry for the country, as a whole. The Irish development policy has been considerably reshaped in the 2000s with the focus to move from FDI-driven export economy to knowledge-based economy”, thus from FDI-driven, efficiency-seeking growth to innovation-led growth, prioritizing two main focus industries: information technology and biotechnology. The vision was consequently communicated and within a decade put into practice. They created and expanded the institutional background<sup>235</sup> and modified all fields of the development policy accordingly. The expression cluster had its place in the strategy, however not in the traditional sense of industrial agglomeration, network of multinational suppliers, but as a tool of the innovation policy, creating knowledge centres, integrating academia-government-industry relations, as a part of the global value creation. The tenders for setting up clusters however did not force the industrial relations. Industrial corporations, SMEs had to be involved not later than the third year from its formation, by the time first applicable results of the research teams could have materialized, increasing their lobby strength in the new cluster structure, when expanding the cluster towards the industry. The strategy did not prescribe which region should be involved, emphasized however that several “Centres of Excellence” should be supported in distant areas from the capital as well. (Szalavetz 2008)

An important conclusion behind the Irish cluster development experience, that there is strong correspondance between the “high road” economic development policy – fostering higher value added, knowledge and technology-intensive value creation and its realization by economic actors deeply embedded in extensive local networks. A research with corporate and government interviews gave in 2003 deep analysis of the very successful Irish Multinational Software Sector, came to the conclusion that thanks to locational elements – as discussed – above - multinational software corporations appear to be more embedded, however “factors internal to corporate networks are much more likely to influence individual firm embeddedness than strictly local influences”. (White, M.C. 2003: 31). Google has its European Headquarters still today in Ireland.

---

<sup>235</sup> Science Foundation created in 2003, which funded already in 2004 the Adaptive Information Cluster by 5,6 mio EUR to finance 5 leading researchers and their teams. National Intitute for Technology and Management created in 1997.

Another successful European cluster development trajectory in a similarly small size economy is the Clusterland<sup>236</sup> in Upper Austria. Upper Austria is a “hot spot” of the mobility sector in Europe. (European Cluster Panorama 2014). Since 1998, Upper Austria continuously runs Strategic and Economic Research Programmes with clear focus of a new era of innovation policy.<sup>237</sup> These programs provide also a continuous, long term funding opportunity for creating and expanding clusters; supporting joint projects of cluster participants through which the region has become an European competence region of clusters – and network initiatives. Currently runs the program for Innovative Upper Austria 2020 and a special long term program for the mobility / logistic sector is designed till 2050. While a cluster initiative unites firms of a certain industry, network initiatives deal with crosssectoral themes, such as the Human resources, Energy efficiency cluster within Clusterland. The assessment report of the ESIC, European Service Innovation Centre of the European Commission finds the established clusters as a major strength of Upper Austria’s innovation policy tools, which are still mostly in the manufacturing sector, e.g. automotive, mechatronics, environmental technology with permanently growing number of members. As of 31.12.2013 the nine clusters belonging to Clusterland had altogether 1927 members, with 288 600 persons employed. During 15 years 359 projects were initiated and successfully carried out projects in form of cooperation between cluster members – involving 6 to 39 member firms in one project.<sup>238</sup> The trust developed in initial interactions during seminars organized by Clusterland followed by the own dynamic of cooperation of firms in joint projects integrating network participants is the region’s major achievement today. As a step further, Upper Austria should focus on linking its manufacturing with knowledge intensive business services (KIBS) firms, furthering internationalization and servitization. It includes focus on creative industries, as nurturing people’s creativity contributes to attracting and securing skilled professionals and preventing brain drain. (Janssen, Hertog and Kuissisto, 2014).

---

<sup>236</sup> The author visited the newly formed automotive cluster in Linz in 1998, the first member in today’s network of clusters in Clusterland, with future stakeholders of the first Hungarian cluster, Pannonautoklaszter established in Győr, Hungary. The latter however ceased to exist around 2009-2011.

<sup>237</sup> ‘Upper Austria 2000+ Strategic Programme’ from 1998 to 2003 with a budget of € 300 million to provide support for technology/R&D, trading and qualification and location marketing. ‘Innovative Upper Austria 2010’ in the period 2004-2010 with a budget of € 600 million covered R&D, professional qualifications, networks, the economic and technology location of Upper Austria and EU networking. Those areas remained the core of the extended ‘Innovative Upper Austria 2010+’, with a budget of € 450 million for period 2010-2013.

<sup>238</sup> Impressive dataset is shown on achievements in detail on the website of Clusterland

In the Hungarian case study we would like to combine the impact of GPNs, spillovers, possibility of upgrading with the activity of clusters. Gereffi argues that clusters are inserted into global value chains in different ways, which has consequences for enabling or disabling local-level upgrading efforts. (Gereffi 2011:35-37)

Following an overview of findings on clusters deriving from explorative research in the previous years, we give a rough assessment on the current situation based on own interviews with organizations involved in fostering innovation as well as cluster managers, owners/managers of cluster member firms.

The first Hungarian cluster, the Pannonauto Cluster was established in 2000 with the aim to assist automotive suppliers develop themselves internationally competitive, only two years after the Upper-Austrian automotive cluster started. The formation of clusters remained sporadic and individual subsidy driven till a real boom came about with specially designed topdown government development initiative – named Polus Program – in 2007, contributing with initial funding for creation of clusters. In two steps more than 200 clusters were formed in 2009-2011 country-wide. The second stage of the Polus program aimed at fostering joint projects among cluster members, providing for those generating projects funding for two more years, while the most advanced cluster tender envisaged the application of real innovation clusters. Experience shows, that most of those artificially initiated clusters could not find their strategy for sustainable future, after spending the subsidies received their activity was reduced, suspended or totally ceased. (Kocsis, 2012). The show case Pannonauto Cluster<sup>239</sup> used up its publicly provided funds in the first years for cluster activities, benchmarking clubs and conferences. As sustainable financing could not be reached in spite of renowned TNCs, AUDI, SUZUKI, OPEL, LUK and large international banks among their funding members, the cluster moved to be integrated into the university, and ceased to exist a few years ago.

To overcome the problem of a large number of “dormant clusters”, a corrective government measure was introduced in 2010. As the first, and even today, the only country within the Visegrad region, a quality insurance procedure for clusters – the “accredited cluster” status - was introduced. It can be obtained only for 2 years and then needs to be applied for

---

<sup>239</sup> The signing ceremony in March 2000 was attended in Marriott Hotel, Budapest by Prime Minister Orban, Minister of Economic Affairs Matocsy and general managers of the Hungarian affiliates of Audi, Opel, Suzuki. Szechenyi University of Győr and several suppliers directly joining as cluster members. Affiliates of large banks also joined to be around the promising initiative, originally started by the Pannon Enterprise Development Fund.

again.<sup>240</sup> The accredited cluster status ensures in case of certain tenders higher financial leverage for projects of the cluster members, however there is a condition to generate their own revenue through compulsory membership fees. This fact and the complex, detailed material required kept back many clusters from the application. The number of clusters with accredited status amounted to 18 in 2012, but grew to 34 by 2015.<sup>241</sup> The accreditation of clusters will be reorganized from 2016, a new accreditation body, belonging directly to the government, will perform this task according to a new decree brought in July 2015. In order to follow the German model the currently accredited clusters created on 25th August 2015 will be known as the Cluster of Accredited Clusters.<sup>242</sup> Whether it contributes to a new “cluster momentum” in Hungary, too, remains to be seen. Several other non-accredited clusters still exist in the country, acquiring project revenues in order to survive.

### *Clusters in global networks*

The empirical research investigated to what extent TNC affiliates are involved as cluster members in knowledge spillovers in the 18 accredited clusters in 2012. Only 4 clusters were identified out of 18 having TNC subsidiaries directly involved in the cluster. Three clusters<sup>243</sup> were explored deeper with 11 structured interviews. (Kocsis, 2012).

Only one of the three clusters the Multimedia and Mobility cluster (MM Cluster), with 5-6 TNC affiliates and 44 SME members at the time of the interview, partly with the help of 2 billion HUF public funds from the Polus program for joint projects, confirmed that the TNC affiliates provide market opportunities for at least half of their SME members, even inputting the SME product into its global portfolio. Joint projects however involved only inter-SME relations. Besides the larger public funds, TNC affiliates contributed proportionally more to the financing of the cluster management (office, computer infrastructure, website development) than the SME members. The study underlined the conclusions of previous research, that foreign

---

<sup>240</sup> This learning most probably came from another economic development program, the “Industrial Park Title Program”. It was started by the government in 1997, which set as a condition for providing public financing to obtain the title. 28 already existing industrial parks received the title in the starting year, 1998, allowing also monitoring of their development. Today more than 200 such parks have the title and spent public funds for physical infrastructure. Several of them could not attract tenants as they promised, but no mechanism was put in place to withdraw titles.

<sup>241</sup> According to stand March 2015, that time only 32 accredited clusters included 495 firms, employed 58.000 persons and produced 2500billion HUF revenue. In 2014-2020 financing period 2700 billion HUF will be devoted to network development, including clusters within GIOP- press release Balazs Rakossy, state secretary

<sup>242</sup> Source: website of the National Research, Development and Innovation Office

<sup>243</sup> a Mobility és Multimédia Cluster, az OMNIPACK Packagetechnological Cluster and the Software- industrial Innovation Cluster.

affiliates of TNCs still have only marginal role in the Hungarian cluster development on the level of active cluster membership. Where they are integrated, their reputations enhances the image of the cluster and channel up-to-date global industry trends, contribute to knowledge-transfer in those clusters. A major role is played by the cluster management with facilitating information flow between subsidiaris and SMEs through workshops, exploring development needs on one side and SME competences on the other side. The success of the clusters to regionally coordinate efforts of private and non-private actors, depends largely on cluster manager as well, how credible he/she is to overcome the mistrust, low level of cooperation intention of SMEs amidst fierce competition. (Sass and Szanyi, 2009). Those concerns explain why supplier networks of GPNs are usually not making the stage to transform themselves into clusters.

Many Western-European countries look back decades of clustering history already, even if the European Union acknowledged it as an important tool of economic development in an official document only in 1998.<sup>244</sup> This might explain, that while surveying 382 European clusters, 13 % of them declared itself transnational (Viachka 2012), Hungarian clusters have hardly been part of transnational regionalization,<sup>245</sup> thus not contributing to collaboration of V4 countries, too. Their role remained of local reach, within national borders.

Openness to international connections in the most advanced Hungarian clusters already exists, first cooperation agreements were signed with foreign cluster networks, including also Clusterland of Upper Austria, introduced earlier in this section. They mainly serve only the exchange of experiences, best practices and the theoretical possibility of joint projects within the EU.

### *Clusters and Innovation*

Research on Hungarian clusters with empirical findings is still very sporadic, thus deep analysis on the impact on enhancing innovation capability of the cluster members on a broader scope is hardly studied. A research commissioned in 2011<sup>246</sup> encompassed the whole West-

---

<sup>244</sup> first declared in Competitiveness White Paper 1998 (Cowling 1999)

<sup>245</sup> In the field different fields Hungarian organizations and organizations from other V4 countries joined a transnational networks, funded from EU 2007-2013 framework program, they have not reached their aim to become transnational cluster organizations (TCOs), achieved by a few Scandinavian and Western-European initiatives. (See Viachka-Walerud, 2012. Appendix 1. and 2.)

<sup>246</sup> The study was commissioned by the West-Transdanubian Pannon-Novum Regional Innovation Agency and carried out by Universitas Kht.Győr, interview with Tibor Dóry

Transdanubian region, identifying altogether 33 clusters in the region. An innovation audit performed on eight selected clusters<sup>247</sup> revealed the following:

- intellectual competence is given on the level of cluster managers, but scarcity of capacity (1, max 2 persons in cluster management), overburdened by administrative, documentation tasks
- source of innovation are mainly brainstorming workshops, intranet interface for innovative ideas with lack of capacity for implementation
- at least 5-10 years planning cycle with sustained funding would be needed to achieve results in innovation;
- four clusters had written innovation strategy – those had higher result in joint product development by members
- innovative capacity results were not measured; only one cluster could provide an example of joint innovative product development (together with a university)

#### *Overview of the Current Situation Based on Desk-top Research and Interviews*

The large euphoria of setting up clusters between 2007-2013, reaching a peak at more than 350 clusters, slowed down by 2015, many of the clusters are in the meantime dormant, others are fighting for survival. We found that a number of really successful cases can provide in Hungary best practices for cluster development. Here below we summarize our findings regarding a set of clusters representing different regions and industries to reduce industry, or region-bias of our findings.

Clusters pre-selected and included in the desk-top/interview based research:

1. AIPA Cluster, Kecskemet
2. 3 P Printing Industrial Cluster, Kecskemet
3. Innoskart IKT Cluster, Szekesfehervar
4. Life Science Cluster Albert Szentgyörgyi, Szeged
5. MM Multimedia and Mobility Cluster, Budapest
6. North-Hungarian IKT Cluster, Miskolc
7. Pannon Creative Industrial Cluster, Zalaegerszeg
8. PANFA, Pannon Wood and Furniture Industrial Cluster, Sopron
9. Sopron Region Logistic Cluster

---

<sup>247</sup> Three in Győr-Moson-Sopron, three in Vas and 2 in Zala county

## 10. West Pannon Automotive and Mechatronics Centre

Seven out of the selected clusters have valid accredited innovation cluster status. Apart from PANFA, which was established in 2002 as the second cluster in Hungary, other clusters were set up between 2007-2011.

Due to reorganization of the wood and furniture industry, PANFA transferred its seat from Zalaegerszeg to Sopron and was reorganized in 2011 to achieve 39 members by 2015. A key element of revitalization of the cluster was the role of its university member, the country's leading university in the wood industry with advanced research laboratories, and dedicated support of one of its member Effix Ltd. in successful marketing of the cluster. Today it is the only accredited innovation cluster in Western – Hungary. Panfa received its title in 2013.

The Western-Hungarian clusters are less active in joint innovation, have difficulties to convince their members to pay membership fees to have at least the theoretical possibility to apply for accreditation. Their members however are very efficient in joint lobbying in special industry- or region specific issues towards public authorities. The Sopron Region Logistic Cluster achieved that their members can still use the border passing Klingenbach towards Austria, which was otherwise closed down for trucks with weight limits introduced. The West Pannon Automotive and Mechatronics Centre, which functions as a cluster with its 42 member firms, and 2 universities achieved successfully lobbying to bring automotive engineering higher education to the local university. A dual higher education program was started in September 2015 in Szombathely, winning 80 new talents with high scores to the new faculty of the university. Among the cluster members, is the international first-tier automotive supplier, Luk, which has also been part of the in the meantime closed first cluster PANAC, discussed earlier. The above three clusters could maintain continuous activity and finance their cluster management.

The region has clustering attempts in emerging service industries, such as creative industries and ICT, which would fit well to the lower unemployment, and high living quality profile of many towns of the region bordering Austria. Such initiatives are the Pannon Creative Industrial Cluster and ICT cluster in Szombathely, Sopron. The Pannon Creative Industrial Cluster set up in 2011 with 30 members, is a good example of the network of local micro entrepreneurs and SMEs (marketing, product design, applied artists). Their customer base is also mainly locally oriented without large international company customer, or business opportunity on the Austrian side of the border. As no membership fees are paid and no funds are currently available for cluster management – their activity is weak. A general phenomenon, the low level of cooperation intention among industry participants, coupled especially among

ICT industry SMEs with lack of confidence, hinders the proper information flow, joint programs as well. According to interview participants in spite of scarcity of financial resources and long term planning capability some clusters out of the 30-40 clusters of the region, thanks to very dedicated cluster managers, can find niches where networking, collaboration can bring value to its members. When new public tenders open, some of the initiatives are likely to revitalize.

One of the most successful Hungarian clusters is still the accredited innovation cluster, MM Multimedia and Mobility cluster surveyed already in a study in 2012 as discussed above (Kocsis 2012). The chairman of the cluster, manager of Ericsson and other powerful members, such as Telecom support the cluster, as they see strongly the value of networking with SMEs and start-ups with very promising development perspectives involving four universities and research think tanks. Knowledge-transfer, knowledge-diffusion regularly takes place within the cluster. Joint R&D projects are implemented within the network of in the meantime 70 members, tapping on the most developed Central-Hungarian/Budapest region's economic potential and provide examples for strategic coupling between TNCs and local service suppliers. This development offers today not only better revenue generation above the collecting membership fees for sustaining the cluster management, but it is a conscious effect to generate private financial sources such as bank and venture capital participation to support promising projects.

The cluster development in Northern-Hungary, a less developed region based on per capita GDP, and wage level, gives an example, that successful clusters plugging into global production networks as suppliers of services are not necessarily created only in most developed regions. Such a best practice example is the Northern Hungarian IT Cluster (NHIT). The cluster established by 5 companies in June 2007, achieved the accredited innovation cluster status in 2010 and has 41 members today. Its cluster management received the European Cluster Excellence Initiative Bronze Label Certificate in 2012. NHIT is a bottom-up initiative by the entrepreneurial sector in the field of informatics. The strategy is aiming at creating R&D results, to enable internationally competitive products and services. Among their members are successful local start-ups and SMEs. Some of their members, e.g. Evopro supplies large TNCs, such as Siemens, National Instruments with engineering and ICT services. The innovative project idea of Basewalk Ltd. funded by two young entrepreneurs in 2009, received in November 2015 considerable subsidy amount from the Horizon 2020 SME Instruments Phase II frameprogram in ICT category to enable them to hire further developers and market their products internationally. Another successful SME Dolphio Technologies, is engaged in R&D in

unique informatics solutions. The company started its operation in 2004, and won the first subsidy on an innovation tender in 2005. Since 2007, they receive students regularly from the Miskolc University for traineeships – currently 37 in a year to their 80 employees. They made it to the final round on the CEE-Global Impact 2014-competition organized by NASA and the Singularity University (established by Google) with their SignAll sign-speech-recognizing system. They have by now subsidiaries in Greece and Bulgaria. The cluster organizes several joint programs together with the university, summer university for the students to ensure the continuous talent pool for its members. The success of NKHT is not an exception in Miskolc, they have another successful cluster in nanotechnology, as well.

NKHT formed a network with the five other Hungarian accredited ICT clusters to achieve better interest representation of the ICT industry. Another accredited innovative cluster is the Innoskart IKT cluster in Szekesfehervar. The cluster management received in 2014 the European Cluster Initiative Silver Label Certificate, first among CEE clusters. In spite of success, their capacity for cluster management is also limited, financial means for joint projects are sporadic – their role is not coherently considered in the regional economic development. Finally the region around Kecskemét has got a considerable new impetus by the decision of Daimler to locate its new production facility there. The local government together with the local high school and several other public organizations interested in local economic development started a top-down initiative to create two clusters to maximize benefits by attracting new suppliers, upgrade capabilities of domestic companies of the region. Both AIPA and 3P Cluster established in 2010 show continuous development in assisting to match the competence level of their local firms with the need of Mercedes. According to the interview partner, 30-40 successful intermediation to supplier position was achieved during the past years thanks to the activity of the cluster. The acquired intermediation expertise of the cluster management was used, as well, when several Suzuki suppliers were successfully reoriented to Mercedes during Suzuki's cutting back production volumes. 3P cluster can boast of common innovative product development of their cluster members, too. Three clusters with their seat in the city of Kecskemét formed a network of clusters of 100 member firms mutually benefitting from each others' services. The enlarged cluster network provides better negotiating position when signing cooperation agreements internationally.<sup>248</sup>

In Southern Hungary the Szeged region cluster development benefits from high level university and research partnerships. The Szeged Biological Research Institute is also among

---

<sup>248</sup> Such agreements exist with Clusters in Linz, Graz, Vienna and Northern Italy.

members of the Albert Szentgyörgyi Life Science Cluster (till summer 2015 named Goodwill Biotechnological Cluster) encompassing 27 members and having obtained accredited innovation cluster status for the third time this March. The Szeged University plays central role in the Szeged Software Industrial Cluster as well showing good cooperation results among their mainly local SME members.

### ***Conclusions and Policy Recommendations***

The international environment is rapidly changing effecting our region as well. On the governance side, global value chains are becoming more consolidated. Large TCN manufacturers, retailers are claimed to need fewer, larger and more capable suppliers, and they want to operate in a reduced number of strategic locations around the world. This is likely to promote a higher degree of regional sourcing letting room for smaller regional suppliers, given the fact, that small countries concentrate to devise policies to enhance their own capabilities to foster development. (Gereffi, 2011: 34-36)

FDI-driven economic development within global production networks characterize both the Southeast Asian and the V4 emerging economies, with much longer history and wider experience in the SEA region. Analysis of developments in bilateral trade relations of the V4 countries confirmed increasing reorientation towards each other since the EU accession, driven by their integration in TNCs global value chains. Studying developments in the East-Asian region, we suppose, more concentrated efforts would be needed to enhance the competitiveness of our region, utilize its locational advantages, skills and competences in geographical proximity – among others by fostering the creation of industrial/business clusters to move towards knowledge-based economy. This is creating the local “buzz” to global developments. Researchers on different continents search for ways to increase local competitiveness through regional industrial policy. There is a broad agreement that most enduring base for competitive advantage can only be grounded on localized capabilities to increase firm-specific competencies (Maskell and Malmberg 1999: 172)

The extensive research program of the US Academy of Sciences defines a set of core general principles when pursuing cluster-based economic development strategies which is worth considering in our region as well. We select the major ones, that we also see appropriate to the Hungarian development:

1. Cluster initiatives should only be started where clusters already exist. It justifies that an industry hotspot has passed the market test (bottom up approach).

2. Data and analysis on strict empirical data should serve to track performance and target interventions.
3. Cluster initiatives on clusters should be focused where there is objectively measured evidence of under-capacity, to upgrade the identified cluster by attacking specific documented constraints, institutional deficiencies, or resource shortcomings
4. Maximize impact by leveraging cluster-relevant preexisting programs and initiatives. (R&D, SME support, training programs)
5. Align efforts “vertically” as well as horizontally.
6. Let the private sector lead. Clustering is a dynamic of the private economy in the presence of public goods. (Mauro-Katz 2010: 6-7)

There is a widespread view among economists that growth and development in the 21st century will be spearheaded by Asia, thus business relations between the especially fast-growing East-Asia and the EU has increasing relevance in the mid-term state investment promotion and corporate marketing strategy in the V4 region, too.

Best practices from East Asia and Western-Europe with previous empirical findings and interviews on the Hungarian development provides the following industrial policy relevant conclusions:

- Clusters should be created mainly in bottom –up process, by common interest of entrepreneurs of a region, identifying the so called “hot spots” of the given sector or activity.
- Clusters can enhance locational advantages of member firms, foster their upgrading capabilities through benchmarking clubs, knowledge transfer and diffusion.
- Improving innovation capabilities of cluster members, fostering their interactions should go hand in hand with a national, regional and local innovation policy.
- Successful development of innovative clusters presumes long-term (10-15 years) consistent „high road” economic development policy and innovation strategy, without regular changes, which enables cluster management organizations to plan their sustainable development and innovation strategy independently on the long run as well. The fact that sometimes even within the same parliamentary election cycle the government support system changes twice is one of the main hindernis, which contributed to the result that out of hundreds of clusters appr. 15-20 can be regarded as really successful today in Hungary.
- Innovative, expanding clusters are internationally deeply involved in the regional economic development strategy e.g. Burgenland, Linz, and for the first 10 – 15 years

are financed by regional institutions. Strong stakeholder approach from not only regional but local institutions as well would facilitate better embeddedness of clusters and its member firms together with their TNC or domestic clients. We note here that this development should involve public and the private sector in an even policy network architecture, without top down approach.

- The “missing middle” or “meso-” strategy — could strengthen the institutions, networks, and regional economies that support business activity to address companies’ needs collectively, not individually, through relevant joint actions. (Muro-Katz, 2010) It could contribute to more even power relations even in quasi-hierarchical governance model of TNCs webbing the CEE region.
- Prime focus on education, R&D and innovation in general economic policy of the countries is indispensable to create such locational advantages which achieve higher embeddedness of Global Production Networks through conducive environment for their affiliates and offer offer of high-value added unique, often cross-sectoral services by innovative domestic firms of the region.

There are a few individual promising examples in the meantime, suggesting that Hungary could be able to capitalize on the potential of the “New Cluster Moment”, and achieve better upgrading possibility domestic affiliates of TNCs, local SMEs and the economy itself within GPNs. It remains to be seen, how public financing under GIOP programs and targeted national, regional and local government strategies coupled with strategic initiatives of foreign and domestic firms in the 2014-2020 EU cohesion policy period can activate this process and embark on a development trajectory outlined in this paper’s international examples. The Hungarian empirical developments offer a still scarcely researched area, even more the interconnectedness within the V4 region and can be explored deeper in future studies. It is a time-consuming research process, as limits to developments, individual best practices can be explored currently only in extensive qualitative research in this field.

## *References*

Antalóczy, K (2012): Beágyazódás a globális értékláncokba –két évtized külkereskedelmi folyamatai Magyarországon, *Külgazdaság*, LVI., 2012. November–December (p. 29–61).

Baga, R. (2013): Measuring Value Chains in Global Value Chain, Background Paper No. RVC-8, May 2013, UNCTAD

Bathelt, H., Malberg A, & Maskell, P. (2004), Clusters and knowledge: local buzz, global pipelines and the process of knowledge creation, in: *Progress in Human Geography*, vol 28, 31-56.

Cattaneo, O. Gereffi, G., Miroudot, S., & Taglioni, D. (2013): *Joining, Upgrading and Being Competitive in Global Value Chains. A Strategic Framework*. World Bank Policy Research Working paper no. 6406, April

Coe, N. & Yeung, H. W. (2015): *Global Production Networks: Theorizing Economic Development in an Interconnected World*. Oxford University Press

Coe, N, Dicken P, Hess M.(2008) Global production networks: realizing the potential, the *Journal of Economic Geography* 8 pp. 271–295

Baldwyn, R.: *Global Supply Chains: Why they emerged, why they matter, where they are going to?* Working paper FGI-2012-1; Fung Global Institute, July 2012

Baldwyn, R.E.- Evenett S.J. (2012): *Value Creation and Trade in 21st Century Manufacturing: What Policies for UK Manufacturing?* In: Greaway, D. et.al: *The UK in a Global World. How can the UK focus on steps in global value chains that really add value?* London Centre for Economic Policy Research

Delgado, M., Porter, M., Scott, S (2010): *Clusters and entrepreneurship*.

Éltető A, Völgyi K (2013): *Integrated in the global value chains – trade developments between Hungary and Asia*, *Eastern Journal of European Studies* Volume 4, Issue 1

Ernst, D – Kim, I. (2001) *Global production networks, knowledge diffusion, and local capability formation – A conceptual framework presented and the Nelson&Winter Conference in Aalborg, Denmark, June 13-15th, 2001 organized by DRUID*.

Gereffi, G. Korzeniewicz, M. (eds) (1994). *Commodity chains and global capitalism*. Westport CT Greenwood press. pp. 95-122

Gereffi, G (1995): *Global Production Systems and Third World Development*. In Barbara Stallings (Ed.) *Global Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development*. Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press

Gereffi, G- Fernandez-Stark, K (2011): *Global Value Chain Analysis: A Primer*. Center on Globalization, Governance & Competitiveness (CGGC), Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA

Gereffi, G & Lee, J (2014). *Economic and Social Upgrading in Global Value Chains and Industrial Clusters: Why Governance Matters*. *Journal of Business Ethics*, September 2014

Han, T, Oh,K, Yoo,I (2012): *From Bamboo Capitalism to Water Lily: LCD Industry in East Asian Countries*, IACSIT Press, Singapore

Humphrey, J. – Schmitz, H (2000): Governance and Upgrading: Linking industrial clusters and global value chain research, IDS Working Paper 120

Humphrey, J. – Schmitz, H (2002): How Does Insertion in Global Value Chains Affect Upgrading in Industrial Clusters? *Regional Studies*, Vol. 36.9, pp. 1017-1027, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex

Jindra, J. , Rojec, M (2014): Knowledge Spillovers from FDI and Positioning of CEECs in Times of a Global Shift in Production and Innovation – A Policy Perspective, Growth-Innovation-Competitiveness Fostering Cohesion in Central and Eastern Europe, Brussels IER/IWH

Kimura, F. (2006): International Production and Distribution Networks in East Asia: Eighteen Facts, Mechanics and Policy Implications. *Asian Economic Policy Review* pp. 326-344.

Kocsis, A (2012) A multinacionális vállalatok szerepe a hazai klaszterekben, TM 28.sz. Műhelytanulmány, Budapest, BCE Vállalatgazdasági és Versenyképességi Kutatóintézet

Janssen, M., den Hertog, P., Kuusisto, J (2014): Summary Assessment of Upper Austria. ESIC European Service Innovation Centre Report. Brussels, European Commission

Lindqvist, G., Ketels, Ch., Sölvell, Ö. (2003): Cluster Initiative Greenbook, Gothenburg, Sweden

Lindqvist, G., Ketels, Ch., Sölvell, Ö. (2013): The Cluster Initiative Greenbook 2.0, Stockholm, Ivory Tower Publishers

Magashazi, A. (2014): Integráció transznacionális vállalatok által: Kelet-Ázsia és a V4 országok. in: Tanulmánykötet: Makrogazdasági döntések – Hálózati szinergiák. Nemzetközi tudományos konferencia a Magyar Tudomány Ünnepe alkalmából. 2014. november 12

Mészáros Á (2010): Közvetlen külföldi beruházások integráltsága a beszállítói kapcsolatok tükrében: a magyarországi Suzuki példája, PhD értekezés, BME Gazdálkodás és Szervezéstudományi Doktori Iskola

Muro, M., Katz, B. (2010): The New ‘Cluster Moment’: How Regional Innovation Clusters Can Foster The Next Economy. Washington, USA, Metropolitan Policy Program at Brookings Institution. September 2010

Pavlinek, P. Zizalová, P. (2014): Linkages and spillovers in global production networks: firm-level analysis of the Czech automotive industry. *Journal of Economic Geography* October, pp. 1-33, doi:10.1093/jeg/lbu041

Porter, M.E (2000): Location, Competition and Economic Development: Local Clusters in a Global Economy, *Economic Development Quarterly*, 2000

Porter, M. (2007): Clusters and Economic Policy: Aligning Public Policy with the New Economics of Competition, ISC White Paper November 2007

Rugraff, E. –Anocchea, D. – Sumner, A. eds. (2008): Rethinking international development. Transnational Corporations and Development. A Critical Perspective. London, Palgrave, Macmillan

Rugraff, E. (2008) Are the FDI policies of the Central European countries efficient? Post-Communist Economies, 20 (3): 303-316

Rugraff, E & Hansen M.W eds. (2011) Multinational corporations and local firms in emerging economies

Sturgeon, T.J – Lee,J-R(2004): Industry Co-Evolution: A Comparison of Taiwan and North America's Electronics Contract Manufacturers Institute for Technology, Enterprise and Competitiveness, Doshisha University, Research Paper 04-03, Kyoto, Japan

Sass Magdolna – Szanyi Miklós (2009): Klaszterek és a multinacionális vállalatok helyi beszállítói hálózatának fejlődése. in: Európai Tükör, 14. évf. 9. sz. (2009. szeptember)

Sass-Szanyi-Szalavetz (2008): A beszállítói hálózatoktól a tudásközpontokig: A klaszterfejlődés tényezői három európai klaszter példáján: VGKI műhelytanulmány 77. szám

Szalavetz, A: (2011) Klaszter alias tudásközpont? Klaszterfejlesztés az ír tudás gazdaságban a dublini Adaptív Információs Klaszter példáján Külgazdaság

Szalavetz, A (2010): Relokáció és a helyi leányvállalat fejlődése egy autóiipari beszállító példáján. Közgazdaság 2010/2

Szalavetz, A (2008): Klaszter alias tudásközpont? Klaszterfejlesztés az ír tudás gazdaságban a dublini Adaptív Információs Klaszter példáján

Tachakanont,K: Thailand Automotive Parts Industry, in Intermediate Goods Trade in East-Asian: Economic Deepening by FTAs, EPAs, edited by Mitsuhiro Kagami, BRC Research Report No. 5, Bangkok Research Center, IDEA-Jetro Bangkok

Vápár, J (2011): A külföldi működőtőkebefektetések regionális hatásai és befektetésösztönzés Magyarországon az 1989-2009 közötti időszakban, doktori értekezés, Győr, Széchenyi Egyetem

Viachka, A. (2012): Global Cluster Initiative Survey 2012, Survey Summary Report 10.09.2012, Stockholm, European Cluster Observatory

Viachka, A., Walerud, C (2012): Transnational networks of cluster organisations, July 2012, Stockholm, European Cluster Observatory, European Commission, Enterprise and Industry

Wessner, W., Wolf, W. eds. Committee on Comparative National Innovation Policies: Best Practice for the 21st Century (2012) Rising to the Challenge: U.S. Innovation Policy for the Global Economy, (2012) Washington, The National Academies Press pp. 265-275 ISBN: 978-0-309-25551-6

White, M. C (2003): Inward Investment, Firm Embeddedness and Place: An Assessment of Ireland's Multinational Software Sector, CISC Working Paper No.1 October 2003, Dublin, Centre for Innovation & Structural Change, National University of Ireland

Xing, L. (2007): East Asian Regional Integration: From Japan-led "Flying-geese" to China-Centre "Bamboo Capitalism" CCIS Center for Comparative Integration Studies, Aalborg University, Working paper no 3.

Yang, C., Liao H (2010): Backward Linkages of Cross border Production Networks of Taiwanese PC Investment in the Pearl River Delta, China. Journal of Economic and Social Geography, April 2010, pp. 199–217.

Yeung, H.W. (2008): Industrial Clusters and Production Network in Southeast Asia: A Global Production Networks Approach. in: Kuroiwa, I. and Toh, M.H. (eds.) Production Networks and Industrial Clusters: Integrating Economies in Southeast Asia, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 83-120.

Global Cluster Initiative Survey, (2012) European Cluster Observatory, Stockholm

Singapore Digital Hub 2012... where IT works (2012) Economic Review Committee, ICT Working Group

StraitsTimes (2015): A 'living lab' as test bed for water and green technologies, 19th September, 2015

The China Post (2015): Economic shifts within India suggest chances for Taiwan: MOEA report, May 13, 2015, Taiwan

The Economist (2011): China's economy: Bamboo capitalism, The Economist, 11th March, 2011

UNCTAD World Investment Report 2013, United Nations New York and Geneva

Websites of all clusters discussed in the paper

***Interviews conducted with following organizations and firms:***

Effix Marketing, Sopron

ForArea Economic Development Ltd, Kecskemét/AIPA, Kecskemét

Innonet Innovation and Technology Center Ltd, Győr

INNOSKART Cluster, Szekesfehervar

Universitas Győr Non-profit Kht, Győr

Pannon Creative Industrial Cluster, Zalaegerszeg

Pannon-Novum West-Transdanubian Regional Innovation Agency, Szombathely

Samsung Electronics Hungary

KOTRA

Webmark, Szombathely

## **Examining Meso Corporations: Who are they? What do they do?**

### **Where are they located? How have they performed?**

#### **Recent Status and trends in the world of the top Meso corporations**

Andrew Black

##### *Introduction and Abstract*

The purpose of this paper is to look at an important sample of meso corporations, namely the very largest of them all<sup>249</sup>. In this section the top 100 non financial meso corporations are examined, together with a smaller number of top financial meso corporations. The overall sample is around 130 entities in size, with small variations depending on the year. The core group of non-financial corporations always consists of 100 companies.

The analysis of the top 100 corporations made here is similar in scope to asking the question, who are those people sitting in the first class compartment of a train, or who are occupying the executive lounges in a top grade global airport. All the comparisons refer to the select group of the top 100 meso corporations, and information is shown on which economic sectors they are active in, what parts of the world they are based in, and how this changed since 2003.

As part of this analysis, a crude “market” share figure is shown summing the value of this groups’ sales, and comparing this to an equivalent estimate of the global economy measured as global GDP. This is estimated to be equivalent to around 12 to 15 % of global GDP. Their share of global corporate output is around 50%, an impressive total. This provides us with a headline top level view. What is not discussed in the paper is the more detailed question of how significant this group of meso corporations are within their own designated industrial, and commercial sectors. This will be discussed elsewhere.

The aim of this paper is to consider what changes have been occurring in this select group of large, global, corporations. They can be described to some extent as the “winners” in their respective competitive races. The reason for saying this is that large meso corporations have a number of features that make them different from their smaller competitors. The following is a non-exhaustive list of special features of meso corporations that are believed to exist:

---

<sup>249</sup> Measured in terms of annual turnover in current US dollars.

- Persistence and longevity. Meso corporations are generally able to weather storms, wars and depressions, and thus survive to enjoy the benefits of prosperity when the business cycle enjoys an upswing
- Meso corporations can adopt longer investment horizons, and look for longer pay back periods on their investments. They may be able to hold investments for the duration of a physical resource, such as an oil field or a metal ore mine.
- Their very size gives them advantages in dealing with governments. They may co-determine safety, health, labour law and taxation standards
- Meso corporations are able to arbitrage different national fiscal regimes, and frequently play one off against the other, including the use of low tax regimes and tax havens.
- Meso corporations, sometimes, have made credible threats regarding re-location, if they are unhappy, or disagree with the domestic policies pursued by a national government, irrespective of what type of government.
- Meso industrial corporations can deal and negotiate with meso financial corporations on more equal terms. They are important issuers of debt. Their equities are regarded as stable (low beta), and through stable dividend policies, can sometimes be regarded as proxy “bonds” for some classes of investors.
- Meso corporations have access to governments, and can exercise influence over government in many ways, varying from the open and transparent, through to more discreet and obscure transactions.
- Meso corporations are conscious of their social impact, and when operating abroad, frequently have to be careful to comply with local rules and regulations. They have to be seen to doing the right thing, and there are benefits in being “good corporate citizens” where possible. This can also transfer real social benefits to recipient countries
- Many Meso corporations are state owned, or started out life as state owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs do not follow profit maximising behaviour, and can choose to maximize a number of target variables, including sales, employment, or in reaching a combination of social and financial goals simultaneously.
- Meso corporations also have to tread carefully in order not to trigger actions by anti-trust authorities when their market shares become too dominant. This occurs when meso corporations merge, or take over other, smaller, enterprises.

- Some meso corporations act as de facto and de jure monopolies or monopsonists, often with express support from their local governments. Again, this gives them privileges denied smaller competitors
- This can also provide some meso corporations with price setting powers in particular markets. For reasons explained below, there is some evidence that pricing power/price setting by meso corporations is becoming weaker and less frequent as their markets become more globalized
- Large meso corporations are uniquely situated by their very size, in being able to acquire other, substantial corporation, thus preserving their market positions, and adjusting to new market conditions and circumstances. In this they are aided and abetted by meso financial corporations, including pension funds and other institutional investors<sup>250</sup>

When examining the meso corporation lists from Fortune, the average meso corporation was included in the Fortune 500 list for the last 17 years. The median value was 21 years, representing the maximum number of years possible. There are several meso enterprises that are now well over 100 years old, and show no signs of decay or decrepitude. For the moment they appear to be “immortal” – something omitted in most economics text books in discussing competition and the theory of the firm.

For the purposes of this analysis two different data sources were used, and data is available for 3 years. The first data source is the Fortune Global 500 listings. Two examples have been used, one using data from 2014 and the other using data from 2007. The second data source is from Unctad, who occasionally publish material on their top 100 corporations. The reference year is 2003. The most comparable data comes from comparisons of revenue (turnover) development. This covers the largest number of years, and so helps to establish trends. Some other comparisons are possible, using data on assets, employment, and for 2014, profits. The Unctad material includes details on the exposure of these meso corporations to foreign markets, and some analysis is included towards the end of the paper.

### *The Choice of years and some macro considerations*

The years chosen for this exercise are not selected at random. The most recent year (2014) represents an example of the post financial crisis environment. This is compared with 2007,

---

<sup>250</sup> At the moment these are mainly assertions. During the rest of the book evidence will be supplied to support these contentions.

representing the last year before the financial crisis, representing the top of the business cycle. These two years use the same source, the Fortune 500 lists, and these contain information on both non financial and financial meso corporations. The 3<sup>rd</sup> study is from 2003, published by Unctad in 2007. 2003 is important since it was the year when the dot.com bust finished (equity prices reached their nadir in March 2003), and it was also the year of the invasion of Iraq, which many thought would unsettle the financial and industrial markets. In fact it went on to usher in the “great moderation” of low inflation, low interest rates, and reasonable growth rates across the world.<sup>251</sup> Hence, in a limited way, comparisons between these years will reveal how these large macro economic changes have affected the sample of the largest global corporations. And as will be seen, it has not left them unscathed, although in a manner that is not immediately obvious.

There are two other large “macro” factors that have clearly left traces through the ranks of the top 100 meso corporations. One of these has been the persistence of high oil prices in the global economy, which has clearly benefited meso corporations in the oil and gas industries. 2014 is the first year when oil prices fell dramatically, the full impact of which will only be revealed with the release of new figures for 2015. The second major macro factor has been the emergence of China on the world markets. This process is less straight forward than is generally realized. There was an initial period where China invited foreign corporations, many of them meso corporations, to establish operations in China, taking advantage for China’s then low wages. Government action, particularly in relation to establishing economic trading zones in coastal areas, plus government control over labour, resources, and other crucial inputs provided a stable political and social framework for foreign and domestic investors.

Large meso corporations saw in this two opportunities. One was use China as a base for exports back to their home regions/countries, thus providing them with a competitive advantage there. The second opportunity was to access the domestic Chinese market, that was effectively “virgin” territory, and was still protected by tariff and non tariff barriers.

During the early part of “noughties”, there was a considerable re-location of manufacturing activity by Western firms, to China. And this resulted in a rapid rise in China’s share of global output, and global exports. China, in so doing, also became the main import market for raw materials, metals, minerals and oil. In terms of crude output figures, China has already overtaken the USA as the world’s largest producer, an historic change.

---

<sup>251</sup> And it has been argued that it was the “great moderation”, sometimes also called the Greenspan “put”, that created the conditions for the flourishing of CDOs, and the construction of the vast pyramid scheme of derivatives based on easy mortgage lending in the USA and to a lesser extent in the UK.

One of the impacts of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008 was to interrupt the twin digit growth in exports and in Chinese GDP. This led the Chinese government into a very large project of Keynesian fiscal expansion, to maintain this 10% plus annual growth rate. And this was done, conventionally enough, by encouraging enormous investments in housing, transport, infrastructure, and in additional industrial capacity. This, in turn, benefitted large numbers of Chinese meso corporations, many of whom have entered the ranks of the Top 100 industrial firms in relatively large numbers. This displaced older established companies in other regions, who have found themselves outclassed in terms of output growth. The figures for 2014 show this trend fairly starkly. The full implications of this have yet to be fully felt.

#### Preliminary High Level Conclusions

- The Fortune listings suggest that the top 100 industrial plus the top 30 or so financial meso corporations account for between 12 and 15% of global output.
- When the top 100 industrial and financial meso corporations are compared with global corporate sector (industry and manufacturing), their share rises to between 40 and 50% of output.
- Their share appear to have increased since 2003, peaking in 2007, and falling slightly thereafter
- Meso corporations in the West have become more internationally diversified, and are operating in more markets and product areas than earlier
- Concentration levels in developing countries show that meso corporations have a larger market presence there than in the older, OECD “metropolitan” markets.
- The top meso corporations are not spread evenly through the global economy, and they appear to cluster in a select number of industry/product groups. These are, in rough order of importance:
  - Oil refining and exploration
  - Automobiles
  - Retailing
  - Technology
  - Utilities
  - Health systems

Within these product/industry groups, State Owned Enterprises are found in Oil/gas, automobiles (China), Utilities. Indeed, in some areas, such as utilities, SOEs may be the dominant form of organization.

As indicated above, macro factors around the price of oil have clearly benefitted the oil and gas meso corporations. What is unexpected is the presence of large meso corporations in the “health systems” area. These are mainly US based meso corporations, meeting needs triggered by demographic developments, particularly in the elderly. These corporations offer varying combinations of health delivery systems, health infrastructure, social care and medical practices, plus some insurance cover. One of the features of this area is that it requires initial investment to set up; there are clearly some economies of scale and scope, and the demand is likely to grow in the longer term – favouring longer investment horizons. Changes in government legislation, and other compliance issues, may also favour this industry.

What is striking about this list is the absence of, or the under-representation of large corporations in the **chemicals, engineering, and metal “bashing”** areas of the economy. Top meso corporations concentrate on mobility (automobiles), and on providing the means for this (oil) they concentrate on where consumer buy their goods (retail). They have large shares in technology, the utilities and in health systems.

In geographical terms the main results are:

- The strong rise in meso activities in the AsiaPacific region, and in particular in China
- AsiaPac has now overtaken the EU as the second largest area of meso activity
- The fortunes of top meso corporations in the EU appear to have declined. This is related to stagnant or falling domestic demand, largely due to austerity policies pursued by EU and Eurozone governments. These would appear to harming the competitiveness of their domestic meso corporations.
- Meso corporations from Africa and the MENA regions are largely missing from the top 100 meso corporations. The only companies within striking distance of being included here are from South Africa.
- Meso corporate activity in South America and South Asia is low. It is increasing in South America. <sup>252</sup>


### ***Top Meso Corporations and the Global Economy***

---

<sup>252</sup> Readers are reminded that these results refer to the shares of meso corporations in the top 100 meso group. There are other meso corporations active in regions like South America, that are not large enough to be included in the top group.

**Chart 1** compares the size of the combined turnover of the Top 100 Meso non financial corporations and the size of the global economy (GDP). The chart shows that the combined share in developed and emerging markets was in the region of 13% between 2012 and 2013.

**Chart 1**



Source: Unctad

The meso share in the developed world is lower. The meso share fell from around 10% in 2004 to just over 8% in 2014. In our view this appears to be quite a large number.

**Table 1** shows the share of industrial, non financial, meso corporations, as well as the combined share of financial and non financial Top 100 corporations compared with the size of the entire corporate manufacturing sector for the global economy. This examines how GDP is produced, where the world is split into output from agriculture, manufacturing and services. Table 1 also compares the results from two sources, Unctad, and the Fortune 500 listings. The former include only non financial companies, while the latter include both financial and non-financial meso corporations.

**Table 1. Meso Shares in global corporate output**

	2003	2004	2007	2012	2013	2014	Source
<b>Meso Share Non Financial &amp; Financial Corps Fortune</b>	29.5%		55.3%			50.5%	Fortune 500


<b>Meso Share Non Financial, Top 100 Fortune</b>	29.2%		43.3%			39.8%	Fortune 500
<b>Developed World Meso Top 100 Unctad</b>		32.0%		29.0%	29.0%	27.0%	Unctad
<b>Developed &amp; Emerging Market Meso Share Unctad</b>				42.4%	42.8%		Unctad

*Table 1* shows that after a rise between 2003 and 2007 (the last year before the General Financial Crisis (GFC), the overall market share fell slightly to 2014. The combined share is above 50% of global manufacturing output.

The Unctad<sup>253</sup> data for both emerging and developed markets show that the meso corporate market share stayed relatively stable at between 42 and 43% of global manufacturing output between 2012 and 2013. The equivalent manufacturing figures for Fortune show the Top 100 meso share at 43% in 2007, falling to 39.8% in 2014. The similarity between these two sets of figures from two different sources leads us to think that the share of the top 100 non financial corporations is around 40% of global manufacturing output, and when combined with the largest financial meso corporations, this share rises to around 50%. These ratios are large enough to indicate that the meso sector may well be able to exercise some market and pricing power over their smaller rivals, and that they have dominant market positions.

<sup>253</sup> United National Trade & Development Agency, based in Geneva.


**Chart 2**



*Source: Unctad & authors calculations*

**Chart 2**, using Unctad data, looks at how the Top 100 Meso corporations (non financial) have grown in the pre and post crisis periods. and separating out domestic and foreign sales trends. The chart shows that foreign sales grew faster than domestic in both pre and post crisis periods. Post crisis growth rates are much lower, and domestic sales barely grew at all for the Top 100 Meso firms between 2012 and 2014. Foreign sales that grew at a CAGR of 7% pre crisis, only managed to grow at 2% pa after the crisis. This shows that the top 100 meso corporations have become more diversified and have grown faster abroad than at home.

**Chart 3**




*Source: Unctad & author's calculations*

A similar pattern can be seen in the growth of assets in chart 3, a consequence of either direct investment, or M&A by meso firms. As with sales, growth rates post crisis are much lower than before 2012. In the pre crisis period foreign assets grew much faster than domestic assets, this differential shrank post crisis. Asset growth in foreign markets has slowed more noticeably

relative to domestic asset growth. Both turnover and asset growth fell after the crisis. And the differential between foreign and domestic markets fell after the crisis. Foreign markets were rather more volatile than domestic markets for the top meso corporations.

*Chart 4* shows how employment growth rates developed after the GFC:




*Source: Unctad & author’s calculations*

Total employment by the top 100 corporation shrank between 2012 and 2014 by around a negative half a per cent a year. Meso corporations still account for 16.8 million employees across the world. The decline in overall employment obscures a growth in domestic employment of around 0.6% pa, and a larger fall in foreign employment of around -1% pa. The reason for this is not entirely clear. It may be that efforts to rationalize production have been accompanied by moves to reduce the importance of national subsidiaries, and to extend product based organization into foreign markets. There may also have been efforts to seek greater scale economies by concentrating production and administration at fewer plants/sites. This could also reflect the growth of the internet making it easier to exercise control over operations from a distance.

*Chart 5* shows Meso market shares % of Global GDP Current Prices:

Chart 5



*Chart 5* combines the Unctad 2003 figures with those from Fortune. The chart also distinguishes between industrial and financial meso corporations. The years also differ slightly from the previous chart. Here there is a clearer pattern. The combined total for meso industrial and financial corporations is over 15% of the global economy in 2007 and in 2014. The industrial share is around 12%. The low share accounted for by the financial corporations in 2003 is also striking. The meso market share appears to have fallen slightly since 2007. This suggests that both groups were negatively affected by the GFC. As we shall see below, there is additional evidence that the down turn in banking was stronger than that shown here.<sup>254</sup>

These charts suggest that the meso sector also experiences turbulence and volatility. The GFC did not provide an opportunity for meso corporations to strengthen their grip on the economy. If anything, the impact of new competitors lower down in the listings may have increased competition in a number of product areas since the crisis, and therefore held back sales growth.<sup>255</sup>

On the basis of this evidence it is reasonable to conclude that the meso sector of the largest 100 enterprises (by sales) combined with the largest financial meso corporations have a combined global market share in the region of 15%, with some fluctuation around this. When compared with the size of the global manufacturing sector, the top 100 corporations have shares around 42% for non financial corporations.(see table 1 above).

<sup>254</sup> Note, although the estimated share of top financial corporations in 2003 is very small. It is not, in fact, zero


<sup>255</sup> In the UK, the long established hierarchy in the grocery business challenged the fortunes of meso groups like Tesco and Sainsbury – the former being in the top 100. Tesco’s performance suffered from incursions by discount stores like Lidl and Aldi – both of whom are privately owned meso corporations in their own right – but not included in the top 100 list.

No tendency towards the longer run wholesale monopolization of commerce and industry, as implied by earlier theories on State Monopoly Capitalism, can be observed. And as we shall see below, meso corporate activity is clustered in specific industries.

***Product Clusters: Meso Corporations: The Product/Industry View***

There is a skewed distribution of meso corporations, and some product/industry sectors are populated by more meso firms than others. Chart 6 provides an analysis of the most important sectors where meso corporations in the top 100 industrial companies are present. The sector description are close to the US SIC system. There are some adjustments to suit the nature of those corporations, not fitting neatly into pre-determined product/industry codes.<sup>256</sup>

**Chart 6**




In the manufacturing view, the three largest product groups are **Petroleum & Refining**, referred to elsewhere as the oil and gas industry; **automobiles** – including the production of both passenger and commercial vehicles, as well as some ancillary equipment such as tyres; **technology** – this ranges from computers and software, through to electrical machinery, and

<sup>256</sup> Fortune 500 lists contain both a 2 and a 3 digit description of what each company does. However, these also do not follow the SIC conventions. The product groups shown here are a compromise between the “official” and unofficial views. Our aim being to provide a bridge between the two statistical sources.

consumer electronics; **Utilities** defined as the suppliers of water, gas and electricity, include both producers and distributors. **Telecoms** includes both fixed line and mobile service providers; **FMCG** refers to Fast Moving Consumer Goods, and includes companies like Nestle, P&G and Unilever; **Retail** includes all manner of retailers, from grocers to more specialized suppliers and department stores; **Industrial** includes a range of heavy industry suppliers including both GE and Arcelor Mittal; **Pharmaceuticals** is self explanatory ;**Trading** refers to large commodity traders and import/exporters of industrial and consumer goods. They are mostly found in the AsiaPacific region. **Metals and mineral** includes companies such as Rio, BHP and aluminium producers; **Chemicals** is self explanatory, and includes both organic and inorganic chemical suppliers; **Aerospace and defence** is also self explanatory, as is Media. **Media** includes suppliers of newspapers, magazines, films and some on line services. **Financial intermediaries** refers to various SOE post offices that also have important financial functions, such as the Japanese Post office, home of huge savings deposits, yet included here by Unctad ! **Construction** includes those companies engaged in large infrastructure projects in rail, and in civil engineering. **Textiles** is the descriptor given to fashion houses by Unctad.

*The Unctad rankings are similar to those observed in the Fortune 100 list.* Chart 7 shows these meso clusters measured by turnover in 2007 and in 2014. These are shown in nominal current US dollars, so include inflation (if any). The great importance of **Oil & Gas** and **automobiles** stands out. Turnover in both industry/product groups rose slightly, more in the auto than in the oil and gas sector. Indeed, turnover in the largest, oil and gas sector, remained virtually static until 2014.

**Chart 7**




Turnover performance in retail, chemicals, also remained flat. Turnover increased in Health systems, Trading and in retail (barely). It fell in the other sectors. The GFC took its toll of meso corporations.

**Chart 8** (below) shows the impact of including the financial sector in measuring meso activity. The two financial sectors are **banking and insurance**, here shown separately. They account for around 3% of global GDP.

