What is the European Union?

This question is probably one of the most important and most contradictory of present days. The responding attempts in the past years have strained the creativity of political thinkers and also social scientists. JACQUES DELORS considers the EU as an „indefinable political object” („un objet politique non-identifié”), PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER calls it 'non-state' and 'non-nation’. Though, it is less complicated to identify the EU with the lack of something than positively. The lack of the constitution, the lack of the European *demos*, the lack of the social legitimacy, etc. These are more characteristic and prominent features than the existing common policies or other ‘positive’ attributes, because they symbolize goals that were envisaged long ago and still not accomplished. The indefinable political objects create great expectations therefore they are constant sources of dissatisfaction.

Researchers - according to their theoretical convincement and political sympathy - described it as a pro-federation, concordance system, quasi state, miscellaneous political and state community, commonwealth (Staatenverbund), consortium (consortio), condominium (condominio), regulatory state, market community, managed society, co-federal coalition, mixed common-wealth, etc.
For obvious reasons some authors emphasize the unsettled, mixed, or ambiguous aspect. Laffan emphasizes the ‘betweeness’ particularly that it „hovers between politics asnd diplomacy, between states and markets, and between governments and governance.”

According to Chryssochou, the EU is not only a social scientical puzzle, but also an open outcome political project: „a federal, confederal and cosociational political community”. The modernity of this trans-national formation is also emphasized by a lot of experts. Walker calls it heterarchical political space „that combines unity and multiplicity, transcendens pre-existing borders and projects a multi-dimensional configuration of political authority.”

In a recent paper Claus Offe raises the question: What does Europe implies and essentially what does it mean for us? Offe points out a sensible issue: the lack of the mobilizing sense, „the relieving sense”. Offe argues that Europeans are not permeated by the sense that something new and inevitable should come about: „the core problem of the European integration is less the ethnic, cultural, linguistic or economical diversity, but rather the total absence of allurement of the evolution in which the unity needs to be achieved.”

This impetus is strongly missing from the EU citizens; consequently they do not express enough enthusiasm and political willingness towards the enlargement or the creation of a reunited ‘New Europe’. Europeans en masse do not grasp the importance that with the enlargement they would reach a higher level of freedom. Offe has right in saying that Europe in its actual state hardly bears the „promise of evolving”, the mobilizing power without it would be hard to imagine the successful achievement of the grandiose task of widening and deepening.

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2 Chryssochou, Dimitris N., Towards a Civic Conception of the European Polity, Working Paper 33/01 (University of Exeter), p4

3 Chryssochou quotes, p5

4 Offe, Claus, „Is There, or can There be, a European Society?, to be published in Ines Katenusen and Wolfram Lampig, Demokratien in Europa. Opladen: Leske and Bud-rich, 2002.
The EU and the Eastern enlargement: are we ready?

There are few things that are more debated in the European seminar rooms and in the media than the issue of the Eastern enlargement. The subject of the discourse – as the goal of the enlargement itself – because of its multi-interpretations, is fugitive and hardly approachable. From the side of the candidate countries, it is often interlaced by doubt or obsession, while from the other side some sort of doublespeak, schizophrenia. For example as a sarcastic Eurocrat said: you pretend that you’re prepared enough, we pretend that we would enlarge.”

The question, from a non-technical or non-judicial point of view, is quite open. But how can we terminate the bogus dialogue? If the EU does not succeed at the beginning of the enlargement, there will be less hope afterwards, when the stake is the effective functioning of an institution consisting of 25–30 members.

The notion of ‘New Europe’ is strongly linked to the Eastern enlargement. At the same time the incertitude of the enlargement process predicts the new cleavages of New Europe. The answer is still missing to the question that when Europe as a geographical area will coincide with Europe as a power.

Moreover, it is still unclear how the causality of the nation state and the trans-national institutions will shape in the near future. We do not know what sort of governance we are about to have between the polars of federation and intergovernmental co-operation. In order to (i) reduce the uncertainties, (ii) harmonize and unify the text of the European core documents as well as taking over the (iii) inevitable institutional reforms etc., at the end of February 2002, the European Convention was set up, in which the representatives of the candidate countries has advisory right (but not decisional). However, it does neither certainly lead to the quick abolishment of the doubts and uncertainties in connection with the EU, nor take into account the potential role of the present member states, the new neighbours or the enlarging New Europe.