**Banking** is the second largest meso cluster after oil and gas. As chart 5 shows, turnover suffered in the aftermath of the GFC, which cannot be said for insurance, where turnover increased quite rapidly. Why is this ? One likely explanation is that as incomes rose in developing markets, and particularly in China, insurance companies began to sell various life and other forms of cover – including more health insurance, thus leading to “good” times for the industry. The overall impact of including the financial sector is to slightly reduce the shares of the manufacturing sector. Chart 8 highlights the quantitative importance of the financial sector. As will be discussed later, the financial sector both lends to government, to business and to the household sectors. This enables the government and household sectors to consume more, and to alter the time pattern of their purchases. Banks also lend to the corporate sector, including the meso sector. As will also be discussed elsewhere, meso corporations have a high rate of internal funding, based on their retained earnings, and so are less dependent on the banking sector for future investment than is generally realized.

**Chart 8**



### *Relative Changes In Meso Product Clusters*

Much of the information above is combined in chart 9 to give an idea of how the various meso product groups/industries have changed, relative to the entire group of the top meso corporations. The chart shows the relative changes in turnover growth rates between 2007 and 2014, compared with changes in the relative number of companies in each cluster. There are four quadrants in the chart. The top right quadrant shows those product groups where both the rate of growth in turnover and the increase in the number of companies is greater than the group average. Product groups in this quadrant are getting larger, and are producing more, and they are becoming relatively more important constituents within the meso corporation universe.

The bottom right quadrant is the “Competition” area. Here, there are more corporations, with below average increases in turnover. This is compatible with more companies competing harder for existing business. This could be a short term temporary phenomenon, as companies enter markets anticipating future growth that doesn’t happen, or it could represent a permanent increase in competition that depresses prices, leading to lower turnovers. Pricing power in this sector would be weak.


The top left quadrant shows a trend towards increased monopolization. A smaller number of corporations operating with above average increases in turnover, possibly achieved at the expense of smaller competitors. And finally, the bottom left quadrant shows relative decline. There are fewer companies in this quadrant and their turnover has grown less, or declined more than the group average. Companies in this quadrant may well be suffering from changes in market structure, technology, and in pricing competition. Conditions may well be becoming more competitive, and the meso corporations are finding it difficult to find effective responses.<sup>257</sup>

The red dotted line shows an approximate direction of change, with the observations being largely concentrated in quadrant 1 “expansion” or quadrant 3 “relative decline”.

---

<sup>257</sup> Readers are once again reminded that all of these changes are relative to the group of the top 100 corporations, and not to their position in their respective industries.

Chart 9



There are several product clusters experiencing expansion. Three have seen a rapid expansion in the number of companies, including **trading, insurance and metals/resources**. The fortunes of two of these clusters, trading and metals/resources were buoyed up by high commodity prices. Other clusters with above average turnover growth include **Health Systems, and automobiles**. Health Systems are reflecting demographic changes in the USA, and automobiles benefiting from income related demand expansion in the AsiaPac region (China).

Interestingly, there are no entries in the “competition” quadrant (quadrant 2). Although both retail and petroleum experienced increases in the number of corporations, with virtually static revenues.

**Quadrant 3** is also empty, although chemicals is a close contender. All the other clusters are in the **fourth quadrant** “decline”. These **include industrials, FMCG, Telecoms, Banking, Utilities, Aerospace and Technology**. Banking is experiencing the negative effects of the GFC. Telecoms and utilities are experiencing downward pressures on prices due to technological changes; Industrials and FMCG are also experiencing increased competition, lower prices and turnover, with the result that companies in this cluster are dropping down the size scale, and are leaving the Top 100.

Does this make a difference? In the short run probably relatively little. In the longer run, as will be explained later, it may reduce the degree of self funding, increase reliance on external funding for any expansion, and may encourage cost saving, downsizing, and the sale of assets (divestments). This in turn will lead to further fragmentation in these clusters.

The presence of Technology in this quadrant is mildly surprising. It is most likely due to the broad nature of the cluster, and the fact that there are technological casualties as well as opportunities. Some of the Japanese corporations have been having a hard time managing the transition to smart phones, and other forms of cloud/internet interactions. This has affected the sale of equipment like printers, faxes, lap top computers, resulting in some of these suppliers leaving the ranks of the top 100.<sup>258</sup> Chart 9 shows that there are clear winners and losers within the group of top meso corporations

### *Conclusions on Product Clusters*

Meso corporations are not evenly spread across the global economy. There are some sectors where they predominate, and look as if they will continue to do so for some time. There is something of an ebb and flow about these changes. Consider the oil and gas industry. It features prominently amongst the ranks of the top 100 industrial meso corporations, and is still the largest sector even when including banks.

Yet, there are important changes occurring in the industry. In a recent paper, Black (2012) pointed out that the privately owned meso corporations were running out of reserves of liquid oil. And these are not being fully compensated for by findings of new gas fields. While they continue to have the technological edge in exploiting hard to reach new resources under the sea, or in extreme conditions like the arctic, some of this edge has passed to the oil field supply

---

<sup>258</sup> A classic example being Nokia, which went from “riches” to “rags” in an unprecedentedly short period of time, having sold its formerly unassailable hand set division to Microsoft, before its value was written off entirely.

industry, with companies like Bechtel, Schlumberger and Halliburton (not in the top 100) now taking on technological “ownership” of many of the trickier processes. Equally, the large oil multinationals have lost control of their downstream retail and refining operations. The previously highly vertically integrated supply chains have dwindled, although they remain largely in place for two of the more successful meso enterprises, Exxon and Shell.

State owned enterprises in the sector are also important, since they own extensive national reserves. They are beset by other issues too, including the need to meet a wider set of national policy targets on employment, training, and in some cases on the environment. The turnover numbers used here probably flatter the sector. As has been pointed out by Mainelli et al ( ), a substantial part of these companies’ valuation is based around exploiting hydrocarbon reserves that may well never be used on environmental grounds. Financial markets have yet to appreciate this.

The other striking impression is that the “winners” do not immediately conform to meso level enterprises that one might have thought would have been there. The sectors showing the largest relative growth in numbers and turnover do not immediately fall into being the “commanding heights of the economy”.

### ***Geographical Clusters and Regions***

Just as the top meso corporations are not evenly distributed through product space, the same is also true for their geographical dispersion. Meso corporations are headquartered, and based in a relatively small number of countries, and these are mainly in the OECD area. There is though, something of a paradox in this. As was shown above, the top meso corporations are also highly internationalized, and spread their activities widely across the globe. Indeed, they are all truly global players. And there is an element of historical accident about where certain meso corporations choose to be headquartered.


In the banking world, one notable example of this is HSBC, the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. It was founded in Hong Kong, and for most of its existence has been closely connected with the Chinese market, following the track of British Imperialism in the Far East.

Following the victory of the Communists in mainland China, HSBC retreated to Hong Kong, and then expanded into the UK by taking over the Midland Bank, a commercial and retail clearing bank. This shifted the centre of gravity of the bank’s operations to Europe and the UK, although the name became suitably anonymised through the use of the HSBC acronym.

Uncertainties around the status of Hong Kong encouraged HSBC to shift its HQ over to the UK, where it currently is. Lacklustre market developments in the UK and the EU have given rise to rumours that, unless properly “incentivised”, HSBC may yet move its HQ back to Hong Kong. There are other examples where global meso corporations are willing to re-locate to take advantage of tax concessions and other fiscal advantages.

Nevertheless, the location of an HQ is generally considered beneficial for the host country, if for no other reason than the groups global earnings will be taxed in the host country. As both France and the UK have found out, this transfers the fruits of international activity into the coffers of the national treasury.


**Chart 10**



*Chart 10* shows the number of corporations by their regional affiliation (the location of their HQ). It shows how this changed between 2007 (pre GFC) and 2014 (post GFC). There are small increases in the number of Top 100 meso corporations in the CIS (former Soviet Union & satellites), Europe (ex the EU), and in South America. The overall number of companies in these areas remains very small. The most striking aspect is the fall in the number of top corporations headquartered in the EU.


The three largest regions in 2014 are, firstly the USA & Canada, followed by AsiaPac (mainly Japan and China) and then by the EU. In recent years there has been a striking switch in the numbers of Top 100 corporations between AsiaPac (increasing) and the EU (decreasing).

**Chart 11**




*Charts 11* and *12* show meso turnover by region in terms of currency values, and as a share in Top 100 turnover. The amounts, and share of turnover in AsiaPac increased dramatically between 2007 and 2014, making the AsiaPac region the second largest after North America. The EU slipped from first to third place in 2014

*Chart 12*




This would appear to be a direct consequence of the application of austerity policies within the EU, and the consequential suppression of demand. The charts show that most top level meso activity is concentrated in North America, AsiaPac and in the EU. There is relatively little top level meso activity in other global regions.

**Chart 13**



*Chart 13* shows the cumulative change in turnover by region between 2007 and 2014. Top Meso turnover increased by over 80% in these 7 years, much faster than the growth rates achieved in North America and by the EU, where output fell by 20%.

**Chart 14**




**Chart 14** shows how meso corporations grew by individual country between 2007 and 2014. The clear winner is **China**, followed by the **Netherlands and Brazil**. The EU entry refers to Airbus, not to the whole of the EU. There were several countries whose top level meso corporations experienced falls in output, including those located in **Spain, the UK, Luxemburg, France, Germany, Norway Indonesia, Italy and Japan**. Again this highlights the variation in performance across region as well as across product based cluster.

**Summary of Geographical Turnover and Meso Corporation Count Changes 2007 to 2014**

**Chart 15** (below) has four quadrants and is similar to chart 9 above. There are no entries in quadrants 2 (bottom right) and 3 (top left). **Meso corporate activity expanded in the AsiaPac, CIS, South and North American regions**. This is partly due to increased numbers of companies joining the top 100, as well as better performance among existing members. Some Asian meso corporate behaved very similar to the average (identified here as the 0,0 intersection of the two axes). The region experiencing the worst performance is the EU, where there was both a decline in the number of corporations in the top 100, and the performance of the remaining companies suffered as well.

**Chart 15**



## *Conclusions*

This paper has shown that the Top meso corporations play a very significant role in the global economy. Depending on the measurement used, the top 100 non financial corporations account for around 12% of global GDP, and around 40% of global manufacturing output. These shares rise further when leading meso financial corporations are included.

The share of this sector rose in the period up to 2007, and may have fallen slightly since then. There are strong concentrations of meso corporations in a small number of sectors. These include oil and gas, automobiles, banks, retail, utilities, technology and health systems.

Not all of these sectors have prospered in the last few years, and there have been some that have experienced a reduction in the number of firms in the top 100, as well as a fall in their revenues. FMCG, Industrials, telecoms and aerospace/defence are this group suffering from relative decline. The reasons for these developments will be investigated in a separate paper. It has also been shown that there has been the emergence of a growing number of Chinese corporations in the top 100 group, and many of these are State Owned Enterprises. The overall share of companies based in the AsiaPac region has overtaken the EU to be the second largest contributor to companies in the top 100 list. North America (the USA) continues to contribute the largest number of large meso corporations.

Further investigation is needed to see whether these winning sectors have common features which help to explain the presence of so many large meso corporations. One factor is that large size provides a buffer in times of crisis and recession, allowing meso corporations to expand, and if necessary, move into new product areas through M&A during periods of prosperity.<sup>259</sup> These figures may also suggest that the rationality of markets view of conglomerates is mistaken. According to this large multi-divisional meso corporations should be shunned by investors on the grounds that their spread of activities leads to inefficiencies, and thus to some kind of under-performance. The theory went on that portfolio investors should make their own decisions about the right balance of activities across product and country groups for their portfolios, rather than allowing the management of large meso firms to do this for them.

---

<sup>259</sup> This may help to explain the paradox of the relative success of low beta stocks (generally meso enterprises) discovered by Fama ( ), French ( ) and others. This appeared to weaken the relevance of the Capital Asset Pricing model as a basis for explaining corporate valuations. It also weakened the relevance of various forms of efficient market theories, themselves based around views of rational expectations.

This in turn led to the creation of a “conglomerate discount”, where large multidivisional meso corporations traded at a discount in equity markets compared with more streamlined and focused rivals. The best answer to this has probably been provided by Warren Buffet, and Berkshire Hathaway, a large, multi sector holding company, based around an insurance company core. This sprawling conglomerate company has performed better than many actively managed portfolios, and better than many smaller, more focused, companies. All of which is a curious reversal of earlier views by investors, particularly in the US stock market in the 1950’s and 60s, who were inclined to invest in the “nifty 50”, most of whose members were multi-divisional conglomerate firms!

The information shown here demonstrates that large meso corporations play a substantial role in the global economy. Their behaviour is not adequately explained by mainstream theories of competition, nor can mainstream theories account for what meso corporations do, and where they are located. In our view this can be done better by addressing some of the factors mentioned at the beginning of this paper that identify those areas where meso corporate behaviour and experience clearly differs from smaller, more competitive, companies.

It is also likely that improved understanding of the meso sector will throw more light on why so much contemporary economic theory has performed so poorly in explaining the recent business cycle, and crisis. One of the areas that will be investigated in more detail is to improve our understanding of the relationships between the meso industrial and meso financial worlds. Both the crisis of 1929 and that of 2008 featured a relative over expansion of the financial sector, which then imploded as a result of a liquidity crisis. None of this is adequately described in conventional, neo classical economic theory.

### *Glossary*

GFC	Global Financial Crisis
Unctad	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
FMCG	Fast Moving Consumer Goods

## *References*

Fortune 100: Listings 2015.NY

Fortune 500: Listings 2008. NY

Barry Naughton. "Macro Economic Obstacles to Reform in China. The role of Fiscal and Monetary Policy", 1998

Unctad,(2015), "World Investment Report", Geneva

James Zhan et al, (2014)," Investment in TNCs and Gender" Unctad, Geneva

James Zhan et al (2015), "Transnational Corporations", vo 21 #3

Unctad, (2012), Facts and Figures; Development & Globalization, Geneva

Matataka Fujita et al, (2009), "Assessing the Impact of current financial and economic crisis on global FDI". Unctad, Geneva

J. Francois Outreville, (2007), "The Universe of the Largest Transnational Corporations", Unctad, Geneva

Professor Chris Dixon, (2015) Communications on Chinese State Owned Corporations, Global Policy Institute, London,

## IV. Cultural Heritage Management and Sustainable Development

### Ego Traces in the Archives: Searching for the Individual in Historical Documents

Mónika Mátay

In history, the exploration of the self was fostered by two dominant influences: a long historiographical tradition on the one hand and the social sciences on the other. In his seminal work on the Italian Renaissance published as early as 1860, the Swiss historian, Jacob Burckhardt, a key representative of classical cultural history dedicated a separate chapter to the rise of the new individual with his unique capacities, motivations and achievements in the *quattrocento*.<sup>260</sup> Since that time, generations of cultural historians turned toward investigating how the self is composed and presented in different ages and under various social and cultural conditions.

In the 1970s and 1980s poststructuralist historians, representatives of the linguistic turn, and new cultural historians had been immensely inspired by literary theorist Stephen J. Greenblatt's influential inquiry about how important figures of Renaissance literature fashioned their career, or more generally, their way of life.<sup>261</sup> In turning to the social sciences and incorporating interdisciplinary methods into historical research, the sociologist Erving Goffman's *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life* was influential because it focused on the individual as the central subject of historical investigation.<sup>262</sup> In turning to cultural anthropology in the 1970s, historians identified model anthropological works, from which they could profit while interpreting the historical "Other", his everyday practices, his perception of the world, his way of thinking and even the material culture that surrounded him. One of these important anthropologists was Arnold van Gennep.<sup>263</sup> His monograph on rituals challenged the then dominant Durkheimian model of social forces and put the individual, his creativity, achievements and influences on a pedestal. Although Gennep's innovations remained unnoticed

---

<sup>260</sup> Burckhardt, Jacob, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*. London, 1990 [1860].

<sup>261</sup> Greenblatt, Stephen J., *Renaissance Self-fashioning*. Chicago, 1980.

<sup>262</sup> Goffman, Erving, *The Presentation of Self In Everyday Life*. London, 1959.

<sup>263</sup> Gennep, Arnold van, *The Rites of Passage*. Chicago, 1960 [1909.]

for decades, the new wave of historical anthropology incorporated his ideas and methods into historical research.

Nowadays, when many people post selfies on their facebook several times a day, and they believe that the places they visit, the dinner they eat, or the clothes they wear have to be integral parts of the presentation of their selves, we need to reconsider our understanding of the individual. But even unintentionally, we leave behind thousands of electronic traces in the world every year: we have become easily identifiable. However, the surfacing of the self was a long procedure in Western history.

Individual achievement had first been reflected during the Middle Ages or at the dawn of modern times, the Renaissance, but that only involved the minor group of the social and cultural elites of those periods. The rising absolutist state and the churches attempted to expand their control over their subjects and followers at various territories of everyday life including birth, death, marriage, communication, taxation and many other important episodes. The Enlightenment and the movements of Romanticism taught new lessons about the unique and unrepeatable characteristics of the individual to the European public. Still, only the 19<sup>th</sup> century and the centralized nation state brought radical changes in how to redefine, register and control citizens through identity cards, passports, census records, or other conscriptions.

In his innovative essay, Carlo Ginzburg demonstrated how the controlling attempts of the state went hand in hand with scientific innovations.<sup>264</sup> A new epistemological model, or, as he calls it, an evidential paradigm surfaced through the ideas of the Italian art historian, Giovanni Morelli in the 1870s. Morelli introduced a new method to make a distinction between original and copy paintings. He suggested that instead of examining the “big details,” smiles, clothes, or how painted figures look at a certain point on the picture, concentrating on nuances, fingernails, earlobes or toes is a more rewarding method. As the founding father of a new approach to historical research, Ginzburg applied Morelli’s ideas in his archival inquiries.

### ***The Triumph of Microhistory***

The 1970s brought radical changes in historical writing and renewed immensely the perception of the past. The grand paradigms of the history of events, Marxism, structuralism, or quantitative methods proved to be insufficient to answer questions about individual ordinary

---

<sup>264</sup> Ginzburg, Carlo, *Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm*. In *Myths, Emblems, Clues*. London and Sydney, 1990. 96–127.

heroes. The grand narratives neglected the “little people” as unimportant, passive participants of history who had rather been victims than creators of the surrounding economic, political and social conditions. In Italy, but also in France and in the United States groups of disillusioned historians turned their scholarly interest towards the unknown, insignificant actors of everyday life.<sup>265</sup> They started to explore their free will, internal motivations, decisions, feelings, thoughts and interpersonal relationships, which cannot be interpreted within large-scale social scientific models. The rich archival documentation allowed these historians to focus on minute details of individuals’ lives, communities and small events. In short, they put the human world under the microscope to reveal ordinary nuances that remained unknown for social scientists who aimed to construct grand narratives of universal history. “Microhistory as a genre of its own would only take shape when historians, in addition to changing the scale of their observations, also revolted against the idea that the microcosm did little but passively reflect the macrocosm.”<sup>266</sup>

Microhistorians, such as Carlo Ginzburg and Nathalie Zemon Davis contributed to this “deliberating” process to a large degree.<sup>267</sup> Ginzburg illustrated the contours of self-fashioning, the freedom of individual actions and decision-making strategies in the example of a 16<sup>th</sup> century miller, Menocchio, who confronted the much-feared Inquisition and sacrificed his life to have a chance to discuss his strange ideas with competent people.<sup>268</sup> Davis excellently crafted the personality of Martin Guerre and his rival, the impostor Arnaud du Tihl alias Pansette, who tried to make his fortune by slipping into another person’s skin.<sup>269</sup> After reading these historical analyses nobody would think that these past actors were helpless puppets depending on contemporary social and economic conditions. Just the opposite was the case; they seemed to be remarkably creative and active in shaping their own life.

---

<sup>265</sup> On microhistory see for example: Iggers, Georg G., From Macro- to Microhistory: The History of Everyday Life. In *Historiography in the Twentieth Century. From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*. Hanover, New England and London, 1997. 101–117; Revel, Jacques, Micro-analyse et construction du social. In *Jeux d’échelle: La micro-analyse à l’expérience*. Paris, 1996. 15–36; Levi, Giovanni, On Microhistory. In Burke, Peter (Ed.), *New Perspectives On Historical Writing*. Philadelphia, 1992. 93–114; Muir, Edward – Ruggiero, Guido, *Microhistory and the Lost People of Europe*. Baltimore and London, 1991; Clark, Elizabeth, A., *History, Theory, Text. Historians and the Linguistic Turn*. Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2004. 75–79. Clark also presents an excellent summary including the key criticism of microhistory.

<sup>266</sup> Bell, David A., Total history and microhistory. In Lloyd, Kramer – Maza, Sarah (eds.) *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*. Malden, Mass., Oxford, 2002. 262–276 [266].

<sup>267</sup> I could include a much longer list here including the works of Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Robert Darnton, Jacques Revel, Giovanni Levi, Judith Brown – just to name a few of the excellent microhistorians.

<sup>268</sup> Ginzburg, Carlo, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*. Baltimore, 1980 [1976].

<sup>269</sup> Davis, Natalie Zemon, *The Return of Martin Guerre*. Cambridge, Mass., 1983.

## *Exploring the Individual in Legal Skirmishes*

Let me refer to a story from the archives: A Debrecenian tailor, György Kovács, decided to get married in 1837.<sup>270</sup> He was young and handsome, and his workshop was successful. The bride, Eszter, was beautiful and quite rich, the daughter of a local pastor, István Komáromi, who had recently moved to the city. The wedding was opulent and the young couple started their new life in an expensive, big home. Two weeks later the wife visited her parents. She was pale and her eyes were red from crying. Her father, the pastor, asked her what was wrong; an awkward long silence followed. She was embarrassed and was reluctant to answer the question for hours. Finally, very slowly, in a faint voice she started to unveil the chastening details of her melodramatic marriage. The newly-wed couple was sexually incompatible. This was not an entirely unknown phenomenon to judges in Debrecen. In 1824, a few weeks after his marriage a disappointed husband, István Ibrányi complained to the Magistrate.<sup>271</sup> He said that his wife “had tremendous organic deformation” and she was not a real woman. A doctor and a midwife examined her and they reported that her vagina was abnormal, it was not fully developed and she did not have a “real hole.”

György’s and Eszter’s case was somewhat different. Eszter told her parents that her buttocks were so “used” that she could hardly sit on it. Every act of sexual intercourse was pure suffering for her: “exceedingly painful.” In the neighborhood everybody knew about the tailor’s homosexual relations except the pastor and his family, who were newcomers in Debrecen. A few weeks after the wedding the young wife turned to the city court with a divorce petition: in the following year she successfully got divorced from the “unnatural” tailor. György Kovács had another marriage where the wife was unable to escape and after suffering for years, she died. With her parents’ support Eszter was lucky enough to make a decision about her life.

This is but one of the thousands of legal tales the historian can discover in Hungarian archives. The massive documentary sources show us a myriad of burghers’ lives, various private issues and conflicts, which, at a certain point, gained publicity via legal channels. Studying the records of court jurisdiction is a uniquely enjoyable endeavor, a special intellectual adventure where the historian cannot resist emotional involvement. Digging out the records of a trial, listening to the competing parties, to witnesses, to specialists such as doctors, and reading the lawyers’ reasoning and the decisions of the judges gives a dynamic series of images from

---

<sup>270</sup> Divorce Case of Eszter Komáromi and György Kovács, March, 23 1837. Hajdú Bihar megyei Levéltár [HBmL] IV.A. 1018/c/61, 18.

<sup>271</sup> Divorce case of István Ibrányi and Julianna Horváth, April 26, 1824. HBmL IV.A. 1018/c/49, 15.

individual's and community's everyday life. More than that, the reader comes across parallel, relatively uninterrupted narratives from the lips of various people, narratives, which contain, very often, contradictory details, told from very different viewpoints and in diverse modes.

Undoubtedly, the stories of marital breakdown, disputes over inheritance, unjust last-wills, petty defamation and debts are amusing; the fictional qualities of the narratives have a profound effect on the researcher. In fact, legal texts are so powerful that it is almost impossible to remain impartial in a given conflict. To reconstruct practices of litigation is, in itself, a legitimate task for a historian. Still, when writing about disputing experiences we can achieve a different goal: by going beyond the tales of quarrel we can try to integrate personal conflicts into individual life stories.

By reconstructing the historical accounts of one's past actions and biographical details we can better understand how everyday conflicts and the solution of these conflicts enabled ordinary people of past urban communities to form and shape their fortune, how they used formal and informal legal means to craft their lives. Dispute was an integral part of everyday existence and there is no reason to take it out from its original context. A number of rational considerations, manipulative strategies, and emotional, irrational motifs are hidden behind these discordances. When people made decisions about initiating a legal case, making a last-will or avoiding some type of conflict, they faced many dilemmas that we can only grasp from the wider environment of legal life. Focusing on individual life stories with special attention to the legal aspects leads historians towards legal anthropology, the practice of dispute and reconciliation rather than simply presenting historical accounts of stories from the court.

### ***A Decision (ego) Document: the Last-will***

A key archival document that allows historians to learn about ordinary people's decisions is the testament. In fact, preparing a last-will was not a particularly widespread practice in Hungary. Although will-making was one of the most important privileges of free royal cities from the medieval times, until the mid-1700s it remained a rather sporadic action, no more than 3–5 percent of the adult population prepared written last-wills.<sup>272</sup> As literacy grew among urban inhabitants, the structures of real estate became more stable, urban administrative authorities gradually became more and more bureaucratized during the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The number of people preparing a bill also increased to some degree. Even in the most developed and civilized

---

<sup>272</sup> Tárkány Szücs, Ernő, *Magyar jogi népszokások* [Hungarian legal ethnographical practices]. Budapest, 1981. 727.

Western territories of Hungary and within the most literate social strata of artisans, merchants, and intellectuals, only about five percent of the total urban population prepared testaments in the early 1800s. The others simply relied on the country's inheritance law or they told their kin how they wanted to dispense with their belongings.

Meticulous testators enlisted not only the members of their nuclear families, but also their cousins, uncles, aunts, brothers-in-law, and sisters-in-law; not to mention other legatees, such as friends, servants, journeymen, neighbors, mentors, doctors and lawyers. The most common reasoning of will-making was to evade "disturbances." Other factors, such as wars, epidemics, illnesses, old age or joining the army were mentioned much less frequently. How should we think about this rhetoric that emphasized order and peace? We should not take it for granted.

While reading the testaments more closely we may get the impression that the rhetoric of conflict-management was only a "facade" which kept hidden the real motivation of will-making: in many cases the testament served to reward and to punish surviving family members, relatives and other relations.<sup>273</sup> Most testators made advantageous decisions to one or more heirs while either leaving significantly less to others or completely excluding them from the inheritance. Instead of reducing conflict, the will did just the opposite: it generated disagreement. . We can identify various grounds of privileging and shunning successors that combined emotional causes and rational considerations.

Those children – both sons and daughters – who "showed cold behavior" and neglected their parents had a better chance of receiving the least amount of wealth. Will-makers often accused their adult children that they "never showed up on the doorstep anymore," although they provided them with financial means for their profession and marriage. The archival sources suggest that emotional alienation had the biggest impact on the final decisions, but other factors could also play an important role. Testators kept personal offences in evidence, often mentioned them in their last wills, and used them to requite improper behavior. An aggressive offspring could have easily been excluded from inheritance. Besides physical attack, other negative characteristics frequented these last complaints: verbal abuse, debts and stealing.

Parents cultivated successful children who showed progress in life and invested their energies into career building and accumulation of wealth. They scathingly commented on half-wit, alcoholic, vagrant, and prodigal offspring who got less than the others due to their misbehavior. In most cases, testators did not scrutinize the circumstances of accomplishment and failure, but further punished losers by leaving them peanuts or excluding them entirely from

---

<sup>273</sup> The statements I make in the following paragraphs are based on the examination of 16–19<sup>th</sup> century last-wills from Debrecen, Kőszeg and Sopron.

the family wealth. Deviant children proved unworthy of “parental benevolence” both because they were unable to show positive results and because they were a disgrace to their families. Idiots got less or nothing; they were left under the control of their healthy family members. Sons were mostly punished for frequenting pubs and daughters for their immoral sexual behavior.

Of all the possible threats unruly children committed against their parents, entering a match which was disapproved by their ascendants was the most serious delinquency. Even as late as the 19<sup>th</sup> century parental influence on the marriage was still remained important. An advantageous match could serve as underlying factor for getting more of the family wealth, and children who resisted their parents’ instructions could suffer exclusion. John Gillis has argued that early modern parents considered their children’s marriage as a capital investment and in the 19<sup>th</sup> this perception was still dominant.<sup>274</sup> In everyday practice, fathers and mothers greatly meddled in their children’s choices and used the testaments as a means to enforce their will upon them.<sup>275</sup>

Besides their children, testators also mentioned their spouses in their last wills. Although wives and husbands enjoyed less attention than sons and daughters, the distribution of an inheritance could serve as final judgment about the spouses’ behavior. Burghers usually made a very clear distinction between good and bad marriages; from the testaments we can more or less reconstruct the criteria of the former and the later. In a good marriage the spouses lived peacefully together and zealously grew their wealth. In this case the surviving mate could at least expect access to using common properties for lifetime; if there were no children he or she could count on full property rights. When the union was less successful, the last will often used a bitter tone, was filled with the everyday details of a bad marriage, and at times sounded like a petition for divorce. Many will-makers punished their spouses in their testaments. The causes varied to a great extent: drinking, laziness, prodigality and infidelity were mentioned most often.

---

<sup>274</sup> Gillis, John, *For Better, For Worse: British Marriages, 1600 to the Present*. New York, 1985. 86.

<sup>275</sup> Diószegi, Sámuel, *Erköltsi Tanítások Prédikációkban* [Moral teachings in preachings]. Debrecen, 1808.

### *Self-fashioning at the Court*

In addition to legal fights over and inspired by provocative last-wills, other legal sources tell us tales of marital debates, the various aspects of bitter marital fights.<sup>276</sup> By scrutinizing marital breakdowns and the subsequent divorces we can better understand ordinary people's attempts to escape from the burdens of unhappy privacy. Usually young couples followed their parents' instructions when choosing each other as mates. Although these unions could have economically been successful, at times, the couples' sexual and emotional life proved to be a failure. More often than we could imagine, ordinary people decided to leave their spouses and start a new life. Individual stories ground the social environment for a more meticulous examination of how marital conflicts were handled, which were those typical grievances that inspired husbands and wives to turn to the court or simply escape from the unhappy home. These analyses contribute to a more complex understanding of gender relations in historical times.

The archival documents reveal details of how female identity was shaped, how women fashioned their social, economic and private, emotional, sexual lives. Undoubtedly, the static traditional scholarly view of the despotic husband and the defenseless wife is overly simplified. In Hungarian cities women had equal inheritance and property rights to men. There were typical female jobs available that allowed them to maintain an independent life. In Protestant communities most women gained primary education which provided them with elementary knowledge. In everyday conflicts, in legal fights as well as in business they were rather partners of men than vulnerable victims of rigid social norms. When they suffered grievances in their marriage, they had an option to seek legal service. More than that, as the documents of divorce cases indicate, women could dominate the marriage in various ways: psychologically, emotionally, economically and intellectually. Their everyday life, however, was harshly circumscribed by the double standards of a sexual morality that was central to the patriarchal urban communities. Like elsewhere in Europe, sexual virtue was the essence of feminine integrity, and chastity provided the major value in a woman's behavior, regardless of her age, social, economic and marital status.<sup>277</sup>

---

<sup>276</sup> See: Mátay, Mónika, *Törvénytéki játszmák: válás Debrecenben 1793–1848* [Games at the court: divorce in Debrecen 1793–1848]. Debrecen, 2006; The adulterous wife and the rebellious husband: a marital dispute in a Calvinist city. *Social History* 2009 (2) 145–162. The Adventures of Dispute: a Marriage Crisis. *Hungarian Historical Review* 2014 (3) 158–189.

<sup>277</sup> See on this for example: Gowing, Laura, *Domestic Dangers. Women, Words and Sex in Early Modern London*. Oxford, 1996.

Through court materials one can gain a better understanding of historical family life. Those were usually patchwork families, where legal fight involved ‘furious stepmothers’ and cheated orphans, and within the following generation, their inheritors. As the numerous inheritance cases attest, very often the last-will was the beginning of a disputing process: instead of settling social relations it created a playing field for both the testator and the heirs and legatees. The analyses of inheritance battles explicate the concept of family and kinship, solidarity, inheritance patterns, gender, and certain values such as ‘trust,’ ‘loyalty,’ ‘parental and marital love,’ and, of course, ‘hate’ and ‘revenge.’ From a novel reading of legal documents we can gain information about the ethics and the value system of burghers as well as about their rational choices, interests and emotions.

### ***A Legal Revolution***

A grand series of civic lawsuits were brought to the Hungarian city courts from the Middle Ages up to modern times. Couples revealing the details of their hellish marriages; insulted women who were called ‘whores’ in public; men accused of selling bad products, of being amateurs in their crafts or cheating their business partners; and quarreling sisters, brothers, and relatives over inheritance, ran to the court to find their justice. As time passed, the number of formal legal procedures increased radically, litigiousness, the readiness to settle disputes in court instead of out-of-court conciliation became a customary behavior among burghers: there was a flurry of remarkably intense legal activity. In other words, at the dawn of modern times the Hungarian cities experienced such a sharp expansion of civic lawsuits that we can call it a “legal revolution.” In this case, the term has multiple meanings. On the one hand, the absolute number of civic legal cases increased immensely. In addition, very often there were several defendants and plaintiffs in one a single lawsuit and many witnesses testified in front of the court, leading us to conclude that thousands of citizens were involved in some form of litigation throughout the country. In the first decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century written litigation became ubiquitous and each case was registered in a distinct legal file; many of the procedures lasted for more than a decade and the documentation, at times, extended to hundreds of pages.<sup>278</sup>

The boom increased the need for legal assistance and called into being a legal profession. A group of moderately trained attorneys appeared on the scene and some of them even attained celebrity status when they provided services to contentious citizens. Lawyers realized how

---

<sup>278</sup> See: Bossy, John (eds.), *Disputes and Settlements. Law and Human Relations in the West*. Cambridge, London and New York, 1983.

effectively court cases could serve as a means of self-promotion, and a generation of ambitious and skillful young barristers of the late 1700s and early 1800s learned how to make their cases known to the public. By reading the archival documents of the time one gains the impression that litigation did not only become more widespread, but that the trials also received more publicity than in earlier periods.

People wanted to hear details about the ongoing disputes and they wanted to know the outcomes of the legal fights, which could stretch for decades. Although until the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century local press was insignificant in Hungary, the spicy cases provoked an intense flurry of interest among the urban public. Sarah Maza explained this phenomenon to us in her masterly case studies about how eighteenth-century French barristers prepared trial briefs and by publishing them could easily reach the reading community.<sup>279</sup> Their Hungarian colleagues did not have such means, most urban communities learned about the famous and less famous court cases through a very traditional communication channel: gossip.<sup>280</sup> Rumor had always been a genuine part of the cities' life; in the early modern times the city court severely punished snooping. Punishment, however, could divert burghers from passionate tattling.

Gossip was one among other factors that contributed to intense litigation, but in the early 1800s other components nourished urban legal revolution. The increase of the number of formal lawsuits as well as of public interest in legal affairs has a number of possible explanations. The first few decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century are a unique period in Hungarian history; historians mostly refer to this time as the 'Age of Reforms.' Lacking autonomous legal status and having been integrated into the Hapsburg Empire for centuries, the Hungarian intelligentsia and small groups of the nobility began to invent a national identity both in terms of culture and politics.

The emergence of national consciousness went hand in hand with a civilizing effort that included more emphasis on private law: popular manuals of the time taught Hungarians how to

---

<sup>279</sup> Maza, Sarah, *Private Lives and Public Affairs. The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France*. London and Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1993.

<sup>280</sup> On gossip see for example Max Gluckman's classical anthropological analysis in which he identifies gossip as the means to reinforce coherence in a community (Gluckman, Max, *Gossip and Scandal. Current Anthropology* (3) 1963. 307–315. Robert Paine provides a summary of the most influential sociological and anthropological theories of the 1950s and 1960s on gossip and examines the connection between gossip, communication and information-management. He put the individual into the focus of his analysis by arguing that in various communities gossip served self-interest rather than protected communal values (Paine, Robert, *What is Gossip About? An Alternative Hypothesis. Man* (2) 1967. 278–285). See also Patricia Meyer Sparks's monograph in which she emphasizes the importance of gossip for subordinated groups. (Spacks, Patricia Meyer, *Gossip*. New York, 1985).

Edith B. Gelles in her article redefines gossip and successfully rescues it from its negative connotations. Gelles demonstrates the potentials of gossip as a positive social organizing force on a late 18<sup>th</sup> century case (Gelles, Edith B., *Gossip: An Eighteenth-Century Case. Journal of Social History* 1989 (4) 667–683.

use certain inalienable privileges and civic rights. Among these were such basic freedoms as the right of an individual to regulate his own affairs and the right to dispose of private property. Medieval Hungary's legal structure was grounded on Roman and canon law, so these concepts were familiar to many Hungarians, especially to the burghers of free royal cities. In the atmosphere of political and cultural revival, however, contemporary intellectuals and reform politicians paid more attention to such legal issues. In a modernizing society people placed greater emphasis on and were more conscious of individual rights than under the earlier feudal social conditions. Moreover, the shifting social structure, a process depicted as 'embourgeoisement' resulted in a new type of civic conflict where non-noble citizens defended their honor and virtue from despotic nobles. As many defamation cases from the archives indicate, ordinary citizens became more reluctant to respect noble status and turned to the local court to revenge unjust noble behavior.

### *The Anthropologist, the Historian and the Legal Arena*

Studies of lawsuits and litigants in European history remained embarrassingly slim until very recently. One reason for this lack of professional interest was that legal historians have traditionally focused more intensely on the institutional structures of courts than on their everyday operations. Dramatic lawsuits and the legal conflicts of the "famous" occasioned, at times, thorough study, but the masses of everyday routine processes were highly neglected by social historians. In the past two decades, however, a small group of historians concentrated on ordinary litigation more profoundly. In her analyses on legal norms and practices, Simona Cerutti describes this recent historiographical development as a 'new fashion,' which brings into focus the relationship between law and ordinary people.<sup>281</sup> According to Cerutti, the major cause of this newly emerged interest is that it opened up ways to integrate legal anthropological methods and findings as well as those of some of the legal historians' into social history. In other words, the meticulous study of legal practice allows historians to examine culture and social behavior, and to investigate social actors in a new context. Focusing on litigation leads historians to pose questions about the influence of law on everyday social life, on the decisions of social actors, on individual and collective lives and about the correlation between social practice and legal norms.

---

<sup>281</sup> Cerutti, Simona, Normes et pratiques, ou de la légitimité de leur opposition. In *Les forms de l'expérience*. Paris, 1995. 127–149.

One of the most successful attempts of this new historiographical ‘fashion’ is Thomas Kuehn’s collection of essays that claims to explicate a “legal anthropology” of Renaissance Italy.<sup>282</sup> Kuehn applied the new methods and followed the claims of legal anthropology. Laws and statutes attempted to diminish individuals’ freedom of action within a coherent and logical structuralist framework. Legal practice in real everyday life, however, was very different and contained many irrational, chaotic and contradictory elements. Kuehn paid distinguished attention to individual choices and decisions even if they did not seem to be cogent.

Kuehn, using published and unpublished notarial records along with private sources such as letters and diaries demonstrates that the citizens of Florence were not only familiar with the ever-changing legal statutes but also that the law had immense influences on people’s everyday life. For Kuehn, *quattrocento* Florentine law was incoherent and fluid; therefore, it left space for individual creativity and for the application of alternative disputing methods besides formal litigation. “My desire has been to understand how, or how much, the very sophisticated and complex apparatus of law could serve the interests of litigants and to see how law functioned in a context with other mechanisms of disputing and settling disputes, ranging from fairly formal arbitration to violence.”<sup>283</sup> The inherently ambiguous law created a broad horizon for social actors, individuals and kinsmen, in which they could find ways to accomplish their goals and interests in competition with other members of the community.

Kuehn’s vision on the relationship between law and society as a formative process combined with his aim to integrate alternative legal habits into his investigation provides his readers with a new understanding of certain social groups’ legal authority, especially those of women. He admits that women’s legal activity was circumscribed by the immanently oppressive, patriarchal order of the period. At the same time, he also explains the manifest contradiction between formal legal regulations and everyday legal practice, and the interpretation and application of law in matters such as female inheritance or more generally speaking, women’s legal authority.

In his essay on the role of *mundualdus*, a male guardian obligated by a statute to assist women in their legal transactions, Kuehn undermines the traditional, one-dimensional picture of women’s subordination to men.<sup>284</sup> Although the existence of such an institution indicated female legal ignorance, the *mundualdus* did not necessarily function as an austere control over

---

<sup>282</sup> Kuehn, Thomas, *Law, Family and Women. Toward A Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy*. Chicago and London, 1991.

<sup>283</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>284</sup> The most famous essay of Kuehn’s collection is: <“Cum Consensu Mundualdi” Legal Guardianship of Women in Quattrocento Florence>, *Ibid.*, 212–237.

a woman's legal matters. Instead, these males often supported women to gain some forms of freedom against their kinsmen, or at times, their husbands. In short, Kuehn examines how legal norms were present in daily life and how, in a creative way, Florentines could manipulate these norms in small territories where social actors – by consensus – could reinterpret legal regulations.

The significance of Kuehn's approach to legal theory and practice is that it challenges the old-fashioned functionalist model, where the relationship between legal norms and social behavior was defined exclusively "from above," from the perspective of the judges, and was characterized as a one-directional connection.<sup>285</sup> According to the functionalist model, law determined the lives of ordinary people, and historians who applied it ignored the possibilities of a less hierarchical structure and failed to articulate a more mutual correlation between regulations and actors. In the new genre, however, the reductionist interpretation of the law is replaced by a more flexible and complex paradigm, in which social historians focus on individuals' legal competence and manipulative capacities.

Microhistory and the new cultural history borrowed both theoretical assumptions and methodological innovations from cultural anthropology. Similarly, some of the leading scholars in the field of legal history have engaged in precisely the same task.<sup>286</sup> In order to understand their intellectual and theoretical considerations and those anthropological traditions that they tried to follow, we need to comment on an anthropological dispute. In the 1970s, a harsh debate emerged among anthropologists over legal theory and practice, where the rule-centered paradigm and the processual paradigm were juxtaposed.<sup>287</sup>

Representatives of the first model concentrated on formal written law and legal institutions as the only legitimate source of legal analyses and they thought that only laws and norms "from above" could define the boundaries between deviant and acceptable social behavior. On the other hand, supporters of the second paradigm emphasized individual decisions and the legal competence of social actors and they refused to view conflicts as

---

<sup>285</sup> See his theoretical considerations in the introduction (1–16) and his useful comments on legal anthropology (75–78; 288–292).

<sup>286</sup> See about the attempts of joining anthropology and history for example: Darnton, Robert, *History and Anthropology*. In *The Kiss of Lamourette. Reflections in Cultural History*. New York, 1990. 329–354; Geertz, Clifford, *History and Anthropology*. *New Literary History* 1990 (21) 321–335.

<sup>287</sup> See more on the debate and the processual paradigm: Comaroff, John – Roberts, Simon: *Rules and Processes. The Cultural Logic of Dispute in the African Context*. Chicago and London, 1981; Falk Moore, Sally, *Law as Process. An Anthropological Approach*. London and Boston, 1978; Nader, Laura – Todd Jr., Harry F. (eds.), *The Disputing Process – Law in Ten Societies*. New York, 1978; Nader, Laura, *The Life of the Law. Anthropological Projects*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2002; Roberts, Simon, *Order and Dispute. An Introduction to Legal Anthropology*. New York, 1979.

“pathological phenomena”. For them, conflict is a natural ingredient of everyday life and it is unavoidable when the individual attempts to realize his or her goals. These anthropologists accept that “order” in a society provides the basis for stability, but they believe that order is not a well-defined structure but a shifting and dynamic environment shaped by the members of the community. In general they argue that the analyses of legal norms should rely on social behavior, because this is the formative context in which social norms and rules are determined. Social behavior is more dependent on social relations than on the regulative authority of any political or social institutions. The shift of focal points led these anthropologists into a new arena where they paid more attention to concrete conflicts among individuals or social groups as well as to the possible resolutions of these conflicts. That means that social practices are not subordinated to rules, but that they have equally important power in shaping social conditions.

A current generation of historians who focus on legal practices has tended to favor the findings of the legal processual paradigm, the socially grounded approaches in the tradition pioneered by Thomas Kuehn. As a result, the legal landscape of Early Modern Europe now looks much different, more complex and varied than fifteen years ago. Legal anthropology provided several theoretical and methodological findings for historians which they can consider in their work. Of course, legal norms and rules are “ranges of discourse” which set constraints on disputants as they argued over marriage, wealth and honor.<sup>288</sup>

### ***New perspectives on historical research***

Lacking private sources such as letters and diaries, the best historical documents that contextualize the mental world of the ordinary people are legal records which allow the historian to depict and understand conflict management, disputing and reconciling processes in past societies. In order to comprehend how controversies are handled in a society it is unavoidable to characterize the cultural context within which they take place. When historians sketch the “socio-cultural maps” of early modern and 19<sup>th</sup> century cities, they introduce a range of crucial issues of political, social and urban history. The architecture of pre-modern cities reflects the combination of the extended agricultural and industrial activities which engaged their burghers. Furthermore, the agricultural and industrial sectors did not distribute the population into two distinct categories; the heads of the households were usually members of a guild and worked in the fields at the same time.

---

<sup>288</sup> Thomas Kuehn applies the term. See Kuehn 1991. 97.

When traditional social historians reconstruct urban societies their analyses in most cases have been launched from singular perspectives and for singular ends, and by overlooking seemingly nuanced changes provide a rather static picture of social conditions. The intense studying of *ordinary* peoples' lives and constructing their biographies demonstrate that burghers were more mobile, they had career choices and in fact, that they shifted in their professions very often. Individual life stories help us to avoid rigid social categories and the inadequacy of a mechanistic classification. Through demonstrating how creatively even ordinary people found multiple ways to raise their income, to integrate themselves into the urban community, or to reshape their career, at times, privacy, historians can provide a more coherent and realistic portrait of everyday urban life. The biography, of course, has to be put into context: the story of one's life is a story in the world, "the outcome of an interpenetration and collusion of inner and outer world".<sup>289</sup>

Analyzing the details of ordinary citizens' biographies allows the historian to reconstruct how "little people" shaped their lives, and what strategies they built to improve their living conditions.<sup>290</sup> In order to achieve that goal, we need to understand their decisions and their motivations behind them. What could have been the major motivations for making unusual last-wills, to defraud one's inheritors from the family wealth? How the cheated inheritors refused to accept the cruel treatment and opposed the vengeful decision? And how their reaction led them into an arena of never-ending legal fights at city courts? Why did people decide to get divorced? Close reading of conflict-generating testaments, the related legal archival sources, other documents of civic litigation and the intense inquiry of Church and guild registers, private notes, bills and whatever information the historian can trace down about quarreling families and couples open up a new space to learn more about pre-modern urban societies. As Giovanni Levi illustrates biographies can be used in multiple ways: one possibility is to perceive them as rational strategies applied by social actors to dodge the law, or at least, to find the optimal ways to utilize the ambiguity of existing norms.<sup>291</sup>

Through careful studying of individual biographies we can reveal interpersonal games, manipulative strategies and competence in extraordinary situations where both the legal and extralegal come into play, both norms and evasion of norms are on display, and both family solidarity and conflict serves as fundamental internal motivating factors. The complex stories

---

<sup>289</sup> Chamberlain, Mary – Thompson, Paul, *Narrative and Genre. Contexts and Types of Communication*. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London, 2004. 3.

<sup>290</sup> On biography see: Caine, Barbara, *Biography and History*. New York, 2010.

<sup>291</sup> Giovanni Levi, Les usages de la biographie. *Annales E.S.C.*, 1989 (novembre–décembre) 1325–1335.

also allow us to pose a range of questions about gender relations, family, social structure, economy, inheritance, and honor, which are fundamental issues of urban communities.

### ***Bibliography***

Bell, David A., Total history and microhistory. In Lloyd, Kramer – Maza, Sarah (eds.) *A Companion to Western Historical Thought*. Malden, Mass., Oxford, 2002. 262–276.

Bossy, John (eds.), *Disputes and Settlements. Law and Human Relations in the West*. Cambridge, London and New York, 1983.

Burckhardt, Jacob, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*. London, 1990 [1860].

Caine, Barbara, *Biography and History*. New York, 2010.

Cerutti, Simona, Normes et pratiques, ou de la légitimité de leur opposition. In *Les forms de l'expérience*. Paris, 1995. 127–149.

Chamberlain, Mary – Thompson, Paul, *Narrative and Genre. Contexts and Types of Communication*. New Brunswick, New Jersey and London, 2004.

Clark, Elizabeth, A., *History, Theory, Text. Historians and the Linguistic Turn*. Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2004.

Comaroff, John – Roberts, Simon: *Rules and Processes. The Cultural Logic of Dispute in the African Context*. Chicago and London, 1981

Darnton, Robert, History and Anthropology. In *The Kiss of Lamourette. Reflections in Cultural History*. New York, 1990. 329–354.

Davis, Natalie Zemon, *The Return of Martin Guerre*. Cambridge, Mass., 1983.

Diószegi, Sámuel, *Erköltsi Tanítások Prédikációkban* [Moral teachings in preachings]. Debrecen, 1808.

Falk Moore, Sally, *Law as Process. An Anthropological Approach*. London and Boston, 1978.

Geertz, Clifford, History and Anthropology. *New Literary History* 1990 (21) 321–335.

Gelles, Edith B., Gossip: An Eighteenth-Century Case. *Journal of Social History* 1989 (4) 667–683.

Gennep, Arnold van, *The Rites of Passage*. Chicago, 1960 [1909.]

Gillis, John, *For Better, For Worse: British Marriages, 1600 to the Present*. New York, 1985.

- Ginzburg, Carlo, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller*. Baltimore, 1980 [1976].
- Ginzburg, Carlo, Clues: Roots of an Evidential Paradigm. In *Myths, Emblems, Clues*. London and Sydney, 1990. 96–127.
- Gluckman, Max, Gossip and Scandal. *Current Anthropology* (3) 1963. 307–315.
- Goffman, Erving, *The Presentation of Self In Everyday Life*. London, 1959.
- Gowing, Laura, *Domestic Dangers. Women, Words and Sex in Early Modern London*. Oxford, 1996.
- Greenblatt, Stephen J., *Renaissance Self-fashioning*. Chicago, 1980.
- Iggers, Georg G., From Macro- to Microhistory: The History of Everyday Life. In *Historiography in the Twentieth Century. From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*. Hanover, New England and London, 1997. 101–117.
- Kuehn, Thomas, *Law, Family and Women. Toward A Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy*. Chicago and London, 1991.
- Levi, Giovanni, Les usages de la biographie. *Annales E.S.C.*, 1989 (novembre–décembre) 1325–1335.
- Levi, Giovanni, On Microhistory. In Burke, Peter (Ed.), *New Perspectives On Historical Writing*. Philadelphia, 1992. 93–114.
- Mátay, Mónika, The adulterous wife and the rebellious husband: a marital dispute in a Calvinist city. *Social History* 2009 (2) 145–162.
- Mátay, Mónika, The Adventures of Dispute: a Marriage Crisis. *Hungarian Historical Review* 2014 (3) 158–189.
- Mátay, Mónika, *Törvényszéki játzmák: válás Debrecenben 1793–1848* [Games at the court: divorce in Debrecen 1793–1848]. Debrecen, 2006.
- Maza, Sarah, *Private Lives and Public Affairs. The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France*. London and Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1993.
- Muir, Edward – Ruggiero, Guido, *Microhistory and the Lost People of Europe*. Baltimore and London, 1991.
- Nader, Laura, *The Life of the Law. Anthropological Projects*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2002.
- Nader, Laura – Todd Jr., Harry F. (eds.), *The Disputing Process – Law in Ten Societies*. New York, 1978.
- Revel, Jacques, Micro-analyse et construction du social. In *Jeux d'échelle: La micro-analyse a l'expérience*. Paris, 1996. 15–36.

Roberts, Simon, *Order and Dispute. An Introduction to Legal Anthropology*. New York, 1979.

Spacks, Patricia Meyer, *Gossip*. New York, 1985). Paine, Robert, What is Gossip About? An Alternative Hypothesis. *Man* (2) 1967. 278–285.

Tárkány Szücs, Ernő, *Magyar jogi népszokások* [Hungarian legal ethnographical practices]. Budapest, 1981.

## Ideology realized?

### The notion of culture industry and cultural industries in the texts of statutory meetings of UNESCO World Heritage organization in 1980s<sup>292</sup>

Adam Bartha and Melinda Harlov

#### *Abstract*

This paper investigates the transforming notion of Adorno and Horkheimer's culture industry appeared in the UNESCO publication *Cultural Industries: A challenge for the future of culture* in 1982. The theoretical switch is taken in a historical perspective discussing the diverse notions and understandings that leads to the new political and cultural space in the 1980s. Contemporary challenges and threats (such as industrialization of culture, diversification and specialization just to name a few) are discussed that formulated a new understanding of culture. After the ideological and social-historical overview the adaptation is researched. The second part of this paper contains an in-depth text-analysis about the statutory meetings of UNESCO World Heritage organization between 1982 and 1990. First, the relatively new institution, its structure and operation are introduced than the realization of the earlier introduced theory is examined to see what aspects were intended to applied in real life.

More than fifteen years after publishing *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Theodor Adorno made some comments on the famous text on culture industry in 1963.<sup>293</sup> At the beginning of his argument, Adorno elaborates that he and Max Horkheimer replaced mass culture with culture industry, whereas in their drafts they spoke of the former expression. As Adorno himself puts it, they did so “in order to exclude from the outset the interpretation agreeable to its advocates: that it is a matter of something like a culture that arises spontaneously from the masses themselves.”<sup>294</sup> This additional information is much more valuable than a mere methodological remark. Considering that, for Adorno, the entire concept of culture industry had

---

<sup>292</sup> An earlier version of this paper was presented at the *International Conference of Cultural and Creative Industries: Economic Development and Urban Regeneration*, held in Rome, Italy on 4-5 December, 2015

<sup>293</sup> T.W. Adorno, *Culture Industry Reconsidered* [1963], tr. A.G. Rabinbach, in J.M. Bernstein (ed.), *T.W. Adorno, The Culture Industry, Selected essays on mass culture*, London., 1991, p. 98-107.

<sup>294</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 98.

been deeply connected with the critique of totalitarian regimes, the aforementioned switch emphasizes that culture industry is inherently not a result of a democratic (or even “grassroots democratic”) process, but rather a more complex and oppressive ideological phenomenon.

In his historical review of cultural and creative industries, Justin O’Connor, who is a Professor of Communications and Cultural Economy at Monash University, Australia, emphasizes that the emergence of cultural industries was rather the establishment of a new cultural and political space than some “recognition of the economic importance of commercial culture”<sup>295</sup> from the late 1970s. O’Connor also identifies three key elements about the social-historic context of cultural industries in this era in comparison with the context of creative industries in the late 1990s.<sup>296</sup> Firstly, the overall institutional intention was to emphasize the collective aspect of culture, hence its rather democratic approach, even though the economic phase of cultural industries was important too. Secondly, the state’s economic tools and therefore its economic role as such were seen as possibilities to correct negative tendencies on the markets. Thirdly, markets were embraced and defined not as places of abstract and neo-classical rational choices, but as embedded socio-cultural practices.<sup>297</sup> These circumstances and notions made the founding concept of culture industry by Adorno and Horkheimer transform.

One of the most influential representatives of this new and transformed concept was Augustin Girard, the Head of Research at the French Ministry of Culture, who wrote a paper<sup>298</sup> for UNESCO in 1980 that became published in 1982 in the organization’s book, *Cultural Industries: A challenge for the future of culture*. Similarly in early June, 1980, social science and culture specialists from various geo-cultural regions of the world were invited to Montreal to help elucidate the problem of cultural industries at a meeting titled *The Place and Role of Cultural Industries in the Cultural Development of Societies*, which also contributed to the 1982 publication. In the foreword of the named UNESCO book, the editors explain their primary approach to deal with a greater and democratic access to cultural values through cultural industries. Accordingly they formulate the following initial questions:

“How might it be possible to harness the power of cultural industries to the promotion of cultural development and, generally speaking, foster the mutual enhancement of cultures and

---

<sup>295</sup> J. O’Connor, *The Cultural and Creative Industries: A Critical History*, “Ekonomiaz,” LXXVIII, 2011, p. 27.

<sup>296</sup> For another detailed historical analysis, see: Ieva Moore, *Cultural and Creative Industries Concept: A Historical Perspective*, “Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences,” CX, 2014, 24, p. 738-746. For Moore, the term cultural industries „refer to industries, which combine the creation, production and commercialization of creative content, which are intangible in nature.” Meanwhile creative industries „need to be viewed in the context of digitalization and not only culture and culture based creativity.” *Ibidem*, p. 745.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 29-30.

<sup>298</sup> A. Girard, *Cultural industries: a handicap or a new opportunity for cultural development?*, in UNESCO, *Cultural Industries: A challenge for the future of culture*, Paris, 1982, p. 24-39.

the current process of universalization, while safeguarding the cultural identity of individual peoples and giving them the means of controlling their own development? Could the development of action at local level, and of small-scale production units, counterbalance the effects of the cultural standardization brought about by the mass media?”<sup>299</sup>

These questions operate with a notion of culture, which is deeply embedded in the society as a whole, and they are approached from the viewpoint of cultural policies and not primarily of cultural theory. The complexity of the concept of “culture industry” is quoted from *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, but its adaptation alludes to some contradictions. While Adorno and Horkheimer spoke about the political aspect, they also developed an underlying cultural theory at a certain stage of capitalism. This lack of a comprehensive cultural theory appears in the very term of cultural industries used by UNESCO against Adorno’s constant singular format of culture industry. In the UNESCO text, the singular form could have doubtfully covered all types of activities that it is supposed to do.<sup>300</sup> As well as the UNESCO definition of “a cultural industry” alludes to the fact that there are more cultural industries, but one is formed “when cultural goods and services are produced, reproduced, stored or distributed on industrial and commercial lines, that is to say on a large scale and in accordance with a strategy based on economic considerations rather than any concern for cultural development.”<sup>301</sup>

Juxtaposing the aforementioned questions and this definition, it becomes clear that the underlying task is to situate cultural industries in the matrix of the markets and cultural policies. So the role of the state or any cultural political institution involves corrections of markets-related processes including not only “safeguarding the cultural identity of individual people” as the main questions of the UNESCO publication contain, but also safeguarding certain inner use-value of cultural products, as O’Connor also explained. The recurring Adorno quotes about counterbalancing the effects of the cultural standardization that appears via mass media can be interpreted as a cultural political reading of his theses. Nevertheless in *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Adorno and Horkheimer are sharply critical about the “democratic” nature of culture industry, as they hint that such “democracy” means rather a certain form of conformism.<sup>302</sup> Moreover, for Adorno, the standardization in culture industry is not equal to the

---

<sup>299</sup> UNESCO, *Cultural Industries*; cit., p. 11-12.

<sup>300</sup> “depending the activity included [i.e. photography, computer science in general, radio, film, equipments used in the production etc.], and the hardware of software involved, the economic factors vary considerably in scale, and the transparency of the interrelationship between industries also varies.” *Ibidem*, p. 21.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>302</sup> “Something is provided for everyone so that no one can escape; differences are hammered home and propagated. The hierarchy of serial qualities purveyed to the public serves only to quantify it more completely. Everyone is supposed to behave spontaneously according to a ‘level’ determined by indices and to select category

destruction of the inner authenticity in art (or “high culture”). The ideological background of industrialization is based on the adaptation of Walter Benjamin’s “designation of the traditional work of art by the concept of aura” as it “conserves the decaying [due to industrialization and standardization] aura as a foggy myth.”<sup>303</sup> This foggy myth can therefore give also the “transcendence in mass culture”, as in “the poetic mystery of the product, in which it is more than itself, consists in the fact that it participates in the infinite nature of production.”<sup>304</sup> Hence, culture industry has to provide and transform some use-value from the artworks in order to generate exchange-value on the markets, while there must be “a space for ‘authentic’ cultural value at the heart of commercial culture; but at the same time, it was liable to distortion by the logic of profit.”<sup>305</sup>

The UNESCO publication also contains three main theoretical approaches towards this question. Augustin Girard explains the need for proper cultural policy that determines the roles in cultural economy for reaching democratic access of culture. Second, Albert Breton<sup>306</sup> describes a mere neo-classical economic approach of cultural industries, where specialization and diversification of the cultural sector are responses to the high risks for the non-vendibility of cultural products on the market. According to him, cultural products can be seen as super-luxuries, whose consumption varies extremely with the consumers’ income. Armand Mattelart and Jean-Marie Piemme<sup>307</sup> examine the validity and the function of Adorno’s analysis within the framework of contemporary capitalism. In their views, a step further should be taken towards an opening of the field of the investigation, “since the aim is no longer merely to define a section of industrial activities or to establish the frontiers of a scientific discipline, but [...] to determine a new form of society, namely the ‘information society’, which is the successor to the industrial era.”<sup>308</sup> In this context the term information society refers to the post-industrial society, in which the power of access to information and knowledge is at least (if not more) as important as the traditional production.

---

of mass product manufactured for their type.” T.W. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* [1947], G.S. Noerr (ed.), tr. E. Jephcott, Stanford, California, 2002, p. 97.

<sup>303</sup> T.W. Adorno, *Culture Industry Reconsidered*, cit., p. 101-102. See also: W. Benjamin, *The Work of Art in The Age of Mechanical Reproduction* [1936], in H. Arendt (ed.), tr. H. Zohn, *Walter Benjamin, Illuminations*, New York, 2007, p. 217-251.

<sup>304</sup> T.W. Adorno, *The Schema of Mass Culture* [1942], in T.W. Adorno, *The Culture Industry, Selected essays on mass culture*, cit., p. 63.

<sup>305</sup> J. O’Connor, *The Cultural and Creative Industries*, cit., p. 31. See also: B. Ryan, *Making Capital from Culture*, Berlin and New York, 1992.

<sup>306</sup> A. Breton, *Introduction to an economics of culture: a liberal approach*, in UNESCO, *Cultural Industries*, cit., p. 40-50.

<sup>307</sup> A. Mattelart, J-M. Piemme, *Cultural industries: the origin of an idea*, in UNESCO, *Cultural Industries*, cit., pp. 51-61.

<sup>308</sup> *Ibidem*, 55.

This is where the historical and theoretical transition can be decoded in the UNESCO document. On one hand, Adorno and the Frankfurt School had given the basis of a cultural political analysis concerning with the issue of democracy (Girard). Similarly, the clear economic consideration can also be found, which is a significant economic history phenomenon regarding the history of neoliberalism.<sup>309</sup> On other hand, a renewed notion and role of culture in capitalism can be traced (Mattelart, Piemme) according to which culture, as such, is not only a product, but a productive force too. On this stage of capitalism, which is described as post-industrial by Daniel Bell and Alain Touraine, or late capitalism mainly by Ernest Mandel, or even network society by Manuel Castells; Daniel Bell's notion becomes valid that "as traditional class structure dissolves, more and more individuals want to be identified, not by their occupational base (in Marxist terms), but by their cultural tastes and life-styles."<sup>310</sup>

This corresponds with Fredric Jameson's theory according to whom after World War Two a new a kind of society with a new kind of consumption began to emerge, that included among others planned obsolescence, a rapid rhythm of fashion and styling changes, the penetration of advertising, to a hitherto unparalleled degree throughout the society.<sup>311</sup> Jameson connected this new form with a cultural phenomenon: postmodernism, which for him is the *Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. For Jameson, one of the most elementary changes in late capitalism is the fusion of the cultural and the economic components, as the unity of superstructure and infrastructure of the same period that express the same.<sup>312</sup> That formulated the contemporary capitalist societies where there were "stylistic and discursive heterogeneity without a form."<sup>313</sup> That is why, we need a cultural theory to see the underlying ideology in this cultural logic of late capitalism. In other words, postmodern capitalism has produced more and more primary narratives, life-styles and concepts, and their conceptual analysis is needed to understand cultural industries, besides researching their cultural political and economic factors. Consequently, the importance of the UNESCO publication is significant, despite all their contradictions and gaps, in expressing the transformation in the relation of culture and capitalism without any cultural theory. It places itself in a certain post-Frankfurt School discourse, but without a comprehensive cultural theory. Therefore it does not take into consideration sufficiently the postmodern capitalism as an abstract conceptual system.

---

<sup>309</sup> See also: D. Harvey, *The Brief History of Neoliberalism*, Oxford, 2005. and D. Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989.

<sup>310</sup> D. Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*, "Journal of Aesthetic Education," VI, 1972, 1/2, p. 15.

<sup>311</sup> F. Jameson, *Postmodernism and the Consumer Society* [1988], in F. Jameson, *The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983-1998*, London and New York, 1998, p. 19-20.

<sup>312</sup> F. Jameson, *Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*, London and New York, 1991, p. xxi.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibidem*, 17.

After reviewing the transformation in the understanding of Adorno and Horkheimer's culture industry to the UNESCO publication of 1982, in which cultural industries are discussed from many aspects by specialists, it is important to see what got adopted in the actual UNESCO texts as guidelines right after 1982. For this research, UNESCO's Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage is chosen for the period in between of 1982 and 1990. This Committee that was established exactly a decade before the discussed UNESCO publication by the verbalization of World Heritage Convention in Stockholm deals among others with the above described topics in the most direct way. As a consequence of recent international threats on heritage sites and values,<sup>314</sup> the Convention united governments and set the duties of the State Parties regarding the protection, documentation and propagation of potential natural and cultural sites. This last aim can be stated in parallel with the democratization of culture introduced in the theoretical review, the fact that the organization is intergovernmental shows that it is not a bottom-up mass movement. The year 1990 was chosen to be the end of this in-depth text analysis as there were other major historical, social and economic changes after that, which reinterpreted the introduced notion.<sup>315</sup>

The founding convention in 1972 also describes the concept and management of World Heritage List and World Heritage Fund. It needs to be emphasized that the Convention is exclusively concerned about the State Parties' heritage sites, even if it uses the term World Heritage. The Fund is consisted of voluntary contributions and the obligatory one percent of the State Parties' UNESCO dues. It is the financial basis of the Committee to ensure the protection of the State Parties' heritage sites. The one percent UNESCO dues are diverse in terms of exact amount depending on a matrix of characters and on this basis different positions among the State Parties formed, which shows the increasing role of economic aspect in culture. There are numerous advisory organizations such as ICOMOS (the International Council on Monuments and Sites) and ICCROM (International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property) that work closely together with the Committee. The advisory bodies cooperate both in the nomination procedure of World Heritage sites and in formulating the professional guidelines for the different heritages. These diverse and specialized professional advisory organizations represent the increasing tendencies

---

<sup>314</sup> For example after the destructions of World War II, monument protection was understood as a crucial and major tool to heal the shaken status of national identities and self-esteems. (See Flora E. S. Kaplan, *Museums and the making of "ourselves": the role of objects in national identity*, Leicester 1994.)

<sup>315</sup> For example: the official enter of East European countries to the Western European cultural, economic and social cooperation.

(diversification and specialization) examined also in the theoretical review although not from a social or consumption aspect, but from a professional point of view.

In order to observe the implementation of the content of the 1982 UNESCO document this research is primarily focus on texts about meetings of the leading units: the General Assemblies, of the World Heritage Committee, and of the Bureau. General Assembly includes all State Parties, and has meetings in every two years “to elect the members of the World Heritage Committee, to examine the statement of accounts of the World Heritage Fund and to decide on major policy issues.”<sup>316</sup> The World Heritage Committee meets every year, and unites twenty-one States Parties’ representatives. They have to implement the World Heritage Convention, allocate financial assistance from the World Heritage Fund and manage the inscriptions on the World Heritage List as well as on the List of World Heritage in Danger.<sup>317</sup> The Bureau that unites seven yearly elected state parties, is the administrative and management section of the organization itself.<sup>318</sup> Any change, new concept or approach have to be discussed and accepted by these units first in order to be realized at all other levels of the organization. The researched theory might be decoded in the texts of these units as recommendations, concrete steps or directions given to specific sites.

The strong tendency of democratizing culture by spreading it among wider and wider audience is explicitly discussed at the opening speech of the 1983 General Assembly, when Makaminan Makagiansar, Assistant-Director General emphasized “the importance of public information activities designed to associate the public as widely as possible with the conservation of the world heritage.”<sup>319</sup> Similar intention can be decoded in the texts about the World Heritage Committee meetings. It can be said that even though as early as the very first document already includes the importance of informing the public the powerful role of proactive public communication is discussed only after 1982.<sup>320</sup> Almost direct influence of the UNESCO document of 1982 is the Bureau’s session in 1983. At that time, the Bureau initiated discussion on and formed a “review of promotional activities and proposals for the development

---

<sup>316</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Center, *World Heritage Information Kit*, Paris, 2008, p. 27.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibidem*, p 9.

<sup>318</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Center, *Rules of Procedures*, Paris, 2013, p. 5.

<sup>319</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Center, *4<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of States Parties to the Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage*, Paris, 1983, <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1983/clt-83-conf022-6e.pdf> pp 2

<sup>320</sup> See the difference of the content and length of the sections titled “Public Information Activities” in 1979 and the more complex “Report on and proposals for promotional activities” description in 1987.

of a World Heritage Information Management System.” In this document the main verbalized aim of rearrangement can be summarized with the notion of cost benefit.<sup>321</sup>

The emergence of the economic value of culture and its contra-effect on the evaluation and role of culture itself within the society appear at the statutory meetings of UNESCO as well. The General Assembly of 1985 was almost exclusively dedicated to this increasing tendency, namely the importance of strong financial basis for the fulfillment of tasks and duties. Not just the unpaid UNESCO dues of the State Parties were called upon, but the voluntary contributions were also emphasized and especially acknowledged (for instance in the case of USA).<sup>322</sup> Adorno’s fear of losing authentic value by overemphasizing use- and exchange value of culture due to mass production and the service of economic aims can be stated in parallel with the World Heritage Committee meeting in 1983. The Chairman of ICOMOS, Michel Parent, discussed that due to the amount and diversity of the proposed sites the evaluation of authenticity, as a major requirement to become eligible for the World Heritage nomination became problematic and almost impossible.<sup>323</sup> In other words, the standardized requirement system at a time, when heritage nominations are generated as fast as in the field of industrialized mass production, questioned. Another aspect of the economic phase of culture was discussed in 1989 at the Bureau’s meeting regarding to the evaluations of world heritage sites after their thorough check and monitor. The increasing economic significance of heritage sites were named mostly as threats such as new roads on sites, increased sizes and human activities at the settlements next to the protected areas.<sup>324</sup>

The notion of culture as a product is examined from diverse perspectives in the theoretical works such as it is the result of its consumption via life-style and taste that is generated by the social-cultural practice of the market. This created character of culture can be decoded in the 1989 General Assembly, where the assistance and technical support given to the State Parties in the implementation of the World Heritage Convention and in the nomination process of sites are emphasized.<sup>325</sup> It seems that the attention is moved from the pure value and outstanding feature of a given cultural or natural heritage to the creation and explanation of those. In other

---

<sup>321</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Center, *7<sup>th</sup> Session of the Bureau*, Paris, 1983.

<http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repbur83.htm>

<sup>322</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Center, *5<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of States Parties to the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Heritage*, Paris, 1985. <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1985/clt-85-conf009-5e.pdf>

<sup>323</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Center, *7<sup>th</sup> Ordinary meeting of World Heritage Committee*, Paris, 1983.

<http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1983/sc-83-conf009-inf2e.pdf>

<sup>324</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Center, *13<sup>th</sup> Session of the Bureau*, Paris, 1989

<http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1989/sc-89-conf003-2e.pdf>

<sup>325</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Center, *7<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of States Parties to the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage*, Paris, 1989 <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1989/cc-89-conf013-6e.pdf>

words the produced information about the heritage got more emphasis than the heritage itself. Another aspect, the task of actively preventing or counterbalancing the possible harmful effect of the market, is discussed in detail by the World Heritage Committee in 1984. “The Tasmanian Dam Case,”<sup>326</sup> when the Australian national government involved in the state government’s (Tasmania) decision of preferring economic advantage over heritage value was analyzed thoroughly and set as example for heritage remaining present as a product of active protection. Even another aspect of the not-static understanding of culture is realized in the new discourse about cities as heritage sites and their categorization based on their capacity to change. The Bureau in cooperation with ICOMOS after 1984 established the categorization of “towns which are no longer inhabited,” “historic towns” and “new towns of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.”<sup>327</sup> The core of this distinction is exactly what Fredric Jameson described as the fusion of cultural and economic components. The questions whether the city is going to transform due to economic influences, if the authenticity of the city is going to be influenced and what necessary steps should be taken are all appeared and discussed.

It is important to see that answers to the problems of Adorno and Horkheimer’s culture industry and the later formulated cultural industries are still created. A more and more vivid realization of the expressed fear of devaluation of art through its mass production can be seen in the negative consequences of mass tourism and cheap souvenirs. On the other hand, positively evaluated distribution of cultural elements got also realized by involving modern techniques, such as the digitalization of heritage. This latter method is a tool for protecting the given heritage value as well as a solution to connect the individual art piece with the widest and biggest audience possible without its distortion.<sup>328</sup> The introduction of intangible cultural heritage that has to be experienced and can be transmitted through practice, and also some other recently formulated heritage categories such as industrial heritage, where production is a key element can be seen as the realization of the culture as productive force notion. The increasing emphasis on local communities and their acting roles ensure the formation of a new cultural political space instead of a (economic) role-based decision making procedure in management of heritage.

---

<sup>326</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Center, *8<sup>th</sup> Original Meeting of World Heritage Committee*, Paris, 1984 <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1984/sc-84-conf004-7e.pdf>

<sup>327</sup> *Report of the Eighth Session of the Bureau: Historic Towns & Centres* in “Committee Decisions” website 1984 <http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/3894/>

<sup>328</sup> Compare this understanding and evaluation of digitalization with Ieva Moore’s notion introduced in footnote 4.

In conclusion it can be said that the expressed transformation characterized by democratization, economic notion of culture and culture as productive force leading to the 1980s can be grasped in UNESCO statutory meetings after the 1982 UNESCO publication too, but mainly not as one connecting chain of thought, but rather by its elements in the diverse texts. Another difference can be seen in the discussed specific signs of this change that can be due to the different professions of the two parties. The theoretic discourse on culture industry and cultural industries were formed by economic and social science or cultural theory experts whereas UNESCO World Heritage Committee has members of mainly practitioners, such as architects, engineers or government people. These characteristics (the different aspects of the transformation are discussed separately with responding to diverse symptoms or circumstances) can be understood as sign of missing culture theory and of stronger attention on policies. Although for such implication more detailed research is necessary that would include thorough examination of the minutes of these meetings as well as of other publications and interviews made by the voting members to see in what aspects and depth they understood and shared the introduced theoretical notion and what other influencing circumstances defined their decisions.

### ***Bibliography***

Adorno, T.W. and Horkheimer, M. *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* [1947]. G.S. Noerr (ed.). tr. E. Jephcott. Stanford, California. 2002.

Bell, D. *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism*. "Journal of Aesthetic Education." VI. 1972, ½.

Benjamin, W. *The Work of Art in The Age of Mechanical Reproduction* [1936]. in H. Arendt (ed.). tr. H. Zohn. *Walter Benjamin, Illuminations*. New York. 2007.

Bernstein, J.M. (ed.). *T.W. Adorno, The Culture Industry, Selected essays on mass culture*. London. 1991.

Harvey, D. *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1989.

Harvey, D. *The Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford. 2005.

Jameson, F. *Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. London and New York. 1991.

Jameson, F. *The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983-1998*, London and New York, 1998.

Kaplan, Flora E.S. *Museums and the making of "ourselves": the role of objects in national identity*. Leicester. 1994.

Moore, Ieva. *Cultural and Creative Industries Concept: A Historical Perspective*. "Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences." CX. 2014, 24.

O'Connor, J. *The Cultural and Creative Industries: A Critical History*. "Ekonomiaz." LXXVIII. 2011.

*Report of the Eighth Session of the Bureau: Historic Towns & Centres*. in "Committee Decisions" website. 1984. <http://whc.unesco.org/en/decisions/3894/>.

Ryan, B. *Making Capital from Culture*. Berlin and New York. 1992.

UNESCO. *Cultural Industries: A challenge for the future of culture*. Paris. 1982.

UNESCO World Heritage Center. *4<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of States Parties to the Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage*. Paris. 1983. <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1983/clt-83-conf022-6e.pdf>.

UNESCO World Heritage Center. *7<sup>th</sup> Session of the Bureau*. Paris. 1983. <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repbur83.htm>.

UNESCO World Heritage Center. *7<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Meeting of World Heritage Committee*. Paris. 1983. <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1983/sc-83-conf009-inf2e.pdf>.

UNESCO World Heritage Center. *8<sup>th</sup> Original Meeting of World Heritage Committee*. Paris. 1984. <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1984/sc-84-conf004-7e.pdf>.

UNESCO World Heritage Center. *5<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of States Parties to the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Heritage*. Paris. 1985. <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1985/clt-85-conf009-5e.pdf>.

UNESCO World Heritage Center. *13<sup>th</sup> Session of the Bureau*. Paris. 1989. <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1989/sc-89-conf003-2e.pdf>.

UNESCO World Heritage Center. *7<sup>th</sup> General Assembly of States Parties to the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage*. Paris. 1989. <http://whc.unesco.org/archive/1989/cc-89-conf013-6e.pdf>.

UNESCO World Heritage Center. *World Heritage Information Kit*. Paris. 2008.

UNESCO World Heritage Center. *Rules of Procedures*. Paris. 2013.

## “Take It Slow” – The Case of Slow Tourism

Ildikó Ernszt

“Why has the pleasure of slowness disappeared? Ah, where have they gone, the amblers of yesteryear? There is a Czech proverb that describes their easy indolence by a metaphor: “They are gazing at God’s windows.” A person gazing at God’s windows is not bored; he is happy. In our world, indolence has turned into having nothing to do, which is a completely different thing: a person with nothing to do is frustrated, bored, is constantly searching for the activity he lacks.” –asks and states Kundera. In this present article I would like to join him and ask the same question. I try to sketch the philosophy of slow movement, the “slow tourism phenomenon”. Finally the possibilities of Kőszeg and its region are mapped in the sphere of slow tourism.

Slowness seems to be the enemy of modern man. Time is one of our most scarce resource, every minute must be used. So we are suffering from a late modern illness: the “hurry sickness.” (Parkins, Craig) Slow is like a synonym for: lazy, waster, not born for this world, enactive, dispirited and unsuccessful. The slow person lives in a different world, in a better case they are just day-dreaming, worse they are even disoriented. But what is sure that they are strange, suspicious, they are resignedly written off.

Meanwhile a fast person is just equivalent with success, they are dynamic, professional, energetic, specifically efficient and amusing. Quoting Kundera: “Speed is the form of ecstasy the technical revolution has bestowed on man...”

However, there is a revolution in society against the speedy lifestyle – which is incorporated in the slow movements, the roots of which go back to the 1970’s. “It is a cultural revolution against the notion that faster is always better. The Slow philosophy is not about doing everything at a snail’s pace. It’s about seeking to do everything at the right speed.” (Carl Honoré, In: Howard, 2012., p. 13.)

### *The “SLOW” Roots...*

“We have to go back giving things a value, not just a price” – stated Pietro Gortani, shepherd and cheesemaker. (<http://www.slowfood.com/slowcheese/>) This could be a slogan of

the “slow food movement” besides its three key words: Good, clean and fair. The food must have good quality, should be tasty and must serve the health. It should be clean from pesticides and its production should not cause harms to the environment. Finally the prices should be fair for both the producer and the consumers as well. Its mission is to protect regional traditions, quality food and the joy of gastronomy. However, this movement has extended to different areas and became a complex “approach to food that recognizes the strong connections between plate, planet, people, politics and culture.” (<http://www.slowfood.com/international/7/our-history>)

Protection of handmade products, the propagation of organic food production, the preservation of biodiversity play an essential role: small, local producers help to preserve premium food production, collecting traditional food procedures, connecting chefs with local producers and giving detailed information about food on labels are also incorporated. Food and taste education make people understand the importance of fresh, clean and local food and their personal responsibility towards sustainability in this field.<sup>329</sup> Besides the propagation of establishing “shopping centres” for local products helps to reach these noble goals.

“Cittaslow movement” was initiated by Paolo Saturnini, who was a former mayor of a small Tuscan city. The supporters of this philosophy have extended “slow food movement” on several elements of the everyday life of smaller cities and communities. They are devoted to sustainability, the well-being of their citizens is in the centre: “the authenticity of their products, good food, rich of fascinating craft traditions of valuable works of art, squares, theatres, shops, cafés, restaurants, places of the spirit and unspoiled landscapes, characterized by spontaneity of religious rites, respect of traditions through the joy of a slow and quiet living.” – as it stands on Cittaslow’s webpage. (<http://www.cittaslow.org/section/association>)

The Cittaslow International Charter tells us how to earn the honour to get the “slow city” title, programs must be elaborated relating to energy and environmental policy, infrastructure, quality of urban life, agricultural, touristic and artisan policies, policy for hospitality, awareness and training, finally social cohesion and partnerships are very important. ([http://www.cittaslow.org/download/DocumentiUfficiali/Charter\\_2014.pdf](http://www.cittaslow.org/download/DocumentiUfficiali/Charter_2014.pdf))

Thanks to this a network has been created which embraces cities with similar values, they believe in a kind of Mediterranean life style, economic development is connected to sustainability, so they establish the foundations of the transition of cities after a century long speed cult. (Martinez, 2009. p.18.)

---

<sup>329</sup> <http://www.slowfood.com/international/9/what-we-do>

Besides these “slow life movement” has a lot of other elements embracing various areas of life. A Japanese city, Kakegawa declared itself a slow life city. In its “Slow Life Declaration” several different elements were enlisted: slow pace, wear (respect for traditional costumes, natural materials), house (durable houses, traditional, natural materials to build houses) industry (sustainability, protecting forests). Education (enjoying studying, arts, less attention to achievements), aging (in a graceful way) ([http://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news\\_id025168.html](http://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news_id025168.html)), medicine (taking into consideration peoples’ values, protecting the environment) can also be interpreted in the „slow way”. ([http://www.slowmedicine.it/Manifesto\\_ENG.pdf](http://www.slowmedicine.it/Manifesto_ENG.pdf)). Finally tourism can also be reviewed in the slow key which shows rising of a new approach.

### *New Type of Tourism*

There were some forerunners, harbingers in tourism which already showed this trend: the new kind of tourism in opposition to mass tourism.<sup>330</sup> Poon sketched the picture of the “new tourist”: he travels more, demands quality and remarkable experiences, more educated and much more opened for adventures and novelties. He has a new value system: environmentally conscious, values “the new”, the different from routine. He is looking for “the real” and “the natural.” He has a new life-style: he has flexible working hours, has more wages and free time as well. He pays attention to healthy nutrition, clean and good quality food is essential for him. For him travelling is not just relaxation, but much more than that: a new style of living. He is more flexible, makes spontaneous decisions. More independent, does not want to merge with crowd, does not want a mass experience. (Wall and Mathieson, 2006., p. 31.)

### *The justifications of slow tourism*

Besides this there are some trends in society which justify the existence and popularity of slow tourism. Speed is the new god, fetish of 21st century, slow tourism gives the chance to get rid of this idolatry.

---

<sup>330</sup> In the 1970’s a new motivation of travellers has appeared: „escapism”. As Crompton states: „the desire to escape from everyday reality”, or quoting Riley: „escaping from the dullness and monotony of their everyday routine, from their jobs, from making decisions about careers and desire to delay or postpone work, marriage and other responsibilities.” (Cohan, 2010., p. 28.)

In the Western part of the world women's equality has already reached the "level" that the vast majority of travel decisions are made by women. Certain estimates suggest that in 75-80% of cases travel service providers must look for favours of women to be chosen to "be the real one". (For example VisitBritain reports that in Canada 75% of travels decisions are made by women. Or the Travel Industry Association suggests that the 82% of travel decisions are made by women. And they also appear on the market as single travellers...). (Bond, <http://gutsytraveler.com/women-travel-statistics/>)<sup>331</sup>

Besides their income is constantly getting higher – they have more and more disposable income, their "economic power" has increased significantly in the last decades. In Europe it is general that they are educated, getting better jobs with high social status, get married later and can be considered to be equal partners of the other gender. (Khan, p. 117.)

They are the persons in the family who take the responsibility for the medical conditions of the other members of the family. This duty especially appears relating to their middle aged or older husbands.

So tourism industry must take them into consideration as important persons and should not forget that they have a different system of values from the one of men's society. For women it is important that a certain product, a place should touch their heart. According to Papp-Váry to the "classical 4" (Sun, sand, sea, sex) a fifth element is attached: the "Soul" of the destination. (Papp-Váry, p. 2.) The designers of Volvo reminded us of a Swedish saying: "What is suitable to satisfy the needs of women, that is more than appropriate for men as well." (Papp-Váry, p. 2.) Slow tourism can be a good answer for this: the atmosphere of a certain place, deeper human relations are especially important.

Sociological studies showed that there are several phases in our life according to our actual family status. It has special importance from the point of view of tourism as well, since in different phases we have different consuming habits and lifestyle. (Seaton, Bennett, 2004., p. 36-27.) Among these groups "empty nesters" are present as well: who already can devote some time for themselves as well after their children have left home, so new perspectives of self-realization are opened. They also have more money to spend on themselves.

They can be grouped into two categories. In the first group the head of the family is still working, they are opened for travelling, educate themselves and willing to spend their money on holidays and luxury products. In the second group the members are already pensioners, they

---

<sup>331</sup> [www.etc-corporate.org/?page=download-report&report\\_id=41](http://www.etc-corporate.org/?page=download-report&report_id=41), [www.etc-corporate.org/?page=download-report&report\\_id=41](http://www.etc-corporate.org/?page=download-report&report_id=41)

spend their money rather on their health. Both groups can be potential targets of slow touristic offers.

Finally, the most developed regions of the world are struggling with the same demographic phenomena: with the ageing population.<sup>332</sup> In 1950 the number of people over the age of 60 was 205 million, this number was nearly 4 times as much in 2012: 810 million. According to estimates this number persists in rising and reaches 2 billion. (Ageing in the Twenty-First Century: A Celebration and a Change, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and HelpAge International, 2012., p.19.) In 2012, 11.5% of the whole population of the Earth was older than 60 years, this number is estimated to be 22% in 2050.

However, this tendency is not steady in every part of the world: The most developed parts of the world has been aging in the biggest proportion, among the continents Europe and North-America is on the top: these are the continents from which the most tourists come from.

**Table 1: The ratio of population of the world aged 60 years or more**

<b>CONTINENT/AREA</b>	<b>2012.</b>	<b>2050.</b>
<b>WORLD</b>	11%	22%
<b>More developed regions<sup>333</sup></b>	22%	32%
<b>Less developed regions<sup>334</sup></b>	9%	20%
<b>Least developed countries<sup>335</sup></b>	5%	11%
<b>Africa</b>	6%	10%
<b>Asia</b>	11%	24%
<b>Europe</b>	22%	34%
<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b>	10%	25%

<sup>332</sup> There is no generally accepted age when the oldness starts. In different sources there are different age limits. (The institutions of the United Nations draw this line at the age of 60, the EU at the age 55 – when examining the travel habits of Europeans.) In The European Union there was a survey to find out what the citizens of member states think about the beginning of old age: the average was 63 years. However there were big differences among countries. (Based on the “Cyrano-logic” it is not surprising that the question is judged on a different way when ageing. With ageing the “age limit” is going up as well...)

<sup>333</sup> More developed regions: Europe, Northern America, Australia, Japan, New Zealand

<sup>334</sup> Less developed regions: Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America and the Caribbean, Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia.

<sup>335</sup> The least developed countries, (the United Nations General Assembly listed them in 2011), comprise 48 countries: 33 in Africa, 9 in Asia, 1 in Latin America and the Caribbean and 5 in Oceania. (See the list of the regions: [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc2/ldc\\_countries.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc2/ldc_countries.shtml))

<b>Oceania</b>	16%	24%
<b>Northern America</b>	18%	27%

Source:

[http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/ageing/Data/2012PopAgeingandDev\\_WallChart.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/ageing/Data/2012PopAgeingandDev_WallChart.pdf)

Ageing of societies is a consequence of higher life expectancy – among other things. Life expectancy at birth is rising rapidly: while people born at the beginning of the previous century (around 1900) lived 45-50 years, nowadays the life expectancy at birth is 78 years in developed countries, 68 years in developing countries. (Ageing in the Twenty-First Century: A Celebration and a Change, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and HelpAge International, 2012., p. 20.)

**Table 2: Life expectancy by sex**

<b>Life expectancy</b>	<b>2011/12</b>	<b>2050.</b>
Life expectancy at birth by sex (men/women)	67.1 / 71.6	73.2 / 78.0
Life expectancy at 60 by sex	18.5 / 21.6	20.9 / 24.2
Life expectancy at 80 by sex	7.1 / 8.5	8.3 / 9.8

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2012), In: Ageing in the Twenty-First Century: A Celebration and a Change, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and HelpAge International, 2012

Fallback or stagnation was a general tendency relating to travelling between 2006-2011. In Europe the age group above 65 was the only one exception to this – in their case the number of tourists has increased by 10%. With this they have contributed to the survival and vitality of tourism.

**Table 3: Number of tourists by age groups**

	15-24	25-44	45-64	65+
2006.	<b>15%</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>15%</b>
2011.	<b>14%</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>17%</b>

**Source:** Demunter, Christophe, Europeans aged 65+ spent a third more on tourism in 2011 compared with 2006., In: Eurostat, Statistics in focus, 43/2012, p. 3.

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5585284/KS-SF-12-043-EN.PDF/0d45fd84-d6ad-4584-a800-2ac868f17e0c?version=1.0>

In 2011 the same age group has made more travels by 29% and has spent more guest nights by 23% comparing to the data of 2006. (Demunter, p.1.) 20% of all tourism spending of Europeans can be attributed to them, showing 5% increase in the same period.

**Table 4: Tourism expenditure by age groups**

	15-24	25-44	45-64	65+
2006.	<b>10%</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>15%</b>
2011.	<b>11%</b>	<b>32%</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>20%</b>

**Source:** Demunter, Christophe, Europeans aged 65+ spent a third more on tourism in 2011 compared with 2006., In: Eurostat, Statistics in focus, 43/2012, p. 3.

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5585284/KS-SF-12-043-EN.PDF/0d45fd84-d6ad-4584-a800-2ac868f17e0c?version=1.0>

Present projections forecast that European older people take the biggest piece from the cake representing all travels of older population. (This is partly due to the fact that European population is the oldest in proportion and on the other hand there is an increasing penetration for travel.) The same tendency is true for Northern American market. (Europe, the best destination for seniors, Experts draft report, Annex 1. p. 2.)

So ageing society appears on the tourism market as a more and more important segment: new offers should be elaborated which satisfy their special needs. Slow tourism can be a terrain of tourism like this.

In 2014 examining the travel habits of Europeans it turned out that people above the age of 55 they take part in the biggest proportion on journeys which are longer than 13 nights. This fact can promote the spread of slow tourism among them, since it has the typical feature that people spend more time at one place – giving time to slow down.

**Table 5: Travel habits: Holiday with more than 13 consecutive nights away by age groups, 2014**

<b>EU 28</b>	<b>28%</b>
<b>Age</b>	
<b>15-24</b>	28%
<b>25-39</b>	24%
<b>40-54</b>	28%
<b>55+</b>	32%

Source: FLASH EUROBAROMETER 414, “Preferences of Europeans towards tourism”, Report, 2015., p. 33.

[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/flash/fl\\_414\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_414_en.pdf)

As a summary: older people –who already do not work – have more free time in general. In future the average age is expected to grow. People stay active and more healthy for a longer period. As a consequence of this their travel habits are changing as well. They are demanding, and security is especially important for them. In certain Western-European countries they have more savings comparing to previous times. However, a lot of them suffer from health problems, and make a precarious living. So this group is quite heterogenous. (Europe, the best destination for seniors p. 5.).

They are willing to and can travel in off-season, they are more flexible in this respect. (Europe, the best destination for seniors p. 5.). Supporting their travel can also be considered to be a health strategy, since it has a positive effect on their overall health.

For older age groups easy accessibility is especially important. Infrastructure should also be established on grounds of their needs. This group also tries to safeguard its previous activity and does not like if they are reminded of their age.<sup>336</sup> (Steina, p. 17-18.)

For the above mentioned tourism demand the answer was born: several tourism fields can be reviewed in a slow key: Eco/green-tourism, rural tourism, health tourism, cultural tourism, gastro tourism and spiritual tourism can be interpreted in the “philosophy of slow.”

Using this approach all operators must devote enough time to get to know their customers, their needs. Personal relations have special importance: the exchange of ideas, experiences and

---

<sup>336</sup> There is also another trend: more generations travel together, so „intragenerational offers” must be elaborated as well.

feelings should be promoted among guests, and providers should stay in touch with their former guests. The possibilities for socialization of guests should be offered at least with the help of a common program. A short course can even be organized for the guests to get to know local art, craft and gastronomic traditions. Tourists should be given information about the culture, traditions and “slow” programs of the destination. The service provider should operate environment consciously, and in marketing should raise feelings and emotions. He should also encourage the use of environment friendly transportation. Appreciating and the warm welcoming of the guests are inevitable. Using local products, serving traditional local food, using local materials are also the characteristics of slow tourism.

On the catering field a slow part should be included in the menu, where traditional food appears in the offer – besides stories, pictures, poems should be attached. If the guest is interested in the recipe of the meal, information could be given about it.

As far as tour guides are concerned they should talk about local secrets, interesting stories, they should be ready to adapt their routes according to the tourists’ wishes. Theme based routes can be elaborated, where the tourists are actively involved as well. They should also be encouraged to act as responsible tourists.

Destination management should concentrate on programs which avoid crowded places and concentrate on network creating between different service providers. They should help the guests to get in touch with the everyday life of the destination. (Guidelines for the slow tourism, 2011. p. 60-73.)

### ***What is slow tourism? Definitions...***

“Being Slow means that you control the rhythms of your own life.” (Carl Honoré, In Praise for Slowness)

Slow tourism is a trend which can be an alternative of mass tourism. During a slow tour the tourist has the possibility of building into local community, to experience the sense of weekdays of a destination, to buy in local shops, eating in small restaurants owned by locals, offering traditional, local food produced by local farmers. The experience should be mutual: both the slow traveller and the local people should have a good impact. (Gardner, Nicky: A manifesto for slow travel In:<http://www.hiddeneurope.co.uk/a-manifesto-for-slow-travel>)

As Pécsek states (Pécsek, 2014.) in slow tourism the journey itself is the goal. Howard draws a parallel with slow travellers of our days and pilgrims: both groups try to escape from the besetting world of phone calls, e-mails, weekdays. As Howard formulates: “Slow travellers

temporarily liberate themselves from the immediacies of “fast life”... Such liberation presents the possibility for alternative experiences of time, pace and self – giving forth new modes of being-in-the-world.” (Howard, In: Fullagar, 2012., p. 12.)

The journey transforms the soul and spirituality of the traveller, as a pilgrim on El Camino stated: “their perception of world change, including their sense of time, awareness of their bodies and the subtleties of the landscape.” (Howard, p. 19., In: Fullagar: Slow Tourism). In the case of another traveller, who was in the Himalayas, we can find similar moments: the whole world was simplified, the beauty of the nature overawes the climber, the alpinist, just like the way how the sherpas live in harmony with nature.: “Life simplifies... This gives you time away from the everyday stresses and allows you to think about the more long term aspects of life”. (Howard, p. 19-20.) So in fact these slow journeys become a kind of pilgrimage and help to find the depths of the traveller and go into a journey into themselves.

Slow travellers are transformed spiritually during the slow journey, and because they have more freedom, they have a feeling that they can control their own life much better. To make a longer journey has also the consequence that they can get rid of their social obligations for a longer time, and they can live a self-controlled life in time with an inner peace. (Tiyce, Wilson, 2013. p. 115.)

Slow tourism “constitutes a framework which creates the alternative of travelling by car and flights, this way people travel on a much slower way, use local transportation and discover local food, traditions and culture, meanwhile their attitude is environment friendly.” (Dickinson – Lumsdon, 2010., p. 2-3.)

Further it is a “social, cultural phenomenon” as Lumsdon and Mcgrath emphasize. (Di Clemente – Mogollón – Salvo,- Campón 2014. p. 26.) It has 4 elements: slowness, the belief that time is a value, the “local conception”, the ways of travel and environmental awareness. (Di Clemente – Mogollón – Salvo,- Campón 2014. p. 26.)

Matos discovered 2 key factors in slow tourism: one of them is the relationship with the destination, the other one is spending time there. (Markwell, Fullagar, Wilson, 2012. p. 229.)

According to Calzati és DeSalvo slow tourism enriches the traveller with a cultural-spiritual experience in every section – meanwhile building deep relation – with the help of slowness. (Di Clemente – Mogollón – Salvo, Campón 2014. p. 26.)

In Canada the touristic marketing campaign of Yukon region also built on this spiritual feature. On one of the pictures above the mountains which are wrapped into fog and clouds the following subtitle can be seen: “Somewhere down there is your soul.” (De La Barre, 2009., p. 145.) “On Yukon Time” marketing campaign (2000-2005.) sketched the essence: „Hit the

Brakes! Slow down and enjoy the moment. Take time to meet locals, discover special spaces... Relax. Breathe in our clean, fresh air. Spend a little extra time nourishing your soul.” (De La Barre, 2012., p. 164.)

Salvo draw the image of “slow tourists”: they are happy to submerge into local culture and traditions and opened for everything NEW. They are experienced travellers, they collect information about the destination in advance. They avoid crowded places and are thirsty for authentic, original relationship with the locals. Besides they respect nature and their hosts. (Salvo-Mogollón – Di Clemente, 2013., p. 144-145.) Their journey has a minimal effect on the environment, only limited resources are needed. A slow tourist does not want a lot of attractions, he wants experiences instead of sights, staying at a certain place for a longer period and enjoying the atmosphere of the place and concentrates on some things to see. For him the authenticity and speciality give the spice of a journey. Instead of globalized, uniform taste world he confesses the slow food philosophy. This kind of tourism is based on flexible, bottom-up initiations. Instead of pure materialism it has a strong connection with spiritualism.

Further it is sustainable: eco-tourism, green tourism, agritourism, health, cultural and gastrotourism are perfect examples for that – they can be reviewed in a slow key. (Pécsek, 2014.)

Sugiyama and Nobuoka define slow tourism as a journey which makes self-realization possible with the help of being and acting slow, - which makes deeper experience possible instead of simple sightseeing. According to them slow tourism can be characterized by 5 factors: good health, slow food philosophy, spending at least 1 night at a certain place, the possibilities of self-realization, acting green, environment-friendliness. It can be an umbrella term – and embraces ecotourism, green tourism, agritourism as well. (Murayama, M. – Parker, G, p. 174.)

One central factor of slow tourism is the local society, the active involvement of local society into the “process of tourism”. They should not be simple supplies or victims of tourism, but active „participants” who profit from the appearance of tourists.

“Slow tourism can transform the destination to an interactive space where tourists engage in activities which can have mutual benefit for them and for local communities as well. The members of society can take an active part in changing local economy as well, not just puppets of outside commercial and government interest.” (Wearing, S, Wearing M, McDonald, 2012., p. 41.) This way the members of society can shape the destination itself, can take part in the planning, improvement and management of the destination as well. Owing to this they could choose what they would like to show for tourists, what kind of social value they would like to

transmit. It is also important how tourism will change the lives of residents of the destination, how beneficial it will be for them. (Wearing, S, Wearing M, McDonald, 2012., p. 42.) “Social value is created through the way tourists and locals interact in the tourist destination.” – it is a central factor of slow tourism. And it is beneficial for the locals and for tourists as well: Locals can show their values, culture, and traditions themselves through their own lens - hereby their identity will be strengthened. On the other hand tourists could flow into the every day of a society on an authentic way. (Wearing, S, Wearing M, McDonald, 2012., p. 42.)

Creating the image of slow tourism – 4 components should be emphasized:

- “The local” – embraces local producers, food, employees, culture
- “Sustainability”: it means an environmental friendly approach: low impact on the environment, eco-investments, and that the profit stays at the destination.
- Social well-being is based on bottom-up initiations, characterized by consensus, higher life-standard. The tourists will have close relationship with locals, becomes a little bit “part of the destination”, experiences in a deeper way. This way besides environment-friendliness it is also social-community friendly.
- Finally experience-based approach means activity, special, unique, personalized attractions.<sup>337</sup>

Finally slow tourism gets a link function: “personal well-being is linked to global well-being”, so it acts as a channel in a global matter.

However there are some contradictions as well: the travellers who are devoted to slow tourism get to the place often by flights, car or coach, where they can start their “slow journey”. Besides laptop is an inevitable necessity of the suitcases even of travellers who want to escape most from their modern life. Then later they keep connection with the world they wanted to escape from. Skype, blogs, web pages. Of course, we can say that that’s how they get information, share experiences. (Markwell, Fullagar, Wilson, 2012. p. 230.)

On the other hand as an interviewee stated: it is hard to make people slow, not everyone is opened for this philosophy: “People do not have time for anything nowadays... You have to convince them that it can even be interesting... A spirit, a cast of mind is needed for this...Tourism is not about this, either. Today the winner is: the fastest, the most instant. The guest– who needs suddenly a fast experience – must be “over-positioned.” Interviewee, man) They are a kind of warnings not to have illusions: “absolute escape” is possible only for a few.

---

<sup>337</sup> Pécssek, B: Gyorsuló idő, lassuló turizmus: a lassú turizmus modellezése, In: Turizmus Bulletin,(2014), XVI. évfolyam, 1. szám

## **Methodology**

A working group was established on the sphere of tourism: we have made structured deep interviews with persons determining the life of Kőszeg (e.g. leaders of the city, cultural institutions, intellectuals, service providers, owners of shops, businessmen....) As it is a key element to get to know the image of the city created by its own citizens, the citizens of Kőszeg were invited to make a scenario and the image of Kőszeg. A lot of citizens have accepted the invitation to begin the common work, the event was successful. We have also made an online questionnaire for the inhabitants of Kőszeg. Finally I have mapped the possibilities of the city and its region relating to slow tourism. I have checked: “What is “slow” already and how can we make it even “slower”.

### ***Kőszeg and its region: the change is needed...***

*“Kőszeg has lost its light, it used to spark, but for today it has staled.”* (Interviewee, woman)

This sentence could be the mysterious end of a sad ballad. That is how one of the interviewees summarized the present image of the city of Kőszeg. But during deep interviews around 75% of interviewees had the same opinion:

*“A lot of people say, this small city is magical, but it is a pity that it is so worn-out”.*(Interviewee, man)

*“One of the big losers of the change of regime” “The magic of Kőszeg has already worn, but it can still be felt..”* (Interviewee, man)

Nearly every interviewees indicated that the city is a *“not used jewel-box”* (Interviewee, man), it has *“amazing gifts – but they are not exploited.”* (Interviewee, woman).

So the change is needed – what is more according to an interviewee *„new blood is needed.”* The present situation cannot be characterized on a more suggestive way than by one of the shop owners:

*“Its strengths are its givens, its weakness is its existence. Its weakness is that it has not exploited its givens for 25 years now. They cannot find ways to attract tourists”.*

However, it is extremely promising that the inhabitants of the city are convinced that their town is valuable, only *“the already existing values should be undertaken”* (Interviewee, woman), *“everything should be built on them, and they should be managed on a clever way.”* (Interviewee, woman). One of the interviewees even identified the stubborn toughness and adherence to saving values as one of the strengths of the city: *“The stubborn toughness,*

*adherence to saving values is one of the strengths of the city – and no one can stay untouched from that.*” (interviewee, woman)

There are a lot of already existing slow elements. But first of all you must determine who you are... In Canada, in the Yukon region the Government started the whole process with creating a self-image. They have invited local people to give answer to the “who are you” question... Our research group has followed this route in Kőszeg with the before mentioned scenario-making and self-image creating by the inhabitants.

### ***The reason for existence of slow tourism in Kőszeg***


Several factors are present in Kőszeg which are the foundations of the “slow” philosophy. The quality of life, the peaceful atmosphere, the personal relations and the trust – all are key elements of “slow tourism.” The interviewees strengthened this first impression of the city – which can be an ideal place to be “slow”:

*“Its strength is: the quality of life: it is good to live here – even in the long term.”* (interviewee, woman)

*“It is good to live here because of the stillness, the personal, friendly atmosphere, the closeness to nature.” “A pearl... It is silent and so peaceful.”*

The quality of life and the calmness of the city are probably the first impressions which charm the visitor, the local people agreed with this statement:

**Chart 1: The quality of life and calmness in Kőszeg**




Source: own compilation

A student, who studies in the capital summarized her feelings this way:

*“I like its atmosphere so much, now Kőszeg has become even more precious for me: it is calm, no stress. The environment is beautiful, it is a peaceful city – comparing to Budapest it is a big contrast. It is good to come home, I know the faces.”* (Interviewee, woman)

Nearly everyone has mentioned the following words: peaceful, quiet, calm, trust, security. The online questionnaire strengthened this image. Most inhabitants of Kőszeg strengthen the peaceful image of the city, most of them considers the public safety very good or good:

**Chart 2: Public safety of Kőszeg**




Source: own compilation

Personal relations and trust are also a brand of the city:

*“Human relations are important, the vibration, the “pulse sweep” what you have here...”* (interviewee, woman) *“The kindness is the charm of the city, everyone greets the other”.*, *“People of Kőszeg are hospitable.”* (Interviewee, man)

**Chart 3: The hospitality of Kőszeg**




Source: own compilation

The human scale, the livability is a strength of the city: *“The city has a human scale, the personal relations are important. In Kőszeg it appears on an increased way: just think of the honour desks, the friendly local people: the “cordiality is flooding.”*” (interviewee, man)

An interviewee is touched by the historical character and charm of the city: *“It is good to live here, because it touches me even now that every stone has a history here. It has a good size: the infrastructure is that of a city, but its size is people friendly. It makes native locals crazy, but it touches the “settlers”.*” (interviewee, man) The local people offered the city to the potential target groups who are also typical consumers of slow tourism products: older age groups, bikers, hikers.

**Chart 4: Potential target groups of Kőszeg and its region**




Source: own compilation

Even in business life – service providers – talked about trust, personal relations – without exception. This emerges not only in connection with tourists, but also when choosing the business partners. *“Clean cards, trust are very important, (Interviewee, woman) „honesty, sincerity is essential.”* (Interviewee, man)

Besides the accessibility of Kőszeg and its region is acceptable – it can easily be reached from bigger cities like Budapest, Vienna, Bratislava.

**Chart 5: Accessibility of Kőszeg**



Source: own compilation

## *The role of civil society*

One of the foundations of “slow tourism” is that civil society is engaged into the creation of tourism experiences. The tourist sees into their everyday life, their customs – anyway it gets into relationship with them – in opposition with the philosophy of mass tourism, where the local community – from the touristic perspective - does not embrace values.

The general attitude of the inhabitants of Kőszeg about social responsibility – is very promising: *“Nowadays the rootlessness of people is a big problem. Where do I come from? Where do I belong? The children must be given this urge to know it. We try to pass this rhythm of life coming from the old times. It gives us much more than money.”* (Interviewee, man)

*“I have my business here, because I live here, I love people of Kőszeg, I have established this shop with the inhabitants here. I have to thank it for the individuals here...”* *“We have to know that we are in the shop window: in a small community we are much more transparent, but we also “see through” the others.”* (Interviewee, woman) There are active inhabitants who go to schools holding lectures about healthy living, there are others who are convinced that local legends, secrets spice history and it is a mission to talk about them.<sup>338</sup> In Kőszeg more interviewees stressed civil society as an important factor in the life of city: *“Every bottom-up organization works really well.”* (Interviewee, woman) *“You can build on civilians. – you could “pull away” the whole world with them...”* (Interviewee, man)

There are more civil groups, artistic groups in the city taking an active part in different programs.<sup>339</sup> The leadership of the city is grateful for the devoted work of civilians: showing their acknowledgment every year in one occasion – on the “Night of Thanks”.