President of the European Commission ROMANO PRODI since 2001 urged to rethink the EU’s role in the world as well as the question of the new border regions. PRODI, in accordance with several experts, believes that the dynamic Central-European economies will strengthen the EU’s stability and prosperity and that entirely it is going to have a positive effect on the new eastern and southern neighbour and partner relationships. Nevertheless, in order to let the trendy and grandiose slogan of ‘unity in diversity’ succeed and remain reality even after the enlargement, the EU has to overcome the existing practise of short-term national interests and intergovernmentalism that generally last for the next elections, and that integration (deepening or widening) would depend on the horse-trading between the present Member States. (In which process the big countries dominate, the small countries resist and everyone constantly seek for an external and internal ally to vindicate their own interests or simply apply pressure with the use of economical power.) Out of accordance of the adopted declarations of the EU summits, the source of the EU’s legitimate deficit and trifling importance on world politics (comparing to its economical and geographical size) is the practice of the primacy of
the national interests over the community interests. The momentous results of integration such as the single market, the euro and the enlargements are the products of the ‘community method’ that is based on the responsive and ceaselessly redifinable balance between the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council. Albeit, most top EU politicians see guarantee in the communitarian method to achieve the appointed goals and long-term projects, notwithstanding the Project Europe is primarily about uncertainties.

However, it is visible that in Nice the EU committed itself to the Eastern enlargement. On the other hand, it is also true that there has not been any major change in the field of the inevitable institutional reforms. Owing to this fact, even the President of the Commission is unsettled about the omnipotence and effective predominance of the invariable circumstances, and initiated a wide-ranging, open debate with the participation of the candidate countries’ most important old and new actors, regions, local economic and municipality institutions and with the representatives of the civil society.

Commissioner GÜNTHER VERHEUGEN at that time (in 2001) was more optimistic. Ever since he indites more precautiously and mentions repeatedly ‘the closure of the windows of possibilities’ as an alternative in connection with the enlargement. JACQUES DELORS, who is seen as the most influential guru in the EU and who is regarded as the chief architect, offers a much more complex and a less contradictory and technicist future view. DELORS, together with JOSCHKA FISCHER, was the first to address the critical situation with the implementation of the ‘Future of Europe’ debate.

DELORS understands it exactly that without real dialogue and confidence the New Europe cannot be born. The lack of confidence, fear, frustration and schizophrenia do not assist in the integration of those societies that were lived separately for a long time. Hence, he advised the EU at the beginning of the debate to regard the candidate countries as full members of the European family.

DELORS intends to gear the suspended machinery; while he is on to that the Europe of 25’s, 27’s or 32’s in the interim cannot fulfill the European dream. But cunning politicians know that it is impossible to stick to an idea - like an icon on the wall -, because if we look at it too long, we ourselves also become unstirred, and stillness is the death of politics. However, the dream of the perfect Europe would be just like this icon. To avoid it Delors suggests a witty solution: the deepening and widening of the integration at the same time, but with different standards. Concerning the widening process, the European dream of perfectness cannot be accounted straightway, while the deepening can be achieved at first only to a certain extent. This circle is called avant-garde by DELORS reflecting to the EU’s harmonized inner core. As the theory goes, the vanguard is already able to create and maintain the federation, while other member states will remain in the EU.

DELORS’ model draws on the reality in motion. Everything is changing, everyone takes a step further: the candidate countries join the EU, but the Union’s core integrates onwards, in a federalized way. The two-tier system can remain, but in a superior level, between definite

\[5 \text{q.v. Verheugen’s speech 16 July 2002}\]
borders. The model is open and dynamic: the federation is not surrounded by walls; the accession is free for every interested country. Therewith it is original: the semi-periphery accede the core, while in the meantime the core attain a more central position. No doubt, this model is a win-win situation for each actor.

The EU’s most assailable surface is the democratic deficit of its institutions, and this democratic deficit has been increased in the 90’s. The consensus which characterized the integration-orientated elite ran out after the war. This consensus bore a major part in the evolvement of the effective and regular co-operation between the Western-European countries and societies. This consensus however does not stand after the post-Cold War period in the time of the Eastern enlargement.

Against all of its efforts, the European Parliament cannot cope with this democratic deficit. Principally, the reason was that there is still a full-blown European society, a European demos that could behave like a sovereign or rather it would possibly assign democratic deficit to its representatives and institutions.6

There has been a lot steamed off with the boat of the integration in the 90’s. The Treaty of Maastricht and Amsterdam missed the governing principal and the central idea. Eastern enlargement still has a chance to become such a central idea and it could provide a new dynamism and legitimacy to the European institutions, but with the approaching of the date of the enlargement and with deferring the implementation of the institutional reforms this possibility is to be bunkered to a narrow lane.

The first decade following the collapse of the Berlin Wall did not proved to be adequate to reconcile the different perceptions in connection with the dividedness of Europe. From a Central-European (Czech, Polish, and Hungarian) point of view, 1989 betokens a break from a one-hundred-years-long historical set of tragedies, and owing to this, the societies of the eastern part of Central-Europe can return to their prior development path which coincides with the Western societies. Eastern enlargement is the pledge of this close- or back up.

The attitude towards enlargement is characterized by a sort of duplicity that breaks out between the official declarations and the practical life. Accordingly, the countries of the EEC, the EC and the EU, always supported the unification of Europe. The official declarations, documents of the ’60s, ’70s, ’80s, regard the European community and its institutions as the representation of the democratic nations of Europe. Intrinsically, owing to the long continuance of the east-west conflict and the increasing difference in the advancement level of the European Communities - despite the pan-European imaginations of the founding fathers – the EC became the community of the Western-European nations. The geo-politic border between East and West came to an important constituting factor of the present EU. In the meanwhile, the original goals have also fainted and the mutual economical advantages deriving from the co-operation extinguished the vision of a politically unified EU. Properly 1989 put out the idyllic moment of this economical prosperity. A new rhetoric was born

According to public opinion polls in 1996 61% of the EU citizens thought that enlargement is appropriate; in 1999 it was 44%; the EU’s Eastern border countries Austria: 30%, Germany: 34%, Italy: 48%. q.v. Table No. 1.
which centered at the closure of the age of the East-West conflict and dividedness; but even these things altogether did not lead to institutional consequences. While some top European politicians were talking about the unifying Europe and the East-European states begin to look at the EU as their utmost ideal aim, the Union itself de facto unalterably remained the embodiment of the community of the Western-European nations. In the beginning, the big historical change did not incline the EU to redefine itself; it has settled with the offer of the membership to the new democracies, and liberalized its trade. All these things – the differences between the declared aims and the reality, the roughly discrepant estimation of the aims of the European integration – led to increasing tensions in the final period preceding the first official date for the Eastern enlargement and to the emerging of the contradictions, while at the same time, from the side of the politicians and also from the field of the social sciences to a deeper need of understanding the complexities, the need for a more comprehensive analysis and a more explicit dialogue.

The next chapter attempts to find an answer to what results were brought by the intense dialogue-experiment after the Nice Treaty in the sphere of the foreign policy and at the field of self-affirmation as well as to what extent the new analyses of the social sciences helped to explore the previously analyzed complex processes and its positive possibilities.
Table 1 - National versus European identity

![Bar chart showing national vs. European identity](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2003/EU28_Comparative_highlights.pdf)


Table 2 - European versus national identity

![Map showing European vs. national identity](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/cceb/2003/EU28_Comparative_highlights.pdf)

Democratic deficit

The EU’s soft spot is that its institutions are not thoroughly transparent and lack the democratic social legitimacy. The democratic deficit during the 90’s was constantly growing. The consensus that was symptomatic of the integration-orientated elite has been drained after the war. This consensus played a noteworthy role in the regular and effective co-operation of the Western-European governments and societies. Nevertheless, this is no longer cogent in the process of the post Cold War Eastern enlargement.

Commenting the situation after Nice, Director of the European Policy Centre JOHN PALMER mentions a growing turmoil and doubt in connection with „the fundamental aims of the European integration“.7 PALMER comes to the conclusion that the Future of Europe debate - owing to the uncertainties around the fundamental aims - cannot mobilize a critical social mass. This standpoint is also underpinned by the public opinion polls (Eurobarometer), the fairly social echoless of the Convention and the aloof tendencies of the Western-European political arena. One should not be surprised. After the failure of Maastricht that tried to create the polity from above, the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties attempted to implement long-term reforms in order to reach a „a civic engagement to the broader political community or the creation of a normative order that is maintained by the independent source of the input-orientated legitimacy“8. These forced attempts from above to create a common identity or the public apprehension of public good have been regularly flopped. As CHRYSSOCHOOU neatly indites „Amsterdam failed to incorporate any substantive civic rights in a formal ‘constitutional’ document addressed to the citizen directly, thus reflecting the insistence of sovereignty conscious states on codifying existing trends in both jurisprudence and legislation“9. In other words: the unkind national interests shadow the broader vision. Amsterdam and Nice - adjusted into the European Communities and to the Union’s development history -were under the necessity of creating and/or addressing the political community – in spite of it, policies were produced and developed.

CHRYSSOCHOOU’s critique of European elites – in accordance with the tenet of numerous European social scientists –, that primarily enhances the self-echo, sharply conceives the gist of the problem: „The significance of tying the self-image of the elites to the dialectic between citizenship and demos-formation is that no common civic identity may come into being unless

8 Ib.
all major actors engaged in European governance see themselves as part of a polity-building exercise that has to evolve from lower level ‘upwards’. Likewise, a transnational political space must be built up in the everyday networks of civic engagement, instead of being constructed from the top down”.

CHRYSOCHOOU’s chart models the present state of the European polity and the civil society.