However several “Achilles points of the city” have been detected – which originate from human attitudes. Besides the picture of a strong civil society, the lack of cooperation and the dissension were also outlined from deep interviews. The rejection of the other’s idea, passivity, *“it is good this way, why change” philosophy*”. (Interviewee, man) Among the weak points of the city “disagreement”, *“the lack of understanding that the city should be handled as one unit.”*

---

<sup>338</sup> Several details from the deep interviews understate the above mentioned things: *“I go to schools to hold lectures – I also take the food.”* (Interviewee, woman). *“My colleague holds lectures as a nutritionist for free.”* (Interviewee, woman). *“It is our duty to help each other. A lot of people helped for me as well – even people I do not even know.”* (Interviewee, woman) *“I approach sociality through historicity. These legends resulted at a change of attitude for me. These legends can be got to know only here. these are the local secrets. I even talk about them. All Hungarians must know about them. With this I do not only transform information but feelings as well.”*(Interviewee, woman).

<sup>339</sup> . e.g. The Brass Band of the City of Kőszeg, Be-Jó Historic Dance Group, Be-Jó Dance Group, Ataru Percussion Group, Alpensanger German Minorities Choir, Hajnalcsillag Folk Dance Group, Concordia-Barátság Singing Group, Majorette Group, Dance Jam, Genius Acrobatic R’nR’ Club.

(Interviewee, woman) can be listed. The lack of openness for the new was also mentioned as the deficiency of the city: the *“that’s how I have done till now, why should I change attitude”*.

(Interviewee, woman)

So a change of mindset would be needed: to cease bias.<sup>340</sup> However, there are people who report that they have been accepted: *“Local patriotism is strong, but now I feel we are appreciated. The way for appreciation is shorter here than in a big city.”* (Interviewee, woman)

For slow tourism it is also important that locals should also be aware of the spectacular values of their own city, but it is not the case here according to one of the interviewees. *“Not even local people know the values of their city.”* (Interviewee, woman)

An owner of a pension, an interviewee has proposed that civil artistic groups could be engaged into different programs more intensely: *“The programs of artistic groups of the city should be taken out of the 4 walls, to the city. In the afternoon short shows, programs could colour the offer. It would be cheap and would give a performance possibility for our groups. The schools, civil groups could be engaged in weekends – it would be spectacular, scenic and the community could be built by them – our children are rootless....”* (Interviewee, woman)

The same opinion arises from a man: *“We support artistic groups, but we do not expect them to hold a short performance in the tourist season... In Baden a Hungarian string-quartet is employed and every evening there is a concert... We could make a tower music by our brass band...”* (Interviewee, man)

### ***Complementary Medicine***

Natural healing methods/alternative/complementary medicine fit perfectly into the image of slow tourism – since they have the same philosophy. They propagate closeness to nature, naturalness is propagated by them against chemicals, they draw our attention to nature and sustainability. They teach us that for healing slowing down and paying attention to ourselves are needed. They also make it obvious that health is the harmony between the body and the soul.<sup>341</sup>

---


<sup>340</sup> The reason of the above mentioned phenomenon can root in history: *“The city is not recipient enough – the reason of this may be that before the borderland was here, anyone could not come here.”* (Interviewee, woman)  
*“It was already the end of the world, there was no further...”*(Interviewee, man)

<sup>341</sup> In Hungary there is a comprehensive legal regulation about complementer medicine (Further: CAM). The framework is ensured by Act CLIV of 1997 on Health. The detailed regulation can be found in 40/1997 (III.5.) Governmental Decree on CAM and in 11/1997(V.28.) Decree of the Ministry of Social Welfare on the practice of CAM).

If somebody wants to practice CAM, must get the license for that. Several methods can only be practiced by physicians:” acupuncture, anthroposophic medicine, ayurvedic medicine, chiropractic, homeopathy, manual

Complementary medicine is getting to be more and more popular worldwide. The situation is the same in Europe. Research has proved that the popularity of these therapies has increased dramatically during the last decades. On grounds of the online questionnaire, in Kőszeg and its region nearly 60% of the population accepts and uses natural healing methods. 54% use complementary medicine for health preservation, only 5% of the inhabitants of Kőszeg uses these methods to cure illnesses. Besides 41% of the local people do not use natural healing methods, partly because of lack of knowledge (23%), partly because they do not believe in it (18%).

**Chart 6: The usage of alternative, natural healing methods**



Source: own compilation


There were several persons who do not use natural healing methods, because they do not have enough information about them. It was interesting to see, where the inhabitants of Kőszeg derive information about the programs, possibilities: the following sources could also be used to publicize the program in connection with complementary medicine. Below on the chart the median values of the answers based on Likert scale can be found by sources of information.

---

medicine, traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), traditional Tibetan medicine and Kneipp practices”. Meanwhile other methods like acupuncture, kinesiology, shiatsu, other complementary moving and massage therapies, phytotherapy and reflexology may also be practiced by nonmedical doctors. In:Hegyi, 2012. p. 115-119. Legal status and regulation of CAM in Europe, Part I – CAM regulations in the European countries,

Most information is derived from printed newspaper and from family members and friends. It is surprising that online sources have less importance on this field.

**Chart 7: Sources of information about the programmes in Kőszeg and its surroundings**




1: Daily, 2: Weekly, 3: monthly, 4: rarely, 5: never

Source: own compilation

Among the methods using herbs is the most popular among people, the massage therapies and yoga the next ones. Thai chi, fast cure programs, bioresonance, reflexology also belong to the better known alternative therapies.


**Chart 8: Usage of natural healing methods – in the past**



Source: own compilation

Regarding the complementary therapies that people would like to try yoga and massage therapies were the most popular. Besides thai chi and herbs and chikung were also mentioned. There was one person who mentioned to be open for any complementary methods, meanwhile there were 10 persons who rejected natural methods.

**Chart 9: Possible usage of natural healing methods – in the future**



Source: own compilation

According to one of the interviewees Kőszeg needs “fine tuning”. You especially have the feeling when you see the intimate relationship of Kőszeg with herbs. As best practice the realm of the “Bükk medicine Man, Uncle Gyuri” can be mentioned.<sup>342</sup> With the cooperation of the already existing actors a complex touristic offer could be developed relating to herbs.

### *Herbs*

- In the city a Flower-garden is working. It also has herb garden. Its owner has special knowledge about herbs.
- In the Jurisics Castle there is a herb garden, herb programs are sometimes organized.
- In the Pharmacy Museum a historic herb dryer is working at the attic, what is absolutely unique. Besides it also has a small herb garden attaching to the Museum. This year For the Museum’s Nights the employees have already organised a program – making philter. (love-potion)
- The Pharmacy Museum has a small room, which is equipped with microscope, TV, DVD player. It is possible to have interactive programs for smaller groups. They already use this room for this purpose. They have already had programs for people with disabilities, what they have really enjoyed. .
- Thematic herb tours are organised in nature.
- There is a herb therapist in the city who teaches future natural therapists. She is happy to hold lectures, because she is “devoted to the city and lives here, she likes the people of Kőszeg.”
- There is even a chocolate store (Csokiszeg) in the city – the employee has mentioned that she sells herbs.
- The location of the city, the amazing natural givens, the positive vibration of the city strengthen this image of Kőszeg.
- As one of the interviewees stated: “the strengths of the city are: “the earth, the water, the air: the elements””.

---

<sup>342</sup> Herbs days are organized with presentations, health advising, cultural programs. (<http://gyorgytea.hu/ix-gyogynovenynapok>). Besides there are succesful (1-3 days long) herb tours with professional guiding. (<http://gyorgytea.hu/gyuri-bacsi-gyogynoveny-turai>).

A comprehensive, complex touristic offer can be created. More herb tours should be organized: (before that in the Pharmacy Museum a short guide could be given, then after that to give a taste of process of herbs – in practice as well. Some possible programmes are listed below:

- “Edible herbs, Decoration with Flowers” – a talk with a practical “show”. (FlowerGarden, Herb Garden in Jurisics Castle – and of course eat the results of the lecture.)
- Herbs and the realm of Senses: recognition of herbs with the help of their scent, touch and tasting. (It can also be exciting for people with disabilities.) (Pharmacy Museum, Flower Garden, Herb Garden in the Castle)
- “Bat and Frog Tale”: “The Night of Magic”: What kind of herbs did witches use? (On grounds of bedtime stories, scripts from the Middle Ages.) – probably night program
- “Healing in the Middle Ages: Medicine-men and Midwives.” (How were people healed in the Middle Ages? Herbs, ancient medicines. (Pharmacy Museum. where the ancient, old medical equipment, jars can be found)
- “Love, love, You Sweet Torture– making love philters, aphrodisiac in the kitchen and in the herb garden. How our ancestors worked? And in our days? (e.g. The secret recipe of Madame Voisien for the rune of the Sun King) (Pharmacy Museum)
- “The Sweet Temptation – On the Footsteps of Vianne” – “Chocolate Tour”– “From the cocoa bean till the sweet fineness. How is chocolate made? What is it good for? (Chocolate Store) Chocolate workshop...”
- Thematic Days could be held to heal different health problems with herbs (Pharmacy Museum)
- “The Secrets of Cleopatra’s Beauty” – what did our grandmothers beautiful? (ancient makeup, hair colour) (with the help of Pharmacy Museum)
- “Beautifying baths, creams, and other cosmetics” – herbs in the service of beauty.

### ***Eastern and Western alternative moving therapies, healing centre***

People are getting to be more opened for alternative moving therapies, since “people are much more conscious... Much more spiritual. A small push would be needed to do more.”

- Thaichi, chikung programs could be organized in the open air on public squares along the lines of the Chinese parks<sup>343</sup>.

---

<sup>343</sup>As a good practice the programs in Chicago Millennium Park can be mentioned. In: [http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dca/supp\\_info/millennium\\_park4.html](http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dca/supp_info/millennium_park4.html),

- 3-1-2 meridian exercises<sup>344</sup> could be exercised in the main square in every morning and evening in 20-25 minutes.

- Yoga sessions should be held – thematic way as well. (for older people, for children....)<sup>345</sup>

Detoxifying and fast programs could be elaborated. Programs could be run with different length of time supplemented with psychological wellness<sup>346</sup>

- Life-style and psychological wellness programs could be elaborated.

### ***Breathe Therapeutic Centre***

Quoting one of the interviewees one of the key strengths of the city and the region is the healing climate: *“Sub-alpine climate – that is the secret. The water is very clean. The same is true for the air. The level of oxygen is higher, the light has a cleaner effect. The earth is also good, trees set here yield spicy fruit.”*

The Kőszeg mountains have Sub-alpine climate. It is perfect for therapeutical purposes – especially for people suffering from asthma. Further among the first associations about the city nearly everyone mentioned the clean air: *“We moved here from the capital. A relative suffering from asthma has suggested the place. Colours, Nature, clean air... We desired it from our soul, we felt it on our children that the air of Velem has strength. Why could not we live here?” “As a first impression I would mention the stillness and the good air... I came here because of my child. The appearance and the environment of the city is unique.”*

More of the interviewees have mentioned this giving should be utilized: *“The place can be sold for people suffering from asthma, you can hike.”* For this a rehabilitation centre could be set up: *“Rehabilitation clinic should be founded here for people suffering from asthmatic diseases.” “It can be attractive for tourists, because the air is much better here. The air is more refreshing even compared to Szombathely or Győr.”* (Details from deep interviews) Ideas have shown up to give this new function for the abandoned buildings.<sup>347</sup>

---

<sup>344</sup> It is an energetic exercise for older people – it moves the energy channels, the meridians, its healing effect was accepted in China.

As best practice Wanderlust festivals can be accentuated, which are „celebrations of mindful living, specially combine yoga, meditation, special triathlon, mindful eating and arts.) (In: <http://wanderlust.com/events/about-wanderlust-festivals/>)

<sup>346</sup> Good practice: the detoxifying programs of Hotel Carbona, Hévíz (<http://www.carbona.hu/hu/ajanlatok/bojtkura>), fast programs in the Káli-Basin, Szentbékakála, the fast program of Káli Guest House, <http://www.kalivendeghaz.hu/hu/boejt/program>)


<sup>347</sup> e.g. the building of the old Panoráma Hotel.. „*Avar Hotel is a Sleeping Beauty*” now, there a therapeutical centre could be established.) (Interviewee, woman)

Eastern and Western therapeutic methods could be mixed under the title: “To Get Wind” – Where the East and West Meet”. In the therapeutic centre traditional, western, breath therapies and Eastern possibilities could also be used.

***The citadel of hiking?***

The city and its region have excellent possibilities to be the citadel of hiking. *“It is the most beautiful small city of the country and it has the most marvelous natural surroundings in the country.”* (Interviewee, man) Natural environment, green areas are extremely important brands of the city – it is also strengthened by the results of the online questionnaire:

**Chart 10: Attractiveness of the environment of Kőszeg**



Source: own compilation

Natural environment is among the top three reasons to travel: In the European Union a research identified the travel habits of Europeans in 2014. The reason for travel (after sun, beach: 46% and visiting friends and relatives: 36%) on the 3rd place is the natural environment (mountains, lake, landscape: 31%) If we see the results relating to age groups, it can be settled that for the 55+ age group identifies nature as the second most important reason for travel. (FLASH EUROBAROMETER 414, “Preferences of Europeans towards tourism”, Report, 2015., p. 13)

Several hiking routes cross the city of Kőszeg<sup>348</sup>, magical environment embraces the town with crystal clear air. Further it has old hiking traditions, dating back to the 1800's years. The interviewees mention without exceptions that the nature, the mountain, hiking possibilities, mountain sports belong to the charm of the city. Besides they are components of the general image as well - summarized in some words: *“good air, the mountain, hiking, bicycle.”* (Interviewee, woman) The hikers are primarily returning Hungarian tourists. As one of the tour leaders have mentioned: *“Austrians are not coming... There is no transit through the borders, they have been closed, separated from each other for too long time.”* (Interviewee, man)

There are several elements in the offer which fit perfectly to the requirements of slow tourism: There are tours organized on the grounds of a story, there are also experience tours.<sup>349</sup> Natúrpark also has an offer: - cultural routes and hiking tour offers (also with tour guides).<sup>350</sup> There are also thematic walking tours within the city.<sup>351</sup> Besides being interactive in most cases, during these tours interesting stories are told about: *“It depends on the tour guide: every tour guide has his special, beloved field: there is the one loving mushrooms, beetles, the fowler, the one loving monuments; the hikers know exactly the speciality of the tour guide.”* (Interviewee, man) There are sometimes stops at local producers.( e.g. at wine cellar.)

There is also a brochure about how a responsible tourist behaves. Natúrpark issued a “Nature Conservation Knowledge Base” – with the title: “I am a Responsible Eco Tourist”. ([http://issuu.com/naturpark/docs/greenmountain\\_see\\_termeszetvedelmi\\_?e=9870929/6351694#search](http://issuu.com/naturpark/docs/greenmountain_see_termeszetvedelmi_?e=9870929/6351694#search))

However, as one of the interviewees drew attention to the way that the tours should be made more interactive, and more experience-based: *“More experience, treasure hunt, explorer tours should be organized on the pattern of the one in the inner city.”* (Interviewee, woman)

On the grounds of “Talking houses” tour a symphony could be composed, the tours could be set to music.<sup>352</sup> The Tale Tour could be set to music.<sup>353</sup> “Every Bird Chooses a

---

<sup>348</sup> Blue, green, red, yellow signs, AlPannonia, Via SanctiMartini.

<sup>349</sup> Night costume Suleiman tour, Tale tour, Croatian Tour, “On the Track of Abandoned Settlements, Old Castles”, „Geo Walk – the Secrets of millions of years” - spiced with picking mushroom), „Fly With Us” – fly your kite...

<sup>350</sup> Cultural Treasure Hunt, The Treasures of the Inner City, Kőszeg and Kőszeg-hegyalja, On the Way to Traditions in Kőszeg and in Lukácsháza, Our Heritage at the Border, Austrian-Hungarian Castle Tours, Natúrpark Hiking for student groups, families: The Treasure Box of Alpokalja, Culture and Nature.

<sup>351</sup> Talking Houses, Walk to the Sites of Literature, Walk in the School City, Walk to the Most Important Ecclesiastic Values.

<sup>352</sup> Or building on the same tour –a musical composition could be attached to the events happened in the houses: e.g. the appropriate melodies could be chosen for different stories.

<sup>353</sup> The music groups of the city could play the music, while the actors could be the students, members of the art groups of the city.

Partner” – it is an existing tour at the moment as well – it should be rowed on romantic ballads, stories from the area. The participants could be amateur actors – the civil groups could play shorter pieces. The possibilities of “geocaching could be utilized much better” – it can also colour the touristic offer. (Interviewee, woman)

Nordic walking routes could also be established on more levels – marked by a silver/gold stick.<sup>354</sup> Finally “thematic tours should be organized for bird watching, for fowlers, for bikers.” (Interviewee, woman)

### ***Nature Park Friendly Qualification***

Natúrpark has issued a “Nature Park friendly” qualification. Service providers can be labelled this way if they have knowledge about the programs of Natúrpark, they offer it for their guests personally, through their webpage and put brochures and paper based information leaflets as well, they sell local and environment friendly products. They make it possible to get feedback from their guests, and they work on an environment friendly way. (<http://www.koszegimuzeumok.hu/hirek-esemenyek/naturpark-barat->)

### ***Shop for Local Products***

Local products embody the cultural roots of a community. Protecting local food traditions and promoting their spread<sup>355</sup> is a key factor of slow tourism. In Kőszeg local products are sold at the Flower Garden, Eco-Garden - Workshop Gallery and at the Castle in the “Natúr Shop” as well. There are also different programs in the city where the local products appear: Fair on St George Day, Seven Springs Picnic, Obsession Days, Vintage at Kőszeg and Brass Band Meeting and Advent or the Fair on Orsolya Day.

---

<sup>354</sup> As a good example the case of the area of Lake Bled can be stressed: around the Lake of Bled there are a lot of people making Nordic walking. In: [http://www.slovenia.info/en/pohodnistvo-paketi/Nordic-walking-across-the-western-Julian-Alps-region-Kranjska-Gora,-Planica,-Tamar.htm?pohodnistvo\\_paketi=1759&lng=2](http://www.slovenia.info/en/pohodnistvo-paketi/Nordic-walking-across-the-western-Julian-Alps-region-Kranjska-Gora,-Planica,-Tamar.htm?pohodnistvo_paketi=1759&lng=2)

<sup>355</sup> In Hungary the Decree No. 52 of 2010 of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development on the conditions of food production, processing and marketing by small-scale producers gives the legal framework on this field. Several regulations, legal norms were issued by the European Union as well: e.g. ): European Parliament resolution of 7 September 2010 on fair revenues for farmers: A better functioning food supply chain in Europe, P7\_TA(2010)0302.; European Parliament Resolution of 8 July 2010 of the future of the Common Agricultural Policy after 2013, P7\_TA(2010)0286.; Green Paper on promotion measures and information provision for agricultural products: a reinforced value-added European strategy for promoting the tastes of Europe, Brussels, 14.7.2011, COM(2011) 436 final; Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on ‘Local food systems’ (outlook opinion) (2011/C 104/01); Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the case for a local farming and direct sales labelling scheme, Brussels, 6.12.2013 COM(2013) 866 final.

(<http://www.naturpark.hu/kiadvanyok.html>) Kőszeg also has a speciality which is a kind of brand of the town: honour desks are the roads with fresh vegetables, flowers or plants.

However, besides shops for local products and honour desks there are several other possibilities which can contribute to the extension of local, healthy food. Farm shops, farmers' markets, box-schemes, home-deliveries, mail orders, mobile urban farms, community supported agriculture, consumer cooperatives, thematic routes, catering to public institutions, production codes or certification labels can contribute to this process. (F. Galli, G. Brunori eds. 2013, p. 35-36.)

### ***Possible Slow Food Programs***

Gastronomy is an attractive cultural factor of a certain region. It reflects the traditions and attitudes of a certain community. It is also extremely important that the food, cooking heritage should not be lost and quality food should have priority. Several slow food programs<sup>356</sup> can contribute to ensure these goals should become reality: Shows of famous chefs, cooking workshops, cooking lessons, taste-manufactures, organizing fairs for local products. Children can also be taken into these programs: at schools gardens can be set up to teach children how to grow vegetables. By this they will get the basic information about gardening, helps them to be more responsible consumers. Operating student farms, markets at schools<sup>357</sup> will have the effect that they study about entrepreneurship, learn communication with vendors, contribute to community building, grounding healthy eating habits. Taste education, making children more responsible are elements of these programs. Finally the joy and culture of gastronomy should also be educated.

In slow food movement special directions have shown up: slow wine and slow fish flows. Slow Wines have “excellent sensory characteristics, manage to distil the character of their terroir, history and environment in the glass... So wine makers can distinguish themselves through their interpretation of sensorial, territorial, environmental and personal values in harmony with the Slow Food philosophy.”

(<http://www.slowfood.com/international/food-for-thought/publications/91861/slow-wine/q=123>) Environment friendly viticulture has special importance: the use of chemicals,

---

<sup>356</sup> The biggest slow food festival in Australia: <http://www.sustainablemelbourne.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/01/final-atos-brochure.pdf>

<sup>357</sup> Denver School Programme is a perfect example for this movement. Youth Farmers' Market Handbook gives detailed information about this programme.

In: [http://dug.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/YFM\\_Handbook\\_digital\\_copy.pdf](http://dug.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/YFM_Handbook_digital_copy.pdf)

chemical fertilizers, propagation with gene manipulation is strictly forbidden. Only natural materials can be used during cultivation. Ecological viticulture has more streams: among this biodynamic farming can be found: which handles a vineyard as an ecosystem, taking into consideration astrological and lunar influences. (<http://www.winespectator.com>) Wine culture has old traditions in Kőszeg and its surroundings. The propagation of environment friendly viticulture can contribute to the further improvement and publicity of the wine territory of Kőszeg. Wellness treatments with wine are getting to be more and more popular. Vinotherapy means different treatments with the help of cosmetics containing grape or wine. There are face and body treatments, wine baths, massages with grape seed oil, wine cream. The cellars could start to produce their own cosmetic products which could be used in wellness treatments.<sup>358</sup> Further complex, cultural programs could be attached to the offer.

Kőszeg and its surrounding has excellent givens: natural surroundings, the elements, the atmosphere. All of them fit into the philosophy of slow. However, a lot could be done to promote the popularity of the city. Besides, the above mentioned possible future directions can also be followed by other smaller cities and communities with similar givens.

## ***Bibliography***

Alén, Eliza - Domínguez, Trinidad – Losada, Nieves: New Opportunities for the Tourism Market: Senior Tourism and Accessible Tourism, Intechopen.com

Bond, Marybeth: Women Travel Statistics: 80% of All Travel Decisions are Made by Women, In: <http://gutsytraveler.com/women-travel-statistics/>, (18. July, 2015.)

Cohan, Scott: Searching for Escape, Authenticity and Identity: Experiences of „Lifestyle Travellers’ In: The Tourism and Leisure Experience: Consumer and Managerial Perspectives ed.: Michael Morgan, Peter Lugosi, J. R. Brent Ritchie, 2010.

De La Barre, Suzanne: Place Identity, Guides, and Sustainable Tourism in Canada’s Yukon Territory, 2009. Edmonton, Alberta

De La Barre, Suzanne: Travelling Around on Yukon Time in Canada’s North, In: Slow Tourism: Experiences and Mobilities, ed.: Fullagar, Simone and Markwell, Kevin, W. and Wilson, E., Channel View Publications, 2012

---

<sup>358</sup> As good practice the Gere Wine Cellar can be taken into consideration. (<http://crocus-hotel.gere.hu/en>, <http://crocus-hotel.gere.hu/wellness-spa#vinoterapia>)

Demunter, Christophe, Europeans aged 65+ spent a third more on tourism in 2011 compared with 2006., In: Eurostat, Statistics in focus, 43/2012

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5585284/KS-SF-12-043-EN.PDF/0d45fd84-d6ad-4584-a800-2ac868f17e0c?version=1.0>, (19. August, 2015)

Di Clemente, José Manuel Hernández – Mogollón, Elide – Salvo, P.de - Cerro, Campón A. M.: *Slow Tourism: An Alternative Model for Local and Tourist Development*, In: Sustainable Tourism: A Collection of Tools and Best Practices, ed.: José Mondéjar Jiménez – Guido Ferrari – Maria-Del-Val, Segarra-Ona, Angel Peiró Signes, Chartridge Books Oxford, 2014.

Dickinson, Janet – Lumsdon, Leslie: *Slow Travel and Tourism*, Earthscan, 2010. In: [https://books.google.hu/books?id=qEYqgeLbmwC&pg=PA75&hl=hu&source=gbs\\_toc\\_r&ad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false](https://books.google.hu/books?id=qEYqgeLbmwC&pg=PA75&hl=hu&source=gbs_toc_r&ad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false), (15. July, 2015)

Frass, Michael, - Strassl, Robert, Paul - Friehs, Helmut - Müllner Michael, - Kundi, Michael - D. Kaye Alan: Use and Acceptance of Complementary and Alternative Medicine Among the General Population and Medical Personnel: A Systematic Review, *The Ochsner Journal*, 2012 Spring, 12(1):, <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3307506/>, (14. August 2015)

Fullagar, Simone - Markwell, Kevin – Wilson, Erica: *Slow tourism – Experiences and Possibilities*, Channel View Publications, 2012.

Gaál, Nikolett, Németh, Ákos: A klímaterápia lehetőségei Magyarországon klimatikus gyógyhelyek, gyógybarlangok, In: Németh Á. (ed.) *Orvosmeteorológiai Konferencia-2013 Konferenciakötet. MMT-MBE-MHT*, Budapest. p 5-13. [http://orvosmet.mettars.hu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ORVOSMET\\_KIADVANY.pdf](http://orvosmet.mettars.hu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ORVOSMET_KIADVANY.pdf)

F. Galli, G. Brunori (eds.) (2013) *Short Food Supply Chains as drivers of sustainable development*. Evidence Document. Document developed in the framework of the FP7 project FOODLINKS (GA No. 265287). Laboratorio di studi rurali Sismondi, ISBN 978-88-90896-01-9. In: [http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents\\_organicresearch/foodlinks/CoPs/evidence-document-sfsc-cop.pdf](http://www.foodlinkscommunity.net/fileadmin/documents_organicresearch/foodlinks/CoPs/evidence-document-sfsc-cop.pdf)

Gardner, Nicky: A manifesto for slow travel In: <http://www.hiddeneurope.co.uk/a-manifesto-for-slow-travel>

Hegyí, Gabriella: *Legal status and regulation of CAM in Europe, Part I – CAM regulations in the European countries*, 2012.

Howard, Christopher: *Speeding Up and Slowing Down: Pilgrimage and Slow Travel Through Time*, In: *Slow Tourism: Experiences and Mobilities*, ed.: Fullagar, Simone and Markwell, Kevin, W. and Wilson, E., Channel View Publications, 2012

Khan, Sonia: *Gendered Leisure: Are Women more Constrained in Travel for Leisure?* TOURISMOS: AN INTERNATIONAL MULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF TOURISM, Volume 6, Number 1, Spring 2011, pp. 105-121, In: [http://www.chios.aegean.gr/tourism/VOLUME\\_6\\_No1\\_art06.pdf](http://www.chios.aegean.gr/tourism/VOLUME_6_No1_art06.pdf), 2015. július 10. Kundera, Milan: *Lassúság*, Európa Könyvkiadó Kft., 2008.

Markwell, Kevin - Fullagar, Simone, - Vilson, Erica: *Reflecting Upon Slow Travel and Tourism Experiences*, In: *Slow Tourism: Experiences and Mobilities*, ed.: Fullagar, Simone and Markwell, Kevin, W. and Wilson, E., Channel View Publications, 2012,  
Martinez, dr. Norberto Muniz: Identity and Marketing of Cities, In:  
[http://www.sbs.su.se/Global/Forskning/Identity and Marketing of Cities Norberto.pdf](http://www.sbs.su.se/Global/Forskning/Identity_and_Marketing_of_Cities_Norberto.pdf),  
(21. August 2015)

Murayama, M. – Parker, G.: „Fast Japan – Slow Japan: Shifting to Slow Tourism as a Rural Regeneration Tool in Japan In: *Slow Tourism: Experiences and Mobilities*, ed.: Fullagar, Simone and Markwell, Kevin, W. and Wilson, E., Channel View Publications, 2012

Nagle, Garrett,: *Tourism, Leisure and Recreation*, Nelson Thornes, 1999. In:  
<https://books.google.hu/books?id=Zs9VZcfBjccC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=empty+nesters+tourism&source=bl&ots=AT7hucQyU-&sig=U286vl1hOODzSoaUrrpC9ETftpg&hl=hu&sa=X&sqi=2&ved=0CEIQ6AEwBWoVChMIraKrtYTgxgIVpmrbCh1CSANB#v=onepage&q=empty%20nesters%20tourism&f=false>,  
(25. July, 2015)

Papp-Váry, Árpád, Ferenc: „A legnagyobb célcsoport: nők a turizmusban”, In:  
[http://www.papp-vary.hu/reklam marketing/A legnagyobb celcsoport nok a turizmusban.pdf](http://www.papp-vary.hu/reklam_marketing/A_legnagyobb_celcsoport_nok_a_turizmusban.pdf), (18. June 2015.)

Pécsek, B: Gyorsuló idő, lassuló turizmus: a lassú turizmus modellezése, In: *Turizmus Bulletin*,(2014), XVI. évfolyam, 1. szám

Ponchione, Alissa: Women travellers influence trends,  
<http://www.hotelnewsnow.com/Article/8352/Women-travelers-influence-trends>, (10. July, 2015)

Salvo, de Paola – Mogollón, José Manuel Hernández- Di Clemente, Elide: „Repellent” Tourists Versus Slow Tourists, *European Journal of Tourism, Hospitality and Recreation*, Vo 1. 4 , I s s u e 2 , p p . 1 3 1 - 1 4 8 , 2 0 1 3 ,  
In: [http://www.ejthr.com/ficheiros/2013/Volume2/EJTHR\\_Vol4\\_2\\_Art6\\_Paola\\_et\\_al.pdf](http://www.ejthr.com/ficheiros/2013/Volume2/EJTHR_Vol4_2_Art6_Paola_et_al.pdf),  
(21. August 2015.)

Seaton, A. V. – Bennett, M. M.: *The Marketing of Tourism Products, Concepts, Issues, Cases*, Thomson Learning, 2004. In:  
<https://books.google.hu/books?id=Zs9VZcfBjccC&pg=PA37&lpg=PA37&dq=empty+nesters+tourism&source=bl&ots=AT7hucQyU-&sig=U286vl1hOODzSoaUrrpC9ETftpg&hl=hu&sa=X&sqi=2&ved=0CEIQ6AEwBWoVChMIraKrtYTgxgIVpmrbCh1CSANB#v=onepage&q=empty%20nesters%20tourism&f=false>,  
(1. August, 2015.)

Steina, van der, *Marketing for Senior Travellers: segmentation, travel behaviour and marketing mix*, In: <http://www.tourage.eu> (12. July, 2015)

Tiycce, Marg – Wilson, Erica: *Wandering Australia: Independent Travellers and Slow Journeys Through Time and Space*, In: *Slow Tourism: Experiences and Mobilities*, ed.: Fullagar, Simone and Markwell, Kevin, W. and Wilson, E., Channel View Publications, 2012,

Wall, Geoffrey, Mathieson, Alister: Tourism – Change, Impacts and Opportunities, Pearson Education Limited, 2006

Wearing, Stephen – Wearing, Michael – McDonald, Matthew: Slow'n Down the Town to Let Nature Grow: Ecotourism, Social Justice and Sustainability, In: Slow Tourism: Experiences and Mobilities, ed.: Fullagar, Simone and Markwell, Kevin, W. and Wilson, E., Channel View Publications, 2012

Guidelines for the Slow Tourism, Italia-Slovenia Programme, Trieste, 2011. In:

[http://www.slow-tourism.net/contentsite/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=59&lang=en](http://www.slow-tourism.net/contentsite/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=59&lang=en)

Market Insights, European Travel Commission, Market Intelligence Group, Canada, 2009

FLASH EUROBAROMETER 414, “Preferences of Europeans towards tourism”, Report, 2015.

Ageing in the Twenty-First Century: A Celebration and a Change, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and HelpAge International, 2012

[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/flash/fl\\_414\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_414_en.pdf)

Population Ageing and Development, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 2012. In:

[http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/ageing/Data/2012PopAgeingandDev\\_WallChart.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/ageing/Data/2012PopAgeingandDev_WallChart.pdf)

World Population Prospects, 2015 Revision, United Nations, In: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, p. 13. In:

[http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/Key\\_Findings\\_WPP\\_2015.pdf](http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/Key_Findings_WPP_2015.pdf)

Active Ageing, Report, Special Eurobarometer 378, European Commission, 2012.

[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs\\_378\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_378_en.pdf)

Europe, the best destination for seniors, „Facilitating cooperation mechanisms to increase senior tourist’s travels within Europe and from third countries into the low and medium seasons”, Experts draft report, Annex 1. In: *ec.europa.eu* (27. July, 2015.)

The Values of Europeans, Report, Standard Eurobarometer, 77, 2012., In:

[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77\\_value\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb77/eb77_value_en.pdf), (15. July, 2015.)

Well-being, Aggregate Report, 2011. Eurobarometer, Qualitative Studies, TNS Qual, at the request of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication, “Research and Speechwriting” Unit

[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/quali/wellbeing\\_final\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/quali/wellbeing_final_en.pdf), (10. July, 2015.)

Cittaslow International Charter, In:

[http://www.cittaslow.org/download/DocumentiUfficiali/Charter\\_2014.pdf](http://www.cittaslow.org/download/DocumentiUfficiali/Charter_2014.pdf)

<http://www.cittaslow.org/section/association>

Kakegawa Declares Itself a „Slow Life City”, In:  
[http://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news\\_id025168.html](http://www.japanfs.org/en/news/archives/news_id025168.html)  
Slow Wine. In: <http://www.slowfood.com/international/food-for-thought/publications/91861/slow-wine/q=123> (15. July, 2015)

<http://www.winespectator.com> (18. July, 2015)

## V. New Approaches to Linguistic Analyses

### **Phonological and semantic awareness of bilinguals and second language learners – potential implications for second language instruction<sup>359</sup>**

Judit Navracsics and Gyula Sáry

#### *Introduction*

For the study of phonological and semantic processing in bilinguals, there are two major sources of information: neuro-imaging data and experimental behavioral data. The aim of this study is to find out to what extent the two sources converge. While there are a number of studies on regional fMRI activation, topography and lateralization during the performance of phonological and semantic tasks (Khateb, 2000; Perrin et al., 2003, among others), there are hardly any findings available when it comes to the processing of two languages at a time (cf. Pillai et al., 2003).

In this chapter, we will analyse the phonological and semantic awareness of early and late bilinguals, employing a psychophysical technique measuring reaction time and accuracy of judgment.

#### *Recent neurolinguistic findings on processing two languages*

The existing neuroimaging literature on bilingual lexico-semantic representation is contradictory concerning how multiple languages are represented in the brain. Neurophysiological and neuroimaging studies support a shared cerebral representation of L1 and L2 lexicons in both early and late bilinguals (Chee et al., 1999; Fabbro, 2001; Illes et al., 1999) and claim that cortical activation for L1 and L2 is located in identical regions of the left

---

<sup>359</sup> This chapter is to appear in Simone Pfenninger and Judit Navracsics (Eds.) *Implications for the Future – Applied Linguistics Perspectives*. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters. 2016.

hemisphere. At the same time, other fMRI and PET studies have found distinct neural representations for L1 and L2 within the classical left hemisphere language regions (Kim et al., 1997; Perani et al., 1998). There is also evidence that although the languages may be represented in different portions of the cortex in the multilingual brain (e.g. Hervais-Adelman et al., 2011), this may be a function of L2 proficiency or the age of L2 acquisition. For instance, studies that examine lexico-semantic processes in bilinguals in the less proficient language (e.g. Leonard et al., 2010) show that greater activity is modulated by L2 proficiency. They also demonstrate that L1 and L2 are not completely isolated from one another, and they both mutually interfere and support each other (Leonard et al., 2010). Kovelman et al. (2008) suggest that the neural processing of a bilingual person differs across the two languages, as they found differential behavioural and neural patterns in studying the sentence comprehension skills of English monolingual and English-Spanish bilingual participants. The basic difference observed was that bilinguals had a significantly greater increase in the blood oxygenation level when they processed English as compared to the English monolinguals. This led the authors to hypothesize that there might be a “neural signature” of bilingualism, as differential activation sheds light on different components of language processing for bilinguals than for monolinguals. Pillai et al. (2004) investigated the activation topography with semantic and phonological tasks and found that there was a difference between when the tasks were performed in the second language (English) and in the first language (Spanish).

In ERP tests, interference effects can be observed in bilingual tasks. Recent evidence (e.g. Huster et al., 2010) suggests that an early component may reflect response selection, while a later component may reflect inhibitory cognitive components. The later ERP component seems to be systematically greater in amplitude in bilingual than in monolingual participants (Moreno et al., 2008). Moreno and her colleagues suggest that this component reflects enhanced cognitive control mechanisms related to the everyday demands of a bilingual.

With respect to lexical access, frequency of use has been reported to be a major influential factor. The more frequently a language is used, the faster the words in that language are identified as members of the language; in turn, the more frequently used language causes greater interference if it is not the target language (Ng & Wicha, 2013). In their fMRI study, Paulesu et al. (2000) show that in addition to the frequency, regularity and familiarity of the word, as well as the orthographic pattern of the language that the word belongs to affect brain activation. They found selective activation for reading words in English, which has a deep orthography, and for Italian, which is much more on the shallow side of the continuum of orthographic consistency; in other words, the predominant process while reading is the letter-

to-sound conversion or the grapheme-phoneme correspondence. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

### ***Processing reading***

Reading involves the joint activation of orthography, phonology and semantics. The question is whether these processes are independent or co-dependent, whether they are performed sequentially or in parallel, and whether they are automatic or strategic (Rastle, 2007). There are two presumed pathways to lexical access: (1) a direct one from orthography to semantics and (2) an indirect one, which, according to the ‘phonological mediation hypothesis’, includes phonology (see Tan & Perfetti, 1999). Price et al. (1996) and Price (2000) suggest that reading frequent, regular words does not require precise phonological recoding. In contrast, phonological forms are accessed directly and automatically. Braun et al. (2009) carried out an ERP study to analyse the time course of visual word recognition as well as the role of phonological processing. Reaction time data, event-related potentials and LORETA (low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography) results showed phonological activation in silent reading as well, which serves as evidence for phonological processes being involved in visual word recognition.

Van Heuven and Dijkstra (2010) reviewed the existing EEG and fMRI evidence for various psycholinguistic models of bilingual word recognition. They found support for their BIA+ (Bilingual Interactive Activation Model), according to which the bilingual lexicon is integrated, and words are accessed in a language non-selective manner. The question arises, however, as to whether there is a difference between phonological and semantic processing.

### ***The aims of our study***

Models of visual word recognition help us understand how we process language. There is neuroimaging and behavioural evidence for models, but our aim is to see how the models work in test situations, and whether the theoretical presumptions are valid among the language users. In other words, we want to show how the theory behind the practice may help instructors with compiling teaching materials so that they are in harmony with the natural language processing scheme.

In this study, we intend to provide possible guidance for language teachers in relation to what is easier to process for language learners: semantics or phonology. The main question

at stake is how we process bilingual visual information. Do we access the meaning based on the orthographic display of the word or do we also embed phonology in the process? Do we activate the phonological and phonetic levels together when we recognise a word? Is there a need for training the ability to make semantic categorisation in the foreign language classroom? Based on our findings, we wish to suggest some implications for the future SLA classroom activities in terms of teaching and learning vocabulary, always bearing in mind that there is likely to be a gap between the laboratory type of data presented here and the strategies and activities in real language teaching classes.

To be more specific, we shall investigate the phonological and semantic awareness of Hungarian L1 and English L2 users. Our goal is to see whether there is a difference in processing time and in the accuracy of written word comprehension at the phonological and semantic levels in the second language. By awareness we mean the ability to successfully apply information gained by implicit and explicit learning during language development. To this end, we constructed two tests: a ‘phonological rhyming test’ and a ‘semantic rhyming test’. With this procedure we follow Khateb et al. (2000), who used a monolingual phonological rhyming test in order to analyse how their monolingual subjects recognized the rhymes in pairs of orthographically dissimilar words. They also investigated how category relations in semantically related and unrelated pairs of words were recognized.

The experiments discussed in this chapter represent a follow-up of our previous lexical decision and language decision tests, where we found that in lexical decision, the participants relied on their orthographic and phonological awareness, i.e. pseudo-words were considered to be real words belonging to either of the languages, depending on their orthographic and phonological structure (see Navracsics et al., 2013). Semantics seemed to play no role in word identification. This being a real surprise, we then decided to investigate the temporal and performance features of phonological and semantic awareness. To this end, we designed two rhyming tests, one with phonology and another with semantics in focus to see the time and success rate differences between the processing of the two linguistic levels. As the tests are presented in two languages (Hungarian and English), the results may have special implications for the development of psycholinguistic models of language processing, in particular reading. The findings may also prove useful for the study of bilingual visual word recognition when the two languages composing bilingualism are different with respect to the degree of orthographic or phonological consistency.

## ***Methodology***

### *Participants*

Forty-eight healthy, right-handed adults (mean age 23 years) participated in this study (see Table 1). Participants reported no history of psychological or neurological impairment, and all had completed or were completing tertiary education. Language history and proficiency in both languages were assessed by a detailed questionnaire that asked participants to rate learning sources and degrees of exposure to both languages, and their reading, writing, and speaking abilities in both languages (Marian et al., 2007). Participants gave informal, written consent to participate in the experiments.

Thirty-one of the participants are native Hungarian L1 speakers and sequential L2 English learners. They are students of an English major programme at the University of Pannonia (henceforth L1 Group). They began learning English when they were in third grade (mean age of onset of acquisition: 9 years). They will be referred to as ‘late bilinguals’ as opposed to the other ‘early bilingual’ group. Their language proficiency in both languages was at C1 level or higher as they had to prove their C1 level proficiency in English when applying for university. Another 17 participants (henceforth HL Group) were early bilinguals, who acquired both languages before puberty.

**Table 1** Language history of the groups in the study

<b>Group</b>	<b>Number of participants</b>	<b>Age of L2 acquisition</b>	<b>Manner of L2 acquisition</b>
<b>L1</b>	31	Late (9 years)	School instruction
<b>HL</b>	17	Early (from birth)	Natural + school instruction

Participants in the L1 Group, born in monolingual Hungarian families in Hungary, learned English through school instruction. HL Group acquired Hungarian in a natural way in their homes as the families they came from used their immigrant language at home. Even the ones that came from mixed marriages had acquired Hungarian from birth. However, as English became the dominant language for them, they were not happy with their Hungarian language command. In order to improve their home language they started to attend Hungarian classes at Balassi Institute in Budapest, which offers Hungarian courses to Hungarians living abroad. The institute provides scholarship programmes for expatriates, and their offspring can learn about the history and culture as well as the language.

### *Material*

The test material was constructed for Hungarian-English bilinguals. We constructed word pairs from both languages: Hungarian and English to test how bilingual visual word recognition was going on and whether there were any differences in the processing of bilingual and monolingual word pairs. Hungarian is an agglutinative language and Finno-Ugric in origin, and English is typologically analytic and of Indo-European origin. For our experiment, it is essential to stress that the two languages differ in terms of orthographic and phonological consistency. English has a deep writing system with many different varieties of letter-sound (or rather grapheme-phoneme correspondence) combinations while Hungarian is rather shallow with some elements of deep writing to serve morphological procedures, such as suffixation, conjugation, etc.

### *Phonological rhyming test*

Forty mixed (English-Hungarian) pairs of words served as test material, and there were 40 pairs of same language, monolingual words (20 per language) serving as controls. The task was to decide whether the word pairs phonologically rhymed or not. In the test condition, there were eight interlingual homophones, i.e. phonologically and phonetically rhyming mixed word pairs in English and Hungarian (e.g., test pair: SIGH–SZÁJ, LOW–LÓ, SHIRT–SÖRT). The orthographic overlap between stimulus pairs was strictly controlled for their phonetic similarity. For instance, the words ‘high’ and ‘báj’ are entirely different orthographically, but very similar in pronunciation: they are minimal pairs differing only in the initial consonant ‘h’ and ‘b’. Pairs shared

- (a) low orthographic and high phonological similarity (e.g., test pair: HIGH–BÁJ);
- (b) low orthographic and low phonological similarity (e.g., WAY–VÁJ);
- (c) high orthographic and low phonological similarity (e.g. VAIN–VAN);
- (d) high orthographic and high phonological similarity (e.g. CAR–KÁR).

In other words, there were homophones, pseudohomophones (PsH) or neighbours, and phonologically non-rhyming pairs. Homophones had identical phonological/phonetic forms in both languages; pseudohomophones were the neighbours that differed only in one feature in their phonological components (e.g. SHOES–HÚZ, SHUT–CSAT); and the non-rhyming word pairs were dissimilar both in orthography and phonology (e.g. DOVE–ÓV). Following this pattern, 40 same-language controls were added to the test. 20 of them were English and 20 were Hungarian pairs. They were constructed the same way as the test word pairs were: there were phonologically rhyming but orthographically dissimilar words in English, such as SQUEEZE–SNEEZE, TAIL–TALE. Such pseudohomophones could not be constructed in Hungarian

because of its higher degree of orthographic consistency. Still, there were phonologically rhyming neighbours (e.g. PÉK–FÉK, VILLA–TRILLA) and non-rhyming pairs, such as VIASZ–PAPÍR, KÁRTYA–SZÖNYEG.

### *Semantic rhyming test*

Forty Hungarian-English mixed word pairs served as test material. The name of the test is metaphorical, as the aim of the test is to discover whether the participants are aware of the relation between the meanings of the words that appear at the same time on the screen. Twenty of the word pairs were semantically related, and 20 were unrelated. For the control word pairs, 20 Hungarian and 20 English word pairs were used. 10 in each language were semantically related, and 10 were non-related. All the words were checked for frequency and familiarity, and the task was to decide whether the word pairs were related or not, i.e. whether they rhymed or not.

In order to check the frequency of English words we used the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), which is a 400 million-word database, from which the 5,000-60,000 word lists are based on the only large, genre-balanced, up-to-date corpus of American English (<http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/>). The 100,000-word list supplements the COCA with detailed frequency data from Corpus of Historical American English (COHA), the British National Corpus (BNC) and the Corpus of American Soap Operas (for very informal language). In COCA the dispersion of the words is given, i.e. how evenly the specific word is distributed in the corpus. All the words selected for the test are from the MRC Psycholinguistic Database, which contains 150,837 words (<http://www.psych.rl.ac.uk>). We chose our test material from the 2,500 words of this Database for which psychological measures are recorded.

For the frequency of Hungarian words we used the Hungarian National Corpus, which currently contains 187.6 million words ([http://corpus.nytud.hu/mnsz/index\\_eng.html](http://corpus.nytud.hu/mnsz/index_eng.html)). In this database, rank, lemma, word category, absolute and relative occurrence and genre are given, but there is no dispersion or familiarity list available.

The English words used in the test were included in the 5-60,000-frequency list with dispersion between 0.92-0.98. Their average familiarity was 567 (minimum 393, maximum 643) on the 100-700 scale. The average frequency of words was 0.0000732. Another 40 words made up mixed pairs with Hungarian words with average familiarity 550 (minimum 379, maximum 644). Their average frequency was 0.0000508.

The average frequency occurrence of the 40 Hungarian words (i.e. 20 Hungarian word pairs) was 0.00002. The frequency occurrence of the other 40 Hungarian words that were used

for the mixed pairs with English words was 0.00001. The word pairs were made up with or without their semantic relations (a detailed description of the different kinds of meaning relations is provided in the Appendix). In the analyses of both test results, we will refer to the word pair conditions using the same abbreviations: TRC (test, i.e. mixed language rhyming correct decision), TNRC (test, i.e. mixed language non-rhyming correct decision), CRC (control, i.e. monolingual rhyming correct decision) and CNRC (control, i.e. monolingual non-rhyming correct decision). These abbreviations will be used in the figures as well.

### *Method*

A custom-made software program (MATLAB, MatLab Inc.) was used for the experiments. Word pairs were presented on a white background, using black characters (Arial, font size 14) in the middle of the screen. The viewing distance was set to be the appropriate normal viewing distance of a computer screen (~ 50 cm).

Participants received written instructions at the beginning of the experimental session. This ensured that every subject received the same instruction. In the phonological test, the task was to decide whether the words just seen were phonologically rhyming or not. In the semantic test, the instruction for the participants was as follows:

In the middle of the computer screen you will see a fixation point. Keep your eyes on it. After 2 seconds, a word pair will appear at the place of the fixation point. Your task is to decide by pushing the right or left arrow of the keyboard whether the two words on the screen are semantically related or not. If you think that the two words are related, push the right arrow, if not, please use the left arrow. You will see the word pairs for 5 seconds while you have to make a decision. When the time is over, the computer does not accept decisions, and the fixation point appears again for 2 seconds before the next word pair comes up.

Trials started with the onset of a fixation spot in the middle of the screen, which was followed by a word pair chosen from the pool. The inter-trial interval was set for 2 s, the word pairs stayed on the screen for 5 s (exposure time). During this time participants were required to hit the right arrow key if they thought the word pair on the screen rhymed, and the left arrow key if they thought the words did not rhyme. If no response key was selected during the exposure time, the program did not record anything and the next trial started (fixation onset for 2 s, etc.). The task was machine-paced to ensure a constant level of attention of the participants.

In an initial training phase, the participants were shown five pairs to become familiar with the procedure. After a short break the 80 word pairs of the phonological rhyming test and then the 80 word pairs of the semantic rhyming test were presented in a semi-random fashion (test phase). The program recorded correct and incorrect hits as well as response latency times.

In the data analyses we only included the correct decisions. Data were analysed with the Statistica software (StatSoft, Inc.), running Wilcoxon tests, Mann-Whitney U tests and ANOVA. The significance level was set at 5%.

## **Results**

### *Phonological rhyming test reaction time (RT) results*

Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the reaction time results of the phonological rhyming test.

**Table 2** Means and Standard deviations of phonological RT results

	<b>Mean</b>		<b>Std. Dev.</b>	
	<b>L1</b>	<b>HL</b>	<b>L1</b>	<b>HL</b>
<b>TRC</b>	1,560129	1,933855	0,361366	0,576657
<b>TNRC</b>	1,840369	2,003375	0,468644	0,641128
<b>CRC</b>	1,586367	1,669170	0,412403	0,509289
<b>CNRC</b>	1,662660	1,852456	0,415629	0,661776

Latencies on rhymes and non-rhymes in the mixed language pairs (TRC vs. TNRC) were significantly different ( $Z=4.27$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) in the L1 Group, but no such difference was observed in the HL Group. Latencies were shorter in the rhyming conditions (TRC: 1.56 s) than in the non-rhyming ones (TNRC: 1.84 s) in the English-Hungarian mixed word pairs.

In the HL Group, we found differences between the reaction time results in the monolingual rhyming and non-rhyming word pairs ( $Z=1.96$ ,  $p<0.05$ ) (CRC vs. CNRC). Again, the average amount of time spent on the decisions about the rhyming word pairs (CRC) was shorter (1.67 vs. 1.85 s) than the decisions about the non-rhyming pairs.

In the comparison of the latencies of decisions of mixed and monolingual rhyming word pairs (TRC vs. CRC), only the HL Group produced statistically different results ( $Z=2.53$ ,  $p<0.02$ ). For them the decision was faster in the case of monolingual pairs (1.67 vs. 1.93 s).

While there was no difference in the HL Group between the non-rhyming mixed and monolingual word pairs' reaction times, the L1 Group produced a significant difference in this comparison ( $Z=3.43$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) with the monolingual word pairs' reaction time being faster (1.66 s vs. 1.84 s).

*Phonological rhyming test – judgment results*

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the judgment results of the phonological rhyming test.

**Table 3** Means and Standard deviations of the phonological judgment results

	Mean		Std. Dev.	
	L1	HL	L1	HL
<b>TRC</b>	80,80645	71,17647	10,73132	22,11684
<b>TNRC</b>	57,41935	61,76471	25,68628	23,44816
<b>CRC</b>	78,06452	65,58824	10,92988	18,86484
<b>CNRC</b>	88,54839	75,88235	7,87333	21,59538

There was a significant difference in the L1 Group's accuracy results of mixed rhyming conditions (TRC vs. TNRC,  $Z=3.63$ ,  $p<0.01$ ) and monolingual conditions (CRC vs. CNRC,  $Z=3.47$ ,  $p<0.01$ ), with 80% average accuracy concerning the mixed rhyming and 57% concerning the mixed non-rhyming pairs. While in the mixed word pairs (TRC), rhymes were more accurately recognized than non-rhymes, in the monolingual pairs non-rhyming conditions (CNRC) resulted in better performance (88% vs. 78%). However, the statistical analyses did not show any difference between the groups.

In the HL Group, the only difference found was concerned with the decisions about the monolingual word pairs ( $Z=2.01$ ,  $p<0.05$ ). Non-rhyming pairs were recognized significantly better (76%) than rhyming ones (65%).

*Group comparison of the phonological rhyming test*

Phonological rhymes in the mixed word pairs were recognized significantly faster ( $U=157.0$ ,  $p<0.03$ ) by the L1 Group (1.56 s) than by the HL Group (1.93 s). However, the accuracy of judgment was the same for the two groups. In the decision about the monolingual word pairs,

L1 Group proved to be slightly better at both rhyming (78% vs. 65%) and non-rhyming (88% vs. 76%) conditions, but there was no difference between the two groups.