**TYPOLOGY OF CIVIL GOVERNANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic identity</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
<th>Civil Space</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nascent (functionalist demos)</td>
<td>Public Sphere (deliberative demos)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed (interactive demos)</td>
<td>Civic Community (organic demos)</td>
<td></td>
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There is an incontestable sign of trans-national civil society at the level of the EU; therefore the EU occupies the upper left box. Although, it is restricted in this position because the original grass-root civil identity did not get to the point of institutionalizing the European-level civic competence. CHRYSOCHOOU convincingly argues for that the civic order institutionalized at a European level, would not have come to existence without the normative frames of the transnational civil society or civiness.

The Big Project of the Europeanization of the civil society exerts a significant influence on the future reforms that can create from “the present fragmented demos” a civil identity. In the light of those agreements that are based on the ‘costs-and-benefits philosophy’ and apparently inadequate to generate civil engagement, it is difficult to say how these fundamental reforms would exist.

LAURENCE WHITEHEAD adjoins the complex and uncertain question of Eastern enlargement with the notion of democracy promotion. As so frequently, it is true in the case of the Eastern enlargement that the reality foregoes the theory. WHITEHEAD has right in saying that the Helsinki Summit in 1999, which decided about the beginning of the negotiations with 10 Central-East European countries, both in terms of the EU enlargement and the Central-East European democratization process, denotes an intense risk. Despite the conceptional wit of

9 Chryssochoou, Dimitros. Ib.
10 Chryssochoou p174
11 Chryssochoou p18
the integration and democracy-theories, Whitehead indicates that „democracy promotion was an indispensable component of the EU’s enlargement strategy, but the academic literature on democratization pay scant attention to this aspect of the process, either.”

Can we consider Eastern enlargement from a Brussels point of view as an honest effort to strengthen and broaden democracy or it is dominated by much more profane goals, namely economical interests and security considerations? The answer does not turn up easily and can also be multiple. The sure thing is that the Eastern enlargement of the European Union is a complex and uncertain process that is probably followed by unintended circumstances and which – according to Whitehead’s prognosis – costs the EU dearly.

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13 Whitehead p17
The relations between territoriality of the nation states and the lack of democracy

One of the efficient causes behind the crisis of democracy in the present globalized, post-national, post-Yalta Europe is that it is no longer possible to identify the absoluteness of the analysis; in other words, the physically or geographically identified 'demos' or voter community. In this strange interim period analysers and theoreticians after they ascertain that the nation state as the frame of the society and democracy has lost its exclusive status – and because of that the nation state cannot be considered as the absolute unit of analysis, – they often relapse to the nation state paradigm. The most possible reason for doing so is that they cannot find another ‘safe’ unit and they are unsettled by the whirling complexity of this trans- and subnational world. Even the trans-national statistical data is based on national researches and mirrors back the cognitive map of the evanescent period of the modern European nation state.

Consequently, there is no consensus between the researchers concerning the trans- and supranational institutions of the European Union. Lots of are on the opinion that we should consider these institutions – and also the whole process of the European integration – as some sort of aggregation and constantly redefined balance of interests. They can cite benefic and grounded arguments, but they also hide parts from the story.

It is valid that one can still discover the signs of wishful thinking in connection with the formation of the pan-European demos and the analysis about the strengthening of the European identity. We can also agree with the standpoint that in order to represent a demos, first it is has to be regarded.14 However, it is rather questionable whether the task of the representation should be managed by only the nation state. The European nation state is the crystallization and a synthesis of the historical processes whose constitutionalizing elements and institutionalizing preludes dates back to the Ancient Greek and Roman Empires as well as to one of the first and major grass-root social movement i.e. the early Christianity. The nation state as we know it and in this form – often believed as its eternal aptitude – is a construction, a model that turned into universal, because robustious material, controlling and social interests linked to it. Its most west-endish and strongest protagonist often created it with the use of force or direct pressure. The universal model of the European nation state with the absolute characteristic of sovereignty can show up a 200–250 years long life-history, in which it became a dominant paradigm that also determines the thinking and the action. During this period, it has repeatedly survived its own inner inconsistencies and those more pestilent wars that were mainly fought under the aegis of nationalism that created this ideology. The secret of surviving was that it was able to serve faithfully the interests of the most important actors in the age of the industrial capitalism, providing the most successful frame and structures for the production, allocation and efficiency-maximizing. All this could not have happened without the strong scale of values, religious system and collective identification. Some parts

14 Whitehead p31
of these – as it was argued beforehand – are organic product of the European history - but not the whole. As the developments of the post-Yalta period shows, the formations that we call the nation state, without the proper external and internal convergent power, can easily or with bloody cruelty draw apart or fragment, as evidence for that the identities, values and traditions that seems to be homogenic and unified are not operational in their ideal, idealized or ideologized forms. It is not merely about that those multinational, multiethnic countries like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia suddenly and dramatically split up in that historical vacuum that originated from the collapse of the bipolar world order, but those ‘nation states’ that were part of the fortunate Europe, enjoying the benedictions of the integration for decades like Great-Britain, Spain, Italy and Belgium, also indicates the partitive signs of disintegration, internal break or at least that these states experience the process of fundamental restructuring that is moved by resurgent and recruited, oftentimes formidable powerful regional national or ethnic dissenting movements and passions. The world’s determined partedness and structure that was drawn by those nation states that were precisely demarcated from each other – at least in the case of Europe – was fading during the decades and this process by this time has reached the point of no return.
Supranational democracy and Eastern enlargement

One of the major misconceptions of the prayers of the nation state paradigm is the clinging to the dichotomy of nation state versus EU. According to WHITEHEAD, “whereas throughout Europe the national state has been capable of drawing on deep rederves of shared beliefs and traditions, the hypothesized deoms of a united Europe would only be united around a very thin set of values…” Nations, ethnic groups, religious communities, socially excluded, marginalized groups, societies belonging to historical regions etc. have common belief. Nevertheless, the geographical borders of these groups or entities rarely coincide with the existing borders of the nation states, more occasionally they intersect them or independently, these borders exist in internal enclosures or transnationally. The adherence to a nation state as the authentic frame of the democracy and the civil society would be the same as trying to stop the historical change and transformation. It would betoken that we ignore sturdy (and real) social, cultural, political and economical processes with considerable flexibility and would preserve something that in the meantime went/goes through a metamorphosis. This metamorphosis does not connote that nation state, as such, would disappear or loose all of its function and meaning. The nation state still exists and will exist also in the future. As an authority it will be able to implement and adapt policies, to reduce or increase taxes or payments, strengthen or undermine the democracy or just counterwork European integration. Just as in the past it is going to do good or bad in the future, too. However, one thing is inevitable: in the turbulent decades of the 20th century, especially since the break-out of the WWII, it is steadily loosing from its absolute sovereignty. With the loosing of absolute sovereignty, in fact with the partial relinquishment, it has also lost its ability to convincingly and legitimately reproduce the belief in absoluteness, omnipotence and uniformity. The process of European integration - intertwined together with the globalization and the transformation processes of the previous Eastern bloc – raised a lot of political passion, value and interest that had to rest until ’89 and beside them some new strong ones were created. From these, the most terrific and powerful is nationalism. Even so the sub- and trans-national movements, networks, regions and other clustering in the post-national period, call for a new conception or re-conceptualization of democracy and the civil society. With the commitment to the Eastern enlargement and the creation of the supranational structures and institutions, the EU gave a major boost to the progression at the field of the decision-making. Without the candidate countries, the EU could not release the tension that accrues from the synchronism of the democratic deficit, the legitimacy-absence of the supranational institutions, the democracy-promotion and the democracy-requirements of the candidate countries. However, a supranational organization with the lack of democracy cannot make democracy-claims and practice effectively the democracy-promotion on its newcomers and new neighbours for a long time. Therewith of course, that the contradictions emerge and tensions obtain structure, it still hangs in the air whether the EU will be able to forestall the forces of disintegration, the

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15 Ib. p31
growing uncertainty and ambiguity that helped the EU to start up in the process of the integration. The European Union truly is an open-ended political, social and cultural process.
The democratisation of the European Union: Is it possible?

In his latest and provocative book titled ‘How to Democratize the EU and Why Bother’ PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER not only addresses the crisis of the nation-state-democracies, but also the growing discontentment in the heart of the EU citizens that was triggered by the lack of the EU-wide democracy. ‘The individuals and groups within the EU realized the extent to which the EU-regulations and directives influence their everyday life and they regard decisions that are taken as something distant, secret, uninterpretable and unaccountable… Europeans, accurately or not, feel exposed themselves to the European integration process that they do not understand and unable to control - however they would enjoy its fiscal benefits.’