*Semantic rhyming test RT results*

Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for the RT results of the semantic rhyming test.

**Table 4** Means and Standard deviations of the semantic RT results

	Mean		Std. Dev.	
	L1	HL	L1	HL
<b>TRC</b>	1,351649	1,622993	0,255597	0,504779
<b>TNRC</b>	1,589970	1,832711	0,343973	0,496566
<b>CRC</b>	1,303384	1,472933	0,269870	0,399378
<b>CNRC</b>	1,594079	1,857462	0,328224	0,529097

Both in L1 and HL groups there were significant differences in the latencies of rhyming and non-rhyming conditions in the mixed word pairs (TRC and TNRC,  $Z=4.08$ ,  $p<0.01$  and  $Z=2.53$ ,  $p<0.02$ , respectively) as well as in the monolingual word pairs (CRC and CNRC,  $Z=4.68$ ,  $p<0.01$  and  $Z=3.41$ ,  $p<0.01$ ). While in both groups, there was a time-related difference (L1 Group:  $Z=2.48$ ,  $p<0.02$ , HL Group:  $Z=2.22$ ,  $p<0.03$ ) and monolingual) between the recognition of mixed and monolingual rhyming pairs of words, there was no such difference in either group between the mixed and monolingual non-rhyming conditions.

*Semantic rhyming test – judgment results*

Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for the judgment results of the semantic rhyming test.

**Table 5** Means and Standard deviations of the semantic judgment results

	Mean		Std. Dev.	
	L1	HL	L1	HL
<b>TRC</b>	88,06452	78,43750	10,54178	21,42574
<b>TNRC</b>	83,87097	75,00000	13,21046	23,52304
<b>CRC</b>	90,48387	73,43750	10,82858	21,65785
<b>CNRC</b>	88,06452	72,18750	8,62916	22,80122


The only difference that we observed in the accuracy of judgments in any of the conditions was the average percentage of the correct recognition of mixed (84%) and monolingual (88%) non-rhyming word pairs in the L1 Group ( $Z=2.06$ ,  $p<0.04$ ). In the HL Group no difference was found in any of the conditions.

#### *Group comparison of the semantic rhyming test*

No time-related differences were observed between the L1 and the HL Groups for the semantic rhyming test. However, L1 Group performed significantly better in the monolingual rhyming and non-rhyming conditions. In the rhyming conditions, the mean accuracy of decisions in the L1 Group was 90% while that of the HL Group was 73%. In the non-rhyming conditions, the accuracy of decisions of the L1 Group reached 88% as opposed to that of the HL Group: 72% (CRC:  $U=95$ ,  $p<0.01$ , CNRC:  $U=100$ ,  $p<0.01$ ).


#### *Processing monolingual word pairs*

Decisions were significantly faster in the semantic than in the phonological rhyming test ( $F=8.874$ ,  $p<0.01$ , see Fig. 1). No difference was observed in the given conditions between the groups. Non-rhyming conditions, be they phonological or semantic, took more time to process. The recognition of phonologically non-rhyming word pairs was the slowest for both groups.



**Figure 1** A comparison of processing times in monolingual phonological and semantic rhyme conditions


Participants performed less successfully in the phonological test ( $F=5.21$ ,  $p<0.04$ ) as compared to their performance in the semantic test. There was also a significant difference between the two groups' accuracy rates ( $F=7.86$ ,  $p<0.02$ , see Fig. 2) in the phonological rhyming condition.



**Figure 2** A comparison of rhyming judgments in monolingual phonological and semantic rhyme conditions


*Processing bilingual word pairs*

Figure 3 shows the reaction times of both groups in the bilingual context. Phonological processing took significantly longer ( $F=6.952, p<0.02$ ) than semantic in the bilingual condition as well. While the RT differences between the groups were minor in the monolingual condition, here we found somewhat greater differences in all the conditions except for the semantically non-related one. In all cases the bilingual group was slower; however, the statistical analysis did not show any significance. The greatest latency difference between the two groups could be observed in the phonological rhyming condition.



**Figure 3** A comparison of processing times in bilingual phonological and semantic rhyme conditions

Figure 4 illustrates the performance results. Our data supports that processing bilingual data is harder as the decisions are less successful than those of the monolingual data. The difference between the two groups is smaller.



**Figure 4** A comparison of rhyming judgments in bilingual phonological and semantic rhyme conditions

### *Discussion*

The main goal of our study was to investigate the question as to whether the processing of two languages is similar to the processing of only one language. To this end we looked at two typologically unrelated languages, namely English and Hungarian. These languages differ not only according to their phonological typology but also in terms of their orthographies. The fact that the two languages are different in their phonological typology raises the question of whether and how bilingual word recognition takes place at the sublexical and lexico-semantic levels in bilinguals who speak these two languages. In this way, when we study written language processing, we must take orthographic, phonological and semantic awareness into consideration.

In a review of neuroscientific data about the bilingual brain, Buchweitz et al. (2013) state that the cognitive processing of bilinguals must be reflected in features in the bilingual brain, such as magnitude and expansion of activation and synchronization of activity in different

brain areas. Marian et al. (2003) suggest parallel activation and shared cortical structures in the early stages of language processing with a special emphasis on phonetic processing. They propose that the two languages may be using separate structures at later stages of processing, such as lexical processing. When the two systems are active at the same time, the elements of both languages have to be taken into account, which involves the activation of different neural connections as well (cf. Hervais-Adelman et al., 2011; Kovelman et al., 2008). This makes the process more difficult and complex and this is the reason for interferences.

A further goal was to see what temporal and performance results could be observed in the phonological and semantic processing by our two groups, i.e., our intention was to examine whether these processes were identical or they showed differences when compared. We hypothesised that the processing of languages very much depended on the age and manner of acquisition. We recruited participants who differed in these two variables: early bilinguals acquired their L2 in a natural setting, and late bilinguals through school instruction. In order to check how bilingual visual processing occurs we constructed two types of tests: one at the sub-lexical, and one at the lexical level. In this way we intended to check Marian and her colleagues' (2003) claim concerning shared and separate processing at different linguistic levels.

Following Khateb et al. (2000), who carried out similar tests among monolinguals, we made up two tests, one for the investigation of the phonological awareness of bilinguals and one for studying their semantic awareness. In our test material we included mixed word pairs from both languages as well as word pairs from the same language in the hope of seeing the difference between processing mixed language information and same language information.

Orthographic and phonological consciousness shows how the two languages can be kept apart. If monolingual pairs of words are processed faster and better, and bilingual pairs take longer time to judge, it indicates that the cognitive burden is much bigger in the bilingual context.

What we examined was the reading quality of words belonging to, on the one hand, a shallow and, on the other hand, a deep writing system. We tested the processing of words in the same and in mixed contexts with words from both languages. With the phonological rhyming task our intention was an immanent investigation of phonological awareness, the recognition and activation of sounds corresponding to letters or letter combinations. We aimed to see how accurately rhymes might be recognized in mixed and monolingual word pairs, i.e. cross-linguistically and in a single language context.

As reading requires the activation of orthography as well as phonology and semantics, we were interested in analysing to what extent school instruction was important in the

phonological and semantic awareness of bilinguals. The results concerning the latencies and the accuracy of the recognition of rhymes in the two conditions showed that phonological awareness was more developed in the L1 Group, that is, in the case of late bilinguals and who acquired the L2 by instruction. As opposed to Khateb et al. (2000), who did not find significant RT differences in the phonologically rhyming and non-rhyming pairs, in our test, rhymes were always recognized faster and more accurately than non-rhymes. Still a difference could be observed in the processing times of the two groups. Those who learnt their L2 through school instruction had shorter recognition times. The early bilingual participants (HL Group), who acquired their L2 naturally in the family, were slower in general. At the same time, in the comparison of the word pair conditions, their processing time of monolingual word pairs was shorter than that of mixed, bilingual word pairs. Even though we proposed a shared representation of languages for early bilinguals that would result in longer reaction times supposing that both their lexicons were activated to the same degree, we could see that there was a difference between the processing times of monolingual and mixed word pairs. Interestingly, when considering the accuracy of the decisions, being faster did not necessarily mean being better as well. It took longer for bilinguals to make decisions but their accuracy results were similar to those of the L2 learners.

What our results imply is that school instruction must have a crucial role in the development of phonological awareness since those who went through instructed learning were faster in the phonological decoding. The fact that monolingual words are processed faster suggests that for the brain it is easier to get on with just one language. The language teacher's putting enough emphasis on the role of phonology results not only in the learner's better pronunciation but the reading processes will also be faster and more automatized.

We found evidence that words from a more shallow writing system (Hungarian) were easier to read and their phonological similarity was easier to judge upon compared to words from a language with a deep phonological consistency. This proves that phonological processing is language selective. Language instructors have to bear this in mind, and give time and special training to their students for phonological development.

Once the learners are good readers, they do not need to spend a considerable amount of time on the grapheme-phoneme correspondence rules to make the written material meaningful for them. If the readers are more experienced, the letter-sound combinations may be more automatized for them and semantics may be linked to the more frequently read word without processing it at the sublexical level.

For semantic awareness school instruction seemed to play a less crucial role than for phonological awareness. Based on our results, we can claim that semantic awareness is more based on the general categorisation faculty of the human mind. Semantic awareness relies more on implicit learning and seems to be less language dependent.

In our tests we found that for both groups the time spent on making decisions about meaning relations was shorter in the rhyming than in the non-rhyming conditions. This is in harmony with the monolingual results of Khateb et al. (2000), where the responses were also faster if the word pairs were related than when they were unrelated. In addition, we observed the same in mixed word pairs as well, which makes us assume that meaning relations are language-independent.

Our results showed that late and early bilinguals took the same amount of time for semantic processing but for the late bilingual participants (L1 Group) the processing of monolingual information was more successful. For early bilinguals (HL Group), the processing time was prolonged, especially in the mixed language non-rhyming conditions.

While there was no difference between the groups in the judgment results of mixed word pairs, they differed in the judgment accuracy of monolingual word pairs: the L1 Group outperformed the HL Group. This means for us that although the meaning relations are there for both languages of the bilingual, the age of becoming bilingual (early or late) influences the distance between the elements of the languages. Relations are tighter within one language if the person becomes bilingual at a later age, and so the languages are easier to be kept apart for late bilinguals.

Semantic processing proved to be faster than the phonological one. This implies that semantic categorization must have had a parallel activation in both languages; or rather that semantics is shared between the languages, at least in the categories that were part of the test. This finding supports the idea of the bilingual mental lexicon's organisation based rather on meaning relations than on languages (Navracscics, 2007), and that representation also depends on the category of the word (de Groot, 1993; 2011). Our results support the hypothesis that the bilingual mental lexicon is to a large extent common for both languages. We also provide evidence that the mental lexicon is built on meaning relations as is reflected in the literature (Fox, 1996; Franceschini et al., 2003). However, we also claim that languages can be kept apart in the lexicon (see Cook, 2003; Singleton, 2007), depending on the orthographic, phonological, morphological and lexico-semantic organisation of words, as well as on the age of L2 acquisition.

Based on our observation, data analyses and results, processing semantics seems to be easier than processing phonology, even in bilingual conditions. This means for our study that word meanings that are composed of the same semantic features across the languages must be processed similarly, and the same brain activity must underlie the processing of semantically related words, irrespective of the language they belong to. This finding seems to be supported by neuroimaging data as well. Buchweitz et al. (2013) also propose a similar semantic representation at the neural level in bilinguals.

Referring to the literature (Leonard et al., 2010) which proposes that L1 and L2 are not completely isolated from one another, and they both mutually interfere and support each other and based on our findings about the difference between phonological and semantic processing, we suggest that during phonological processing languages interfere while during semantic processing they support one another. The phonological structure is more language-dependent and the semantic structure is more shared between the languages. Instructed language learning may improve phonological awareness but it has no effect on semantic awareness.

### *Conclusions*

In our chapter we intended to analyse how neuroimaging data and experimental behavioural data converge in our psychophysical test on bilingual phonological and semantic awareness. As is stated in the literature, when the two language systems are active at the same time, the elements of both languages have to be taken into account, and processing is more difficult and complex, which causes interferences. In our study it became clear that interferences have different impacts on processing languages at different linguistic levels.

The investigation on phonological and semantic awareness showed that for bilinguals, phonological processing is a more difficult cognitive task than processing semantics if we take latencies as a measure. This difference may be due to the fact that languages of different phonological typology are processed differently in the bilingual brain, whereas lexical semantics and sense relations do not differentiate languages in the cerebral representation, and the semantic representation is common for all the languages.

When considering the validity of the bilingual cognitive advantage (cf. de Bot, 2015), we need to keep in mind that bilinguals need more time to process their languages than monolinguals, but this delay does not imply that they are any weaker in performance. Language learners, i.e. late bilinguals, who have help while learning their L2 through school instruction, may be faster at recognizing the phonological structure of the word than early bilinguals but

they are not better at solving the linguistic task. This is of great importance to consider in bilingual visual word recognition and other types of reading tasks. Through school instruction language learners may get to be faster in recognizing the grapheme-phoneme correspondence. At the phonological level, the manner of L2 acquisition makes a difference between natural and school instructed bilinguals in terms of recognition time. Based on our results, school instruction has a great role in phonological processing. With conscious learning, with a special attention to phonology, language learners may reach a higher level of phonological awareness than through natural language acquisition. In this respect, early bilinguals do not show any advantages in phonological processing. On the other hand, the fact that bilinguals' processing time is longer compared to that of L2 learners should not imply the interpretation that this delay is a disadvantage of bilingualism as opposed to monolingualism, since there is no difference in the quality of the processing in relation to the correctness of similarity judgements. The time-related difference may also be due to the greater brain area involved in language processing, which must be the result of the different phonological representations of the bilinguals' languages.

Finally, frequently used words are recognized faster and their meanings are accessed automatically without the need for processing the phonological structure of the word completely. This might be the reason why semantic processing is faster than phonological in our study.

This study has two main implications for the future.

1. While our findings are to some extent relevant to instructors, we want to be careful not to take this too far. Language learning and teaching are complex processes, in which many factors interact at different levels including the individual level, the group level, the school level, and the level of society in large. There is increasing awareness of that all these factors potentially play a role, which makes issues like the ones raised in this contribution relevant for theoretical development. All this should ultimately enhance our understanding of the processes of learning and teaching. However, we should be careful when it comes to direct implications. Semantic and phonological awareness are important aspects of language learning but the findings cannot be translated directly into classroom practices. They should, however, be part of teacher training programs, since teachers have to be aware of such issues. It is certainly possible to develop course material aimed at raising awareness of these issues at different levels and evaluate such an intervention but it should be the subject of another research.

2. In our test material we incorporated frequently used, supposedly familiar words having a concrete reference, the semantic features of which must be shared across the languages. However, we had difficulties in finding the right words and matching them for frequency and familiarity due to differences of the depth and the extension of the available corpus linguistic databases in the relevant languages. In our case, the available databases differed in size and in comparability as well. Researchers need unified, comparable corpora-based databases to be able to make up valid test materials in different languages.

### ***Acknowledgment***

This research was realized in the framework of the key project of the “TÁMOP 4.2.1.D-15/1KONV-2015-0006 -The development of the innovation centre in Kőszeg in the frame of the educational and research network at the University of Pannonia”, which is subsidized by the European Union and Hungary and co-financed by the European Social Fund.

### ***References***

- Braun, M., Hutzler, F., Ziegler, J., Dambacher, M. and Jacobs, A. (2009) Pseudohomophone effects provide evidence of early lexico-phonological processing in visual word recognition. *Human Brain Mapping* 30: 1977-1989.
- Buchweitz, A. and Prat, C. (2013) The bilingual brain: Flexibility and control in the human cortex. *Physics of Life Reviews* 10: 428-443.
- Chee, M., Tan, E. and Thiel, T. (1999) Mandarin and English single word processing studied with functional magnetic resonance imaging. *The Journal of Neuroscience* 19: 3050-3056.
- Cook, V. (2003) Introduction: the changing L1 in the L2 user’s mind. In V. Cook (ed) *Effects of the Second Language on the First* (pp. 1-18). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
- De Bot, K. (2015) A bias in citation patterns in Applied Linguistics: the case of the Bilingual Advantage. In Sz. Bányi and J. Navracsics (eds) *First and Second Language: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Studies in Psycholinguistics* 6 (pp. 22-32). Budapest: Tinta Könyvkiadó.
- De Groot, A. (1993) Word-type effects in bilingual processing tasks: Support for a mixed-representational system. In R. Schreuder and B. Weltens (eds) *The Bilingual Lexicon* (pp. 27-53). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

- De Groot, A. (2011) *Language and Cognition in Bilinguals and Multilinguals*. New York and Hove: Psychology Press.
- Fabbro, F. (2001) The bilingual brain: Cerebral representation of languages. *Brain and Language* 79(2): 211-222.
- Fox, E. (1996) Cross-language priming from ignored words: evidence for a common representational system in bilinguals. *Journal of Memory and Language* 35: 353-370.
- Franceschini, R., Zappatore, D. and Nitsch, C. (2003) Lexicon in the brain: What neurobiology has to say about languages. In J. Cenoz, U. Jessner and B. Hufeisen (eds) *The Multilingual Lexicon* (pp. 153-166). Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Hervais-Adelman, A., Moser-Mercer, B. and Golestani, N. (2011) Executive control of language in the bilingual brain: Integration the evidence from neuroimaging to neuropsychology. *Frontiers in Psychology* 2: 1-8.
- Huster, R., Westerhausen, R., Pantev, C. and Konrad, C. (2010) The role of the cingulate cortex as neural generator of the N200 and P300 in a tactile response inhibition task. *Human Brain Mapping* 31: 1260-1271.
- Illes, J., Francis, W., Desmond, J., Gabrieli, J., Glover, G., Poldrack, R., Lees, C. and Wagner, A. (1999) Convergent cortical representation of semantic processing in bilinguals. *Brain and Language* 70: 347-363.
- Khateb, A., Pegna, A., Michel, C., Custodi, M., Landis, T. and Annoni, J. (2000) Semantic category and rhyming processing in the left and right cerebral hemisphere. *Laterality* 5(1): 35-53.
- Kim, K., Relkin, N., Lee, K. and Hirsch, J. (1997) Distinct cortical areas associated with native and second languages. *Nature* 388: 171-174.
- Kovelman, I., Baker, S. and Petitto, L-A. (2008) Bilingual and monolingual brains compared: A functional magnetic resonance imaging investigation of syntactic processing and a possible “neural signature” of bilingualism. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience* 20(1): 153-169.
- Leonard, M., Brown, T., Travis, K., Gharapetian, L., Hagler, D., Dale, A., Elman, J. and Halgren, E. (2010) Spatiotemporal dynamics of bilingual word processing. *Neuroimage* 15: 49(4): 3286-3294.
- Marian, V., Spivey, M. and Horsch, J. (2003) Shared and separate systems in bilingual language processing: Converging evidence from eyetracking and brain imaging. *Brain and Language* 86: 70-82.
- Moreno, E., Rodríguez-Fornells, A and Laine, M. (2008) Event-related potentials (ERPs) in the study of bilingual language processing. *Journal of Neurolinguistics* 21: 477-508.
- Navracscs, J. (2007) *A kétnyelvű mentális lexikon [The Bilingual Mental Lexicon]*. Budapest: Balassi Kiadó.

Navracsics, J., Sary, Gy., Batyi, Sz. and Varga, Cs. (2014) Testing linguistic awareness among learners of Hungarian. In M. Pawlak and L. Aronin (eds) *Essential Topics in Applied Linguistics and Multilingualism: Studies in Honour of David Singleton* (pp. 111-128). Switzerland: Springer Verlag.

Ng, S. and Wicha, N. (2013) Meaning first: A case for language-independent access to word meaning in the bilingual brain. *Neuropsychologia* 51(5): 850-863.

Paulesu, E., McCrory, E., Fazio, F., Menoncello, I., Brunswick, N., Cappa, S., Cotelli, M., Cossu, G., Corte, F., Lorusso, M., Pesenti, S., Gallagher, A., Perani, D., Price, C., Frith, C. and Frith, U. (2000) A cultural effect on brain function. *Nature Neuroscience* 3: 91-96.

Perani, D., Paulesu, E., Galles, N., Dupoux, E., Dehaene, S., Bettinardi, V., Cappa, S., Fazio, F. and Mehler, J. (1998) The bilingual brain. Proficiency and age of acquisition of the second language. *Brain* 121(10): 1841-1852.

Perrin, F. and Garcia-Larrea, L. (2003) Modulation of the N400 potential during auditory phonological/semantic interaction. *Brain Research. Cognitive Brain Research* 17(1): 36-47.

Pillai, J., Araque, J., Allison, J., Sethuraman, S., Loring, D., Thiruvaiyaru, D., Ison, C., Balan, A. and Lavin, T. (2003) Functional MRI study of semantic and phonological language processing in bilingual subjects: preliminary findings. *Neuroimage* 19(3): 565-576.

Pillai, J., Allison, J., Sethuraman, S., Araque, J., Thiruvaiyaru, D., Ison, C., Loring, D. and Lavin, T. (2004) Functional MR imaging study of language-related differences in bilingual cerebellar activation. *American Journal of Neuroradiology* 25(4): 523-532.

Price, C. (2000) The anatomy of language: contributions from functional neuroimaging. *Journal of Anatomy* 197: 335-359.

Price, C., Wise, R. and Frackowiak, R. (1996) Demonstrating the implicit processing of visually presented words and pseudo-words. *Cerebral Cortex* 6: 62-70.

Rastle, K. (2007) Visual word recognition. In M. Gaskell (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Psycholinguistics* (pp. 71-87). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singleton, D. (2007) How integrated is the integrated mental lexicon? In Zs. Lengyel and J. Navracsics (eds) *Second Language Lexical Processes: Applied Linguistic and Psycholinguistic Perspectives* (pp. 3-17). Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.


Tan, L. and Perfetti, C. (1999) Phonological and associative inhibition in the early stages of English word identification: Evidence from backward masking. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance* 99: 59-69.

Van Heuven, W. and Dijkstra, T. (2010) Language comprehension in the bilingual brain: fMRI and ERP support for psycholinguistic models. *Brain Research Review* 64(1): 104-122.

## Appendix

The semantic relations between the word pairs were of the following character (test words are typed in normal characters, their translations are in all capitals):

- Aggregation (2.5%)
  - eső (RAIN) - cloud
- Attachment (7.5%)
  - cipő (SHOE) – sock, level (LETTER) – boríték (ENVELOPE), iskola (SCHOOL) – tanár (TEACHER)
- Attribute (5%)
  - kotta (NOTES) – violin, jegy (TICKET) – concert
- Hyperonym (32.5%)
  - madár (BIRD) – rigó (THRUSH); food – bread, rózsza (ROSE) – flower, kutya (DOG) – pet
- Hyponym (35%)
  - Kígyó (SNAKE) – snail, toll (PEN) – pencil, sun – star, bársony (VELVET) – selyem (SILK)
- Meronym (17.5%)
  - lámpa (LAMP) – égő (BULB), fa (TREE) – leaf, vitorla (SAIL) – boat



**Figure 5** Semantic relations between the test words

# **A dynamic Usage-based approach to language learning and teaching; from theory to practice<sup>360</sup>**

MarjolijnVerspoor

## ***Abstract***

As Larsen-Freeman has pointed out extensively, from a CDST perspective there are no single causes, and no single ways to go about achieving things. Moreover, each learner has to find his or her own path in learning a second language and it will never be exactly the same as those of others. From a CDST point of view instruction cannot determine the learning path and therefore the teacher's job should not be to teach but to create an environment in which an optimal learning path for each individual can be accomplished. There is no single route to master the new L2 conventions but exposure and cognitive, emotional, and social engagement are essential. The main aim of the present project is to apply recent insights from applied linguistics, in particular from Complex Dynamic Systems Theory (CDST) to language teaching. In what follows a link is proposed between CDST and a usage-based approach to language and language learning. Some examples of concrete teaching activities are presented.

## ***Language from a dynamic usage based view***

In this paper I will draw mainly on usage-based theories, which are very much in line with a complex dynamic system theory (CDST) view of language in that language is viewed as a complex dynamic system. The first corollary of a usage-based view is that language is not a system on its own, but is part of, interrelated with, and embedded in our cultural, sociological and psychological lives, each of these levels interacting over time with the other. The primary function of language, which includes non-linguistic signals such as posture, gestures, eye gaze, is communication. As Tomasello points out children learn language primarily because they want to communicate:

---

<sup>360</sup> This research was Supported by the New Central Europe II. Research Scholarship Program TÁMOP 4.2.1/D-14/1/KONV

“Because natural languages are conventional, the most fundamental process of language acquisition is the ability to do things the way that other people do them, that is, social learning broadly defined. The acquisition of most cultural skills, including skills of linguistic communication, depend on a special type of social learning involving intention reading that is most often called cultural learning.” (Tomasello 2006: 73-74)

In such a view language learning is part and parcel of social and cultural learning, a holistic process within a social and cultural context, in which cognitive development also plays a role. Even within a CDST perspective it is difficult to focus on all the interacting complex dynamic systems simultaneously and describe or understand them. Therefore, for right now, I will focus on one sub-part of the whole, the so-called linguistic system, which in itself is an assembly of part-whole assemblies.

Langacker defines language as follows:

“[It is] a structured inventory of conventional linguistic units. The units (cognitive “routines”) comprising a speaker’s linguistic knowledge are limited to semantic, phonological, and symbolic structures which are either directly manifested as parts of actual expressions, or else emerge from such structures by the processes of abstraction (schematization) and categorization (this restriction is called the content requirement).” (Langacker 2000 p.8)

In other words, a language such as English is nothing more than a large collection of conventionalized units or (also referred to as “constructions” in the literature, cf. Goldberg, 2003). Units can be short or long. It can be a word, a phrase, a clause, a sentence, and even longer units such as a whole prayer, poem or song. Units are “cognitive routines”, meaning that a language user can recall them in one go. Units are symbolic structures with a meaning (semantic structure) and form (phonological structure). Langacker (2008) also points out that his definition implicitly includes conventionalized uses (pragmatic structure) and that the use in context actually gives rise to the meaning. For example, if I say “Nice weather today” to my friend on a miserable rainy day, my friend will interpret the meaning as “She is not happy about the weather”. So each conventional unit has a form (how it is pronounced or written or signed

and includes non-verbal behaviour such as facial expression and gesture) and when used in a certain context to communicate something (use) it has an intended meaning (what is meant to be conveyed by the communicator and co-constructed by the listener within that particular context). In the UB literature, the terms ‘unit’ or ‘construction’ are quite common but unfortunately these terms highlight especially the structural form and do not make clear enough to a general readership that they refer to “form-meaning-use dynamic patterns of language using” (Larsen-Freeman and Cameron, 2008, p.82). I would like to propose to use the new term Form-Use-Meaning-Mappings (FUMMs) as it better captures the fundamental notion in a CDST and DUB approach that the “units” are interrelated and meaningful wholes.

If language is nothing but a collection of FUMMs, does such a usage based model deny that there is a grammar or syntax? According to Langacker (2008), grammar definitely exists and can be studied in its own right but the main difference from traditional theories is that grammar and syntax are not the fundamentals upon which the remainder of the language is built and it does not drive the language. In other words, language is not an analytical system in which small parts make a whole but a holistic system that is more than the sum of its parts; however, it may also contain regularities that have emerged through use and can be seen as entrenched patterns or “attractors” in CDST terms. These regularities have been called schemas or schemata in the literature but from a UB view, grammar and syntax are just FUMMs at different, albeit more abstract levels. For example, the common patterns in languages such as subject-verb order (ENTITY/ACTION), which probably emerged in line with how we perceive and conceive of events, has the abstract meaning of ‘someone or something performs an action’. So when a new event is described just the ordering of the units is a clue to the meaning.

Also what we traditionally call ‘grammar’ is a FUMM at a more abstract level. In English and in French, for example, an *-s* at the end of a word in spelling (*words, mots*) indicates that there is more than one of that particular entity, so the schema for many words (but not all) would be (WORD +S), denoting a plural. In other words, in addition to the unique conventionalized units in a language (such as words and specific phrases and expressions), users over the centuries have established conventionalized patterns, which may have become quite intricate. However, they are not analytical systems underlying language, nor the essence of language, just the interesting by-product of language use in an attempt to make fine meaning distinctions.

Empirical evidence for such a view of language comes from the work done in the ‘Second Language Acquisition by Adult Immigrants’, which took place from 1981-1988 in five

European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, The Netherlands and Sweden) and reported on by Klein and Perdue (1997). They studied adult learners with different first languages learning different second languages over time. Assuming that language is a communicative system, they argued that by looking at non-instructed learners who are trying to communicate in an L2, they might see what the essence of language could be. They called this the Basic Variety. The conclusion was that it contained very little, if any, of what we traditionally call grammar.

“There is no inflection in the basic variety, hence no marking of case, number, gender, tense, aspect, agreement by morphology. Thus, lexical items typically occur in one invariant form. It corresponds to the stem, the infinitive or the nominative in the target language; but it can also be a form which would be an inflected form in the target language. Occasionally, a word shows up in more than one form, but this (rare) variation does not seem to have any functional value: the learners simply try different phonological variants.” (p. 312)

In addition to the lexical expressions, there were some general syntactic patterns, schemas in Langacker’s terms, to express meaning in use. But if grammar is only a by-product of language use, what is its function? Klein and Purdue (1979) speculate that the simpler the structure in a language is, the easier the language is to produce and understand; however, simplicity goes at the expense of expressive power. More complex thoughts need more complex means to express them, and different languages have found different ways to express those, usually with very different grammatical forms. The following quote shows quite nicely how arbitrary and particular these grammatical forms and distinctions may be in different languages.

“[I]s it really necessary to have a dozen different noun paradigms, as in Latin? There are much simpler ways to mark case - if obligatory case marking is necessary at all. German distinguishes three genders (*der Löffel, die Gabel, das Messer*), and most Germans take it for granted that such a distinction is a natural if not necessary thing to have. But speakers of English do not necessarily share this view. English, by contrast, systematically distinguishes two aspectual forms of the verb (*he left, he was leaving*)

and this distinction has a clear functional value. It is a very natural if not indispensable thing to have. But German gets along very well without such morphological complexities, and its speakers are somewhat reluctant to adopt them whenever they try to speak English. In French, the direct object follows the finite verb when it is lexical, and it precedes the verb when it is a pronoun (*Charlie voit la jeune fille- Charlie la voit*). Couldn't one think of a simpler solution? French grammarians, before and after Hegel, would probably deny this; but other views are imaginable.” (Klein and Purdue 1997 p. 313)

To summarize, meaningful units such as words and phrases and some kind of sequencing of these words and phrases should be seen as the essentials of language, not the grammar. However, grammar may have developed in language to help people make subtle meaning distinctions. Most work in cognitive linguistics, by Langacker in particular, is to show that seemingly arbitrary grammatical forms and patterns are based on meaning and use, and may give us insight into how humans conceptualize their world. For example, the distinction between “he left” and “he was leaving” is made to show that the speaker construes the event as either ‘bounded’ with a beginning and an end or ‘unbounded’, where the beginning and end are not visible. The use of a finite verb form is to indicate that the speaker ‘grounds’ the event in time, so both “left” and “was” put the event on a time line indicating a moment before now. Many of these cognitive insights may be used to improve explicit grammar teaching (Lantolf GURT-book, Tyler 2012, Verspoor& Boers 2013) but we must remember that language is not an analytical system and that grammar or syntax is not the core of language, so grammar is not a prerequisite in learning how to use a language meaningfully and communicatively. Moreover, as several recent longitudinal studies have shown (Rousse-Malpat&Verspoor 2012, Tilma 2014, and Verspoor& Hong 2011) an explicit focus on grammar in a structure-based approach is not needed to learn the language accurately.

Rather than seeing grammar or syntax as the constitutive elements of language, a DUB model holds that these categories are only an outcome of language in use. "Structure, then, in this view is not an overarching set of abstract principles, but more a question of a spreading of systematicity from individual words, phrases, and small sets” (Hopper 1987 p. 162).

Hopper (1987) illustrates this idea with development in use of the English indefinite article *a/an* (a notoriously difficult grammar construction to be learned by speakers of languages who do not make a definite/indefinite distinction (Young 1996)). It originally came from the Indo European numeral “one” and had that meaning in Old English; in addition, it was used to

introduce a new participant into the discourse as in “A [certain] man has arrived”. But the very common use of today as a general indefinite article as in “He is a teacher” does not appear until much later. These three “indefinite” and “non-specific” meanings still occur regularly in modern English but now another use has become quite common too: specific but new-mention as in “They introduced me to a young woman [whose name was Ethel]”. However, these specific and non-specific senses are not the only ones used in modern English. There are expressions such as “Birds of a feather flock together” and “They are all of a kind” where the indefinite article denotes ‘one and the same’. A can also still denote the numeral ‘one’ in older sayings such as “A stitch in time saves nine” or “A penny saved is a penny earned”, and “How much does it cost? A dollar”. These uses are very much limited to these particular fixed contexts. Hopper concludes:

“Evidently the meanings represented by the English “indefinite article” are not unified under one hyper-abstract function. Instead, an open ended set of small sub-systems has come into being, and the membership of new occurrences of forms with the indefinite article is not specifiable in advance, but is impromptu and negotiable.” (Hopper 1987 p144)

Hopper suggests that rather than seeing old sayings such as “A stich in time saves nine” as an exception in language, it should be recognized as an example of extreme repetition in the language and that in real live discourse repetitions are actually the norm: idioms, proverbs, clichés, formulas, specialist phrases, transitions, openings, closures, favoured clause types, and so on, are each more or less fixed. They cannot be considered ‘sentences’ or ‘clauses’ with a clear syntactic pattern but they are used as a whole. Bybee (2006) gives some more examples of such conventionalized sequences (*prominent role, mixed message, beyond repair, and to need help*, phrasal verbs like *finish up, burn down* and verb-preposition pairings like *interested in, think of, think about*) and has found such combinations pervasive in English as well as other languages. In the L2 literature, these are called formulaic sequences and have been referred to as prefabs, chunks, collocations, idioms, conventionalized ways of saying things (CWOSTs) (Smiskova, Verspoor & Lowie 2012) and so on, which may all be considered FUMMs in their own right.

The fact that everyday language contains so many repeated chunks is not a new usage based finding as they have been noted by linguists such as Pawley and Syder (1983), Sinclair (1991), Erman and Warren (2000), and Wray 2002. Erman and Warren (2000) estimate that such chunks make up about 55% of both spoken and written discourse. Verspoor, Schmid and

Xu (2012) have shown that the number of such chunks discriminate significantly between proficiency levels at the lower levels and Smiksova (2013) has shown that high input learners use relatively longer chunks than their low input peers. What is new from a UB perspective is the idea that these semi-fixed, often repeated constructions are not exceptions to language but form the core of language use and have given rise to some regularities, which we consider grammar and syntax. Bybee, agrees with Hopper in this view of language:

“What we see instantiated in language use is not so much abstract structures as specific instances of such structure that are used and reused to create novel utterances. ... Viewed in this way, language is a complex dynamic system similar to complex systems that have been identified, for instance, in biology (Larsen-Freeman 1997). It does not have structure a priori, but rather the apparent structure emerges from the repetition of many local events (in this case speech events).” (Bybee 2006 p.714)

If the Hopper’s and Bybee’s view is accepted, then it would make sense to focus on specific instances of structures in L2 teaching rather than rules, and the “repetition of local events” refers to frequency effects in language, so the instances need to be heard often. N. Ellis who reviewed such effects concludes that language knowledge and use at every level is related to everyday experience with language.

“[P]sycholinguistic studies of sentence processing show that fluent adults have a vast statistical knowledge about the behavior of the lexical items of their language. They know the strong cues provided by verbs, in English at least, in the interpretation of syntactic ambiguities. Fluent comprehenders know the relative frequencies with which particular verbs appear in different tenses, in active versus passive and in intransitive versus transitive structures, the typical kinds of subjects and objects that a verb takes, and many other such facts. This knowledge has been acquired through experience with input that exhibits these distributional properties and through knowledge of its semantics. This information is not just an aspect of the lexicon, isolated from “core” syntax; rather, it is relevant at all stages of lexical, syntactic, and discourse comprehension (Seidenberg & MacDonald, 1999).” (N. Ellis 2002 p.160)

A usage based model of language is in principle a dynamic one because of the idea of iteration, variability and variation (Larsen-Freeman, forthcoming, p. xx; Van Dijk, Verspoor & Lowie 2011) change the system as a whole. Langacker (2000) used the term “a dynamic usage based model” and inspired Verspoor and Hong (2012) to refer the theory as a dynamic usage based (DUB) approach to explicitly address the dynamics within and change over time of a usage based view of language.

Grammaticalization studies have argued that the structure in language emerges from the repetition of many local events (Bybee 2006) and that over the centuries there is variability in the use of forms (several used simultaneously) and that forms may develop other forms (variation) (Hopper 1987). Secondly, this view of language is dynamic in that with every communicative act in a given context, the FUMMs at all the different levels (subsystems in CDST terms) interact to give rise to meaning. The meaning emerges not from any of the individual parts separately but from the whole. A change at any of the levels will change the meaning, however subtly. One example could be the difference between “He always arrives early” versus “He is always arriving early”. In the first sentence, the default one, the speaker is presenting the event in a rather neutral way, as a fact. In the second one, the speaker presents the same event as an unbounded one, which is unusual with the repetitive “always” in there, and together with the progressive it has become a conventionalized way to expressing some level of irritation on the speaker’s part. Thus a small change in the grammar gives rise to a different intended meaning of the whole utterance.

It is not only grammar but also a word, the word order, intonation, all within a given context that can indicate subtle meaning differences. As mentioned before “Nice weather” can mean literally that the weather is nice, but when said in a rainstorm, it can mean the opposite. The examples given above are simplified because an intended meaning has to be co-constructed.

Clark (1996) explains in detail how two or more people co-construct meaning dynamically, and humans can do so because they have joint attention (A is aware that B is aware of the same entity and vice versa) and common ground (A has a very good intuition of what B knows at the moment of speaking and vice versa). Clark gives the following example: He and his wife are driving to work and it starts to rain. His wife then says “It is on the back seat” and he nods. He knew she was referring to the umbrella. This shows that both were simultaneously aware of the fact that both were worried about the bad weather and would need the umbrella. Basically, if we take a DUB view, a language utterance does not have any literal meaning of its

own until it is used in a communicative act, and then the meaning emerges as participants, using their cognitive, social, and cultural resources and all visual or other perceptual clues available (eye gaze, gesture, linguistic utterance, intonation and so on) to solve the communicative puzzle.

To summarize, a DUB view of language holds that language is a general complex, dynamic, holistic system in which at every level the whole and the parts are interrelated, the psychological, social cultural and linguistic. The linguistic subsystem consists of units at different dynamically interacting sub-systems or levels (the phonological, lexical, phrasal, morphological and syntactic, textual, contextual, and cultural) resulting in “form-meaning-use dynamic patterns of language using”, called FUMMs for short, all equally important in expressing the intended meaning, which emerges in communicative acts.

### *Language teaching from a DUB perspective*

The choice in how language is viewed is very important to teaching. If the language is viewed as an analytical system that is built up logically piece by piece, then especially discovering rules will help the learners master the L2. If the language is viewed as a holistic system consisting of an array of smaller and larger FUMMs then teaching should be more piecemeal as many FUMMs have to be learned separately and holistically in that the learner is exposed simultaneously to the sounds, words, phrases, and patterns and how they are used in the right context.

The individual learner is also a complex dynamic system and learning is a complex dynamic process. The student that we teach is a person who is at the moment of teaching a product of many interacting variables: the first language, the family background, the history of education, his or her own beliefs on how a language is supposed to be learned, his or her aptitude, his or her previous experience on language learning, and his or her perceived needs. No individual is the same nor will any individual develop in exactly the same manner and as a complex dynamic system, the individual will be rather unpredictable in his or her development as each individual follows an individually owned path. Within a CDST view learning is using, and using is processing, but all within a social and cultural context, in line with an ecological view of learning:

“From an ecological perspective, the learner is immersed in an environment full of potential meanings. These meanings become available gradually as the learner acts and interacts within and with his environment. Learning is not a holus-bolus or piecemeal migration of meanings to the inside of the learner’s head but rather the development of increasingly effective ways of dealing with the world and its meanings.” (Van Lier 2000 p.246)

Over the years, many L2 teaching approaches have found their way into schools and universities, some more or less successful, and there is no need to reinvent the wheel completely as we can build on good practice. Spada and Lightbown (2013, Chapter 6) give a solid and nuanced overview of how different linguistic and psychological theories have influenced second language teaching approaches over the last 60 years, ending each section with a review of empirical studies that do or do not support these approaches. They finally conclude that a communicative approach has the best chance to be effective in language teaching, when language is used meaningfully, is taught with a large amount of input – preferably as authentic as possible and some attention to form is given. Moreover, they provide several examples of effective approaches: the reading comprehension approach, in which learners read books instead of receiving explicit instruction and a content language integrated learning (CLIL) approach, in which L2 learners are taught subject content (such as history) in the target language. Spada and Lightbown conclude that these truly communicative methods are much more effective than structure-based programs. However, despite the evidence of the efficacy of approaches which focus on input and meaning, Spada and Lightbown (2013) point out that the use of communicative approaches remains rare in the foreign language classroom, while the use of structure-based teaching methods remains widespread.

My own view is that this may be due to a deeply ingrained but sub-conscious--belief inspired by our long-time association with Saussurian and Chomskyan linguistics that language is a systematic, analytical system and that therefore grammar forms are the building blocks of language. As will be shown below such beliefs are also present in communicative approaches.

Communicative approaches are characterized by various pedagogical principles and Beale (2002) mentions seven that have been re-arranged below in the order of compatibility with a DUB view of language learning and commented upon to make clear to what extent some of these are based on the systematic view of language and need to be reconceptualised or refined if one takes a CDST or DUB view seriously:

1. *There is exposure to examples of authentic language from the target language community*

There is no doubt that meaningful exposure has to be the core of any language teaching method. It is with multiple exposures that understanding takes place (Larsen-Freeman 2012). Indeed, as Langacker (2008) points out, becoming a fluent speaker involves a prodigious amount of actual learning and what is not emphasized enough in this first principle is that the exposure needs to be extensive and frequent. This can be done extensively as, for example, in the reading comprehension approach but as several lexical studies have shown revisiting the vocabulary in texts is more conducive to remembering them in the long term (Schmitt 2010). This is in line with Larsen-Freeman (2012) who points out that from a dynamic point of view, that intensive exposure is also useful as iteration, a combination of repetition and recursion, may lead to self-organization and creative use. Only through the variability that iteration provides, learner can select their own forms.

2. *Students are encouraged to discover the forms and structures of language for themselves.*

This principle is partially in line with a DUB perspective and with Larsen-Freeman's earlier thinking that teachers should take a "less dominant role" and the students are encouraged to be "more responsible managers of their own learning" (Larsen-Freeman 1986: 131). However, what is implicit in the way Principle 2 is phrased is that students learn how the language works as a formal, analytical system and that is not in line with a CDST view: "I think if we take CDST seriously we must recognize that language itself is not a bounded rule-governed system." (Larsen-Freeman, 2016 p. xx). The fact that learning is not form based is clear from the following quote:

"Embodied learners soft assemble their language resources interacting with a changing environment. As they do so, their language resources change. Learning is not the taking in of linguistic forms by learners, but the constant adaptation and enactment of language-using patterns in the service of meaning-making in response to the affordances that emerge in a dynamic communicative situation." (Larsen-Freeman and Cameron 2008: 158)

Therefore, what needs to be reconceptualized from a DUB perspective is that students should learn the language as a holistic meaning making system and see and hear specific instances of language use, FUMMs, repeated so the learner will not only discover the forms (spelling, pronunciation, intonation, accompanying gesture, and so on) and structures (regular patterns in grammar and word order), but most importantly which words are used together within a given pragmatic context to communicate meaning.

3. *The formal properties of language are never treated in isolation from use; language forms are always addressed within a communicative context.*

The third communicative principle is definitely in line with the view that a structure-based approach may be less effective than a communicative one but as in communicative Principle 2, language here is still viewed as an analytical system with formal properties that need to be discovered rather than an array of conventionalized units that have to be memorized and automatized. As Larsen Freeman points out:

“...that conceiving of language as a complex system did away with the need for language acquisition researchers to posit an innate LAD, a competence-performance distinction, and an appeal to performativism ... (forthcoming, p. xxx)

However, even within a CDST view there are attractors for language patterns, which are called schemas within a DUB perspective. On occasion, it may be useful to point out the meanings and uses of some subtle schemas if they are too difficult for the L2 learner to discover on their own, especially at the more advanced stages in learning (Verspoor & Tyler 2011)

4. *There is a whole-language approach in which the four traditional language skills (speaking, listening, reading, and writing) are integrated.*

The idea of a whole-language approach is very much in line with a CDST perspective as all skills will interact with each other. However, what is missing from this principle is the dynamic perspective that “performance emerges from a confluence of subsystems within a particular task environment” (Thelen & Smith 1994: p. 84) and eventually coordinate. Because the process involved towards coordination is difficult to imagine, a telling audio example is given

here. In his Ted talk “The birth of a word”, Deb Roy presents a time-lapsed audio of how his son learned the word ‘water’. The careful listener will detect that at first the boy uses ‘gaga’ a lot; then in each new occurrence of the word he seems to practice a different sub-system, such as the different consonants and vowels of the word and the stress pattern. Early on, there is a great deal of variability, presumably related to competition in attention to particular sub-systems, going from ‘gaga’ to an almost perfect ‘water’, but quickly reverting back to ‘gaga’ and then at one time near the end he uses a strong aspirated ‘t’ instead of a ‘d’, suggesting he is practicing the dental plosive but now has a problem with voicing. But then at the end, the boy says ‘water’ fluently as one whole unit. It sounds as if the different sub-systems have become coordinated and there are no longer separable sub-systems recognizable.

In other words, the learner seems to practice different separate behaviours (pronouncing vowels, consonants, voicing, syllable stress) with ups and downs but at the end these behaviours coalesce and the system as a whole reorganizes and the sub-systems coordinate: the word as a whole has emerged and it is greater than the sum of all its parts. Once reorganization has taken place and the new sub-system (the word *water*) has emerged, the individual sub-systems would show some, but relatively very little variability.

Van Geert (1994) uses the term ‘precursor’ for a system that needs to be partially in place before another system can develop and ‘competitor’ for a sub-system that may compete with another over time. In second language development, depending on the initial conditions of the learner (the main one probably being the level of proficiency in the L2), it may be therefore be wiser to build skills incrementally, for example by first asking the learner to listen and read carefully and understand what is being said or written before asking him to produce language creatively. This is in line with van Lier’s ideas on language development “from firstness (quality, feeling or iconicity) to secondness (change, reaction, recognition, comparison—or indexicality) to thirdness (rule, reason, habit or symbolcity)” (Van Lier 2000 p.256). And if language is produced at the early stages, it may be better to repeat, imitate, and reuse what has been heard (Larssen-Freeman 2012) then to ask learners to use the language creatively. First of all, early on the listening and speaking skills may compete and by trying to produce sounds there is less room for listening. As in the early days of communicative teaching, it may be good to return to the idea that input is a first prerequisite in language learning (Long 1985), so that output and meaningful interaction can build on that.

Actually, the widely held notion that grammar needs to be taught first may be based on the implicit idea that knowing about the structure is a precursor for communication, but as

Larsen-Freeman (1992) points out “Speakers do not choose words, then arrange them in order, then add sounds and then articulate the sounds.” (p163)

5. *The target language is acquired through interactive communicative use that encourages the negotiation of meaning.*

In an ideal world Principle 5 is totally in line with a DUB perspective. In this ideal world L2 learners interact intensively and frequently with very patient native speakers who are genuinely interested in keeping a meaningful conversation going. However, in most foreign language instructional contexts such interaction is not feasible and language teachers resort to no interaction or interaction among pairs or groups of L2 speakers with the idea that learners will co-construct the target language. The problem with this approach is that the conversations among learners are rather artificial, not very motivating and worse of all, the language is created in an analytical sense: Learners may string words they know from their textbooks together in grammatically correct constructions, but these constructions may not be the constructions that very proficient speakers of the language would use in a similar context. If we take the idea of conventionalized expressions seriously, the learner needs to hear and see those very frequently before he has internalized them and can become creative based on having been exposed to a sufficient number of types and tokens of constructions (Ellis 2002).

The problem of exposure could be solved by asking L2 learners to passively participate in interactive meaningful conversations by listening to authentic language, provided by the teacher through meaningful stories told incrementally with repetition and pared down language, by watching film scenes repeatedly in which the characters have a meaningful conversation until the learners at least passively understand the utterances, or by teachers providing meaningful language on content with lots of meaningful scaffolding. Not until FUMMs have been heard and practiced enough should the learner be asked to use them creatively. In other words, in early stages, we should be less worried about creative use of language as it is more important to become familiar with target-like FUMMs.

6. *Teaching is learner-centred and responsive to students' needs and interests.*

This principle is very much in line with a DUB view. For example, Lowie & Verspoor (2015) point out that “language development should be seen as an individually owned process

rather than a product and that this process is shaped by the nonlinear relationships of changing components over time” (p. 65). Therefore, from a CDST point of view instruction cannot determine this path and the teacher’s job should not be to teach but to create an environment in which an optimal learning path can be accomplished, one that suits the needs of the particular students. Another reason the teacher cannot really teach a language is that it is not an analytical system. “Teachers should be teaching language as the semiotic dynamic system it is, giving students opportunities to encounter patterns iteratively and meaningfully” (Larsen-Freeman, 2016). The teacher needs to provide optimal learning conditions through meaningful exposure for such learning to take place. To accomplish this, the teacher needs to be very much aware of the materials that will interest the students and meet their needs. Moreover, as a stream of authentic language by proficient speakers may be too difficult to grasp at first, pared down language may have to be used early on, or authentic language needs to be repeated by the teacher, who can articulate clearly and use visuals or gestures to scaffold to understanding.

*7. Genuinely meaningful language use is emphasized, along with unpredictability, risk-taking, and choice-making.*

One of the greatest fears of proponents of structure-based instruction is that learners will learn something incorrectly to begin with and then fossilize (which would be considered reaching a strong attractor in CDST). In communicative approaches the need to let go of such fears was recognized, but not really substantiated by research or theory. As Larsen-Freeman points out, “errors from a target-language perspective can be indicators of progress. They are also evidence of learners’ creativity and are not, in any linguistic sense, readily distinguishable from the linguistic innovations of language users” (forthcoming, p. xxx ). Several recent CDST studies in L2 development have shown however that this unpredictability (variability), risk-taking (shooting at target forms) and choice-making (eventually settling on forms) are indeed functional and part and parcel of the developmental process (Van Dijk, Verspoor& Lowie 2011; Verspoor, Schmid& Xu 2012; Tilma 2014) and Verspoor et al (2012), have found that the majority of errors disappear after about an A1 level in the Common European Framework of Reference. Also the work of Rousse-Malpat and Verspoor (2012) and Tilma (2014) has shown that whereas structure-based learners may have the advantage early on in accuracy, the communicatively taught learners are definitely more proficient in both oral and written

language early on, but less accurate; however, they also catch up with their structure-based taught peers after one or two years as far as accuracy is concerned.

The discussion of the Spada and Lighbown's review of teaching methodologies and the seven communicative principles have shown that truly communicative language teaching approaches are most in line with a CDST or DUB approach to language and that especially CLIL programs have proven to be quite effective, most probably because they allow for a lot of exposure (up to 15 hours a week in the Netherlands) to meaningful language use in which the language is a means to an end, and as Verspoor, de Bot and Xu (2015) have shown they clearly outperform their non-immersion peers in language proficiency.

CLIL is certainly successful, but also difficult to achieve as whole school programs have to be adapted and there may not be enough subject teachers in many areas of the world who can teach in the target language, especially if it is a language other than English. Moreover, in many foreign language settings, it may even be difficult to find enough language teachers who are really proficient in the target language and are able to provide meaningful exposure with sufficient amounts of repetition themselves, especially when class sizes are big. With greater access to modern technology, though, a newly developed Film Language Integrated Learning (FLIL) approach in Groningen--which takes a DUB perspective on language as a starting point--may be a solution.

In this approach, an appropriate, popular film is cut into 2 minute segments and is taken as the "content" to be taught by the teacher. The advantage of a film is that the actors try to act as naturally as possible and use language that is rather authentic. It is usually full of chunks, conventionalized every day expressions, fillers, hedges and conversations in their pragmatic and cultural contexts as the following text from the first scene in *The Pursuit of Happiness* with father and young son navigating San Francisco traffic to go to the day care centre will show:

Dad: Time to get up, man.

Child: All right, Dad.

Dad: Come on. Should be here soon.

Child: I think I should make a list.

Dad: What do you mean?

Dad: For your birthday gifts?

Child: Yeah.

Dad: You know you're only getting a couple of things, right?

Child: Yeah, I know. Just to look at and study so I can choose better.

Dad: Okay, well, that's smart. Yeah, make a list.

The teacher can show the segment as many items as needed, for example, once for general understanding and a second time for the language, but what is really important in this approach is that the teacher then revisits the language and helps the learner by making all the forms in FUMMs more salient through spelling the text out (usually in PowerPoint format), articulating the words carefully (so unstressed forms such as *you're* and *that's* can be distinguished) and scaffolding to full understanding, not focussing on grammar only but on all the forms in the language such as words, chunks and especially collocations (*make a list*) and what they mean. Depending on the learners' proficiency level, the learners can repeat the phrases after the teacher, role play the conversations among each other or create new conversations, all adding up to a great deal of playful iteration needed to entrench the language. Because there are so many visuals and the language is embedded in a natural context, the learner can make plentiful mental elaborations and probably remember the expressions better (Anderson & Reder 1979). For more proficient learners, the social and cultural implications can be focussed upon more, such as a father taking care of his son and the idea that in America parents like to make their children's dreams come true as much as possible, and lead to meaningful conversations and interactions among teacher and learners. This approach has already been tried out in two semester long experiments with large groups. Hong (2014) showed the movie approach to be more effective than its more traditional communicative counterpart, which included a focus on grammar in increasing general proficiency, and Irshad (2015) showed that a computer version of the approach was more effective than both the traditional communicative approach and the teacher-fronted movie approach, probably because the students could go at their own speed. To summarize, this FLIL approach gives authentic exposure within a social and cultural context that can be repeated and elaborated upon as needed. What's more, students are truly interested in what is happening next in the movie.