This state, when the affirmative consensus is absent, in the phrase of SCHMITTER could be termed as a legitimate crisis. We can agree with SCHMITTER that these tendencies can lead to a characteristic, not by a long chalk secure “double binding” Inasmuch this double binding cannot ease off the frustration and xenophobia following the enlargement so it can step up further and reach that critical mass that could threaten even the existence of the EU. Schmitter like lot of experts urges reforms. Eastern enlargement not only offers a unique opportunity, but put considerable pressure on the implementation of the new reforms. The question is not only who decides, but also who and how will bring about the decisions. Who is going to take the first, radical and manful steps? Or who are exerting an influence from beneath on behalf of the interests of the public? Who are the new players of the European game and where can we find them? The signs that can be read out from the latest Commission reports and the news coming out from the Brussels-maze often contradict the official declarations. On the one hand, the EU announces repeatedly that it is ready to accept all of the candidate countries if they are prepared enough. On the other hand, more and more Commission reports see the light of day that numerically set forth the perils threatening the social-economical cohesion as well as the opening of the scissors of income, development etc. on account of the enlargement. The liquidation or radical reducing of these structural developmental differences is impossible without conscious development policies and remarkable financial support. Nevertheless, currently there is not enough political will and financial commitment to bring the infrastructure and institutional system of the lagging regions of East- and Central Europe close to the EU-standard. According to all indications, the limits of the European solidarity in financial terms last until the banks of Elba River.

Adjourning enlargement or the ‘omission’ of Poland, which is by its size the biggest liability, is impossible owing to political reasons, therefore the most feasible scenario is the scenario of the ‘two Europe’ inside the enlarged EU. In this case, the EU after the sixth enlargement will qualitatively differ from its state before the enlargement. There are several

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17 Ib.
18 q.v. the reports of Anna Diamantopolosz!
signs that politicians working on the enlargement process are preparing to this qualitative change consciously. The inner contradictions and uncertainties in connection with the enlargement seem to vindicate the statement that the EU has not got an explicit and comprehensive enlargement strategy\(^\text{19}\). One of the reasons behind is that in terms of correspondence and condition system, the EU has not got any deliberate, conscious future view based on consensus. For the time being, it is unclear how it is possible to syncretize the preparing for the future with the directly predominating imperative of the economical profitability. So far it was successful only in words and in the declarations. The EU after the enlargement with a population of 500 million, yet undetermined, but still, the internal social conditions of the creation of a new political entity - that aspires for an increased role in the world politics - and the necessary elements like the EU-wide solidarity and political will do not emerge in the interim with a convincing power. The inner contradictions of the present that determines the future – short-term against the long-term strategic goals; the so-called 'European values’ (solidarity, tolerance, diversity etc.), against the mean economy-economical view; the technicist-procedural continuance of the integration against the radical institutional reforms; the over-ruling against the subsidiarity etc. – has just come to the surface in a tense form. The fronting and the efforts to declassify these facts cannot be put over for a long a time. The process of Eastern enlargement holds also in itself the constraint of the fronting: the long-term goals – peace, stability, secure and enlarged single market, the enlarged undertaking of the global role – cannot obtainable without a qualitatively miscellaneous long-run sacrifice-taking. To push through these in a wider public, it is a must to realize that Eastern enlargement quantitatively differs from every preceding enlargement. The Jean-Monnet method that worked outstandingly for decades cannot function in this case. As for the Eastern enlargement, the integrative institutions will not function more effectively based on the spill-over effect on the functionally associative fields. The challenge is now much higher; the real differences are larger by order of magnitude, the social-psychological roots of the historical East-West dividedness are much deep-seated.

With the advancement of the accession negotiations the support towards the Eastern enlargement is decreasing in the candidate countries. 74% of the Greeks, 69% of the Swedish and the Danes, 60% of the Italians, Spanish, Irish and Dutch support the enlargement, but it is vigorously weakened by the social commitment of the three big (Germany 47%, Great Britain 41%, France 39%) towards the sixth enlargement (altogether 42%).\(^\text{20}\) Albeit, it is true that the data of the public opinion polls shall be regarded carefully and the sources of the communication strategy and the EU citizen’s convincement has not run out yet, it is also indisputable that the European Union’s long-term strategic goals represented in the enlargement are not fully accepted by the societies of the present Member States. Also the accretive signs of withdrawal, xenophobia, populism witnessed by the electoral results of late years (in case of Austria, Ireland, France and the Netherlands) indicate an enlargement panic rather than an enthusiasm towards the New Europe consisting of 27–30–32 members.


\(^{20}\) q.v. *Eurobarometer 56*. 2001!
At the dawn of the new millennium an old and a new spirit is walking around in Europe: the spirit of democracy and Eastern enlargement. They create whirling and threaten the upset order with chaos. Growing crowd follow them on their path, but fear and somewhere signs of hysteria can be seen. Vis-à-vis the nation states and the supranational institutions of the EU have not proved to be so effective. In order to keep down them the birth and liven up of the European civil society seems inevitable. The European civil society – whose spirituality is fundamentally present since the beginning of the integration – can only be effective in this new situation if it succeeds to manifest in the forms of movements, institutions, organizations, initiatives, allies and networks that are willing to co-operate with each other, and when the legal and institutional frames are assured in the long term.