## ***Conclusion***

As Larsen-Freeman has pointed out extensively, from a CDST perspective there are no single causes, and no single ways to go about achieving things. Moreover, each learner has to find his or her own path in learning a second language and it will never be exactly the same as those of others. From a CDST point of view instruction cannot determine the learning path and therefore the teacher's job should not be to teach but to create an environment in which an optimal learning path for each individual can be accomplished. There is no single route to master the new L2 conventions but exposure and cognitive, emotional, and social engagement are essential. We have argued that language is not a systematic system driven by rules but a complex dynamic system in which all sub-systems interact within a meaningful context to give rise to meaning. Therefore, we should focus on all these aspects together rather than exclusively on grammatical forms. Through iteration of target FUMMs, the learner will discover and self-organize eventually and as long as non-target forms are not iterated too much (which may happen when we force the students to produce output too early) we should give them the time to do so. There is so much to learn in the language and if we want our learners to become fluent, frequent exposure and meaningful use of the target language is more useful. "Learning takes place not by repeating forms of a closed, static system, but by meaningfully playing the game while revisiting the same territory again and again" (Larsen Freeman 2012, p. 206).

## ***References***

- Anderson, J. R., & Reder, L. M. (1979). An elaborative processing explanation of depth of processing. In L.S. Cermak & F.I.M. Craik *Levels of processing in human memory*, 104, 385-403.
- Beale, J. (2002). Is Communicative Language Teaching a Thing of the Past?. *Babel*, 37(1), 12-16.
- Bybee, J. (2006). From usage to grammar: The mind's response to repetition. *Language*, 711-733.
- Clark, H. H. (1996). *Using language*. Cambridge university press.
- Ellis, N. C. (2002). Frequency effects in language processing: A review with implications for theories of implicit and explicit language acquisition. *Studies in Second Language Acquisition*, 24: 143-188.

- Ermann, B. & Warren, B. (2000). The idiom principle and the open choice principle. *Text*, 20: 1, 29–62.
- Goldberg, A. E. (2003). Constructions: a new theoretical approach to language. *Trends in cognitive sciences*, 7(5), 219-224.
- Hong, N. T. P. (2013). A Dynamic Usage-based Approach to Second Language Teaching. Unpublished dissertation. University of Groningen.
- Hopper, P. (1987). Emergent Grammar. *Berkeley Linguistics Society*, vol. 13 (1987), 139-157.
- Irshad, M. (2015). XXX Unpublished dissertation. University of Groningen.
- Klein, W., & Perdue, C. (1997). The Basic Variety (or: Couldn't natural languages be much simpler?). *Second language research*, 13(4), 301-347.
- Langacker, R. W. (1987). *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 1, Theoretical Prerequisites*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Langacker, R. W. (1988). A usage-based model. In B. Rutzka-Ostyn (Ed.), *Topics in cognitive linguistics* (pp.127–161). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
- Langacker, R. W. (2000). A dynamic usage-based model. In M. Barlow, & S. Kemmer (Eds.), *Usage-based models of language* (pp. 1-63). Palo Alto, CA: CSLI.
- Langacker, R.W. 2008. Cognitive grammar as a basis for language instruction. In Peter Robinson & Nick Ellis (eds.), *Handbook of cognitive linguistics and second language acquisition*, 66-88. New York: Routledge.
- Larsen-Freeman, D. & Cameron, L. (2008). *Complex systems and applied linguistics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Larsen-Freeman, D. (1976). An explanation for the morpheme acquisition order of second language learners. *Language learning*, 26(1), 125-134.
- Larsen-Freeman, D. (1992). Consensus and divergence on the content, role, and process of teaching grammar. *Georgetown University Round Table on Languages and Linguistics (GURT) 1991: Linguistics and Language Pedagogy: The State of the Art*, 260.
- Larsen-Freeman, D. (2003). *Teaching language: From grammar to grammaring*. Boston: Heinle/Cengage.
- Larsen-Freeman, D. (2012). On the roles of repetition in language teaching and learning. *Applied Linguistics Review*, 3(2), 195–210.
- Larsen-Freeman, D. (forthcoming)
- Larsen-Freeman, D., & Anderson, M. (2013). *Techniques and Principles in Language Teaching 3rd edition*. Oxford university press.

- Lightbown, P. M., & Spada, N. (2013). *How Languages are Learned 4th edition*. Oxford University Press.
- Long, M. H. (1985). Input and second language acquisition theory. In S. Gass and C. Madden (eds.), *Input and second language acquisition* (pp. 377-93). Rowley, Mass.: Newbury House.
- Lowie, W., & Verspoor, M. (2015). Variability and Variation in Second Language Acquisition Orders: A Dynamic Reevaluation. *Language Learning*, 65(1), 63-88.
- Pawley, A., Syder, F. H. (1983). Two puzzles for linguistic theory: Native-like selection and native-like fluency. In *Language and Communication*, J. C. Richards, and R. W. Schmidt (eds.), 163–199. New York: Longman.
- Rousse-Malpat, A. & Verspoor, M. (2012). Measuring effectiveness in Focus on Form versus Focus on Meaning. *Dutch Journal of Applied Linguistics* 1(2). 263-276.
- Schmitt, N. 2010. *Researching vocabulary: A vocabulary research manual*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Seidenberg, M. S., & MacDonald, M. C. (1999). A probabilistic constraints approach to language acquisition and processing. *Cognitive science*, 23(4), 569-588.
- Sinclair, J. M. (1991). *Corpus, Concordance Collocation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smiskova, H. (2013). *Chunks in L2 development: a usage-based perspective*. Unpublished dissertation. University of Groningen
- Smiskova, H., Verspoor, M. & Lowie, W. (2012). Conventionalized ways of saying things (CWOSTs) and L2 development. *Dutch Journal of Applied Linguistics*, 1(1), 125–142.
- Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1994). *A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition and action*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Thibault, P. J. (2011). First-order languaging dynamics and second-order language: the distributed language view. *Ecological Psychology*, 23(3), 210-245.
- Tilma, C. (2014). The dynamics of foreign versus second language development in Finnish writing. Groningen/Jyväskylä: University of Groningen/University of Jyväskylä dissertation.
- Tomasello, M. (2006). Acquiring linguistic constructions. *Handbook of child psychology*. P 73
- Tyler, A. (2012). *Cognitive linguistics and second language learning: Theoretical basics and experimental evidence*. Routledge.
- Van Dijk, M., Verspoor, M., & Lowie, W. (2011). Variability and DST. In M. Verspoor, K. De Bot & W. Lowie (Eds.), *A dynamic approach to second language development* (pp. 55-84). Amsterdam, Netherlands: Benjamins.
- Van Geert, P. (1994). *Dynamic systems of development: Change between complexity and chaos*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Van Lier, L. (2000). From input to affordance: Social-interactive learning from an ecological perspective. In J. Lantolf (Ed.), *Sociocultural theory and second language learning* (pp. 245-259). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Verspoor, M. & Hong, N. T. P. (2013). A dynamic usage-based approach to communicative Language Teaching. *European Journal of Applied Linguistics* 1(1). 22–54.

Verspoor, M. & Boers, F. (2013). Cognitive Linguistics of Second Language Acquisition. In C.A. Chapelle (Ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Applied Linguistics* (698-705). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Verspoor, M. & Tyler, A. (2009). Cognitive linguistics and second language learning. In W.C. Ritchie & T.K. Bhatia (Eds.), *The New Handbook of Second Language Acquisition* (160-174). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

Verspoor, M. Lowie, W. & Van Dijk, M. (2008). Variability in second language development from a dynamic systems perspective. *Modern Language Journal* 92.214-231.

Verspoor, M., de Bot, K., & Xu, X. (2015). The effects of English bilingual education in the Netherlands. *Journal of Immersion and Content-Based Language Education*, 3(1), 4-27.

Verspoor, M., Schmid, M. S. & Xu, X. (2012). A dynamic usage based perspective on L2 writing development. *Journal of Second Language Writing* 21(3).239-263.

Wray, A. (2002). *Formulaic Language and the Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Young, R. (1996). Form-function relations in articles in English interlanguage. In Bayley R. *Second language acquisition and linguistic variation*, 135-175.

## **VI. Supporting Critical Thinking in Science and Education**

### **The Conceptual Framework of Critical Thinking in Education: a Proposal**

Gyöngyi Fábíán


#### ***Abstract***

Since critical thinking became an ideal in post war North America, the concept has gained much attention in philosophy and psychology, and furthermore, it has been brought into the limelight in education sciences. If critical thinking in education is as vital as its proponents claim, it will also be crucial in teacher education and teacher assessment. The paper provides an outline of the dimensions of the critical thinking concept by integrating the current theories into a wider conceptual framework in order to allow a more comprehensive approach to the study of critical thinking practices in the classrooms worldwide. First, it briefly presents the findings of the philosophical, the psychological and the educational schools of thought in the subject area to identify the main trends of critical thinking studies. The thought, the personality and the process are highlighted as the three main aspects of the individual component of critical thinking concept. However, a comprehensive understanding of the concept requires a wider scope of approach comprising the social, the contextual and the cultural components of critical thinking, which are often neglected aspects of education research.

#### ***Introduction***

In an age when the selection of information requires increasingly sophisticated ways, when the only constant feature is change, and when problems must be solved quickly, thinking is a survival skill for the individual and the society alike. From an individual perspective the differences between thinking and non-thinking attitudes involve different behaviours, and furthermore, might result in a different way of interaction with and impact on the social environment as shown in Figure 1.

*Figure 1: Thinking and the individual*



(Adapted from Fábíán 2014)

The World summit on teaching (Asia Society, 2012) claims that an adequate goal is to provide higher-order skills for the majority of students, and in addition, future world citizens not only need subject knowledge, but also a wide range of skills and attitudes. The Assessment and Teaching of 21st Century Skills consortium provides a definition which divides twenty-first century skills, knowledge, and attitudes into four categories. Among these categories, ways of thinking comprising elements of creativity or innovation, critical thinking, problem-solving, decision-making, and learning to learn completed with a positive attitude to learning are considered to be key factors.

Furthermore, regarding its social aspects, critical thinking is also a key competence in performing citizenship activities, which is also a reason why researchers and educators worldwide have recently focused on identifying and developing the strategies, competencies and the attributes of critical thinkers.

Despite the widespread effort, we still face a lack of consensus regarding the definition of critical thinking. The purposes of this paper is to (a) explore current approaches to the critical thinking concept, (b) investigate how these approaches can be extended into a more comprehensive framework for education (c) and learn how classroom culture play a role in the development of students' critical thinking.

### *The concept of critical thinking: a review*

Although the growing body of literature in critical thinking demonstrates the widespread recognition of its importance, there is a notable lack of consensus regarding the definition of the concept. This section provides a brief outline of the development of the concept in philosophy and psychology over the past decades.

Philosophy has developed a coherent and sound framework for the perfection of thought and focuses on the qualities of the ideal thinker. As a result, towards the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the rather vague interpretation of critical thinking featured by “*reflective and reasonable thinking*” (Ennis, 1985:45) was soon completed with the criteria of being goal-directed and purposive (Ennis, 1985 ; Facione, 1990) and with the standards quality thinking is required to meet (Bailin et al., 1999; Lipman, 1988; Paul & Elder, 2008). More recently the concept has been developed into a detailed description of the good thought, the purpose of thinking and the interaction between the thought and the thinking person.

At present a widely held view of the philosophical school suggests that critical thinking maintains the fundamental intellectual standards of the good thought, which are clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance, depth, breadth, logic and significance (Paul & Elder, 2008). In addition, the dispositions dimension of critical thinking is made clearer in The Delphi Report (Facione, 1990), which aims to promote success in educational instruction and assessment through providing a detailed description of the skills, subskills and dispositions characterizing the critical thinker.

The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed, trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation, honest in facing personal biases, prudent in making judgments, willing to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex matters, diligent in seeking relevant information, reasonable in the selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in seeking results which are as precise as the subject and the circumstances of inquiry permit. (Facione, 1990:2)

The psychological school of thought, on the other hand, often intends to move away from this ideal, and focuses on how people actually apply critical thinking. It means, researchers intend to describe the types of actions and behaviours critical thinkers can perform, which involves defining a list of essential skills or procedures completed by the critical thinking person.

According to The Delphi Report (Facione, 1990) the six essential skills include the following.

1. Interpretation: The ability to understand information.
2. Analysis: The ability to identify the main arguments.
3. Evaluation: The ability to judge whether this argument is credible and valid based on the logic and evidence given.
4. Inference: The ability to decide what to believe based on solid logic, and to understand the consequences of this decision.
5. Explanation: The ability to communicate the process of reasoning to others.
6. Self-Regulation: The ability to monitor one's own thinking and correct flaws in logic.

Seven dispositional elements, or habits of mind, are also identified by this panel of experts and are included in the document.

1. Inquisitiveness: Concern to become and remain well-informed.
2. Truth-seeking: Willingness to face one's own biases and reconsider views.
3. Critical thinking self-confidence: Trust in one's ability to reason.
4. Open-mindedness: Flexibility in considering alternative viewpoints.
5. Systematicity: Systematic thinking that follows a linear process.
6. Analyticity: The willingness to pick apart your own and others' logic.
7. Cognitive Maturity: Being persistent in seeking the truth.


While The Delphi Report (Facione, 1990) provides the most common definition of critical thinking procedural elements to date, philosophers have often criticized what they call the reductionist approach, that is reducing a complex system of knowledge and skills into a series of disconnected steps or skills which one can move through without actually engaging in critical thought (Sternberg, 1986; Bailin, 2002).

Furthermore, the two schools of philosophy and psychology disagree concerning the importance of criteria in thinking, as well. While philosophers maintain a normative approach to achieve the goal, that is the perfection of thinking and thought according to fundamental criteria, psychologists are more concerned with observing and developing the procedures and the ways of performing the thinking process. Another example of the critical thinking conceptual differences is shown in the manner how permanence in individual critical thinking is handled in the various theories (Figure 2).

The most traditional approach to critical thinking intends to maintain the quality of the product of thinking. It investigates the thought, its internal cohesion, the relationship between

the thought and reality, and the relationship between the thought and the language expressing the thought according to universal intellectual standards. The main aim of the approach is to identify flaws of thinking or expression and introduce corrections to develop the thought and thought utterances, or language, for perfection. At the same time, the two schools intend to identify a set of skills and abilities required to complete the process of critical thinking. A set of skills or abilities will enable the individual to proceed, however, might not be demonstrated in the process observed, which may be the reason why recommendations to efficient procedures and methods have also been developed. Still, some argue that instead of a single way to think critically, there are a variety of tools one can choose from when completing the thinking process, which implies that a variety of routes are available in successful critical thinking, too.

*Figure 2: The concept of critical thinking according to permanence*



(Adapted from Fábíán 2014)

Despite the differences between the approaches to critical thinking some overlapping areas can be pinned down in naming essential skills and abilities, such as inductive and deductive reasoning, making decisions or solving problems, or asking and answering questions for clarification (Ennis, 1985; Facione, 1990, 2013; Paul, 1990). Most researchers also agree that in addition to skills and abilities, critical thinking requires certain dispositions of the thinker (Bailin et al., 1999; Ennis, 1985, 1991, 1996; Facione, 1990, Paul, 1990), of which the most often cited ones are open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, the propensity to seek reason, inquisitiveness, flexibility and respect for others' opinions.

Thus, by present, it seems that the philosophical and psychological schools have been highly successful in drawing a thorough picture of the domains within which the critical thinking of the individual can be identified either for research or for developmental purposes. They have a clear understanding of the quality of the critical thought on the one hand, and the quality of the critical thinker in terms of the dispositions, skills and abilities critical thinking requires on the other hand.

The two schools provide us with valuable findings. The investigation of the three domains of (1) the product (the good thought) best developed by philosophy, (2) the person (the ideal dispositions of the thinker) best developed by personal psychology and (3) the process (the skills and abilities of the thinker) best developed by cognitive psychology will help us better understand the critical thinking concept at the level of the individual. Since the three domains describe individual performance, that is the individual demonstrating certain dispositions and applying particular skills and abilities during the process of thinking, and because at the nexus of the three domains we will find the individual himself, we will integrate them in what we call the individual factor of our critical thinking conceptual framework.

### *Towards a new concept of critical thinking in education*

The educational school appears to draw largely on what already has been developed by the philosophical and psychological schools while extending the concept with theories of developmental psychology. However, the educational school of thought has failed to come up with a consensus of definitions of the concept of critical thinking, and as a consequence, competing definitions of critical thinking are still vague and teachers are still in need of a clear and tangible definition of the concept (Bailin, 2002; Willingham, 2007).

This can be illustrated by the example that the concepts of critical thinking and higher order thinking are often used synonymously in literature on critical thinking in education. However, in contrast to the lingering ambiguity of the concept, the general interest in the education scene has stimulated the rise of a new aspect of critical thinking theory among philosophers and psychologists.

Some contextual features of the educational situations have emerged as crucial factors in influencing the individual's critical thinking processes. Fulfilling the goal of educating critical thinkers may be achieved with the direct assistance of the teacher and, more indirectly, through the subject matter of teaching. Interestingly, it is the indirect impact of some subject-related aspects that has attracted researchers' attention. Among these aspects the role of background knowledge and the qualities of the learning task have raised special interest (Csizmadia et al., 2012).

Most researchers of critical thinking agree on the important role of background knowledge (McPeck, 1990; Willingham, 2007) meaning that the student needs something to think about. Some go even further (Facione, 1990; Bailin et al., 1999; Paul, 1992) claiming that critical thinking is domain-specific. Willingham (2007) argues that critical thinking is

fundamentally intertwined with domain knowledge, and as such, is subject-specific. Similarly, Bailin (2002) states that domain-specific knowledge is necessary for critical thinking, since what constitutes valid evidence, arguments, and standards tends to vary across domains.

Norris (1985), on the other hand, analyzes the relationship between the task provided and the thinking response. He explains that the inferences, and the appraisals of inferences that a person can justify making depend on the background assumptions, the level of sophistication and the concept of the task (Norris, 1985). His idea is further enhanced by Bailin (2002), who claims that critical thinking always takes place in response to a particular task, question, problematic situation or challenge, which always arise in particular contexts.


This challenge has inspired many to develop new critical thinking development and assessment methods for classroom application all around the world. An abundance of materials are aimed at fostering critical thinking, and thus suggest ways, procedures and techniques for improving students' critical thinking, as well as provide materials for application in teaching and assessment classroom procedures.

Although the elements of the context relevant to critical thinking in the classroom still need to be elaborated, the aspect of context itself has earned a place in the framework of critical thinking concept. While a lot of valuable work has been done in the area of teaching and assessing critical thinking in the classroom, there seems to be a lack of systematic and clear description regarding what variables the teacher or the researcher of the critical thinking class need to consider. In what follows we shall attempt to propose the extension of critical thinking conceptual framework.

### ***Extending the critical thinking concept in education***

While ample intellectual effort has been invested in elaborating the qualities of the critical thought, the most efficient thinking process and the necessary skills, abilities and dispositions of the thinking individual, we are still far from a consensus over what critical thinking means in general, and in particular, what it means in education.

*Figure 3: The educational environment of critical thinking*



As opposed to the narrow framework of critical thinking focusing on the individual, extending it to the environment where the teaching and learning process takes place creates a wider framework for critical thinking in the formal educational environment (Figure 3). While some research addresses the sensitivity of critical thinking to some features of the learning context, the issue which has hardly been discussed in the literature seems to be the immediate environment of the thinker and the impact that the affective and the socio-cultural factors in this environment might have on the thinker's behavior. In other words, the social environment of the thinker and the thinking process on the one side, and the education culture within which the interaction takes place on the other side are often left out from the debate over critical thinking.

To respond the need, below we will promote an interactional perspective to develop the concept of critical thinking in education theory and practice by discussing these two distinct environmental factors. Besides the contextual factor, we will make an attempt to integrate the social and educational-cultural factors into our proposed conceptual framework of critical thinking concept.

Ennis (1998) suggests that critical thinking practice is more readily accepted through shared decision-making processes at group level, if it is possible, as a replacement of the individual level. Similarly, we agree that critical thinking is very much an interactional

participant activity. Having said that, we would like to emphasize the conversational imperative of critical thinking in education through looking at the partners of the individual thinker during the classroom interaction, that is the class.

However, the class is a social group where the paraphernalia of motivating and demotivating cognitive and affective factors will enhance, prevent or disrupt the development of critical thinking. The classrooms that encourage critical thinking possess distinguishing features (Browne & Freeman, 2000). A critical thinking classroom commonly reflects the attributes of frequent questions, developmental tension, fascination with the contingency of conclusions and active learning, which reinforce one another to provide developmental stimuli for enhanced critical thinking. We also believe that threat, or more often, peer pressure on behalf of the group might exert an even stronger influence on individual behaviour in the classroom situation.

In line with this Norris (1985) warns that a threat-free environment is indispensable for stimulating the expected thinking process. While within the educational context the main source of stress and threat is the teacher herself, from an attitudinal approach, experience shows that critical thinking threatens the amiable calm of much of our interactions with one another, which may be threatening people away from revealing their ideas.

Although there is much more to be discussed concerning the classroom social environment impact on critical thinking development, the reasoning in the current literature seems to be firm enough for us to add a social component to our framework, and furthermore, to provide researchers with a wider perspective of classroom behaviour study.

Cultures are different in a number of ways, which has immediate impact on the culture of education in the classroom. Some of the differences can be pinned down in the subject-related goals and aims of the education, the methods of teaching and assessment applied in the educational institution or in the subject, the beliefs related to learning and teaching (Csizmadia et al., 2008).

As a response to earlier work on the topic (Norris, 1995) Ennis (1998) raises the issue of bias with the aim to generate a discussion and to suggest strategies for approaching cultural differences. One of his claims is that asking for reasons and being open to alternatives may disrupt some culturally accepted behavioural patterns in the family and in the school, especially in more traditional contexts. He believes that in this situation promoting critical thinking practice is preferable rather than holding it as an ideal, which he considers unfair.

His claims seem to be in line with our own recent findings (Fábián, 2015) concerning education culture in Hungary. Our investigation was inspired by our experience collected on a

teacher training course. We hypothesized that the trainees' reluctance to actively participate in discussions and to perform critical thinking demonstrated a learned behaviour which is rooted in the behavioural traditions in their previous educational contexts. Thus the students (N= 40) aged between 19 and 22 were asked to reflect on their previous education experiences, and to discuss and describe the typical features of the Hungarian educational cultural context based on the individualistic and collective dimensions of cultural differences (Hofstede, 1986). The results clearly show that the collectivist characteristics of the Hungarian classroom outweigh the individualistic characteristics in many aspects. This means that in Hungarian mainstream education the class discussions are often conducted in a social environment where the following can be observed.

- Individual students will only speak up in class when called upon personally by the teacher;
- large classes split socially into smaller cohesive subgroups based on particularist criteria (e.g. ethnic affiliation);
- individuals will only speak up in small groups;
- formal harmony in learning situations should be maintained at all times; and
- education is a way of gaining prestige in one's social environment and of joining a higher status group.

Besides the collectivist concerns, however, the results also demonstrate a minor shift towards the individualistic cultural features in the Hungarian classroom environment, which can be observed in the two aspects below.

- Students expect to learn how to learn; and
- Education is a way of improving one's economic worth and self-respect based on ability and competence.

Based on our findings we can hypothesize that the dominance of the collectivist features of the classroom learning environment will prevent the individuals from practicing critical thinking in class, and what is more, will provide little opportunity for students to observe critical thinking behaviours in the classroom. These conclusions may lead us to the assumption that cultural bias of critical thinking might also persist in a collectivist environment, and furthermore, it can be feared that in these classrooms resistance to change is prevalent.

Based on the reasons discussed above we would like to propose an extension of the framework of critical thinking concept with a fourth component, which is the educational-cultural factor of the classroom.

## *Conclusions*

In our paper one of our intentions was to integrate and extend the current theories of critical thinking concept into a wider conceptual framework used for analyzing and developing critical thinking theory and practice in education. We found that critical thinking in the classroom can be analyzed from the perspective of the individual thinker and from that of the environment surrounding the thinker. The analysis can be completed through examining the component of the individual and the three factors of the context, the social environment and the classroom culture.

The theory and the practice of investigating the individual component of critical thinking has successfully been developed by and applied in the philosophical and psychological schools of thought. The individual component comprises elements within the area of the thought, the person and the process. It involves the elements of good thought formulated according to universal intellectual standards, the thinker's behaviour demonstrating essential intellectual traits, dispositions, and furthermore, the skills and abilities the ideal thinker employs during thinking.

A more comprehensive understanding of critical thinking in the classroom, however, requires the extension of the current conceptual framework by adding the components of the context, the social environment and the educational-culture, which together are referred to as the environmental component in our paper.

The environmental component comprises elements within the three distinct areas of the situation, the learning group, and the traditions of the educational environment. The area of the situation, called the contextual factor, involves elements in the immediate context of the specific learning and teaching process in formal education. Some examples of the elements within this factor are the task-related features of learning, such as the language of the instruction within the task, or the conditions of completing the task, such as the deadline of students' assignment. The area of the learning group, called the social factor, involves elements in the immediate human environment of the thinker. Some examples of the elements of the social factor are the social psychological features of the group, such as the attitudes and values within the group, or dynamics of group processes, such as group cohesion or climate. The area of the educational traditions, called the educational-cultural factor, involves elements in the wider educational environment of the thinker. Some examples of the elements of the educational-cultural factor are the methods of teaching and assessment applied in the educational institution or in the

subject, the beliefs related to learning and teaching, or the subject-related goals and aims of the education.


Based on the literature consulted we can conclude, that the individual component of the critical thinking concept is well defined in terms of its elements, the forms and the methods of analysis, as well as the methods of development.

On the other hand, the environmental components of the contextual, social and educational-cultural factors of the critical thinking concept require further research and improvement in terms of their elements, the forms and methods of analysis or the development of critical thinking in the classroom.

It seems vital to collect more evidence concerning the critical thinking-related social factors of the classroom. We believe that in this work some existing findings concerning the barriers to critical thinking rooted in the social environment of the workplace (Down & Hogan, 2000) might also carry considerable implications for classroom research.

We found that one shocking difference between cultures is that critical thinking may not be seen as positive behaviour of the individual in some places. This implies the necessity of our better understanding of how classroom cultures are related to cultures, how education cultures might be distinguished from each other, and what features characterize the classroom culture which is supportive in developing students' critical thinking.

Figure 4: The functional system of critical thinking components in education



Because all the four factors are functionally interrelated, it is crucial to understand their relationship to each other within the whole componential system of critical thinking. Figure 4 demonstrates a possible functional structure of the componential system discussed above. The educational-cultural factor acts as a fundamental basis for the practice and the development of the critical thinking of the individual, and for the practice and the development of critical thinking within the group during the teaching and learning process. It influences, extends or limits thinking processes based on beliefs, attitudes and traditions held in the educational context. It has immediate impact on the behaviours of individuals and learning groups, as well as on the teaching curriculum, methods, materials, and tasks provided during the teaching process. However, the educational-cultural factor may require further theoretic and empirical evidence to better understand the nature of classroom critical thinking.

### ***References***

- Asia Society (2012) Teaching and leadership for the twenty-first century. Report, accessed 13 July 2015. <http://asiasociety.org/files/2012teachingsummit.pdf>
- Bailin, S., Case, R., Coombs J.R. and Daniels L.B. (1999) Conceptualizing critical thinking. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 31 (3), 285-302.
- Bailin, S. (2002) Critical thinking and science education. *Science & Education*, 11 (4), 361–375.
- Bloom, S. B. (1956, 1984) *Taxonomy of educational objectives: the classification of educational goals; Handbook I: Cognitive Domain*. New York: Longman.
- Browne, M.N. and Freeman, K. (2000) Distinguishing features of critical thinking classrooms. *Teaching in Higher Education*, 5 (3), 301-309.
- Csizmadia, T., Balogh, Á., Bogdány, E. and Polák-Weldon, R. (2012) Improving Quality rather than Feeding the Fads: A Framework for Quality Management in Higher Education. *International Journal of knowledge, culture and change management*, 11(5). 163-178.
- Csizmadia T., Enders J., Westerheijden Don F. (2008) Quality Management in Hungarian Higher Education: Organisational Responses to Governmental Policy. *Higher Education*, 56(4). 439-455.
- Down, B. and Hogan, C. (2000) “Critical Reflective Practice and Workplace Learning: Impediments and Possibilities in Teacher Education.” *Australian Journal of Teacher Education*, 25 (2), accessed 13 July 2015. <http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1292&context=ajte>

- Ennis, R.H. (1985) A logical basis for measuring critical thinking skills. *Educational Leadership*, 43 (3), 44–48.
- Ennis, R.H. (1991) Critical thinking: A streamlined conception. *Teaching Philosophy*, 14(3), 5-22.
- Ennis R.H. (1996) Critical thinking dispositions: Their nature and assessability. *Informal Logic*, 18(2-3), 165-182.
- Ennis R.H. (1998) Is critical thinking culturally biased? *Teaching Philosophy*, 21(1), 15-33.
- European Commission (2014) Initial teacher education in Europe: an overview of policy issues. Brussels: EC., accessed 13 July 2015. [http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/strategic-framework/expert-groups/documents/initial-teacher-education\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/strategic-framework/expert-groups/documents/initial-teacher-education_en.pdf)
- European Commission (2013) Supporting teacher competence development for better learning outcomes. Brussels: EC., accessed 13 July 2015. [http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/school/doc/teachercomp\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/school/doc/teachercomp_en.pdf)
- Facione, P. A. (1990) *Critical thinking: A statement of expert consensus for purposes of educational assessment and instruction*. California, Millbrae: The California Academic Press.
- Facione, P.A. (2013) Critical thinking: What it is and why it counts. *Insight Assessment*. accessed 31 July 2015. <http://spu.edu/depts/health-sciences/grad/documents/ctbyfacione.pdf>
- Fábián G. (2014) *Kritikai gondolkodás az osztályteremben*. Gondolat Kiadó.
- Fábián, G. (2015) Non-critical thinking: What if not thinking? *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 186 (2015) 699-703.
- Hofstede, G. (1986) Cultural differences in teaching and learning. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 10 (3) 301-320.
- Lai, E. (2011) Critical thinking: A literature review. Pearson report series, accessed 13 July 2015. <http://images.pearsonassessments.com/images/tmrs/CriticalThinkingReviewFINAL.pdf>
- Lipman, M. (1988) Critical thinking—What can it be? *Educational Leadership*, 46 (1), 38–43.
- McPeck, J.E. (1990) Critical thinking and subject specificity: A reply to Ennis. *Educational Researcher*, 19 (4), 10–12.
- Paul, R. (1990) *Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs To Survive in a Rapidly Changing World*. USA, CA, Rohnert Park Sonoma State University: Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique.
- Paul, R.W. (1992) Critical thinking: What, why, and how? *New Directions for Community Colleges*, 1992 (77), 3–24.
- Paul, R. and Elder, L. (2008) *The miniature guide to critical thinking concepts and tools*. The Foundation for Critical Thinking., accessed 20 April 2015. [www.criticalthinking.org](http://www.criticalthinking.org)

Pearce, J. and Morrison, C. (2011) "Teacher Identity and Early Career Resilience: Exploring the Links." *Australian Journal of Teacher Education*, 36 (1) 2011, accessed 13 July 2015. <http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1513&context=>

Schuck, S. and Buchanan, J. (2012) "Dead Certainty? The Case for Doubt in Teacher Education." 37 (8), accessed 13 July 2015. <http://ro.ecu.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1889&context=ajte>

Sternberg, R. J. (1986) *Critical thinking: Its nature, measurement, and improvement*. National Institute of Education, accessed 13 July 2015. <http://eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED272882.pdf>.

Willingham, D. T. (2007) Critical thinking: Why is it so hard to teach? *American Educator*, (2007) 8–19.

# Information Technologies. Reading and The Future of Higher Education<sup>361</sup>

James M. Skelly

## *Introduction*

Recent discussions among students, professors, and administrators regarding the current status of the social sciences, liberal arts, and the humanities has motivated me to offer some reflections, not least because I think the discussions often assume a context that has largely disappeared. To begin however, let me make clear a foundational assumption that will inform my remarks and that I will elaborate upon as I proceed: that is, that the fundamental challenge for universities and colleges rests with the academic and intellectual vitality of its course offerings. Concern with recruitment, finances, and the quality and character of student learning outcomes, will all increasingly depend upon whether or not we are clearly preparing students for the world that they will inhabit during the remaining years of this century. I dare to say that many of the institutions, and the faculty upon which they depend, that I am familiar with in the United States and in Europe, are not doing that. Instead, they seem to be preparing students for an idealized version of education from the last half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, with classrooms that still resemble chapels, where the professor is ‘priest,’ and with a pedagogy that is informed by monologue, methodological nationalism, and a general lack of awareness of the rapidly changing social and physical worlds that we humans inhabit.

Zygmunt Bauman (2001:128) has captured the broader crisis of educational institutions in the context of contemporary post-modern circumstances:

“The present educational crisis is first and foremost a crisis of inherited institutions and inherited philosophies. Meant for a different kind of reality, they find it increasingly difficult to absorb, accommodate and hold the changes without a thorough revision of the conceptual frames they deploy, and such a revision, as we know from Thomas Kuhn, is the most overpowering and deadly of all the challenges thought may encounter.”

---

<sup>361</sup> This paper originated as a presentation made to the IAU College Board of Trustees in Washington, D.C., on 19 February 2015. It is not for publication or copy without the express permission of the author. ©James M. Skelly, 2015.

## *The Gutenberg Revolution*

Bauman's notion that the educational crisis is "a crisis of inherited institutions and inherited philosophies," can be given historical context if one recognizes that most of the professors, their academic disciplines, and the institutions that they inhabit are the progeny of the revolution engendered by Johannes Gutenberg and the literacy that came with the reading of books. Febvre and Martin in their work on the broad impact of printing emphasize the revolutionary character of the printed book by noting that it "created new habits of thought not only within the small circle of the learned, but far beyond, in the intellectual life of all who used their minds" (1990:10-11). Most notable in this regard were the new habits of thought that Martin Luther engendered and which were made widely available because of the printing press. Elizabeth Eisenstein observed that "the advent of printing was an important precondition for the Protestant Reformation taken as a whole; for without it one could not implement 'a priesthood of all believers'" (2012:171).

The necessary precondition to create the new priesthoods, both religious and secular, was that print culture unlike scribal culture had made texts stable, because, as James Gleick (2012:400) noted: "Before print, scripture was not truly fixed," but print in contrast "was trustworthy, reliable and permanent." Furthermore, "All forms of knowledge achieved stability and permanence.....simply because there were many copies." The stability and permanence of the forms of knowledge that print engendered, and Luther's emphasis on individual conscience with regard to scripture, "prepared the way," as Erik Erikson has observed, "for the series of concepts of equality, representation, and self-determination which became in successive secular revolutions and was the foundations not of the dignity of some, but of the liberty of all" (1993:231). Thus, Marshall McLuhan could assert that, "Western man knows that his values and modalities are the product of literacy" (1967:269).

McLuhan however also worried that it was "necessary to understand the power and thrust of technologies to isolate the senses and thus to hypnotize society," because the "somnambulist conforming of beholder to the new form of structure renders those most deeply immersed in a revolution the least aware of its dynamic," and "it is felt, at those times, that the future will be a larger or greatly improved version of the *immediate past*" (Ibid: 272 – emphasis in original). The revolution fostered by information technologies in the past two plus decades has not only hypnotized our societies, but most significantly, the hypnosis is central to the current crisis of our educational institutions. As Sven Birkerts noted just over 20 years ago in his work on the fate of reading in the electronic age, "we are in the midst of an epoch making

transition,” and “that the societal shift from print-based to electronic communications is as consequential for culture as was the shift instigated by Gutenberg’s invention of moveable type” (1994:192).

Birkerts was particularly concerned “that while circuit and screen are ideal conduits for certain kinds of data....they are antithetical to inwardness” because “circuit driven communications are predicated upon instantaneousness.” In contrast, “To the degree that we immerse ourselves in a book.....we relinquish the governing construct of the now, exchanging it for content, feeling, and absorption” (Ibid: 193). Birkerts went on to claim “that the wager is intuitively clear: we gain access and efficiency at the expense of subjective selfawareness.” (Ibid: 220). Joseph Brodsky captured the deeper political and psychological problem in his 1987 Nobel lecture when he argued that, “though we can condemn the material suppression of literature - the persecution of writers, acts of censorship, the burning of books - we are powerless when it comes to its worst violation: that of not reading the books.” “For that crime,” he said, “a person pays with his whole life; if the offender is a nation, it pays with its history” (1987).

### ***The Information Tsunami***

The scale of the knowledge problem engendered by the information tsunami is captured in a study conducted a few years back at the University of Southern California which indicated that using digital and analog devices we were then able to store 295 exabytes (put 20 zeros after the 295) of information which is 315 times the number of grains of sand in the world. Even seven or eight years ago, according to *Science Daily* (2011), humans were successfully sending 1.9 zettabytes of information through broadcast technology such as televisions and GPS units. That's equivalent to every person in the world reading 174 newspapers every day. And, Thomas Barnett, the Director of Thought Leadership for Cisco Systems Worldwide Service Provider Marketing Group claims (2011) we are now in what is being characterized as the “Zettabyte Era.” To visualize a zettabyte, one can think of 36 million years of HD video, or the volume of the Great Wall of China if you allow an 11oz cup of coffee to represent a gigabyte of data.

The deeper social-psychological problem embedded in this tsunami of information that we in educational and other institutions face, is that information has become increasingly independent of meaning. In Freeman Dyson’s commentary in a *New York Review of Books* essay four years ago on James Gleick’s book, *The Information: A History, a Theory, a Flood*, Dyson cited the work of the so-called “father” of information theory, Claude Shannon. Shannon had controversially noted, as Dyson pointed out, that “information could be handled with

greater freedom if it was treated as a mathematical abstraction independent of meaning.” Dyson further suggested that the resulting “immense size of modern databases....gives us a feeling of meaninglessness,” but that it is “our task as humans to bring meaning back into this wasteland” (2011).

### *Consequences*

One consequence of the information tsunami at an individual level is that because of the neuro-plasticity of the human brain, our minds are being rewired in accord with the new information technologies in a manner that is much more profound than the major re-wiring that occurred as the result of the Gutenberg revolution. As the researcher Jane Healy pointed out twenty five years ago, there was increasing evidence to indicate that television was actually bringing about a restructuring of the human brain, as widespread reading undoubtedly began to do five hundred years ago. Healy argued that "the ability to read, and the related ability to write, are not hard-wired into the human brain." Children must learn to make meaning out of printed texts, and the work of such learning is substantially more difficult than the work of watching television. Among the negative effects of television watching on children according to Healy, was the inability "to sustain attention independently, stick to problems actively, listen intelligently, read with understanding, and use language effectively." Healy suggested therefore that it was no wonder that a University of Michigan study showed that when asked whether they would choose their fathers or television, if forced to make the choice, over 30% of four and five year olds chose television (Quoted in Skelly, 1995).

The re-wiring that began manifesting with television has of course been heightened by the new information technologies associated with the internet that now increasingly permeate everyday life throughout the world, as Nicholas Carr has so convincingly argued in his book *The Shallows* (2010), which elaborated on his rather well-known article, “Is Google Making Us Stupid?”(2008). Drawing on the work of neuroscientists and brain researchers, Carr argues “that long-term memory is actually the seat of understanding” because it stores not just facts but complex concepts, or ‘schemas’.” Since “the depth of our intelligence hinges on our ability to transfer information from working memory to long-term memory and weave it into conceptual schemas,” the problem that develops when the cognitive load of our working memory exceeds the “mind’s ability to store and process the information” is that “we can’t translate the new information into schemas” and “it becomes harder to distinguish relevant information from irrelevant information, signal from noise” (2010:124-125). As Sven Birkerts also noted

(1994:18), one consequence is that “the world we have known, the world of our myths and references and shared assumptions is being changed by a powerful, if often intangible, set of forces.”

However, it isn't simply being *changed* by powerful forces, it is replacing the ability to think critically. Several years ago, a close friend of mine, Bud Mehan, who is a well-known educationalist, and senior faculty member at UC San Diego, provided me with an interesting anecdote regarding the capacity of students to think critically that I have mused upon ever since. He said that he had been the “tag-along spouse” at an international education conference with his wife at which he had met many young people who had in his words, “excellent values.” “But,” he said, “they had no capacity for critical analysis!” In my reflections upon this insight, it seemed clear that the source of this distortion was that the total information environment had become the total educational environment, or what Raymond Williams (1967:15) intuitively foresaw 50 years ago as the “permanent education.”

Thus, one of the initial tasks is to understand the character of that permanent education today, and the difficulty that students face in sorting the meaningful from the meaningless. Given the overwhelming amount of information in disconnected bits that students are swimming in, it has become increasingly difficult for them to develop a coherent sense of what is happening in the actual world rather than in the limited virtual worlds they increasingly seem to inhabit. I sincerely wonder, given the tsunami of information that we have been subjected to in the last two decades, if we are not seeing the development of a kind of cyber peasantry in which the mind has a mass of bits of information strewn incoherently about in a manner that mimics the images of the devastation that followed the horrific tsunami in Japan a few years ago.

Let me provide some examples of how I think the problem manifests concretely in students. The British lecturer Mark Fisher characterizes his students as suffering from “hedonic lassitude,” such that when students are asked “to read for more than a couple of sentences... many will protest that they *can't do it*” because “*it's boring*.” And, it's not the content of the reading that students complain about Fisher says, “it is the act of reading itself that is deemed to be ‘boring’.” Fisher suggests that a fundamental mismatch has developed between the increasing numbers of post-literate students who are “‘too *wired* to concentrate,’ and the confining concentrational logics of decaying disciplinary systems” – in other words, the disciplines that inform our teaching! Thus, rather than being dyslexic, Fisher argues that increasing numbers of students are actually “post-lexic” because they can process the “image-dense data very effectively without any need to read.”

Birkerts also speaks of the students he had in a class on “The American Short Story” in a similar manner. He queried them on their responses to Henry James’s “Brooksmith,” and there was a general complaint summed up by one student who said, “I dunno, the whole thing just bugged me – I couldn’t get into it.” In further discussions with the students about their responses, Birkerts learned “that they were not, with a few exceptions, readers-never had been; that they had always occupied themselves with music, TV, and videos;” and “that they had difficulty slowing down enough to concentrate on prose of any density” (1994:17-19).

In my own experience, a few years ago while I was Visiting Professor of Peace Studies in Derry at the Magee campus of the University of Ulster, I told two of the seemingly intelligent students from the American Middle West who were studying there the legendary story of Nobel Peace Laureate John Hume, who, standing on the bridge separating Strasbourg and France from Germany, had said that if the French and Germans could create an enduring peace, so too could the Irish and British. John Hume was then not only the most famous resident of Derry, but also a Professor on the Magee campus – one bumped into him regularly - and the two students had been on the campus and living in Derry at this point for three months, but mentally they were still in Indiana and Kansas. They had no idea who John Hume was, let alone how he was inspired to initiate the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. I told this story to a colleague in Strasbourg who had also been teaching American students, and he did me one better - he had given a talk to his students about the origins of French republicanism and mentioned the Enlightenment - yes, as you may have guessed, none of them had heard of, or knew anything about, the Enlightenment. My suspicion was that they might have guessed that “The Enlightenment” was a film starring Matt Damon!

Of course, their education was not enhanced by the fact that between 2008 and 2011 the University of Ulster had gradually decided to eliminate courses in Philosophy, History, and Politics from the curriculum at the Magee campus of the university in Derry, nor when the Vice-Chancellor told a meeting of faculty and staff in December of 2011 that, "I don't think anyone comes to Magee to explore the meaning of life." Instead, he said, the university curriculum must be focused on “skills” and “employability.” This is a general tendency in educational institutions today, and therefore public discourse has become increasingly debased and ignorance becomes increasingly acceptable.

And when I took up the position of Interim Director of the Baker Institute at Juniata College in 2012 after living in Europe for most of the last 25 years, I was astounded to see how pervasive this kind of ignorance was, and how easily the new information technologies colluded functionally in this phenomenon. One concrete consequence of this was how readily students

copied or unthinkingly used the work of others and presented it as their own. One might call this “plagiarism,” but in some cases, believe it or not, I became convinced that students didn’t actually realize that they were plagiarizing!

In a noteworthy instance, students in an introductory class in Peace and Conflict Studies were meant to explore the process of institutionalizing peace – in Northern Ireland, for example, in the final course essay. One student submitted a paper that was superficially what we might call “pretty” – it had a fair number of quotes from well-known people about peace spread throughout the paper, rather as though the student had sketched flowery images around the margins of the essay, or was advertising a product called “Peace.” She ended the essay with a quote from Eleanor Roosevelt. When I subsequently asked her who Eleanor Roosevelt was, a pained look spread across her face, and after some delay she quietly uttered that she didn’t know, but then a tiny light bulb seemed to go on, and she said, “Teddy Roosevelt’s wife??” I then asked her where she had gotten this and the other quotations – enthusiastically, she said, “*brainyquotes.com!*” I suppose this is the website for people with insufficient grey matter of their own!

There was an interesting sequel to this story however, which I think captures the even deeper problem.

About ten days after I had the conversation with the student, I was sitting next to a faculty member from the College of Information Sciences and Technology at Penn State University on a flight out of Dulles airport, and I told her the story of the brainy quotes student. When I finished my tale of woe, she looked at me and said, “Well, I use brainy quotes! But I always look up who the person is.”

The student, and undoubtedly the professor as well, had understood a key element of what passes for “knowledge” today. Not only was critical thinking about an issue unnecessary, but presentation was more important than substance. It was another manifestation of the dominance of the culture of advertising whereby the seductive quality of the object, in this case a term paper, as well as the student herself, became more important than the quality of the analysis informing how peace could be institutionalized. Although I doubt that she had read *Be Your Own Spin Doctor* (Richards: 1998 – emphasis in original), the ethos that “you can **spin doctor YOURSELF into greater prominence and enhance your reputation** with colleagues, friends, neighbours and opinion-formers,” is one that she had undoubtedly internalized.

Unfortunately, I don’t think the students are atypical of those who reside in academic institutions. Instead, like increasing numbers of those who ostensibly come to learn, many faculty members also have difficulty developing a coherent sense of what is happening in the

actual world, as well, because of the knowledge problem created by the flood of information. A faculty member at a liberal arts college on the East Coast of the United States tells the story that in the fall of 2013, at the height of the Snowden' revelations when Daniel Ellsberg was regularly to be seen and heard on every form of major media, he was invited to give a major public lecture on surveillance and secrecy at the college. When Ellsberg's visit was mentioned on separate occasions to two senior members of the faculty, one the Chair of the college's Communication Department, they each said exactly the same thing: "Who's that?" The "system," if you will, does not want a broadly educated citizenry, and therefore mirrors Orwell's insight in *1984* where Winston reads the initial chapter, "Ignorance Is Strength," of Emmanuel Goldstein's, "Theory of Oligarchical Collectivism." In that chapter, Goldstein/Orwell makes clear that there is no problem with the proletariat having intellectual freedom because "they have no intellect." That's where we're headed, I fear.

Sven Birkerts pointed to the root of our difficulties in a 2010 essay on "Reading in a Digital Age." It wasn't just the information glut that was the source of our problems, but the character of the information technologies as well, and the manner in which they contribute to the fragmentation of attention:

"When there is too much information, we graze it lightly, applying focus only where it is most needed. We stare at a computer screen with its layered windows and orient ourselves with a necessarily fractured attention. It is not at all surprising that when we step away and try to apply ourselves to the unfragmented text of a book we have trouble. It is not so easy to suspend the adaptation."

In a Commencement address at Juniata College in Pennsylvania four years ago, Maryanne Wolf, the director of the Tufts University's Center on Reading and Language Research, who wrote *Proust and the Squid: The Story and Science of the Reading Brain*, claimed that we "need to transmit a mode of learning that is not content with the ever more immediate, ever more passive reception of information," and that we must "never let the distinctions among information, knowledge, and wisdom be lost to the next generations."

Wolf however, has found that she too has developed problems with sustained reading. As Michael Rosenwald wrote in the *Washington Post* a year ago, Wolf "sat down one evening to read Hermann Hesse's *The Glass Bead Game*" following a day in which she had scrolled through the internet and a multitude of emails. Her response - "I'm not kidding: I couldn't do it. It was torture getting through the first page. I couldn't force myself to slow down so that I

wasn't skimming, picking out key words, organizing my eye movements to generate the most information at the highest speed. I was so disgusted with myself."

Instead of struggling, Wolf might have been encouraged to try the new app called "Spritz" that speeds up your reading "without having to move your eyes." According to its developers, Spritz speeds up your reading because, "Removing eye movement associated with traditional reading methods not only reduces the number of times your eyes move, but also decreases the number of times your eyes pass over words for your brain to understand them." So much for sustained reflection then!

Our students who suffer what Maryanne Wolf struggled with are among the multitude that Richard Arum and Josipa Roksa have characterized as "academically adrift" in their book on "limited learning on college campuses." Arum and Roksa found that a significant percentage of students – nearly 50% - showed "no statistically significant gains in critical thinking, complex reasoning, and writing skills," and spend their college years doing as little as possible to attain a certificate that attests to their having successfully completed the requirements to receive an undergraduate degree (2011:36). That this has profound implications for the social, political, and economic institutions that depend on the insights of those who can think critically, should be obvious. Birkerts again notes the problematic consequences when he argues that "our entire collective subjective history- the soul of our social body-is encoded in print" and that these are "in effect, the cumulative speculations of the species." Ultimately, he says, "Our historically sudden transition into an electronic culture has thrust us into a place of unknowing" (1994:20-21).

This "place of unknowing," and the failure to think critically, is *my ultimate nightmare*. It is a nightmare that is fundamentally informed by Hannah Arendt's reflections on Adolph Eichmann. In a lecture and subsequent essay (1971:417) published after the publication of *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, Arendt noted that however monstrous Eichmann's deeds were "the only specific characteristic one could detect in his past as well as in his behavior during the trial and the preceding police examination was something entirely negative: it was not stupidity but a curious, quite authentic inability to think." And therefore, as Birkerts laments, "Looking at our society, we see no real leaders, no larger figures of wisdom. Not a brave new world at all, but a fearful one" (1994:20).

Thus one aspect of the challenges that higher education institutions have to face is, I think, how to structure its educational offerings so that they overcome the increase in institutionalized ignorance and grounds students in the world of concrete events rather than in the simulacra of the virtual world. These pedagogical initiatives should require deep reading

and the development of some significant psychological distance from the seductions of information technologies, including those that allow students to stay in Kansas while they are actually in Strasbourg or Derry.

### ***Critical Thinking Seminars***

In order to challenge the information overload, the lack of deep reading, and the failure to think critically, along with colleagues from institutions in Europe and the United States, we have offered a number of three week seminars in the summers and late spring since 2012 related to “critical thinking in the information age.” The seminars to date have included: *The Political Economy of Information Technologies; History and Social Change*; and, *Self and Identity*. We expect to add several more in the coming year.

From the beginning in 2012 we attempted to create a “social world”- *Una Comunidad de Pensamiento* - for students and faculty to assist them in developing a critical analytical narrative that will help them to make sense of our world during the three weeks of each seminar. Each seminar session is structured to last 3 hours each morning from Monday thru Friday, and they are followed by a communal lunch, and later in the day by dinner together. Generally, students are meant to read two or three books per week, and approximately 100 pages per day, and therefore leaving no time for excursions or other contemporary entertainments during the three weeks of the seminar.

***Most importantly***, seminar participants are asked to restrict their use of information technologies other than books. For pedagogical reasons, including what Carr and others think is the increase in attention deficit disorders engendered by internet usage, we ask participants to completely disconnect from the internet except to respond to emails during a two-hour period on Saturday afternoons. Therefore, participants are asked not to bring mobile phones, computers, tablets, or so-called smart phones to any seminar sessions and to disconnect them while they are in residence except for a two hour period on Saturday afternoons for responses to email only. Surfing the internet, following hyperlinks, etc., are all strongly discouraged in order to keep participants’ focus on seminar content. Prospective students who are addicted to Facebook and other social networking sites, are discouraged from applying, and it is gently suggested that they instead read *The Winter of Our Disconnect* by Susan Maushart (2010).

In total by the end of the summer of 2015 there have been eight seminars since 2012 with an average of eight students and two or three faculty members in residence at any given time during a seminar. Students participating in the seminars during that period have come

from 13 countries of origin including Austria, Brazil, Croatia, Germany, Ireland, Israel, Lithuania, Rumania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A total of 13 faculty members from eight institutions in five different countries have also participated in the seminars during that period.

### *Analysis of the Seminars*

In the summer of 2015 Dr. Gyöngyi Fabian, a lecturer at Pannon University in Hungary, who has been engaged in exploring the social aspects of learning and teaching, joined the seminar on *Self & Identity* at the Institute for Social & European Studies in Koszeg, as a participant observer since she has a strong interest in critical thinking. She indicated that although “critical thinking is mainly discussed as an individual endeavor in current literature,” what she observed in the seminar we were holding was “that developing critical thinkers can successfully be achieved through developing a learning community.” She further noted that:

“The participants of the seminar have demonstrated a number of the dispositions which I understand are vital for critical thinking. They are courageous in revealing their positions, trustworthy, sensitive to different opinions, and first of all, open to interact with others without violating their personal domains. What is more, as skilful thinkers they are able to engage in discussions using the appropriate functional language of agreement, disagreement, making a point, etc. in a sophisticated manner.”