At the beginning of the 21st century the European democracies have to tackle an unprecedented circumstance namely the deep alteration of the role and political significance of the borders. While the borders of the classic modern nation state virtualizes, it is still unclear, where the new eastern borders of the European Union will be located in the near future and how they will function – as soft or hard borders, friendly or borders that create political tension. This uncertainty measurably redounds to the increase of the fears and politically materialized distress connected to the process of integration. Neither the uncertainty, nor the fears can be dissolved without a much wider co-operation between the candidate countries and the social and institutional actors of the Member States that can be achieved and kept persistent and effective if the common goals and tasks are sharply determined at the level of the social and institutional actors.

All this simultaneously suppose the widening and deepening of democratization, a creation of a new European social consensus consisting of the Member States. This radical democratization of the institutional operation, decision-preparation and decision-making is impossible without the strengthening, institutionalizing and the tangible and effective public role-undertaking of the European civil society. Several conditions are partly or mostly given – mental, technicist, infrastructural, professional etc. – for the fast invigorating and the mighty role-undertaking in such a trans-national society. However, the question whether there will be enough solidarity, courage, risk-taking and a long-term vision in the European societies based on a widespread consensus to take the plunge and stride along from their ‘national’ nests that were believed secure and well-guarded and undertakes the risk that they create bigger at a safer European supermarket, it is cannot be answered today with a full accordance.
The new European social space

The European social space is populated by the old and new institutions, structures and actors. The regions, especially the cross-border regions, outstand from these.

Although it is not incidental that they obtain more attention and turn out to be in the center of international researches, the state still remained the most important unit of the European space. At the same time, it is also proper that we can witness in the relation of these two notable actors the changing of a centurial trend: while from the Middle Ages until nowadays the emerging nation states represented the challenge for the historical regions, today just reversibly, the challenges betide the nation states from the side of the regions. The connective networks inside and between the regions acquire a new importance in the post-national constellation, as well as the functional civil social chains crossing natural and administrative borders. In this new age of the birth of the new institutions and actors and the changing of the old ones, the notion also experiences a shift in the connotation. Thus for instance, the residual sovereignty of the states growingly serves the strengthening of its negotiation positions rather than expressing the supremacy over the territory which is inside the state borders. The new proceeding forms and networks of the civil society offer alternative loyalties and identities for the participants, and with this, the emphasis moves from the nationality to the citizenship. We could witness in these new co-operating frames – with a special emphasis to the cross-border co-operations – how the principle of the „obligations without borders” proceeds. The static definition of notions increasingly passes over its place to the dynamic definitions, where the process, the movement and the change are determinant. As the inhabitants of the nation state growingly become active citizens participating in different networks, in the case of the state the emphasis is also growingly on the intercessor, negotiator role. Latest literature appeared to mark this phenomenon with the notion of the „virtual state”\textsuperscript{21}; the state as the mediator between the economical and the political sphere as well as the national and international activities. A similar denotation is the notion of the regulatory state; here the emphasis is on that the state does not latch on to the redistribution or the stabilization and does not take on the symbolic functions of the governments; the state regulating the other states bank upon the existing administrative functions in its policies. So the regulatory state has not got a clear tracing pyramid-structure that would identify the progression of the control of power. Symptomatic also of it that it does not regulate the relation of the citizens and the state with a constitution and the level of the budget is again preciously low.\textsuperscript{22} Consequently the regulatory state is neither a traditional federal state, nor a Westphalian modern European nation state; it is rather a sort of political construction that based on the division of labor between the Member States.

The notion of the network derives from the source-field of the natural sciences and was captivated by the social sciences only in the past years. The network conception or network-creation resulted in the headway of the „open system perspective” over the traditional


\textsuperscript{22} Spends 1,3% of the overall GDP of the EU’s Member States.
handling of the political institutions. The analyzing unit developed into an interaction between the different organizations and the attention channeled from the formal structures to the informal organization. At the same time, this shift in the approach also indicates the metamorphosis of the political structures. The political and social institutions and organizations are more inherently linked to the interdependency-chain of the European and global spaces. The substratum of the network principle is horizontality and juxtaposition. The policy networks developing in the framing of the European Union are „based on the coexistence of autonomy and mutual dependency.“ These are the alternatives of the previous hierarchies. The appearance and headway of the network co-operation is not an adventitious or unforeseen event in the history of the European construction.

The architects of the European integration were working on since the beginning of the integration to establish economical and political spaces where the emphasis is on the cross border exchange processes. This is the root of the new governing form that is based on permanent interaction. According to JACHTENFUCHS and KOHLER-KOCH: „the actors of the European networks not only object of the governance, but partners in the solution of the common problems.“ So it is not accidental that some often corresponds to the EU as a greenhouse in which different kinds of networks are breeding.

Against the austere structures and formal controlling, networks make the wide and flexible participation possible; open the door to the establishment of agglomeration points, assemblies, associations, novel federations, worth-while feedback. All this ease the adaptation of the decisions and reduce the inconsistency, the possibility of the ‘breaking’ of the processes, and create the frames of a more anti-friction bargaining procedure.

By this token, the regional, national and supranational levels are linked by the transnational networks. In the phrase of the Former Foreign Minister of Belgium WILLY CLAES a wrought system of networks would be able to harmonize the differences and common interests.

Does all this bring us closer to our original question namely what is the European Union in effect? The inventory positive definitions and comparisons – „new-mediaeval“, „post-modern, soft Empire“, „post-national constellation“, „post-sovereignty“, etc. – all refers to that the emerging political structure cannot be measured up to the traditional formula of the territorial sovereignty, but rather the consists of the elements of the’ diffuse and the public influences’ overlapping each other. Both the federal and the regulatory state is discoverable in the EU (and more herein not analyzed types), but we cannot identify any of them to the full. It seems there is an increasing consensus in the circles of EU experts that the parturient political order can be regarded neither as an inter-governamental (Staatenbund), nor as a supra-national state

23 Q.v. Jönsson–Tägil–Törnqvist, p104
25 q.v. Peterson.
26 Jönsson quotes et al. p130
27 Jönsson p126
(Bundesstaat\textsuperscript{28}). Nevertheless, it does not betoken at the same that the EU could be definable as equilibrium between the two or as some sort of mean proportional. Its liquid and constantly changing structure is growingly determined from one side by the supranational regulations, while from the other side by the formation of the trans-national society as well as the institutional expansion. Therefore inter-governmentalism is bordered from two sides so its chances are restrained and decreasing.

Consequently the European Union can be considered as a process rather than a structure. It is permanent and dynamic search for the balance between territoriality and non-territoriality, in which the non-territorial element is the dynamizing circumstance. Subsequently the EU phenomenon or process cannot be squeezed into conventional categories.

The shift from the dominance to the negotiation does not only betoken that the states handle their conflicts and build their relations by negotiating with each other, but also that the states take up negotiations with a set of old and new countries: from the trans-national corporations and trans-national movements to the communities of the NGOs.

According to this, the EU ignores to thicken its Member States into a hierarchic order so it could be interpreted as „the integrated system of multi-level bargaining” (Edg. Grande), „the institution of the permanent negotiations” (Leendert Jan Bal), „negotiating marathon” (B. Kochler-Koch), or „negotiating order” (Smith). This negotiating order come about through the interactions between the ’negotiating state’ and the new actors.

The European Union, as a controlled arena of conflicts and co-operation of the national and non-national, the profit-orientated and the civil initiatives and institutions, is a unique phenomenon working as an interactive space. The EU is a creative chaos that projects itself as a negotiating order in which the non-traditional model of political community can also be found. In the same way as we interpret the EU as network governance or the network of networks, it can be defined as a collected sovereignty or collective sovereign. The parturient new, collective sovereignty is still open to the definitions. This circle however is shrinking. The open-ended process slowly comes at the end of its own boundaries; this moment probably will take place when the political object gains its definition.

We encounter with a new, unprecedented phenomenon; the non-traditional model of the political community is about to born. However hard is to define it, we cannot question that a New Sovereign is about born.

It has not got a name yet and the contours of its face and body can only be identified by a finger's breadth. Lots of are keen on to find a new category that would fit perfectly. Half-sovereign or collective „gatherer”-sovereign, post-modern soft empire or supranational constitutional network-governance, all these are possible definitions. In respect that it is unprecedented, it can also be possible that the new-born will have several names at the same time.

\textsuperscript{28} q.v. Philippe C. Schmitter, Imagining the Future…
The question what sort of attribute would the EU - this more and more identifiable political object for the long term - accept, is the function of the concurring of several factors. It depends on the work of the Convention as well as the success of the Eastern enlargement or the importance of its accepted and conquered role in the new world constellation, and last but not least, the extent of the activity of the „Great Signifier”. For the time being, it is object of guessing, debate and political clashes whether the more characteristic, sharper contoured, constitutional character, or the flimsy, federal body, the confederal conception of the association of the nation states will prevail. The debate now arises in the social science workshops, the political arena, the Convention and also in the civil society. No doubt, that the responsibility of the clerisy - that remarkably influences the public opinion - and the NGOs in this phase has been remarkably extended. Nevertheless, all of the political willingness, the economy calculations and civil diligences only could set off in the context and clench of the robust processes of the wild globalization, the European integration and Europeanization that became self-exciter as well as the transformation towards the democratic market economies. Hence, it is worth keeping in mind that one of the compulsion-tracks of the projects of the European construction, i.e. constructivism also has its own path with no alternatives.
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23