In Fabian’s assessment, this behavior was “supported by the materials read” which “triggered serious and valuable ideas over a variety of topics of high concern, like social constructs, identity, power, language, gender issues, love and a lot more.” The method of teaching that Fabian observed is not unlike what Zygmunt Bauman (2001:126) argues for where “it is far from clear who acts as the teacher and who acts as the pupil, who owns the knowledge to be transmitted and who is placed at the receiving end of the transmission, and who decides which knowledge needs to be passed over and is worth appropriating.”

Fabian further argues that she had “witnessed a way of teaching which is difficult to find in classrooms of post socialist cultures,” and I would add, throughout the world. She suggested that, “The vibrant discussions, the deep sincerity and the critical attitude” she observed, “clearly stimulates learning efficiently.” However, she concluded, the dominant

“methods of frontal teaching, the common ways of transmission of knowledge, and teacher directed classroom management all featured by a high level of teacher centeredness,” do not stimulate the efficient learning she observed in the seminars which provided “a successful model for approaching critical thinking in adult education.”

### *Student Critiques*

In addition to Fabian’s observations, we also undertook an assessment of the experience of ten student participants in the seminars during the summer of 2014 through in-depth interviews in several areas including: an evaluation of the experience of disconnecting from information technologies: whether or not their capacity for deep reading increased; and how the seminars compared to other educational experiences the participants had previously participated in.

Somewhat to our surprise, though not wholly, students were very positive about disconnecting from information technologies. A student from Spain indicated that it made him reflect on how much he needed the internet and that he had realized “it’s not as important” as he had previously thought, and that it’s very good “for focusing more on what we were reading,” as well as on “personal relations, and when you talk to people you’re talking to people, you’re not thinking other things or taking a look to the telephone.” Similarly, a student from the United Kingdom said, “It really opens up space for reflection, and that she felt “like it’s an utter relief,” because she previously thought she associated “my emails and all the things that I regularly do on the internet with some pressure, psychological pressure, just because I need to respond, and expectations of being, in contact all the time... So yeah, I find it, just, liberating, quite a relief, relaxing.” And a Croatian student exclaimed that disconnecting “was really powerful” in making her realize how much she “was relying on technological stuff in everyday life,” but also how much she “was deeply embraced by all this technopoly.” The most expressive response came from a Lithuanian student who said that all he could think about was “the “privilege” of disconnecting.” He contrasted this with the “pressure to be part of it all, be informed, networked and stuff” and that by being “in an environment where there is no pressure like that,” he was able to “see that a different way of living and thinking is possible.”

We were less surprised obviously that with the positive responses to disconnecting from information technologies, students were able to engage, and enthuse, about deep and sustained reading. The U.S. students however, would appear to have had greater difficulty with attention to reading prior to the seminars, perhaps because of greater addiction to information

technologies. One student from the United States for example, answered in the affirmative that he had indeed been able to engage in deep reading, and then he suggested why this was so. He indicated that, “While I don't usually have problems focusing while I'm reading, I don't really get the sense of being immersed in books anymore, especially when I'm in school or surrounded by technology.” Another suggested that he didn't “read a lot in general, and then coming here I read more than I ever have in that short of a period of time,” because “there's so much more time than when you're at home,” and “there are so many more things that I'm constantly worrying about than when I'm here.” Another U.S. student said something similar: “Well, the length of my attention span for reading has heightened, and also I'm interested in reading deeper, or more than just glancing through an article. I was skimming things. My attention span was gone.” A fourth U.S. student said, “I found myself able to read for the first time in years, because I didn't really feel any compulsion to check up on things, I didn't really have distractions around. If I was just sitting somewhere quiet with a book I could really focus all of my attention solely on the book.”

The European students didn't seem to have been as overwhelmed as the Americans by reading prior to the seminars, but nonetheless, one could still see the general trend. The student from Croatia exclaimed, “Oh yes. Like never before. Because you're not distracted so you're able to follow your own thoughts more deeply, and being reflective in ways that you can't do when you're connected constantly.” The Romanian student similarly said, “Yes, of course. It really had.....a therapeutic effect” since “it really allows you to be there (well, here!) and only focus on what you're reading.” She also noted that it gave her back sovereignty over the knowledge she was acquiring – “what's great about it is that it gives you back control over how you digest information, and what you're reading.” Perhaps most profound were the comments of a Lithuanian student, who said that for him, “the seminar changed how I read books” because he was “a lot more capable of trying to get at the whole idea of the book, even if I did not like parts of it.”

In the final query in our study with the student participants, we asked them to compare their experience in the seminars with other educational experiences and how this affected their perspectives on education and pedagogy. In this instance, the students were overwhelmingly critical of the pedagogical approach in traditional educational institutions, and there was a strong consensus on this point from both the U.S. and the European students. Many of the students were critical of the ‘teacher centeredness’ of traditional educational experiences. One U.S. student, for example, said that:

“it’s definitely unlike any traditional academic classes. And it’s just a very different feeling than if you feel like you’re learning in a factory, or getting a factory education, a one-size fits all, rather than really engaging in a critical thinking mindset. It reaffirmed the belief that I’ve had for a while that the student is certainly not...below a teacher,” as “a teacher has a role to play in the classroom that is a little bit different from the student, but the two are not mutually exclusive and there definitely needs to be less of a, “I tell you what’s going on,” and more of a “let’s explore this together...”

Another student from the U.S. indicated:

“I liked that it was a community, and that we were all discussing these ideas. I liked that I was focusing on one subject or topic at a time, and that was an astounding difference and made it all better. I wish I could do this for all of my education. It makes me wonder why education..... is so focused on discreet bits of knowledge that you can use to get a job, as opposed to wondering why we’re here or wondering about the deeper structure of society.”

The student from Romania said something similar. She indicated that at her university, “there was no exchange of information,” but that information “was just being fed” and her professors were “very much pleased, that the ‘audience’ is able to reproduce the information and that’s where it stops.” The seminars, in contrast, she said, confirmed “the way it should be - what can be called ‘education’.” A Spanish student added further confirmation of this critique. He claimed that, “This kind of education was encouraging you to have deeper thinking about the meaning of what you’re studying, and not just staying on the surface of things. I think that education should be more like this, that it’s preparing people not only for performing a role or just finding a position, but for having deeper thinking about what you’re going to do with your life and with your learning, and also your career.”

The students from Croatia and Lithuania made further complementary statements. The Croatian student said that “there is a huge amount of freedom, intellectual freedom, in these seminars, which you can’t have and you’re not allowed to have during any other educational system or experiences. I always thought that....the educational system is just deeply wrong, and should be changed, and this experience just made me more aware of that.” The Lithuanian student indicated that the seminars had been “so much more superior to” his other educational experiences and was “what education basically should be. It’s not putting information into people and trying to give them a certain set of very superficial skills or capacities, to meet very

superficial requirements, but it is really giving people the capacity to think.” One consequence for him was that “it makes it much more difficult to go back to any traditional forms of education because they seem absolutely superficial and that they don’t facilitate any real understanding.” The penultimate critique of the dominant educational models came from a British student who said the following:

“With my undergraduate university experience, the paradigm was about passing exams so I was just playing the game really and just doing what I needed to do to pass and I wasn’t engaging much more than superficially with the content. In terms of the education model all I can say is that it felt like a completely standardized form of education, where it was really just a means to an end and didn’t at all challenge me to really learn how to think at all. I don’t think I learned how to think. I just learned a bunch of knowledge, and I learned how to use criteria in order to be able to write a convincing essay, play the game, and pass. Which I did successfully, but it definitely wasn’t education!”

### ***Concluding Reflections***

“But it definitely wasn’t education!” So, what might *education* look like today? How might we challenge young people “to really learn how to think”?? Quite obviously there are initiatives that should be taken at the primary and secondary levels, as well as in the home. But since my experience, and consequent analysis is focused on third-level education in universities and colleges, let me suggest that overall, especially with the larger institutions, the habitualization that Bauman critiques, as well as the vested interests of various institutional actors, will make the task nearly impossible, at least until the crisis becomes much more problematic.

That said, it might be possible for smaller institutions – the independent liberal arts college in the United States, for example – to have sufficient innovative capacity to create a semester that performs the function of an “Intellectual Bootcamp.” There are probably a small but significant number of students who long for a true in-depth education. As I have suggested in this article, the first task would be to critique and transform the political architecture of classrooms and the teacher centeredness of most pedagogical activity. Dialogue should surely replace monologues by the priest/professor. The seminars we have been offering for the past four summers might provide a model, but regardless of the structure, students should be taught

how to distance themselves from the seductions of information technologies, and educational institutions should not only stop touting “wired” learning, but return to a requirement for deep reading and discussion of extended narratives – in other words, books!

## ***References***

Arendt, Hannah, “Thinking and Moral Considerations,” *Social Research*, 38:3 (1971: Autumn)

Arum, Richard and Roksa, Josipa, *Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on College Campuses* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011)

Barnett, Thomas, “The Dawn of the Zettabyte Era” ( <http://blogs.cisco.com/news/the-dawn-of-the-zettabyteera-infographic>, 2011)

Bauman, Zygmunt, *The Individualized Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001)

Birkerts, Sven, *The Gutenberg Elegies: The Fate of Reading in an Electronic Age* (London: Faber and Faber, 1994)

Birkerts, Sven, “Reading in a Digital Age,” *The American Scholar* (<https://theamericanscholar.org/reading-in-a-digital-age/#.VfK27pdKDCc> 1 March 2010)

Brodsky, Joseph, *Nobel Lecture* ([http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/literature/laureates/1987/brodskylecture.html](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1987/brodskylecture.html) 8 December 1987)

Carr, Nicholas, “Is Google Making Us Stupid? What the Internet is doing to our brains,” *The Atlantic* (<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/07/is-google-making-us-stupid/306868/> July/August 2008)

Carr, Nicholas, *The Shallows* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010)

Freeman Dyson, “How We Know,” *New York Review of Books*, 10 March 2011

Eisenstein, Elizabeth, *The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe*, second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012)

Erikson, Erik, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993) Fabian, Gyöngyi, personal communication, 19 August 2015.

Febvre, Lucien and Martin, Henri-Jean, *The Coming of the Book: The Impact of Printing 1450-1800* (London: Verso, 1990)

Fisher, Mark, *Capitalist Realism* (Winchester, UK: Zero Books, 2009)

Gleick, James, *The Information: A History, A Theory, A Flood* (London: 4th Estate, 2012)

Maushart, Susan, *The Winter of Our Disconnect* (London: Profile Books, 2010)

McLuhan, Marshall, *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967)

Richards, Paul, *Be Your Own Spin Doctor: A Practical Guide to Using the Media* (London: Take That, 1998)

Rosenwald, Michael, "How The Internet Is Making It Harder To Read Books," *Washington Post*, 11 April 2014

Science Daily, "How much information is there in the world?" *Science Daily* (<http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/02/110210141219.htm> , February 11, 2011)

Skelly, J. (1995). "Pau, Cultura i Comunicacio," in *Teoria de la Paz*, ed. Vicent Martinez Guzman. Valencia, Spain, Nau Llibres. Spritz, (<http://www.spritzinc.com/the-science/>, 2015)

Williams, Raymond, *Communications* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967)

Wolf, Maryanne, *Proust and the Squid: The Story and Science of the Reading Brain* (New York: Harper, 2008)

# **The Search for the Holy Grail of Efficiency in Higher Education: a Preliminary Pilot Study Comparing the Organisational Culture of Two Higher Education Institutions in Hungary and Slovenia**

Nick Chandler

## ***Abstract***

This paper presents the apparent differences in the use of government spending and the relative apparent efficiencies in Hungary and Slovenia, and considers the possibility that differences in organisational culture and market orientation may contribute in favour of or contrary to these efficiencies. A pilot study of the organisational cultures and market orientation of two higher education institutions (HEI) is undertaken, one in Slovenia and one in Hungary. Initial findings indicate that the HEIs in these two countries have significantly different culture types, according to analytical typologies used in the study. Although past research indicates that the age of these institutions may be a contributing factor in the creation of these differences, it is found that this should not be seen as a decisive factor, especially when considering the current reforms in Hungarian higher education. The pilot study's preliminary findings indicate that the Hungarian institution maintains a hierarchy culture type, despite major changes in staffing over the past few years, whereas the Slovenian has a greater leaning towards the market culture type. A full study of the hidden complexities in organisational cultures in higher education, with special regard to subcultures, is planned for the next phase of the study. However, there are some reservations about conducting a full study of the organisation and so recommendations are put forward as to the form that the next phase of the study should take.

## ***Introduction***

Obadić and Aristovnik (2011) conducted a study comparing the efficiencies of Croatia and Slovenia in higher education and found that with regard to government spending, there was a much greater efficiency in Slovenian higher education institutions (HEIs) compared to Croatia and other members of the EU (Aristovnik, 2013). Through a study of staff values in relation to the organisation and perceptions of relation to market orientation, this study seeks to uncover the differences between organisational cultures of two HEIs: the Budapest Business School in

Hungary and Maribor University in Slovenia, with the aim of discovering some of the basis for the apparent efficiencies in Slovenian higher education.

Štimac and Šimić (2012) compared the competitiveness of three HEIs (Business Schools) in Croatia, Slovenia, and Hungary. It was concluded in their study that “*the most dangerous threat to their market position is the competition, particularly from private higher education institutions which seem to be more flexible and market oriented. Understanding of value and importance of marketing concept application in the field of higher education is a prerequisite for their successful market performance, due to dynamic changes in needs, requirements and values of all stakeholders*” (Štimac and Šimić, 2012: 33). Thus, an additional aim of the study is to consider the market orientation of staff in these two HEIs, with the concept of “market orientation” in higher education comprising of three elements: competitive orientation; collaboration orientation; and student orientation. The demonstrated understanding of market orientation and perspectives taken may be seen within the context of their strategic implications for the institutions.

### ***Organisational culture in higher education***

Pushnykh and Chemeris (2006) claim there are significant differences between ‘for profit’ companies and organisations in higher education. Birnbaum (1989) distinguished the universities as having: less differentiation of working processes (e.g. a professor, associate professor and assistant lecturer carry out the same teaching roles); narrow specialisation of members; a developed professional hierarchy rather than a structural one; weak interdependency among subdivisions (e.g. departments, institutes); limited capacity to influence the ‘raw material’ quality (enrolled students); and limited accountability and transparency on both an individual and organisational level. Kezar (2001; 6) lists unique features of HEIs, and cites them as key considerations for organisational change. According to Kezar, HEIs: exist as interdependent organizations; remain relatively independent of environment; possess the unique culture of the academy; have institutional status; are values-driven; have multiple power and authority structures; have loosely coupled systems; utilize organized anarchical decision-making; possess a particular set of professional and administrative values; have shared governance; cultivate employee commitment and tenure; have goal ambiguity; and express image and success.

Given that Handy (1993; 185) describes culture as “something perceived, something felt”, it comes as no surprise that, depending on who is asked, different views or understandings

of HEI culture appear. A student's perspective of HEI culture may be: "it's everything we aren't tested on in the classroom" (Van Maanen, 1987; 5). Becher (1984; 167), in his extensive study of academic culture, put forward the definition of culture in an HEI context as "the traditional and social heritage; their customs and practices; their transmitted knowledge, beliefs, law and morals; their linguistic and symbolic forms of communication, and the meanings that they share". Kuh and Whitt (1988; 28) define culture in higher education as "the collective, mutual shaping of patterns of norms, values, practices, beliefs and assumptions that guide the behaviour of individuals and groups in an institute of higher education and provide a frame of reference within which to interpret the meaning of events and actions on and off campus". Riesman and Jencks (1961; 132) highlight the uniqueness of HEIs and that, although related to national academic models, institutions within each country may "draw on different publics" and have "quite different flavours".


According to Kuh and Whitt (1988; 7), an institution's culture to a certain extent reflects the host society in terms of values and accepted practices. Thus, as Hungary has transformed into a more consumerist society and away from the budget-commanded regime, it seems that HEIs may take on a more consumerist approach than was held in the previous system, especially when other HEIs around the world are already 'setting the pace'. With the emergence of mass higher education ('massification') and the greater need for self-sufficiency, different HEIs have reacted differently: some have come under criticism for being out of touch with market needs or lacking adequate skills and knowledge among top managers with primarily academic backgrounds, others have adapted and changed, thereby bringing upon themselves the accusation of adhering to 'academic capitalism' (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). From a cultural perspective, the issue of 'cultural clash' between the traditional HEI and commercial cultures (Fisher and Atkinson-Grosjean, 2002) may point to the possibility of finding multiple subcultures with vastly differing orientation, and potentially their own subcultural clashes.

When considering HEI culture in general, the levels of culture have some distinctions. Stories may provide particular information about an HEI but certain characteristics have been found in studies to be similar between different institutions (Martin et al. 1983), such as written histories of colleges placing the founders on a pedestal, and the difficulties experienced in the development of the college to its current state (Clark, 1972). Although myths may abound amongst students, the student culture is not a part of this study. On the second level of culture, according to Clark (1983) there are four values in the context of HEIs: justice, competence, liberty and loyalty. Kuh and Whitt (1988; 40) claim that most institutional values are unconsciously expressed as certain themes, such as academic freedom, or are related to a certain

context connected to the HEI's well being (Riesman and Jencks, 1961). On the third level of culture, it is conceded by Kuh and Whitt (1988; 42) that the existence of subcultures in HEIs provides a significant challenge to the mapping of core assumptions.

Silver (2003; 161) found that institutional culture may be seen by members as a culture of research, of tension, or of conflict, and cites the work of Taylor (1999) as highlighting the conflicting nature of HEIs. Silver (2003) also mentions the contrast between a sense of community and the competitive aspects of academic staff as part of the complexity of HEI culture. Riesman and Jencks (1961) referred to the complexities of culture in higher education when referring to not only the overall HEI culture, but also the student and faculty cultures as well as other subgroups (Riesman and Jencks, 1961: 105). This complexity is one of the distinguishing features of HEI cultures and as Dill (1982) mentions, higher education organisational cultures are differentiated from others because of their greater complexity. According to Clark (1987), such cultures are extremely fragmented into what Clark refers to as 'small worlds', as illustrated in the following figure:

Figure 1: The small worlds in Higher Education culture



*Based on the work of: Valimaa (1998); Becher (1987)*

It is within this complex framework that Valimaa (1998) noted the existence of subcultures. Becher (1989) refers to this framework as 'academic tribes and territories' with each subculture acting as an 'academic tribe' competing with other 'tribes' to maintain their territory and

survive. Lawrence (1994; 26) highlights that “higher education researchers recognize that college and university faculty are members of multiple cultures, each having its own set of normative expectations for their behaviour and productivity”.

Although it seems organisational culture in an HEI is not likely to be monolithic and homogenous, cultural typologies in higher education may serve to indicate possible typologies of the more dominant culture or subcultures in this study. Handy (1993: 188) describes types of cultures in terms of influence and power and categorises the types as follows: Power culture, Role culture, Task culture and Person culture. Handy (1993: 196) also refers directly to universities as traditionally having a role culture but that professors see themselves as part of person culture. Based on Handy’s ideas, Anderson, Carter and Lowe (1999: 128) point out that as Higher Education Institutions become more ‘corporatized’, they tend to become power cultures (under centralized control) or task cultures (when departments are dismantled and faculties are transformed into ad hoc research or instructional units). Mullins (1999: 804) argues that the person culture is prevalent among doctors, consultants and university professors. As such, individual traditions, along with identities, are a real social force in higher education and often cited as a reason that HEIs exhibit inertia when it comes to change (Valimaa, 2008: 18).

Berquist and Pawlak (2008) revised their existing four types of culture in higher education (Berquist, 1992), namely the Collegial, Managerial, Developmental and Advocacy types, and expanded the model to six types:

- *Collegial*. This type of culture identifies itself in the disciplines and so values faculty research, scholarship, and quasi-political governance processes. Assumptions prevail about the dominance of rationality, in light of the organisation existing for the generation, interpretation and dissemination of knowledge (Berquist and Pawlak, 2008; 15);
- *Managerial*. This culture type focuses on the organization, implementation and evaluation of work with a specific goal or purpose in mind, as well as on fiscal responsibility and supervisory skills. This culture might be reflected in the organisation of this case study, as much attention is paid to giving students a practice-oriented course to make them more marketable with employers. As Bergquist & Pawlak (2008: 43) point out, this culture values cultivating knowledge, skills and attitudes amongst students to encourage success in their careers;
- *Developmental*. This type is based on the personal and professional growth of all human resources (faculty, administrators, staff, and students);

- *Advocacy*. This type values the equitable distribution of resources; as a consequence there is the possibility in this context that inequitable distributions may lead to increased unionization of employees;
- *Virtual*. The virtual culture is an open system and has no physical presence, structures or borders since it involves the internet and other related technologies;
- *Tangible*. According to Kock (2010) this is the culture type that typifies universities in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. It upholds traditional values and the importance of its role in the community with an emphasis on standards and quality.

Not only do these six types highlight possible outcomes for research into HEI cultures, the shift from 4 to 6 types represents the impact of global external forces in creating new dynamics and phenomena. McNay (1999) put forward a typology of HEIs as collegium, bureaucracy, enterprise or corporation. Due to the evidence indicating complexity in the cultures of HEIs, it would seem that these models are too broad and too simplistic to show the range of heterogeneous / homogenous cultures found in HEIs (De Zilwa, 2006; 560).

Since many HEIs are steeped in history, with unchanging traditions and long tenured members, whatever form the organisational culture may take it is likely to be strong. According to Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1993: 19), there are three elements which determine the strength or weakness of a culture: the ‘thickness’ of the culture, which refers to the number of shared beliefs, values, and assumptions; the proportion of organizational members who share in the basic assumptions (the more shared assumptions, the stronger the culture); and finally, the clarity of the order of values and assumptions, in terms of which are major and which are minor (those that are minor are more easily changed). A larger number of clearly shared assumptions is more likely in organizations where members have been there for a considerable period of time, such as long-standing university professors. Whilst a strong culture might provide a strong sense of identity and clear behaviours and expectations, it is also more prone to resisting change. An examination into the strength of organisational culture is beyond the scope of this study.

### ***The potential composition of HEI cultures***

According to Tierney (1988) there may be numerous subcultures in a university or college based potentially in: managerial groups; discipline-based faculty groups; professional staff; social groups of faculty and students; peer groups (by special interest or physical proximity); and/or location (offices arranged by discipline). That is not to say that all factors

are found in all institutions with a plethora of emergent subcultures. Taking one example, location may be a limiting factor of who talks with each other, but that does not necessarily mean that such behaviours are related to assumptions and values about the culture or subculture (Kuh & Whitt, 1988; 27). The relative importance of each factor in shaping subcultures is somewhat contested. Becher (1989) asserts that disciplinary cultures are the key to HEI cultures. Valimaa (1998) reinforces this, finding that disciplinary differences affect many areas of academic life such as modes of interaction, lifestyle, career paths, publishing patterns, and so on. Thomas (1990) even asserts that disciplinary differences outweigh gender differences.

Disciplinary cultures were first examined by Becher (1989) and have been used as a basis for research in many cases since that time (e.g. Snow, 1993; Collini, 1993). Becher (1989) indicates that disciplinary cultures are differentiated according to knowledge and classifies the cultures into four categories: hard, pure, soft and applied knowledge. These disciplinary cultures are also found by Becher (1989) to be either socially convergent or divergent. It is this study that led Quinlan and Akerlind (2000) to the introduction of department culture as a concept. Disciplinary cultures not only indicate the potential for the formation of subcultures, but also indicate the ranking of staff, or 'pecking order', with the basis being hard-pure, soft-pure, hard-applied and soft-applied (Becher, 1987). According to Becher (1989: 57), theoreticians are ranked highest, with staff involved in practical, soft and applied disciplines ranking lower. However, Becher (1989) also points out there may be subgroups according to specialisation and that within disciplines and specialisations there may in fact be some overlap. Subgroups within disciplines include women faculty, minority faculty and part-time faculty (Bowen and Schuster, 1986). Becher (1984, 1989) focussed on these sub-specialisations as a unit of analysis. Sanford (1971, 359) refers to rules in faculty culture dictating that only specialists in a given field are permitted to discuss in conversation and present their ideas concerning the specialisation. Other faculty are expected to defer to the specialists. This sense of boundaries seems to be only transversal by administrative and library staff who, lacking academic credibility, are actually interdisciplinary (Berquist, 1992; 41). Freedman et al. (1979: 8) described HEI culture according to the faculty as 'a set of shared ways and views designed to make their (faculty) ills bearable and to contain their anxieties and uncertainties'. Finkelstein (1984; 29) saw the main components of faculty culture as: teaching, research, student advisement, administration and public service.

There are some patterns that emerge in faculty cultures in terms of the values expressed. Kuh and Whitt (1988: 76) claimed that the core value of faculty was the pursuit and dissemination of knowledge. Sanford (1971) claimed that faculty cultures encourage a focus on

specialization within a given discipline, and through this subcultures are created. The boundaries between the disciplines and specializations are vehemently upheld to such an extent that in many cases only the administrative staff and librarians are allowed to be interdisciplinary (Bergquist, 1992). Bila and Miller (1997) discovered that faculty perceived themselves to be isolated from the general public, under-appreciated, and true and honest; junior faculty felt overwhelmed with responsibilities, and exploited; senior faculty saw themselves to be survivors with a certain degree of radicalism, and perceived there to be too much emphasis placed on external activities. Bila and Miller (1997) found that similarities do exist between institutions, as well as that power was found to be somewhat related to tenure and rank (Berquist, 1992).

Departmental subcultures have been developed as a concept describing subgroups of faculty cultures (Quinlan and Akerlind, 2000). If employees are acculturated into various subcultures within organisations, then the factors affecting acculturation could also be applied to subcultures. Acculturation is the “exchange of cultural features that results when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact: the original cultural patterns of either or both groups may be altered, but the groups remain intact” (Kottak, 2005; 209; 423).

For an HEI the strength of the culture can be seen to some extent in its traditions. Traditions play a large role in the formation of cultures and subcultures in HEIs, be they traditions of the individual or those of the discipline, department, faculty, or institution. Since many HEIs are steeped in history, with unchanging traditions and members with long tenures, a strong culture is likely to prevail. If higher levels of interaction are seen as a means of becoming assimilated into a subculture, then faculty can be considered according to an unusual mix of highly levels of autonomy and interaction. According to Tierney (2008: 35) when referring to HEIs “...on the one hand, they are organisations with highly autonomous workers – the faculty. And yet, on the other hand these autonomous workers assume a great deal of voluntary work in their organisational and professional lives, a fact which binds them together”. Thus there is a tension between autonomy and interaction through certain work groups and projects. Bourdieu’s (1988) is cited by Naidoo (2008: 47) in stating the following: “the field of higher education is in fact not a product of total consensus but the product of a permanent conflict...with agents and institutions improving or defending their positions in relation to others”.

The external environment may also affect the culture of HEIs, and thus in turn the subcultures and their formation (Tierney, 1988). For an HEI the areas of knowledge and skills are to a large extent determined externally, especially when accreditation is a central concern.

Ruscio (1987; 353) points out “faculty subcultures have institutional as well as disciplinary foundations”. Local or regional issues may also affect the HEI culture, as many of those employed and studying come from the host country or region, perhaps more so in the case of institutions in Hungary where the Hungarian language is not widely spoken outside its borders. Institutions may also have a ranking and reputation, which in turn affects how the organisation is seen and how members see themselves in relation to the organisation. Riesman and Jencks (1961) refer to this as the institution’s place in reference to the economic elite – to the haves and have-nots.

Trice (1993) maintains that subcultures form according to occupation. When members interact with one another differently than with people in the culture at large, then occupational subcultures form. Trice (1993) also claims that occupational subcultures may also arise if members of an occupation work in very close cooperation with one another but not with members of other occupations. Trice (1993) argues that the most important occupational subcultures are those of managers and administrators, because of their impact on many other occupational subcultures. For example, the importance of the managerial subculture has resulted from its prominence in the bureaucratic organization. In fact, Trice makes a significant division between managerial and non-managerial subcultures, citing competition between non-managerial subcultures based on their relative strengths. Such competition also heightens the importance of technology as a means of enhancing occupational skills and thereby the strength of the occupational culture.

Faculty experience substantial (if not complete) professional autonomy, and there is a tendency toward long tenures. Autonomy appears to indicate a freedom to work and develop one’s own way of working. Clark (1963) and Ruscio (1987) highlight that differences in mission and commitment affect faculty member behaviour, as do institutional size and complexity, since larger and more complex HEIs are likely to have more subcultures rather than one unified culture (Clark, 1963; 139). The administrative structures also shape faculty subcultures (Ruscio, 1987; 355), especially when considering decision-making and governance. Clark (1963) groups faculty members as: teachers, scholar-researchers, demonstrators and consultants, each with varying levels of identification with the institution and commitment to the organisation.

Bourdieu (1988) mentions one important issue with regard to autonomy in HEIs, which is that “the relative autonomy of fields varies from one period to another, from one field to another and from one tradition to another” (cited in Naidoo, 2008: 46). Thus it seems possible

that as levels of autonomy vary between fields, subcultures may also appear more distinctively in certain fields.

### ***Hungarian organisation culture and higher education***

Hungary as a nation has undergone many changes over the past few decades. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was the tumultuous change from a communist regime to a democracy, from socialism to capitalism, and more recently Hungary has become a full member of the EU hoping within the next decade to join the Euro currency zone. This section seeks to uncover aspects of organisational cultures in general in Hungary.

Bognár and Gaál (2011) undertook a survey of 260 companies in Hungary using the Organisational Culture Assessment Instrument (OCAI) and found that the majority favoured the hierarchy culture type (81 companies) closely followed by the clan type (76 companies) and with adhocracy (8 companies) as by far the least common type. This is in stark contrast to the findings of Bogdány et al. (2012), who found from a survey of 1500 prospective employees that the majority (75.5 %) preferred the clan type as a future workplace, followed by the market (9.2 %) and the adhocracy (9.4 %) culture types. In this study the hierarchy type was least preferred by prospective employees. This seems to indicate the potential for culture preference change over the coming years, either as new employees are assimilated into current organisational cultures or as new employees seek to gradually change existing cultures to suit their preferences. However, it should be noted that a similar study conducted by Balogh et al. (2011) found conflicting results to that of Bogdány et al. (2012), with 1,242 prospective employees who preferred the clan type, followed by the adhocracy, and then by market and hierarchy with similar results. Although the clan type still ranks as one of the more preferred, the preferences regarding the adhocracy and hierarchy types seem less certain.

Aside from the preferences found using the OCAI, Bakacsi et al. (2002) considered the perspective of managers and used the GLOBE findings to describe the Eastern European cluster (Albania, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia). Managers from this cluster expressed distinctively high power distance, and high family and group collectivism. This seems to reinforce a form of 'clan mentality'. The managers also highly valued future and performance orientations, as well as charismatic and team-oriented leadership. Gelei et al. (2012) highlight that Hungary being a member of the East European Cluster may have a significant impact upon organisational relationships with Germanic or Anglo regions, as the East European cluster is closer to the Latin American, Middle East and

Sub Saharan Africa clusters. However, the external relationships of the organisation are beyond the scope of this study. Matkó and Berde (2012) also used GLOBE to analyse the organisational cultures in the public sector, namely regional local authorities. This study found the highest values in future orientation, and asserted this was due to the economic situation and an increasingly competitive sector. This may serve to indicate a similar situation in higher education in Hungary as it experiences drives to become more competitive. Matkó and Berde (2012: 21) point out that “the future cannot be planned without team work and cooperation”.

Borgulya and Hahn (2008: 222) assert that Hungarians (as well as other Eastern Europeans) see the workplace as “not only an area for creating value added, but also a social net[work], where people can fulfil their social need for creating human relationships”, seemingly confirming the findings of Bakacsi et al. (2002: 69, 75). This seems to indicate a potential for interactions leading to the formation of subcultures. Furthermore, Hofmeister-Tóth et al. (2005) take this view one step further and claim that Hungarian employees are very likely to develop informal relationships, and arguably closer relationships as they see each other out of working hours. It should be noted, however, that in a more recent work Borgulya and Hahn (2013) considered the impact of the economic crisis on Hungarian work-related values with a longitudinal analysis using data from the earlier study in 2008. They found that this importance placed on personal relationships at work had decreased somewhat, leaving only two aspects with similar figures compared to their earlier study: good pay and a secure job.

In the education sector, many institutions are leaning towards an emphasis on equipping the students with the need for skills and competencies required by local and global employers. For some time, government policy has been portraying intellectual capital as a major determinant of economic success. However, government funding has decreased significantly. State funding for students has dropped significantly since 2012, leading to decreased enrolments across the board. Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) are required to search for their own sources of finance, such as international students and research funding, as well as submitting tenders for EU educational projects. With limited resources, some HEIs have merged in order to remain competitive and others have been forced to do so through government intervention.

Considering the changing nature of the organisation in terms of its impact on the employees, not only may perceptions change but values and behaviours as well. Shared perceptions that are concerned with ‘success’ may lead to cognitive changes. The threat of complaints about the student as a consumer, and about the lecturer as commodity producer, may in turn lead to changes in teaching approaches and a change of priorities as academics opt for

'safe teaching' (Naidoo 2008: 49). Such changing behaviours may in turn alter values and perceptions of employees, and in turn affect the degree of market-orientation, although it is beyond the scope of this study to consider whether this change is for the better or not, within the context of what the product is and who the consumer is. At an EMUNI conference in 2010<sup>362</sup> the central theme was entrepreneurship in education, which involved a focus on enhancing the employability of graduates by equipping them with more than theory, so as to include the necessary skills useful in business. This aspect of the importance of employability of graduates is seen as somewhat lacking in Hungary by Barakonyi (2009: 212) when he adds that the "unsatisfactory development of skills and a lack of a European dimension have undermined the serious student mobility" in Hungary.

Half of this study deals with a case study in Hungary and therefore will exemplify typical behaviour within the national system of education. Hardesty (1995; 25) points out that, for example, German tradition is characterized more by emphasis on the sciences and the individual pursuit of knowledge for knowledge's sake, with a greater emphasis on discipline and the work of faculty members. Whereas the British tradition is characterized by "a dominance of the liberal arts, development of the total person beyond the formal curriculum, and the emphasis on complexity of thought and of the educational process rather than a particular body of knowledge" (Berquist, 1992; 18-19). This study does not seek to explain national differences or national culture through the case study, despite national culture being understood as transmitted to people through HEIs (Banya and Elu, 2001). Heidrich (1999) claims that Hungary was very much collectivist and prone to social grouping, with informal groups forming at many work places prior to the changeover. Heidrich (1999) claims that there was a lack of individual risk-taking and autonomy in making decisions, also due to this aspect of collectivism. Meschi and Roger (1994) studied 155 companies with partial ownership in Hungary and, using the OCAI of Cameron and Quinn (1999), found the main types to be clan and hierarchy culture types. Heidrich (1999) also points out that power distance is a distinct characteristic of the education system. Bakácsi and Takács (1997) claimed that Hungarian culture tended towards masculinity rather than femininity. This case study concerns an organisation where well over half of the staff is female. The issue that national systems of higher education have differing characters, and are placed in the wider context of history and politics in relation to Hungary, are considered as background to this study.

---

<sup>362</sup> 3rd EMUNI Conference on Higher Education and Research focussing on Entrepreneurial learning and the role of universities. Held in Portorož, Slovenia.


The history of Hungary's education system is a relevant one not only since it has an impact on the organisational culture of the organisation, but also because it gives context and background to the study. During the changes of 1991, Kaufman (1991) conducted a study of this transition from a budget planned regime to a free market economy from the point of view of education. Kaufman (1991) found that the vast majority of educators favoured a Western focus, with only one out of eighteen interviewees indicating the need to look inward, build national pride, and concentrate on national uniqueness. This can be contrasted with the finding that the majority of the population in rural Hungary favoured strong nationalism, whereas in urban Hungary a European focus was preferred. The locations of the organisations in this case study vary, with the three colleges based in various parts of Budapest and two satellite institutions outside of the capital. The two satellite institutions are still in urban rather than rural areas, but as Hungary is very heavily centralised around Budapest, it may be that there are differences in values found between the employees in Budapest and those outside. In addition, the organisations have staff that work in both locations, such as teaching staff required to teach in Budapest but based at one of the satellite institutions, forming an overlapping subculture that crosses the boundaries of each. One significant constraint expressed by educators was that of a "prevailing mood of uncertainty and hesitancy" coupled with a tendency for passivity and non-action in light of the past (Kaufman, 1991; 13, 16). Halász (2002; 5), on the other hand, argues that "a significant proportion of the teaching profession expressed nostalgia for the former centralised model". Halász (2002) cites Setényi (2000) concerning recent changes in teachers such as increased openness to innovation and change, both of which could be seen within the context of a market-orientation, and the need for a change in direction.

### ***Slovenian organisation culture and higher education***

Higher education in Slovenia has faced a number of recent changes in light of the Higher Education Act. The new role of the university has changed from an association of independent faculties to an integrated university, resulting in the creation of single higher education institutions. At the same times there appears to be greater fragmentation in the separation of some large faculties into several smaller ones. Furthermore there are changes in the structure of the higher education system in regards to the nearly completed implementation of a three-cycle higher education system, in accordance with the Bologna Declaration. This is to be fully implemented by 2016.

At the time of writing, Slovenia has 3 public universities, 44 public faculties and 110,000 students. Higher education institutions are autonomous in managing their internal organisation and operations, selecting and electing the faculty, and electing internal bodies such as senates, student councils, and deans. The stark difference between Hungary and Slovenia concerning public expenditure in higher education can be seen in the following chart:

Figure 2: National differences of total public expenditure on education



Note: ISCED5-6 refers to the International Standard Classification of Education in tertiary education

Source: Eurostat (2012)


As can be seen in the above figure, Slovenia has most recently seen an increase in expenditure on education, whereas Hungary has faced a trend of decreasing public expenditure in this area since 2002. Furthermore, Slovenia mirrors the EU27 trend since 2002, and to a greater extent. Only Hungary and Slovakia seem to have decreasing public expenditure on higher education, and this may explain why it is claimed Hungary faces significant market pressures whereas, following on discussions with colleagues in Slovenia, it seems that such pressures have yet to fall upon Slovenian higher education institutions.

The level of funding has been found in previous studies to have an impact upon market orientation, which in turn over time has an impact upon the culture of the organisation. Omerzel et al. (2011) assessed the organisational culture of two faculties using the OCAI, which is the same tool to be used in this study.

The Competing Values Framework (CVF) was developed by Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) as a means of describing the effectiveness of organisations along two dimensions, and

makes use of two bipolar axes as a means of indicating four orientations of culture. The origins of this model go back to the study of Campbell (1977), who designed a scale of organisational effectiveness. Following on this, Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) used the scale comprising 39 indexes to develop the CVF. Quinn and Kimberly (1984) developed the CVF further to assess organisational culture. With this model, it is not the case that the culture can only be one of the four, but rather a question of which orientation is the more dominant. The model can be seen in the following figure:

Figure 3: The competing values framework



Source: Cameron and Quinn (1999)

According to Cameron and Quinn (2006; 31), this model with the four quadrants denotes “the major approaches to organisational design, stages of life cycle development, organisational quality, theories of effectiveness, leadership roles of human resources and management skills”. The two axes create four quadrants for each of the four culture types (Cameron and Quinn, 1999; 32) as follows:

The ‘Clan’ culture is characterized by internal cohesiveness with shared values, participation and collectivism. A focus on internal problems and concerns of individuals. Perpetual employment

with an informal approach to work. Cultural values include cohesion, morale and HRM. The leader type would be a facilitator, mentor or parent style.

The 'Adhocracy' culture uses ad hoc approaches to solve problems incurred from the surrounding environment, and indicates a willingness to take risks and exercise creativity and innovation. Independence and freedom are highly respected. Cultural values include growth and cutting-edge output. The leader type would be innovator, entrepreneur or visionary.

The 'Hierarchy' has centralized decision-making, very formalized structures, and rigid policies, instructions and procedures aimed at reducing uncertainty and enforcing stability. Changes are impossible without it being official. Conformity is encouraged. Cultural values include efficiency, timeliness and smooth functioning. The leader type would be coordinator.

The 'Market' culture is based on orientation to the market and maintaining or expanding current market share. There is a focus on profit and ambitious, quantifiable goals. Competition is emphasised both inside and outside. Culture values include market share, goal achievement, and beating competitors. The leader type is a hard-driver.

With a response rate of 46%, a total of 82 respondents for the 2 faculties, Omerzel et al. (2011) found interestingly that there is no one set organisational culture type for higher education institutions in Slovenia. The younger faculty was dominated by a market culture type, followed by the adhocracy culture. Omerzel et al. (2011) see this culture of innovation and market orientation as a precondition for any HEI to be ranked among the most successful. The second faculty was part of the oldest University in Slovenia and was found to have the most rigid system. It was found to have a dominant hierarchy culture type.

Omerzel et al. (2011) claim that their findings confirm those of Kwan and Walker (2004) who conducted an extensive study of HEIs in Hong Kong. Kwan and Walker (2004) found that life cycle is an indicator of organisational culture type in that a market culture is typical of younger HEIs, whilst older institutions have a hierarchy type. However, these findings are hard to swallow when considering the case of Hungary in this paper. The institution is comprised of three colleges with a long history, and yet they were merged into a 'new institution' in 2000. The question arises as to whether this would be classed by Omerzel et al. (2011) as a young or old institution. Legally, on paper, it is only 15 years old, but the institutions that comprise this organisation have existed since 1857. As mentioned earlier, Hungarian organisational culture

in general seems to have a predilection for the clan culture type and this is often attributed, in part at least, to the previous socialist system and a certain desire for ‘the good old days’. This raises the question as to whether this element should have been factored into Omerzel’s study. Without doing so we are left to wonder why Hungarian organisational cultures were seemingly impacted by this aspect, whilst Slovenian organisations were not. We should also bear in mind that Omerzel’s study involved 2 faculties out of 44 in Slovenia, and shouldn’t be considered representative of Slovenian organisational culture in higher education. As a final point, culture is a complex phenomenon, which is impacted by and has an impact upon a wide range of internal and external factors. Any study which claims that culture types are dictated by the age of institutions may be overlooking complexities and oversimplifying a notoriously complex area, although this is not to say that age is not a contributing factor to the emerging culture type of HEIs.

Giving a more generalist view of the organisational culture of organisations in Slovenia, Hribar and Mendling (2014) collected 159 surveys (with a rather low 7.9% response rate) from Slovenian organisations in both the service and non-service industries. The results revealed that the prevalent organizational culture type in the target population was the clan culture (42.6%, N = 49), followed by the hierarchy (33.9%, N = 39), market (16.5%, N = 19) and adhocracy culture (7.0%, N= 8). These seem to confirm that organisations may have a predilection for the clan culture type, and that perhaps if Omerzel’s study had been more extensive a number of clan culture types could have been found in higher education institutions in Slovenia, too.

### ***Methodology: pilot study***

The aim of the pilot study was to test the questionnaire on a small sample whose characteristics are the same or similar to those who will be completing the final questionnaire, as a means of spotting any flaws which can be corrected before implementing the main survey. The pilot study is a means of considering unanticipated procedural problems, not only in the administration of the questionnaire, but also in the planned statistical and analytical procedures. The pilot study also investigates the comprehensiveness of the questionnaire and the usefulness of the answers given. This pilot study was conducted prior to the main stage of questionnaire distribution and data gathering, which occurred in the following autumn semester.

The sample size for the pilot is small for two reasons. Firstly, Bless and Higson-Smith, (2000; 52) argue that a pilot study should involve taking a sample from the population upon which the study is planned. With a case study involving a limited number of participants for

each institution, a large sample for the pilot study might result in a less than representative sample of the actual study, as the data of those involved in the pilot study would not be used in the main study (Peat et al. 2002: 57). Furthermore, questionnaires would not be given in the main study to those who took part in the pilot study due to concerns about “questionnaire fatigue”, and the possibility that participants will no longer follow the protocol as it is no longer novel (Van Teijlingen and Hundley, 2001). Secondly, the interviews concerning evaluation of the pilot questionnaire were qualitative rather than quantitative in nature, and a smaller sample was deemed adequate (Hudson et al. 2007; Jacobson and Wood, 2006; Haralambos and Holburn, 1995).

The sample chosen for the pilot study was a purposive sample, aimed at representatives from diverse parts of the organisation and from three main functions: administrative, teaching and management. In this way, the potential for varying perspectives and understandings can be covered in the pilot study through a full range of individuals and their possible responses. A semi-structured interview methodology was utilized to assess the suitability of the questionnaire. The interview questions were based upon those questions recommended by Bell (1999) and Wallace (1998) for a pilot study:

1. Were the instructions clear and easy to follow?
2. Were any of the questions unclear or ambiguous?
3. Were you able to answer all of the questions?
4. Did you object to answering any of the questions?
5. Did you find any of the questions embarrassing, irrelevant or irritating?
6. In your point of view, are there any important or concerning issues omitted?
7. Was the layout of the questionnaire clear?
8. How long did it take you to complete the questionnaire?

For each participant, the aim of the pilot was explained and then they were asked to complete the questionnaire. Participants were asked to think out loud when completing the questionnaire and notes were taken of any comments made during the completion of the questionnaire. Following completion of the questionnaire, the interview was held using the questions above as a loose structure for the interviews. Each interview lasted approximately 20-40 minutes depending upon the responsiveness of the interviewee and interruptions.

Despite these closed questions, after each one was asked participants were given ample opportunity to add any further comments, with an extra section indicated at the end of the evaluation questionnaire.

### ***Recommendations***

Following the pilot of the questionnaire at Maribor University, questions were raised concerning the protocol and logistics involved. The following options were considered:

**Option 1:** The whole university is used as a sample. Advantages: this provides the best opportunity of getting a large sample for identifying subcultures. Disadvantages: The preferred method has been stipulated as online format, giving a likely response rate of 7-9% from previous experiences. This would yield a sample of around 200, which would mean that we could compare values and market orientation overall, but cannot identify subcultures with such a small sample of 7-9% of the whole population.

**Option 2:** The faculties relating to business (economics, organisation and tourism) are the only ones covered. Advantages: This might bear a closer comparison with Budapest Business School, and represents a maximum total population of around 200. Disadvantages: Less scope for identifying subcultures, though sample response rate may be higher due to contacts within these three faculties.

**Option 3:** The quantitative study is feared to be too intrusive and the organisation appears fragmented to such an extent that there are doubts about any response beyond the organiser's own faculty. Therefore, it is considered to conduct instead a qualitative study of 15-20 members. There are some concerns over interviewing from other faculties and non-teaching staff. Drawbacks include that this would no longer be comparable with existing studies of Hungary. Thus there would also be a need for a qualitative study of Budapest Business School, which may mean the entire study takes on a qualitative aspect. Questions concerning the author (a non-native) and his ability to interpret correctly Hungarian and Slovenian responses indicate that further assistance would be needed from natives for interpretation. Furthermore, with a seemingly fragmented organisation it would necessitate having interviews with a member of teaching staff, non-teaching staff, and management from each faculty. With 21 faculties,

the result would be 63 interviews, representing a seemingly insurmountable quantity of data.

In view of the advantages and disadvantages of the options suggested, as well as the anticipated problems of undertaking the next phase of a full study of the Slovenian institution, a qualitative study of the business-related faculties of Maribor University is suggested. It is suggested to involve three faculties, and include one staff member from teaching, administration and management from each faculty, resulting in 9 in-depth interviews. It is further hoped that a qualitative study may uncover some of the hidden complexities of organisation culture referred to in the literature, and discover whether age of the institution is in fact a key determinant of organisational culture type, or what other factors require due consideration. Once the veil covering the organisation culture can be lifted, then it is hoped that explanations for the apparent efficiencies found in recent studies of Slovenian HEIs, and seemingly lacking in Hungarian HEIs, may be explained.

## **References**

- Anderson, R.E., Carter, I. E., Lowe G. (1999). *Human behaviour in the social environment: a social systems approach*. Fifth Edition, Aldine De Gruyter.
- Aristovnik, A. (2013). ICT expenditures and education outputs/outcomes in selected developed countries: An assessment of relative efficiency. *Campus-wide information systems*, Vol 30(3), pages 222–230.
- Bakacsi, G., Takács. S. (1997). *Organisational and societal culture in the transition period in Hungary*. 13th EGOS Colloquium, Budapest.
- Bakacsi, Gy., Takács, S., Karácsonyi, A., Imrek, V. (2002). Eastern European Cluster: tradition and transition, *Journal of World Business*, Volume 37, Issue 1, pp. 69-80.
- Balogh, Á., Gaál, Z., Szabó, L. (2011). Relationship between organisational culture and cultural intelligence. *Management & Marketing Challenges for the Knowledge Society* (2011) Volume 6, Number 1, pages 95-110.
- Banya, K., Elu, J. (2001). The World Bank and financing higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa, *Higher Education*, Volume 42, Number 1 (2001), pages 1-34.
- Barakonyi, K. (2009). *Bologna „Hungaricum” – Diagnózis és terápia*, (Lit: Bologna “Hungaricum” – Diagnosis and therapy). Új Mandátum publishing 2009.

Becher, T. (1984). The Cultural View, in B.R. Clark (ed.) *Perspectives on Higher Education*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Becher, T. (1989). *Academic tribes and territories. Intellectual enquiry and the cultures of disciplines*. Milton Keynes: SRHE & Open University Press.

Bell, J. (1999). *Doing your research project: A guide for first time researchers in. education and social science*. 3rd Edn. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Bergquist, W. H., Pawlak, K., (2008). *Engaging the six cultures of the academy*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Bergquist, W. H., (1992). *The four cultures of the academy*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Bila, T. A., Miller, M. T. (1997). College Faculty Culture: Dominance in the Academy. *Annual Conference of the Popular Culture Association* (6th, Honolulu, HI, January 1997). <http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/recordDetail?accno=ED412876> (accessed 14<sup>th</sup> August 2015)

Birnbaum, R. (1989). The latent organizational functions of the academic senate: Why senates do not work but will not go away. *The Journal of Higher Education* volume 60, number 4, pages 423-443.

Bless, C., Higson-Smith, C. (2000). *Fundamentals of social research methods: An African perspective*, 3rd edition, Cape Town: Juta

Bogdány, E., Balogh, Á., Csizmadia, T., Polák-Weldon, R. (2012). Future Employee Preferences in the Light Of Organizational Culture, *Knowledge and Learning: Global Empowerment; Proceedings of the Management, Knowledge and Learning International Conference 2012* (pp. 363-371). International School for Social and Business Studies, Celje, Slovenia.

Bognár, F., Gaál, Z. (2011). Rethinking Business Process Maintenance Related To Corporate Culture, *Problems of Management in the 21st century*, Volume 1, 2011, pp. 16-25

Borgulya, A., Hahn, J. (2008). Work related values and attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe, *Journal for East European Management Studies*, ISSN 0949-6181, Hampp, Mering, Volume 13, Issue 3, pp. 216-238

Borgulya, A., Hahn, J. (2013). Changes in the importance of work-related values in Central and Eastern Europe: Slovenia and Hungary against the trend?, *Journal of Arts and Humanities*, Volume 2, Number 10.

Bourdieu, P. (1988). *Homo academicus*. London: Polity.

Bowen, H., Schuster, J. (1986). *American professors: A national resource imperiled*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Cameron, K.S., Quinn R.E. (1999). *Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture: Based on the competing values framework*, MA: Addison-Wesley.

- Cameron, K.S., Quinn, R.E. (2006). *Diagnosing and Changing Organizational Culture*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Campbell, J. (1977). On the Nature of Organizational Effectiveness. In *New Perspectives on Organizational Effectiveness*, edited by P. Goodman and J. Pennings, pages 13-55. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Clark, B. R. (1963). Faculty cultures. In T. F. Lunsford (Ed.), *The study of campus culture* (pp. 39-54). Boulder, CO: Western Interstate Commission on Higher Education
- Clark, B. R. (1972). The organizational saga in higher education. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, issue 17, pages 179-194.
- Clark, B. R. (1983). *The Higher Education System*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Clark, B. R. (1987). *The Academic Life. Small Worlds, Different Worlds*. Princeton: The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.
- Collini S. (1993). *The Two Cultures*. (Introduction). Cambridge University Press.
- De Zilwa D., (2006). Organisational culture and values and the adaptation of academic units in Australian universities. *Higher Education* (2007) issue 54, pages 557-574.
- Finkelstein, M.J. (1984). *The American Academic Profession: A Synthesis of Social Scientific Inquiry since World War II*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Fisher, D., Atkinson-Grosjean, J. (2002). Brokers on the boundary: Academy-industry liaison in Canadian universities, *Higher Education*, Volume 44, Numbers 3-4 (2002), pages 449-467.
- Freedman, M. B., Brown, W., Ralph, N., Shukraft, R., Bloom, M., Sanford, N. (1979). *Academic culture and faculty development*. Berkeley, CA: Montaigne.
- Gelei, A., Losonci, D., Toarniczky, A., Báthory, Zs. (2012). Lean production and leadership attributes – the case of Hungarian production managers, *4th World Conference P&OM "Serving the World"*. 1-5 July 2012, Amsterdam, Holland
- Halász, G. (2002). *Educational change and social transition in Hungary*. National Institute of Public Education. Retrieved on 12<sup>th</sup> July 2015 from: [http://www.see-educoop.net/education\\_in/pdf/halasz\\_edu\\_change\\_in\\_hungary1-oth-enl-t00.pdf](http://www.see-educoop.net/education_in/pdf/halasz_edu_change_in_hungary1-oth-enl-t00.pdf)
- Handy, C. (1993). *Understanding Organizations*. Penguin, London (4<sup>th</sup> edition).
- Haralambos, M., Holborn, M. (1995). *Sociology: Themes and Perspectives* (4th edition) London: Collins Education.
- Hardesty, L. (1995). Faculty culture and bibliographic instruction: an exploratory analysis - the Library and Undergraduate education. *Library Trends*, Fall, 1995.
- Heidrich, B. (1999). *The change of organizational culture in transition period in Hungary*, PhD dissertation. University of Miskolc.

Hofmeister-Tóth, Á., Kainzbauer A., Brück F., Neulinger, Á. (2005). Kulturális értékek, kulturális dimenziók és kulturális standardok. (Lit.: Cultural Values, Cultural Dimensions and Cultural Standards), *Vezetéstudomány*, Issue 34, Volume 2, pp. 2-15.

Hribar, B., Mendling, J. (2014) The Correlation Of Organizational Culture And Success Of BPM Adoption, *Twenty Second European Conference On Information Systems*, Tel Aviv 2014, Retrieved on 19 September 2015 from [Http://Ecis2014.Eu/E-Poster/Files/0249-File1.Pdf](http://Ecis2014.Eu/E-Poster/Files/0249-File1.Pdf)

Hudson, S., Thomson, G., Wilson., N. (2007). A pilot qualitative study of New Zealand policymakers' knowledge of, and attitudes to, the tobacco industry. *Aust. New Zealand Health Policy*. Volume 4, Number 17. (Published online 2007 July 25).

Jacobson, S., Wood, F. (2006). Lessons Learned from a Very Small Pilot Study. *Online Journal of Rural Nursing and Health Care*, volume 6, issue 2.

Kaufman, C. F. (1991) Hungarian Education in Transition. *Annual Conference of the American Educational Research Association* (Chicago, IL, April 1991).

Kezar, A. J. (2001). Understanding and Facilitating Organizational Change in the 21st Century: Recent Research and Conceptualizations, *ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Report*, Volume 28, Number 4.

Kokt, D. (2010). Towards depicting the organisational culture of universities of technology (UOTS): a South African perspective. *International journal of business and management studies* Volume 2, Number 2.

Kottak, C.P. (2005). *Windows on Humanity*. McGrawHill, New York.

Kuh, G., Whitt, E. (1988). *The invisible tapestry. Culture in American Colleges and Universities*. ASHE-ERIC Higher Education, Report No.1, 1988.

Kwan, P., Walker, A. (2004) Validating the competing values model as a representation of organizational culture through inter-institutional comparisons, *Organizational Analysis*, Vol. 12 Issue 1, pages 21 – 37

Lawrence, J.H. (1994). Campus culture and faculty perceptions of time. *New Directions for Institutional Research*, issue 83, pages 25-38

Martin, J., Sitkin S., Boehm M. (1983). Wild-eyed guys and old salts: The emergence and disappearance of organizational subcultures. *Working Paper*, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University.

Matkó, A., Berde, C. (2012). Relationships between Competitiveness in the Northern Great Plain and the Organisational Culture of Local Authorities. *APSTRACT: Applied Studies in Agribusiness and Commerce*, Volume 6, Issue 5, pp.13-21.

McNay, L. (1999). Subject, Psyche and Agency, *Theory, Culture & Society* Volume 16, Number 2, pages 175-93.

Meschi, P-X, Roger, A. (1994). Cultural context and social effectiveness in international joint ventures. *Management International Review*, Volume 34, pages 197-215.

Mullins, L.J. (1999). *Management and organizational behaviour*. Prentice Hall 5th edition.

Nahavandi, A., Malekzadeh, A. R. (1993). *Organizational culture in the management of mergers*. Quorum books.

Naidoo, R. (2008) (Ed.). *Building Sustainable Higher Education*, International Development 21, Department for International Development and the Institute of Development Studies and University of Sussex. Available at: <http://www.eldis.org/> (accessed 20<sup>th</sup> August 2015).

Obadić, A., & Aristovnik, A., (2011). Relative efficiency of higher education in Croatia and Slovenia: an international comparison, *Amfiteatru Economic*, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, volume 13(30), pages 362-376.

Omerzel, G., Biloslavo, R., Trnavcevic, A. (2011) Knowledge management and organisational culture in higher education institutions, *Journal for East European Management Studies*, 16 (2) (2011), pp. 111–139

Peat, J., Mellis, C., Williams, K., Xuan, W. (2002). *Health Science Research: A Handbook of Quantitative Methods*, London: Sage.

Pushnykh V., Chemeris V. (2006) Study of a Russian University's organisational culture in transition from planned to market economy. *Tertiary education and Management*, issue 12, pages 161-182.

Quinlan, K.M. Akerlind, G.S. (2000). Factors affecting departmental peer collaboration for faculty development: Two cases in context. *Higher Education*, volume 40, number 1, pages 23–52.

Quinn, R.E., Kimberly, J.R. (1984). Paradox, planning, and perseverance: Guidelines for managerial practice. In J.R. Kimberly, & R.E. Quinn (Eds.), *Managing organizational transitions*. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.

Quinn, R.E., Rohrbaugh, J. (1983). A spatial model of effectiveness criteria: Towards a competing values approach to organizational analysis. *Management Science*, Issue 29, pages 363-377.

Riesman, D. Jencks, C. (1961). The Viability of the American College. In N. Sanford, (Ed.), *The American College*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, pages 74-192.

Ruscio, K. P. (1987). Many sectors, many professions, in B.R. Clark (ed.) *The Academic Profession*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Sanford, N. (1971). *Academic culture and the teacher's development*. Soundings, volume 54, number 4, pages 357-371.

Setényi, J. (2000). Study on Innovation in Education. New Approaches of Educational Management. *Hungarian Background Report to OECD*. OKI Budapest. Available at: <http://www.oki.hu> (accessed 10<sup>th</sup> August 2015).

Silver, H. (2003). Does university have a culture? *Studies in Higher Education*, Volume 28, Number 2.

Snow, C. P. (1993). *The Two Cultures*. Cambridge University Press.

Štimac, H., Šimić L. (2012) Competitiveness in Higher Education: a Need for Marketing Orientation and Service Quality, *Economics & Sociology*, Volume 5, No 2, 2012, pp. 23-34

Taylor, P.G. (1999). *Making sense of academic life: Academics, universities and change*. Suffolk, UK, Open University Press.

Thomas, C. M., Ward, M. Chorba, C., Kumiega., A. (1990). Measuring and Interpreting Organizational Culture. *Journal of Nursing Administration*, issue 20, pages 17-24.

Tierney, W.G., (1988). Organizational culture in higher education: Defining the essentials. *Journal of Higher Education*, volume 59, number 1, pages 2–21.

Tierney, W.G. (2008). Trust and Organizational Culture in Higher Education. *Cultural Perspectives on Higher Education*, number 1, pages 27-41.

Trice, H.M. (1993). *Occupational subcultures in the workplace*, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press.

Valimaa, J. (1998). Culture and identity in higher education. *Higher Education* volume 36, number 2, pages 119-138.

Valimaa, J., (2008). Cultural studies in Higher Education Research. In *Cultural Perspectives on Higher Education*, Springer. (Valimaa and Ylijoki eds.).

Van Maanen, J. (1987). Managing education better: Some thoughts on the management of student cultures in American colleges and universities. *AIR Forum*, 18, 1987 (Keynote Address for the 27th Annual Meetings of the Association for Institutional Research. Kansas City, Missouri, May 3, 1987).

Van Teijlingen E.R., Hundley, V. (2001). The importance of pilot studies. *Social research update*, issue 35, winter 2001.

Wallace, M. (1998). *Action research for language teachers*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

# **Global Academic Identity: A path to strengthen internationalization?**

Anita Trnavčević

## ***Abstract***

Between 15<sup>th</sup> September and 15<sup>th</sup> October a qualitative study was conducted aiming at exploring the notion of a 'global academic'. This question emerged deductively from the literature on global elites (Appadurai, 1990, 1996), students of the new global elite (Vandrick, 2011), global citizenship and global citizens (Carter, 2001), global employees (Shafer and Westman, 2015), global researchers (Appadurai, 2006), EU research elite (Kwiek, 2015) and other topics on the global. The idea was that there could be a global academic – a teacher/researcher who has the attributes of a 'global' and also perceives him/herself a global academic, and is also recognized by the 'Others' (students in our case) as 'global'. The aims of empirical part were: a) to explore experience of teachers/researchers with Erasmus mobility program with regard to changes in their academic identity; b) to identify elements that constitute the notion 'global academic; and c) to explore students and teachers/researchers' perceptions on 'global academics'. In this study, 5 individual semi-structured interviews and 1 group interview were conducted with teachers, 1 out of 9 interviews was conducted via skype. 3 group interviews were conducted with students, two groups consisting of 4 students and 1 group consisted of 2 students. Data was analyzed by applying content analysis method and open coding. The following categories were identified: 'Teachers go to the world', 'Geographical component, specialization and gender matter', and 'Global academic'. Recommendations for policy makers were developed.

## ***Introduction***

The world of today is a world of mobility. If we look at the transport industry we can see how large profits are generated in this branch of 'industry'. Airline companies, for example, report increase in the number of passengers. »The International Air Transport Association (IATA) released an industry traffic forecast showing that airlines expect to welcome some 3.6 billion passengers in 2016. That's about 800 million more than the 2.8 billion passengers carried by airlines in 2011/.../ International passenger numbers are expected to grow from 1.11 billion

in 2011 to 1.45 billion passengers in 2016, bringing 331 million passengers for a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.3%. (<http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/pages/2012-12-06-01.aspx>, access 12.10.2015).

If transport and specifically air traffic is seen as one element of global mobility then other fields, such as the Internet, Facebook, and other ICT supported 'mobility means' show huge increase in terms of 'virtual mobility'. This virtual mobility, among others, enables students or potential users to choose courses on the internet and to access knowledge (see Kukolja Taradi et al. 2008). Both industries are indicators of mobility for different purposes and in different 'shapes'. Tourism, as a »key to development, prosperity, and well-being« (UNWTO, Tourism Highlights 2014, available at <http://www.e-unwto.org/doi/pdf/10.18111/9789284416226>, accessed 12.10.2015) has the following characteristics regarding long term outlook:

- International tourist arrivals worldwide are expected to increase by 3.3% a year from 2010 to 2030 to reach 1.8 billion by 2030, according to UNWTO's long term forecast 'Tourism towards 2030'.
- Between 2010 and 2030, arrivals in emerging destinations (+4.4% a year) are expected to increase at twice the rate of those in advanced economies (+2.2% a year).
- The market share of emerging economies increased from 30% in 1980 to 47% in 2013, and is expected to reach 57% by 2030, equivalent to over 1 billion international tourist arrivals.

ERASMUS mobility is also part of tourism – tourism for 'business purposes'. It has different origins, and is derived from different policies and European incentives and strategies but it also contributes to the flow of groups. We still don't perceive and practice it as virtual mobility, although this notion has been researched and used in the field of cross-border education (see Richardson and Radloff, 2014). Erasmus and Erasmus+ are specific cross-border education, provided by physical mobility. Therefore, Erasmus and Erasmus+ programs are still part of the physical flow of teachers and students with a purpose to strengthen internationalization, increase employability and enhance cultural sensitivity and understanding. »The ERASMUS Programme is a European student exchange programme established in 1987 offering university students a possibility of studying or working abroad in another European country for a period of at least 3 months and maximum 12 months. The name of the project refers to Dutch Renaissance humanist and theologian Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam. He

studied at diverse European universities and described the education as a chance for modern people. Since 2014 Erasmus and other programmes were included under The European Union programme for education, training, youth and sport ERASMUS+. Apart from the students, the mobility offered by the Erasmus+ programme is dedicated for professors and universities' staff as well. ERASMUS+ will allow ([http://esn.org/erasmus?gclid=CjwKEAju-ZqrBRDt\\_KjhjcbzhISJAAIRGv124Lam4Qb43SlilEToMTDUiBt18ZRoe5Bx3mjTkKWqhoCw23w\\_wcB](http://esn.org/erasmus?gclid=CjwKEAju-ZqrBRDt_KjhjcbzhISJAAIRGv124Lam4Qb43SlilEToMTDUiBt18ZRoe5Bx3mjTkKWqhoCw23w_wcB), accessed 27th May, 2015):

- 2 million higher education students
- EU grants and training for about 4 million people and 125,000 institutions
- 500,000 young people will volunteer or participate in youth exchanges
- 650,000 vocational apprenticeships or traineeships abroad
- 200,000 Master's degree loan scheme
- 25,000 joint master degree grants
- 800,000 educators and youth workers will acquire new teaching and learning methods abroad«.

In 2013, the European Commission announced an increase of 40% in the budget for the new programme Erasmus+, or a total of 14.7 billion EUR for the time period 2014–2020. The Multiannual Financial Framework, of which Erasmus+ is a part, was adopted in November 2013 (Klemenčič and Flander, 2013). We can imagine the flow of people who, like tourists, go abroad and seek different education experience. From this point of view, Erasmus+ program is about experience for students, and also for educators. It is expected that there is significant impact of this program on students, teachers, and internationalization of institutions in general. Large amount of finances is allocated to the program and extensive external evaluations of institutional and national impact have been conducted, just to mention few, for example Van Brakel et al. (2004), Klemenčič and Flander (2013), Jacobone and Moro (2015), Marin (2014). Many of these studies focus on the impacts of the Erasmus program on national and institutional level, and many of them focus to a great degree on students and less on academics/staff mobility. The Erasmus+ program implements three key actions, one of them is Key Action 1 – Mobility of Individuals, which supports Mobility of learners and staff (European Commission, accessed 27th May, 2015). Despite many succinct studies and reports on the impact of the Erasmus program, there seems to be one still underreported question. It is related to the impact of teaching mobility on teachers' views about teachers' identity as academics. This study is

about teachers' identity as global academic. The research questions guiding this piece of research are:

- How is academic identity presented in available literature and perceived by participants in the study?
- Has 'teaching mobility' had an impact on teachers' academic identity?
- Is there a concept that could be called 'global academic'?
- How can potential global academic identity be created and how it can be recognized?

Exploring academic identity through the perspective of a 'global academic' is fairly new. Although some relevant authors on globalization, like Bauman (1998), Appadurai (1990, 1996), Featherstone (1991, 1995), and others have extensively discussed the notions of 'global elite', 'transnational elite' and the issues of globalization of cultures, and cosmopolitanism (Carter, 2001), however specifically 'global academic' has not been (to my knowledge) thoroughly researched. This research is an initial exploration into this concept aiming at revealing the potential for its further development and thorough investigation. In the next sections some studies, reports and research on the impact of the Erasmus programs – teaching mobility are presented, and brief literature review on academic culture and academic identity within the context of globalization and internationalization is summarized.

The empirical part of this research consists of the description of methodology, and data analysis. 9 semi-structured interviews were conducted with teachers from different Hungarian universities. Participants were from business, tourism, economics, management, marketing and humanities. 10 semi-structured interviews were conducted with Bachelor program students from the same universities. At the end of this report, some possible strategies for developing and enhancing the identity of a 'global academics'<sup>363</sup> are proposed.

### ***The Erasmus program and academic mobility***

The Erasmus program has been successful since its launch in 1987:

Needless to say, the Erasmus Programme, which started in 1987, has been one of the first initiatives to implement the fundamentals of the European Space for Higher Education and lies at the heart of the Bologna Process. In fact, international

---

<sup>363</sup> Global academic is a teacher/researcher in Higher Education institution. Although the focus is on teachers and teaching as path to strengthen global academic identity I keep using the term teacher/researcher because it is usually part of teacher's workload to do also research. Hence, it is teacher and researcher in one person.

student mobility within Europe has been given a massive boost by the five successive Erasmus programmes, financed by the EU.<sup>1</sup> During the 21 years of this programme, two million students have moved around the member states of the EU (the EU-27, plus Iceland, Norway and Turkey). During the 4th Erasmus-Socrates phase (2000–2006), annual Erasmus Student Mobility (ESM) growth has been 6% and the average number of students, who moved each year, was 135,000, representing 30% of the total intra-European student mobility. For the current, 5th Erasmus phase (Erasmus-LLP 2007–2013), the goal is to achieve an annual 10% increase in Erasmus flows and reach three million students by 2012. This will augment the participation of tertiary students in the ESM programme, which is still only 0.8%, well below the European Commission's aim (Gonzales, Mesanza and Mariel, 2011, 414).

Based on an econometric model Gonzales, Mesanza and Mariel (2011) provide recommendations how to strengthen these flows. If their analysis is a) focused on students' mobility<sup>364</sup> and b) based on data prior 2010, then it is worth focusing on data about teachers' mobility and newer data.

In Slovenia, Klemenčič and Flander have published the results of the first systematic study on the impact of Erasmus Programme on internationalization in the entire higher education system<sup>365</sup>. They have identified several recommendations for institutions and policy makers yet their focus is on the impact of mobility on the institutions. What we find interesting and not explored is the question what is the impact of mobility on teachers – their identity and consequently changes in the lecture rooms.

Aydin (2012) provides qualitative analysis on the impact of ERASMUS mobility on pre-service teachers of English from Turkey and reports significant impact on language skills and professional and personal development. There are quite some articles and books on mobility in the European higher education area dated from the 1990' onwards. There is strong focus on students mobility<sup>366</sup> (see Byram and Dervin, 2008; Baron, 1993), on academic mobility and gender issues (see Jons, 2011), not so recent paper on academic staff mobility – ERASMUS experience (Enders, J. 1998) and academic mobility in relation to academic profession (Kim and Locke, 2010; Yang and Welch, 2010). The notion of transnational academic mobility has been explored by Kim 2010, specifically emphasizing that international or even transnational academic mobility has always occurred but today we have been witnessing new patterns, and

---

<sup>364</sup> Erasmus + program target is 20% of students mobility

<sup>365</sup> Data about incoming and outgoing academics in e.g. 2011/12 is a valuable source for our discussion. 5,4 days in that year was the average duration of teaching abroad and 3,4% share of the entire academic staff participated in Erasmus exchange that year.

<sup>366</sup> Interesting enough, the expression 'academic mobility is often used as synonymous for students' mobility.

in our view also channels, media and technology. This is perhaps one of the most important and seemingly so obvious facts but it is often overlooked when policy initiatives at the institutional levels are initiated and implemented. Mobility, internationalization and exchange, as well as collaboration, groups (networks) of scientists who are connected in different ways and collaborate through different media and technology and in person, are not new facts. Mobility, for example, has been existing, we can simply say, since the 'Man' has developed. In the Antique, rich families had slaves or free man –teachers who were brought to their homes from different countries. Knowledge and its conveyors have always been in flow. However, the patters have changed, and the requirements and expectations about the 'size', the extent and the targets to be achieved have shifted from individual benefits to institutional, national and transnational. The aims of such mobility have changed. In the past mobility used to be almost a privilege of individuals, and surely individually initiated and maintained, but this is not the case in the last three or four decades. ERASMUS program well reflects and embraces as well as supports the EU goals, related to common European space, comparability, structural sameness and flow of people. Benefits are not on individual level only but are expected to have impact on higher education institutions and also on the job markets. This multi-purpose and multi-functional notion of mobility is also focused on staff (academics) mobility and ERASMUS is the program that had been created to enhance this mobility. There are, as indicated, few studies on the impact of teacher's mobility on the institutions and even less studies on the impact on individuals – teachers that use the ERASMUS opportunity to enrich and strengthen their teaching skills.

As mentioned above, in Slovenia, for example, the average teaching period in Erasmus program is 5.4 days. The questionnaire that is sent by ERASMUS national contact point is long, profound, and most of all gives the impression that much could be changed within 5.4 days in average on individual and institutional level. This is also one of the elements that we have explored in our field work.

### ***Global academic identity***

'Globalization' is on everyone's lips; a fad word fast turning into a shibboleth, a magic incantation, a pass-key meant to unlock the gates to all present and future mysteries. For some, 'globalization' is what we are bound to do if we wish to be happy; for others 'globalization' is the cause of our unhappiness. For everybody, though, 'globalization' is the intractable fate of the world, an irreversible process; it is also a process which affects us all in the same measure and in the same way. We are all being 'globalized'

– and being 'globalized' means much the same to all who 'globalized' are (see Bauman, 1998: 1).

Later, in our analysis this question of global as cause of happiness and global as a cause of unhappiness, of agreement and disagreement, of pros' and cons' has emerged. The question of polarities or dualities can be in the case of globalization, associated with ideological foundations and is not merely about an academic discussion. Two issues can hence be associated with the question of global academic identity: a) polarization (global: international: local), and b) ideological foundations (pros and cons) which are also polarities.

The question of dualities, especially in management has lately been extensively discussed. There is a strong tendency that polarities are omitted, bridged or blurred, and binary oppositions replaced by dialectical logic (Andriopoulos, 2003). Regardless, how strong the calls against polarization(s) are, Bauman's idea of "increasingly global and extraterritorial elites and the ever more 'localized' rest" (Bauman, 1998: 3) is still very much alive. This division in the academic world could be associated and reflected in the division between teaching and researching, between the teacher and the researcher. If research is considered global, and the elite can be identified either by metric systems, like WoS, then elite in teaching unless emerging directly from research, is not recognizable. It seems to be almost impossible to have a global teacher who is not an elite researcher. Elite in this sense is hence associated with publications with the highest impact factors and in the most prestigious journals for specific disciplines. This notion of elite and the idea of elite research and elite journals opens broad discussion about how to bring interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity into polarized globalized world where the international is not 'elite' and the global is elite, but this 'global' is associated with monodisciplinarity, standardization and specialization.

Even more, the idea that one is identified as global academic implies monodisciplinarity, individualism, competitiveness and 'following the rules' of writing scientific articles and doing research in standardized, comparable, paradigmatically acceptable way. There are different possibilities to discuss academic identity and identity in general. Flowerdew and Wang (2015) provide extensive literature review on the identity from linguistic point of view, also discussing the English as lingua franca. Psychological aspect of identity creation is summarized in the following statement:

An identity is the cognitive and affective understanding of who and what we are (Schouten, 1991, p. 413). According to the symbolic interactionist perspective (Blumer, 1969; Cooley, 1902; Mead, 1934), part of this understanding of who or

what we are based on "reflexive evaluation" (Solomon, 1983, p. 321), or the way in which we believe that others see us. Our identities are shaped not only by our own self-characterizations but also by our perceptions of the manner in which other individuals in society view us" (Yurchisin, Watchravesringkan, Brown McCabe, 2005: 736).

However, there is extensive body of literature on professional identities. Clegg (2008) points to academic identities that have been in constant flux and need to be understood as part of lived complexity. Archer (2008) points to many changes in higher education that had led to fracturing and loosing professional identities. Her view is shaped by idea of identities as disrupted processes of 'becoming' but also of 'unbecoming'. Henkel (2005) explores implications of policy changes for academic communities and identities. Ylijoki and Ursin (2013: 1137) argue:

We understand identity as constructed and negotiated in social interaction in everyday practices (e.g. Harré 1983; Mead 1977). Identity is not a fixed or static entity but a reflexive project (Giddens 1991) continuously reshaped and redefined through time and changing contexts. Although identity always involves idiosyncratic, personal features since individuals are active agents with unique life histories, identity building is fundamentally embedded in the social stock of knowledge specific to each institutional and cultural context.

Stronach et al. (2002) point to 'uncertain being' - a concept that can be applied to the notion of a global academic. A global academic, seen as a singularity, is an empty concept, ideal type in Weberian sense that is decontextualized and reduced from complexity to simplicity. However, this reductionism cannot offer dynamic, interwoven picture of identity, culture, and constant flux of multiple identities in singularity, bounded with culture and broadly speaking the 'globe'. Various authors have in common the following: identity and also professional identity is relational, complex, dynamic and contextual. It is about the process of becoming and unbecoming, and most of all, it is about 'uncertain being', meaning it is in constant flux between being and becoming.

From this point of view, one might argue that studying global academic is an attempt to reduce global and academics to singularities and frame them within simple, decontextualized world of academia. The purpose of this study was to reveal the complexities rather than to reduce complexities but also to provide some recommendations to policy makers what to do to increase internationalization.

## *Methodology*

The study is designed as a qualitative analysis (Creswell 1998, Denzin and Lincoln 2000, Charmaz 2000, Merriam 1998). In order to collect empirical data that has not been available yet to policy makers at institutional and potentially at national level, semi-structured individual and group interviews were conducted and data analyzed by open coding with the purpose of identifying the elements of 'global academic', and how this identity is recognized by students. The aims of the empirical part were the following:

1. To explore experience of teachers/researchers with Erasmus mobility program with regard to changes in their academic identity.
2. To identify elements that constitute the notion 'global academic'.
3. To explore students and teachers/researchers' perceptions on 'global academics'.

## *The sample*

Originally, 12 interviews with academics and 8 interviews with students were planned<sup>367</sup>. I approached universities through 4 contact persons. I asked contact persons to conduct the nomination process at their faculties. They were asked to ask teachers and students to nominate the most international teachers. I originally planned to select participants from the nominees, as follows:

- being in Erasmus teaching mobility program at least 3 consecutive years in a period between 2010 and 2015, and
- being nominated by third year undergraduate students from one faculty of selected universities as 'very international academic (teacher/researcher)', and
- being nominated by colleagues from one faculty of selected university as 'very international academic (teacher/researcher)', and
- equally represented by gender.

Contact persons implemented the nomination process, I received names and e-mails, and then I approached the nominees in person, and by e-mail. I contacted 18 academics yet only 9 interviews out of 18 contacted persons were conducted, and 2 out of 9 interviewees were

---

<sup>367</sup> The project was designed for 3 months period. It was approved for one month which limited the opportunity to collect more data.

persons who did not follow the nomination process. I approached 12 students and 10 agreed to participate in the interview. In total, 9 teachers/academics and 10 students participated in interviews.

In this study, 5 individual semi-structured interviews and 1 group interview were conducted with teachers, 1 out of 9 interviews was conducted via skype. 3 group interviews were conducted with students, two groups consisting of 4 students and 1 group consisted of 2 students. Only 3 teachers were on Erasmus teaching mobility in three consecutive years. With regard to gender balance the sample consisted of 3 men and 6 women although among 18 approached persons 8 were men and 10 were women. 6 students were selected from the third year students at selected universities, who had participated in the nomination process for identifying 'the very international academic', and 4 students did not participate in the selection process yet they participated in the interview. The short time available for the research and hence for data collection required flexibility in sampling procedures.

### *The interview*

Academics were asked the following questions:

Part 1: Erasmus and Erasmus+

- What are your perceptions, attitudes, and experience about Erasmus and Erasmus+ program?
- Have you been on mobility exchange? If yes, what was, in your view, the impact of mobility on your professional identity?
- How has the mobility impacted your professional identity?

Part 2: Global academic

- Who is 'global academic' and how can one become 'global academic'?
- What meaning do you assign to the notion 'global academic'?
- Is there a difference between being international and being global? Please, explain your answer!
- How would you describe yourself?
- Could you, please, identify the elements, that describe your 'global' dimension the best?
- Who is your role model for 'global' academic?

Interview question for students were, as follows:

- What meaning do you assign to the notion 'global academic'?

- How would you describe the most global teacher you have met at the university?
- Could you, please, identify the elements, that describe teachers' 'global' dimension the best?
- Who is your role model for 'global' academic?
- What practices in the classroom global teachers perform?
- Is there a difference between being international and being global? Please, explain your answer!

The interviews were recorded, and also typed during the interviews, and in the later stage both, voice record and typed material, were put together into the form of a text material. There was specific language barrier which needs to be taken into account and is also noticed as one of the limitations of this study<sup>368</sup>. Researcher and participants used lingua franca – the English language which caused some problems in understanding and during the communication itself with some participants, mostly students. We all tried to expressed ourselves as good as possible, and share the meaning.

### *Data analysis and findings*

Data collection phase took three weeks out of four weeks on the site. It was difficult to agree access to participants and also little time to do the sampling – nomination procedure<sup>369</sup>. Data was analyzed by applying content analysis method (see Esterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2005) and open coding (Mesec, 2009). The following categories were identified: 'Teachers go to the world', 'Geographical component, specialization and gender matter', 'Global academic'. In the next sections these categories are presented and interpreted.

### **'Teachers go to the world'**

---

<sup>368</sup> Jenkins, Cogo, Dewey (2011) provide an overview of literature focused on the English language as lingua 'franca'. In their discussion, English as lingua franca is also seen as a means and source of globalizing practices. Although in further discussions in this study some elements of global academic identity are identified, such as specialization and standardization, lingua franca is not only a space, means and source of communication but also source of power in globalizing practices. Rostan (2011) discusses internationalization of 'academe' and the English as lingua franca.

<sup>369</sup> The study would not be possible without help of Edit, Aniko, Petra, Izabella, and Marta who helped to arrange access and nomination process. Also, it needs to be mentioned that the language in quotations has not been changed.

The Erasmus program has contributed to mobility, to travel to different countries and to get a sense of a culture. Perhaps it is overstated to say that those academics who had used Erasmus program to visit different universities and gain the experience of teaching in new, different cultural environment got deep experience if they, as for example statistics in Slovenia show, spent more on the visit than the average time of 5.4 days . TD pointed to this short time period that is often now and the difference when she thought a comprehensive course.

“In the past when I was teaching for two weeks, I was giving comprehensive course and I talked about my research. Now it is 5 days /.../« (TD).

TD points to the fact that going abroad on teaching assignment is not necessarily an activity that will change an academic in terms of teaching methods and approaches. TB clearly stated that there was no change in terms of teaching due to Erasmus mobility and also nothing special to go abroad. However, the experience was good.

»I was 3 times abroad. I have the best experience – how I was accepted and professionally. They appreciated my lessons, it was very useful. The mentality of students was different and mentality of teachers as well. It has connection with nation. There was no change in me as a teacher. I was coming from business sector. I was moving around the world, and I had many contacts. For me it is very natural to move around the world«.

TA is more enthusiastic about teaching abroad. He feels he has benefited a lot.

“I have been on Erasmus exchange many times, and I was also invited lecturer in Portugal and Turkey. I learned a lot, I got acquainted with excellent people, I have built friendships, and we still share ideas. /.../ I learned a lot – professionally and personally because of their access to the newest literature, to professional networks; I was able to join different links and networks, sharing new publications, ideas, try to do long range planning. This is not so easy – we hardly say anything for tomorrow. I have good contacts to top officials because of my age. They are good persons but because of their circumstance they don't make any promise”.

He changed his teaching and developed excellent and long-lasting networks.

“I attended a lot in Erasmus, international week, we made whole courses, and I had modules of xxx, 5 days all days. On Fridays we have exams and at the end of the week students have credits. I like this week because you work with student. I was in 23 countries in Erasmus, in some I had to do the teaching, in some I only showed up. I don't like Erasmus tourisms. I have been on Erasmus in at least 5-6 years” (TC).

TC mentions Erasmus tourism and in a way he approves it because he finds benefits from it.

“Even the tourism part is useful for the teachers. If you experience the country, culture can be interesting and gives you different views of the world. I had the experience, I travelled a lot. Those who have never been abroad have not experienced something that is not local. My colleague went to Finland, it was interesting different approach to the students - it makes you a better teacher” (TC).

The point is that the more Erasmus teaching mobility is short the more there is a chance that it becomes ‘Erasmus tourism’. Even in that case, when teaching is secondary activity and Erasmus is justification for travelling there are positive impacts on teachers and their professional identity. If there is a view that mobility widens perspectives, and open space for learning something new then it is, in views of participants, worth ‘going on mobility’.

TE says: “The chance to discover new people, cultures, values, also practice (my curriculum), it is part of my life to travel; it is good possibility”.

TF sees Erasmus teaching mobility: “It is positive initiative to learn the cultures. We adopt the practices from where we are; it widens our perspective.

TH: “It is also about the influence – feeling I can influence international students and colleagues. And to be honest, it is also financial security. In Hungary you don't earn so much that you could afford all travels. With this help you can travel”.

Participants feel that mobility has an impact on their professional identities. They better explain and understand themselves and they also feel more authentic.

“It /mobility/ makes me more self-confident, when I talk to students. I identify myself as someone who has foreign experience” (TG).

“It keeps me open and authentic (when I was teaching in GB, Turkey – you also get different impression about the country and people” (TH).

“Everybody has practical experience but with Erasmus we become more different” (TF).

“Personally, this kind of experience gives you the feeling you can live out of the box. You can survive in a foreign country; you can see yourself somehow stronger” (TE).

“You have international value” (TG).

“Even in Hungary (which is closed society) through these trips you speed up the change and slow it down at the same time” (TE).

It causes frustration – you go home and think what you'll do. But obstacles come all the time” (TH).

To summarize: Participants mention the benefits that are: financial (support), establishing contacts and eventually building networks, and widen the perspectives. It seems there is not much direct impact on teaching and changes related directly to the classroom practices. 5 days

(and 8 hours) are not sufficient to create change in teaching, however there is potential in intensive, comprehensive courses, during which a teacher does a comprehensive work – deliver a course from beginning to the end. This seems to be valuable experience (see TC and TD). There is some perceived impact on professional identity. As one participant said – mobility speeds up the change in professional identity and slows it down at the same time.

Mobility is hence multifaceted. Erasmus program which aims are related to support the creation of common European space and to foster international relations has some other, perhaps even more important aims – to contribute to the process of reconstruction and rebuilding professional identity. If it lasts long enough, or it is intensive enough this impact can later be noticed also in the classroom. The impact on the teaching and classroom practices moves the focus from the local on the international, and potentially to the global.

“You have a chance to see a big picture. Local views are not the whole picture. When I work with students from USA, Finland, it gives me more professionally. Professional part means marketing part. Different kind of motivators, approach to students, more experience. I met a lot of professors, outside my home zone /.../; it gives you a chance to build connections and through them you work better. I participated with my colleague from Belgium. He came to Hungary; I saw how his teaching methods work in Hungary. I have connections with Greece, Finland; this knowledge exchange can also give you some more knowledge in professional and in teaching side. Two things: networking, meeting new persons, and teaching international students. In marketing this gives you the understanding of customers, cultures” (TC).

Students also expressed their view about possibility or time needed to change. SA said:

“I spent one year in Denmark, it changed me. It helps, it affected me – 4-5 months matter; weeks don't change anything. You will not find deep cultures, you stay on the surface. 1 week is a spice in professional life, opportunities to live with. Change needs more months”.

**Recommendation:** *The length - time frame matters. In order to make more out of the Erasmus+ program it would be useful to encourage and enable academics to take either intensive weeks or to extend their teaching mobility to longer periods in order to fully embrace the opportunities of mobility – to become encultured into different countries and hence to become ‘change agents’ at home. It seems longer periods abroad reduce the possibility of Erasmus tourism because both partners involved are engaged in fruitful collaboration.*

## **‘Geographical component, specialization and gender matters’**

Participants, academics and students, were asked the same questions: “Is there a difference between being international and being global?” They did not hold one view only. Actually the views were polarized.

### **Pros’ (YES) – there is a difference**

“Yes, there is a difference, that’s what I teach in marketing. Global is something you do the same course in different countries. International is like me who teaches something here, something in Hungary – so different courses in different places” (TC).

“Global has a rather negative connotation. International – I feel more inclined toward this word, I am more to it. International is more familiar to me, your colleague was here, everyone like her, she was international. I would say, I am international professional, and my interest does not belong to the global. It is my world” (TA).

“Global is further reaching – cross continents, and is about different mind-set” (TE).

Some students defined the difference between global and international with the distance, e.g. if you teach in Europe you are international, if you teach on other continents, you are global (VC, VD). Global and international are defined in the light of geographical perspective and in the light of specialization, different disciplines and (in) variety of courses. Although the ‘boxes’ pros’ and cons’ were developed, the statements indicate that there is no clear cut about the differences. It is more about ‘I like’ and ‘I don’t like’, or ‘I agree’ and I don’t agree’. Even so, these polarities do not mask the processual dimension.

### **Cons (NO) – there is no difference**

“In teaching I don't see the difference. I could feel the style that would be different” (TB).

“Global means like transnational, and in that sense it also entails international but not all international relations are global relations. Global, globalization to me means hierarchical feature of the academic space. For instance, even if I have PhD earned in the UK it doesn't put me on equal footing in the competition position for employment, publication, participation in research with someone who earned PhD the UK and have a British past. I don't want to buy into that competition. But I noticed the difference. I can be international but I cannot be global whether I want it or not.

I consider myself in many ways international. By way of dealing complex courses on MA and PhD level in many places in EU and even in US and even in Australia – these are all white spaces. Globalizing insofar – became /.../ governed by values and expectations, and interests predominantly by men – the global north” (TD).

Global and international are mentioned in the light of gender issues. There is interesting position regarding the global academic identity. Namely, it is possible that one ‘decides’ to be international or global in the sense how she/he perceives him/herself but identity is relational and it is therefore important how the Others perceive the person. For further analysis in this direction there is no sufficient data to argue but we can only indicate from informal talks that the participant is perceived by the Other as very international and global person. Also there is a whole body of literature that explores policy and managerial changes that have influenced the question of academic identity (see, for example Kim, 2010; Watson, 2011; Paradeise and Thoenig, 2013) and opened new space for gender explorations.

### **Floating concepts**

Some participants also pointed to international and global as floating concepts between the two extremes. They tried to find the ‘middle’ point but they implicitly stated that international and global are floating concepts, not static, and context, culture, media and technology dependent.

“We are between international and global. I am not sure we have got world-wide impact, so we are more international. But it makes us more global, if we look at the Erasmus and international students, and the disciplines” (TF).

“Depends if customers are the global or not? At our university there are not global students. Most of them come from Hungary. University of Lisbon has many students from South America, and Asia we couldn't say we are global, because our customers are not global” (TE).

“Don't forget about media. Research gate –when you get the report, you see how many articles are downloaded from Brazil /.../. Even in teaching, you don't know what happens with your slides (TH).

In students view:

“There is no difference between the international and the global. It is a question of dimension. If you go within Europe, you are international if you go to different continents you are global. Every international person is not global, but every global

person is international, like every bug is an insect but every insect is not a bug. It depends on the perspective about the global” (SA, SB).

Participants indicate what has been already discussed – the flux of ‘global and local’ dimensions and identities. The question could be raised – are teachers global teachers? Can they at all be global and what needs to be ‘there’ to become global? It is about the flux of global-international – local dimensions and identities – are teachers global teachers/academics? In participants’ views it depends on the audience and also on the position of teacher as researcher. Media, internet and ICT play essential role in becoming global due to e.g. Research gate and similar platforms that enable global in a virtual world. International and global are interwoven and also a matter of personal decision, not only self-perspective. It could be that ‘decision’ what to be is also derived from the gender discourse.

**Recommendation:** *strengthening the internationalization and encouraging the notion of ‘global’ has a potential. Participants, who recognize themselves also as ‘global’ might use different worlds for teaching, hence physical and virtual worlds. They position themselves between two poles (international and global) with one specific aim – to bring home, to the ‘local’ environment these dimensions in all richness of their variety and interwoven-ness. In order to encourage internationalization in teaching and to develop teachers as ‘global knowledge workers’ the research part needs to be enhanced and globalized.*

### **The ‘Global academic’**

The focus of this study was on the question, if there is something that could be called ‘global academic identity’ and hence a ‘global academic’. This question emerged deductively from the literature on global elites (Appadurai, 1990, 1996), students of the new global elite (Vandrick, 2011), global citizenship and global citizens (Carter, 2001), global employees (Shafer and Westman, 2015), global researchers (Appadurai, 2006), EU research elite (Kwiek, 2015) and other topics on the global. The idea was that there could be a global academic – a teacher/researcher who has the attributes of a ‘global’ and also perceives him/herself a global academic, and is also recognized by the Others (students in our case) as ‘global’. Participants were not surprised by using the concept ‘global academic’ and they had an idea what could constitute the identity of a global academic.

“The first that comes to my mind is the massive on-line courses – Mooc (remark AT: Massive Open Online Courses). I have some degrees from this course. If you upload

your course to Mooc, you are global. When I uploaded my first course, 40 000 students were in the classroom. This is global. Also when you have a clear knowledge on something /.../ you will become global, because you will be invited to different universities, to teach the same course all over the world. You do the same thing” (TC).

One becomes ‘global academic’ when she/he uses ICT platforms and goes into virtual world in order to provide teaching to indefinite number of students. It requires standardized approach and high specialization. Although standardization has been recognized as one of the outcomes of globalization, or perhaps better to say, as one of the features of globalization, it is also a means or form by which students around the world regardless of their national, social, economic background receive the same (potentially the best) education. The two ‘poles’ of globalization (standardization and also local variety and differences) become less visible when associated with ‘the global academic’ but they also become more visible in terms of their potential positive impact on the questions of social, economic and also gender issues. However, this is not so straightforward, as one participant in the study says:

“I don't like globalization. Academic becomes global academic in a sense of like an act of embodying the values of globalization. Global academic is someone who is part of producing a technocrat disregarding the location. I hope I have not become a technocrat. Academic is global academic if she/he is part of the global capitalist social formation which I call global world of academia. /.../ Globalizing insofar became /.../ governed by values and expectations and interests predominantly by men – the global north” (TD).

Global academic is hence associated with standardization, the sameness and virtual world but also with technocracy and global capitalism. TD also points to the white man expectations and values that govern the globalization processes therefore the question of a global academic is associated also with gender discourse and power.

TC points to the fact that by embracing the global one becomes better researcher and also acts better locally.

“I try to be more and more global, my scientific interest and teaching makes me rather global. You can't avoid being global if you write an article. This part of the international experience is important for me. The local environment is not just something that is /.../ and about more knowledge; experience makes you a better teacher, a better man. As global citizenship – dealing with global problems and understanding the global world makes you act locally. I would describe myself as global teachers, but it important as global to act locally” (TC).

Global also seems to be ideologically driven concept and perceiving oneself as ‘global academic’ could have negative connotation.

“Global has a rather negative connotation. International – I feel more inclined toward this word, I am more to it. International is more familiar to me, your colleague was here, everyone like her, she was international. I would say, I am international professional, and my interest does not belong to the global. It is not my world” (TA).

In order to become global academic, TB points to three ‘territories’ that have to overlap simultaneously, teaching, research, and practical experience.

“I am not a global academic type. 3 territories have to be combined in one person: a) teaching; b) research activities, c) to have professional practical experience. In economic fields if somebody never saw a company from inside, may be it is waste of time of dealing with him. What can a theory say if he/she did not see the company from the inside? I am not a global academic. I teach too much, I try to be in practice, no time for research. Global academic would become if companies gave task to university, if someone gives me the topic to research. I always felt it is important if research has the result, if company uses result. Example 1: In banking – they asked for academic person to do a research. I recognized there was a chain of clients, I was the fourth one asked to do the research, the task. I prepared report and I felt I was really good academic person. Example 2: Opportunity to develop video course. VAT system – I set up subject, I had to sit in front of the computer – camera and record my subject. Initially it was tiring, later I learned the method. It was useful, students liked the video. I teach management to international companies. It is difference between international and global companies. In teaching I don't see the difference. I could feel the style that would be different. I am very international with deep roots in Hungary. I have enjoyed travelling abroad but I like to return back” (TB).

This focus on research was persistently mentioned by many participants. Teaching too much (although not specified what is too much) is opposite to the concept of a global academic.

“Don't forget about media. Research gate –when you get the report, you see how many articles are downloaded from Brazil, for example /.../. Even in teaching, you don't know what happens to your slides. /.../. I was born to be global lecturer. Extrovert people – sometimes they are more global. You feel the university is small, the country is small; I was born to be global” (TH).

When global academic is at stake, the research part of identity plays significant role. Global academic is a teacher with relatively strong focus on research. The concept of ‘global

researcher' has been studied by Kwiek (2005) for example and other authors who were interested in competition in academia, metrics and success rate through publications and not last – through rankings (Shanghai ranking etc.).

“The English speaking people are at front. I believe many talented people are behind famous people. Marketing is about the articles /.../ they are global academics. Global academic is to see people from the other perspective (US point of view is one only.) We are teaching one slice of reality, global academic means that you see the world from, for example, the Brazilian perspective” (TE).

One is a global academic if she/he has an impact on the global and has experienced different cultures from different part of the world.

“Global academic is a person who has experience in different parts of the world, and has the perspective on different cultures” (TG).

“Somebody who makes a global impact also in teaching” (TF).

“You can think globally, see things as system, you see the global impact” (TG).

“It is like ‘poli-historian’ – depends on marketing, there should be a lot of people, we should be global academics but we are not (TH).

Participants in the study were extensive in their thoughts and pointed to standardization, generalization and also to the distance in the sense of out-reaching and the impact. They mentioned that a global academic has an impact beyond European borders on other continents. They also argued that disciplines, like tourism for example, are global by its nature.

Students pointed to the fact that if one only travels for a short period abroad he/she is not yet a global academic. Global in their view is associated with living abroad for some time to be encultured into culture and to change attitudes, perceptions, habits as well as to establish networks.

“Four, five months matter, one or two weeks don't change anything. You will not find deep cultures, you stay on the surface. One week is a spice in professional life, opportunities to live with. Change needs more months” (SA, SB).

In students' views global is related to the mind-set, with getting the ideas from the whole world and mix them. Also, students indicated that by being in Facebook, You-tube etc. one becomes global because of the followers. However, they made an interesting point:

“The distance means you are global, you have to experience. You learn by doing. Internet gives you knowledge and not experience. Like if you read how to use machine. You may understand or not. But it is about emotions first, and then comes the idea. You can have pictures on the internet but when you see persons it is different” (VD).

Hence, being global is about experience not about knowledge or information only. Experiential learning is different from abstract learning. In students' views, there is the difference between experience and knowledge. This difference is related to the question of global and international/local. One needs to experience cultures, differences and variety and hence become international while global is less about experience and more about knowledge (standardized, specialized and with impact on the globe).

### ***Features of a global academic identity***

Basically all participants argued that global academic is an open minded person, curious and willing to travel abroad to learn. They see the contact with other cultures, people, colleagues and students as necessary if one wants to be 'global'. Who would then, as derived from data, be a global academic? A person who uses technology to access students, teaches specific topic (is specialized in a relatively narrow subject area), teaches in a standardized way (through media and in person) and brings novelties to local environment. It seems that 'becoming global academic' is a personal decision rather than only part of an individual developmental process, or to say differently – to spontaneously grow into profession. Becoming global academic is associated with uncertainty and uncertain being (see Stronach et al. 2002), also because the processes of becoming 'are also the processes of un-becoming. There is a constant need to re-invent, re-define and re-create professional identity in turbulent and changing policy environment. However, as data indicate, developing a 'global academic' seems to be the path to strengthen internationalization. The flux between global and local/international is a major source of strengthening internationalization.

### ***Instead of a Conclusion***

We have extensively analyzed, interpreted, and discussed the data. Although there were doubts about the concept of 'global academic' we have identified the features of a 'global academic' – a teacher who is considered global due to his/her teaching (and not primarily due to his/her research). There is still a lot to be explored, and, most of all, it is needed to broaden the sample. At this stage, we point to three major recommendations:

**Recommendation 1 for policy makers:** *The length - time frame matters. In order to make more out of the Erasmus+ program it would be useful to encourage and enable academics to*

*take either intensive weeks or to extend their teaching mobility to longer periods in order to fully embrace the opportunities of mobility – to become encultured into different countries and hence to become ‘change agents’ at home. It seems longer periods abroad reduce the possibility of Erasmus tourism because both partners involved are engaged in fruitful collaboration. Having a lot of short time Erasmus mobility is good for institutional records but does not necessarily bring the change to students at home institutions. Students recognize global academics and appreciate their open-minded attitude and curiosity.*

**Recommendation 2 for policy makers:** *it is worth increasing participation in Erasmus+ program, even if there is ‘Erasmus tourism’ only. It needs to be understood as important financial support which enables academics to go abroad. It is worth considering additional resources to enable the most active Erasmus+ teachers to be sent abroad in consecutive years. The continuity is not a substitute for long (4 or 5 or more months) stay abroad but it might bring benefits due to the possibility to be academically encultured in different values and academic traditions.*

**Recommendation 3 for policy makers:** *strengthening the internationalization and encouraging the notion of ‘global’ has a potential. Participants, who recognize themselves also as ‘global’ might use different worlds for teaching, hence physical and virtual worlds. They position themselves between two poles (international and global) with one specific aim – to bring home, to the ‘local’ environment these dimensions in all richness of their variety and interwoven-ness. In order to encourage internationalization in teaching and to develop teachers as ‘global knowledge workers’ the research part needs to be enhanced and globalized. By becoming excellent global researchers teachers might also become excellent global teachers.*

### ***Bibliography***

Andriopoulos, C. 2003. Six Paradoxes in Managing Creativity: An Embracing Act. *Long Range Planning*, 36: 375–388.

Appadurai, A. 1990. Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. *Theory, culture and society*, 7(2): 295-310.

- Appadurai, A. 1996. Sovereignty without territoriality: Notes for a post national geography. *The geography of identity*, (1996): 40-58.
- Appadurai, A. 2006. The right to research. *Globalisation, Societies, Education*, 4(2): 167-177.
- Archer, L. 2008. Younger academics' constructions of 'authenticity', 'success' and professional identity. *Studies in Higher Education*, 33(4): 385–403.
- Aydin, S. 2012. „I am not the same after my ERASMUS”: A qualitative research. *Qualitative Report*, 17(55): 1-23.
- Baron, B. 1993. The politics of academic mobility in Western Europe. *Higher Education Policy*, 6(3): 50-53.
- Byram, M. and Dervin, F. 2008. *Students, staff, and academic mobility in higher education*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Carter, A. 2001. *The political theory of global citizenship*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Charmaz, K. 2000. Constructivist and objectivist grounded theory. *Handbook of qualitative research*, 2, 509-535. Thousand Oaks: sage.
- Clegg, S. 2008. Academic identities under threat. *British Educational Research Journal*, 4(3): 329–345.
- Creswell, J. W. 1998. *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five designs*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y. S. 2000. *Handbook of qualitative research*. Thousand Oaks: sage.
- Enders, J. 1998. Academic staff mobility in the European Community: the ERASMUS experience. *Comparative Education Review*, 42(1): 46-60.
- Easterby-Smith, M., Lowe, A. and Thorpe, R. 2005. *Raziskovanje v managementu*. Koper: Fakulteta za management.
- European Commission. 2015. ([http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/documents/erasmus-plus-programme-guide\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/erasmus-plus/documents/erasmus-plus-programme-guide_en.pdf)).
- Featherstone, M. 1991. *Global culture*. *Global culture*. <http://sociology.sunimc.net/htmledit/uploadfile/system/20110522/20110522013506118.pdf>.
- Featherstone, M. 1995. *Undoing culture: Globalization, postmodernism and identity*. (Vol. 39). London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Flowerdew, J. and Wang, H. S. 2015. Identity in academic discourse. *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics*, 35 (2015): 81–99.
- Gonzales, C. R., Mesanza R. B., and Mariel, P. 2011. *Higher Education*, 62: 413–430.
- Henkel, M. 2005. Academic identity and autonomy in a changing policy environment. *Higher Education*, 49(1/2): 155-176.

Jacobone, V and Moro, G. 2015. Evaluating the impact of the Erasmus programme: Skills and European identity. *Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education*, 40(2), 309-328.

Jenkins, J., Cogo, A., and Dewey, M. 2011. Review of developments in research into English as a lingua franca. *Language Teaching*, 44(3): 281 – 315.

Jons, H. 2011. Transnational academic mobility and gender. *Globalisation, Societies and Education*, 9(2): 183-209.

Kim, T. 2010. Transnational academic mobility, knowledge, and identity capital. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, 31(5): 577-591.

Kim, T. and Locke, W. 2010. *Transnational academic mobility and the academic profession*. Centre for Higher Education Research and Information. London: The Open University.

Klemenčič, M. and Flander, A. 2013. *Evaluation of the impact of the Erasmus Programme on higher education in Slovenia*. Radovljica: Centre of the Republic of Slovenia for Mobility and European Educational and Training Programmes (CMEPIUS).  
[http://www2.cmepius.si/en/files/cmepius/userfiles/publikacije/2014/Eval\\_en\\_Erasmus.pdf](http://www2.cmepius.si/en/files/cmepius/userfiles/publikacije/2014/Eval_en_Erasmus.pdf)

Kukolja Taradi, S., Đogaš, Z., Dabić, M., and Drenjančević Perić, I. 2008. Scaling-up Undergraduate Medical Education: Enabling Virtual Mobility by Online Elective Courses. *Croatian Medical Journal*, 49: 344-351.

Marin, E. 2014. The mobility of Romanian students in Europe. *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 116 (2014), 4884-4888.

Merriam, S. B. 1998. *Qualitative research and case study applications in education*. Revised and expanded from "Case Study Research in Education." San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.

Mesec, B. 2009. *Uvod v kvalitativno raziskovanje v socialnem delu*.  
<https://sites.google.com/site/kvalitativnametodologija/kvalitativna-metodologija/uvod-v-kvalitativno-raziskovanje-v-socialnem-delu-knjiga->

Paradeise, C. and Thoenig, J-C. 2013. Academic Institutions in Search of Quality: Local Orders and Global Standards. *Organization Studies*, 34 (2): 189-218.

Richardson, S. and Radloff, A. 2014. Promoting cross-border education – Virtual mobility. *Research Developments, ACER*. <http://rd.acer.edu.au/article/promoting-cross-border-education-virtual-mobility>.

Rostan, M. 2011. English as “Lingua Franca” and the Internationalization of Academe. *International Higher Education*, 63(Spring): 11-13.

Shaffer, M., and Westman, M. 2015. Expanding the boundaries of research on global employee families. *Journal of Global Mobility*, 3(2): <http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JGM-03-2015-0010>.

Stronach, I., Corbin, B., McNamara, O., Stark, S., and Warne, T. 2002. Towards an uncertain politics of professionalism: teacher and nurse identities in flux. *Journal of Education Policy*, 17(1): 109-138.

Van Brakel et al. 2004. *External evaluation of Erasmus institutional and national impact*. HESP, Price Waterhouse Coopers: European Commission DG EAC.

Vandrick, S. 2011. Students of the new global elite. *TESOL Quarterly*, 45(1): 160-169.

Watson, C. 2011. Accountability, transparency, redundancy: academic identities in an era of 'excellence'. *British Educational Research Journal*, 37(6): 955-971.  
<https://www.nuffic.nl/en/news/blogs/survey-shows-erasmus-programme-benefits-teachers-students-and-universities>, accessed on 29th May, 2015.

Yang, R. and Welch, AR. 2010. Globalisation, transnational academic mobility and the Chinese knowledge diaspora: an Australian case study. *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education*, 31(5): 593-607.

Ylijoki, O-H. and Ursin, J. 2013. The construction of academic identity in the changes of Finnish higher education. *Studies in Higher Education*, 38(8): 1135–1149.

Yurchisin, J., Watchravesringkan, K., and Brown McCabe, D. 2005. An exploration of identity re-creation in the context of internet dating. *Social Behavior and Personality*, 33(8): 735-750.

\*\*\*